ON MORAL CAUSATION.1

(Mind, i., 393.)

Mr. P. Proctor Alexander's Moral Causation, a counterblast to Mill on Free-will. Weak point in Mill's admirable polemic-acceptance of current, but unsuitable modes of describing the will. Hamilton's "causeless volition". Admitted now, by Libertarians themselves, not to be a synonym for Free-will. Our actions governed by our motives according to the law of uniformity of sequence. Alexander's first issue with Mill-what is meant by our being able to act freely. The kernel of the dispute whether "I could if I willed it". Meaning of could or ability-"what will happen in certain circumstances". To say I could do a thing, were I in a definite state of mind, commits me neither to Free-will nor Necessity. The question is: What is that state of mind?" Point of discrepancy between the Necessitarian and Libertarian meanings of "I"-"a mystery of the human personality". Other points of difference-Moral Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. These points should be argued apart from the Freedom of the Will. Moral" as based upon legal enforcements, but admitting, in the better part of mankind, a moral sentiment or conscience. What elements it contains. The legal interpretation pushing out the moral point of view. In any case, the debate should be under Conscience. Free-will versus Necessity as regards the just grounds of punishment. Freedom, in the sense of conduct beyond the scope of motives, introduces perplexity. If a man's conduct is ruled by motives, to control him we must supply motives: make the pains of punishment overbalance the attractions of indulgence. To this extent, legislators and governors of men, in all ages, have declared for Necessity. This the deterrent view of punishment. Difference between it and the reformatory view. Robert Owen. Mill self-contradictory-according to Alexander-as regards the justice of punishment. But supposing Freedom adopted, the reconcilement of punishment with abstract justice is an almost, if not quite, impossible feat. Moral desert as a justification of punishment. This objected to by the writer for reasons stated. Punishment falls most unequally. Punishing "as an ex

:

1 Moral Causation or Notes on Mr. Mill's Notes to the Chapter on "Freedom" in the Third Edition of his "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy". By Patrick Proctor Alexander, M.A. Edinburgh, 1875.

ample". This rests solely upon the ultima ratio of social security. A long chapter required for the difficulties and anomalies of punishment. Some of these aggravated by the hypothesis of Freedom, some smoothed by it. In making allowances for the criminal, the writer holds that we state his case in terms of Necessity. The usual idea of justice in punishment points rather to retribution than to prevention. Mill's distinction between Necessity and Fatalism. This criticized. To an observer of the conduct of a number of persons, the sequence of motives and actions presents no puzzle, save what is due to mixture and occasional concealment. How we should try to influence the evil-doer, and avoid the Free-will puzzle. “You can, if you will" has, however, a rhetorical value. To look at the question in the most advantageous light, the laws of the mind must be observed in other persons, and not in oneself.

1

AMONG the counterblasts to Mill's book on Hamilton was an essay by Mr. Patrick Proctor Alexander, of Edinburgh (Mill and Carlyle), devoted chiefly to the chapter on Free-will. In the third edition of the Hamilton, Mill included, among his replies to critics, several foot-notes of some length dealing with Mr. Alexander's positions. In a new work, entitled Moral Causation, Mr. Alexander rejoined; and he was surprised at finding that Mill, while answering two other rejoinders in the fourth edition, did not notice his. He now reprints Moral Causation revised and extended. In the shoal of writings on the Free-will question, this is one that well deserves perusal; both from the acuteness of the reasonings, and also from the vivaciousness of the style, which is turned to account not merely for literary effect, but for giving clearness and point to the author's meaning. He puts in a strong light every appearance of a flaw in Mill's reasonings and modes of expressing himself; showing the advocates for necessity (or Determinism) what are the real or seeming weaknesses of their side.

Admirable as Mill's polemic is, in that chapter of the Hamilton, I do not think that he is sufficiently aware of the unsuitability of the current modes of describing the operation of the will. It is by accepting these unsuitable forms that he lays himself open, in my judgment, to the thrusts of an acute and determined critic like Mr. Alexander.

1 Alexander himself looked upon this treatise as a tour de force.

When I find both Professor Calderwood and Mr. Alexander strongly maintaining that Free-will does not mean uncaused volition," I feel myself obliged to admit that the controversy has made a very great advance, if, indeed, it be not absolutely ended. As a problem of the psychology of the Active Powers of the mind, all that I have ever contended for is that our actions are governed by our feelings, as motives, according to the law of uniformity of sequence; so that the same situation as regards the feelings is always followed by the same voluntary action. As against any one fully conceding this, my opposition seems to be at end. Mr. Alexander wishes to make out that this has been generally allowed by the advocates of Free-will. He endeavours to explain away some very strong expressions to the contrary made use of by Hamilton "A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation. Nay, were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only casualism; and the free acts of an indifferent are, morally and rationally, as worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined will.” From this, and other passages it would appear that Hamilton considered that "causeless volition" was an admissible statement of the Free-will doctrine; and it would be highly satisfactory to be assured that this mode of putting it is no longer admitted on either side. For, the difficulty then will be to find out what, if any, is the remaining difference.

Mr. Alexander's first issue with Mill is as to the meaning of our being conscious of our freedom, or our ability to act freely; but I prefer to dwell upon the second issue, which contains the kernel of the dispute in one principal aspect. He puts to Mill the question, "Whether having touched the left side of his nose, Mr. Mill did not feel, that he could have willed to touch, and have touched, its right side?" He complains that Mill declines to give a simple "yes" or "no," but answers it thus: "I could have touched the right, had I so willed it; and should have so willed, if there had existed a sufficient inