I must begin by confessing that my mind is biassed. Even if I did not see how to account for malevolence, I do not think I could conclude that it was original. The double presumption that weighs against it would force me, I think, to suspend my judgment.

The first ground for suspense would be my inability to give this passion its place in human nature. It entirely declines to pair off with benevolence founded on sympathy. For we not only see that, as a matter of fact, the perceived pain of others is painful to ourselves, but we also see how and why this must be so. The fact follows from the first principles of psychical life. But pure malevolence would seem a thing quite by itself, a foreign germ dropped from outside into our system.

This consideration makes me biassed, and there follows another which carries great weight. If a human passion claims to be original, it should show itself present in the lower animals. But what animal is cruel for the sake of cruelty? The accusation has indeed been launched against the cat (Romanes, p. 413), but in this one point that guilty animal is innocent. There is not the smallest reason to credit it with a knowledge of the pain it inflicts, or with the idea of prolonging life to lengthen torture.1 Add the desire for play to the appetite for slaughter, and all is explained. And if further the monkey is included in the charge, then I should see in the appearance of the passion so very late in development a proof that it was developed and hence presumably explicable.

But I do not feel obliged to fall back on these presumptions, since the passion can actually be analysed and explained.

I do not wish to reproduce in detail the excellent remarks made by Mr. Stephen and Professor Grote, but will briefly set down the chief materials that are offered for an explanation, and will then enlarge on one important point. We have in the first place the feeling of wrong, the identification of my

1 A case was reported to me of a cat, otherwise effective, who was useless as a mouser because his habit was, having played with his mouse until weary of the pastime, then to let it go unhurt. Was this animal malevolent? And, if not, why any other?

happiness, and the conAnd under this head we We may add that if any

comparative failure with another's sequent wish to remove the latter. may set down envy and jealousy. thing is a source of pain to me, that may generate hate and the desire to remove this source of pain by retaliation. Then we have the latent self-gratulation on our own security, which tends to make pleasant the view of others' disaster. And again we have another origin of pleasure in the excitement of the senses and the imagination which comes from violent sensations. Mr. Stephen has done well to lay great stress on this fact (cf. Horwicz, Psychologische Analysen, ii., ii., s. 322), and I do not see how it can be called in question, or itself in every case reduced to malevolence. When the vessel is among the breakers and the life-boat in the surf, who but hastens to look on, and yet who wishes ill? What malevolence underlies our fearful delight in the supernatural, our passion for adventure, and our love for the perilous contrasts of gambling? At least among human beings we find a genuine hunger for change and emotion"; and, whatever in the end we may think is the truth of it, it seems as if, within limits, all heightening and expansion of our 'self-feeling' were pleasant. Nor is it any answer to reply that pain becomes predominant when those limits are overpassed, or when other conditions are added.

These known affections of our nature do clearly all contribute to make malevolence, and yet there is another point which I think is essential.

We shall all admit that there exists a love of power. And by this I do not mean the mere pleasure which comes from energy put forth, but the delight in self-assertion and the wish to increase the area of our control. I am not offering these phrases as a theory of the passion, but as a description which may point to an evident fact. There is a desire in human nature to widen the sphere which it can regard as being the expression of its will. And this desire has no boundary. boundary. Now the mere existence of another man's will, which is independent of ours, is a limit to this desire, and in consequence we aim at the removal or diminution of that check to our sovereignty.

How remove the limit? The limit is removed by the subjugation of the other. We must make him a material for our self-assertion, in other words, we must work our will on him. But how be sure that we do this? His submission is not enough, for his submission may be willing, and he still keep in reserve an independent choice. We work our will on him when he struggles ineffectually, and when we force him to that which he most dislikes. In this way we efface him as a boundary to our power. But why not kill him? Well, perhaps he is useful; and, apart from that, killing must make an end, and the end of him is the end of our mastery over him. We have our will of him most by keeping him in the state which he most longs to escape from. In this devilish extreme of wanton cruelty we have, I presume, got as far as malevolence. We do desire the other's pain, because only by his pain can we make an utter sport and plaything of his will. But even here we do not desire his pain simply and as such. Even here there is a positive ground for our cruelty, and our malevolence is never and could never be pure.

This explanation may be confirmed by the reflexion that torture inflicted by a third person, who is not our agent, lacks a great element of pleasantness. No doubt we here may sympathise with the torturer, and so get pleasure; but a tyrant, speaking generally, would care little to see the cruelties of a neighbouring tyrant. The malevolence which would take delight in the quiet and passive starvation of the unoffending, would be an abnormal product.

Still even that disease could be readily explained. The misanthrope, to whom the sight of abject misery would bring joy, would be a man who for some reason hated his race, was aggrieved by it, and in its misfortunes felt his own depression repaired and his self-assertion restored. Where I hate I desire the diminution of that welfare which pains me by expressing the source of my pain. And my hatred may lead me to the cruelty of desiring the constant recovery from a constant smart, and the luxurious alternations of a morbid appetite. But even here we have not got pure malevolence.

With the above principles in our hands we might confidently

approach the pathology of the subject, but I prefer to call attention to an additional source of pleasure in evil. We are said to be gratified by our friend's misfortunes. That is true, but we should make an important distinction. The lingering disease of a friend would not be pleasant unless it called forth self-felicitation. What is pleasant is a sudden and exciting mischance. The excitement falls under a principle we have described, but the suddenness appeals to our sense of the ludicrous. Now even if we follow Professor Bain (as for myself I cannot) in reducing the comic everywhere to a perceived degradation, that is very far from establishing malevolence. For the degradation must imply a degrading power, and our pleasure would lie in thus feeling our own self-assertion increased. I think that Professor Bain would find it difficult to verify the presence of malevolence in every species of the ludicrous. When we laugh, for instance, at an absurd child's doll, do we do so from a latent odium generis humani? And, if malevolence is to be imported into the sense of the comic, are we to find it at the root of our joy in the sublime and of our pleasure in resignation?

I would add one word more on the delights of angry temper. Where this is not retaliatory and therefore remedial of our own wrong, it can easily be explained by our love of excitement, and explained again by our desire for making ourselves felt, and for swelling at the expense of those around us. In something of the same way we all cling to our wrongs, for they keep us for ever in mind of our rights, and we hug our hatreds since without them how little would be left to some of us. positive self-realisation, whether normal or morbid, is still the end of our being. The devil that but denies, the malevolence that is pure, is no mere ethical monster. It is monstrous too psychologically, and, despite Professor Bain's warnings, we must take heart to say that it is not possible.

Our

The reader, I think, can now judge for himself how I should deal with the remainder of the instances adduced; and, while admitting the difficulty of some special applications, I venture to think that the origin of malevolence can be satisfactorily explained.

IS THERE SUCH A THING AS PURE MALEVOLENCE?

(Mind, viii., 563.)

Reply to Mr. Bradley's Objections.

The reply cites in .methodical order Mr. Bradley's points in the previous article. He has not disposed of the arguments seriatim, which makes it more difficult to follow him closely.

Most unequivocal instances of pure malevolence are-the delights of teasing, the conduct of boys at school to the new entrants, reproduced in the entry of apprentices into trades, and in the army; angry passion; the delight in seeing punishments, comedy and the ludicrous; the record of sensational crimes, newspaper prominence to disasters and horrors generally; the gratifications of sport. The early struggle for existence referred to, and its supposed resulting Associations. Our anger when pained and wronged, very natural, but not a sufficient explanation of our malevolent dispositions. The anger ought to correspond to the pain, but seldom does. Element of Fear. Explanation of Anger seems to be the genuine pleasure of malevolence drawn upon as a solatium for the original injury. Revengeful passion not the best case for malevolence. Better instances in the fascination of seeing punishments inflicted where we have no personal injury in the matter. The love of teasing, practical joking, giving trouble and annoyance, is independent of retaliation. Workings of Power complicated and need to be analyzed. The explanation by love of power fallacious: instead of gaining power and importance, retaliation lessens power. Revenge, though sweet, is often a losing game, as remarked by Milton. Power is better gained by doing good, if the law of beneficent action is admitted. Self-assertion fully reviewed. The pleasure of giving pain at its maximum when self is the agent, but there is also pleasure when others are the agents. Remarkable instance quoted by Bailey still more remarkable case recorded by a traveller in Siberia. Love of Excitement a defective explanation. Comedy and the ludicrous inexplicable without a disinterested pleasure of malevolence. Full discussion of this topic, by reference to ancient critics: Quintilian adduced. Love of sport examined.

Extraordinary interest in the sentiment of revenge, proof of a powerful passion--just as the love passion attests its strength by responding to the most far-fetched examples. Hatred as further supporting the argument.

I BEG to offer a few observations on Mr. Bradley's note, in the the last number of Mind, relating to the ultimate analysis of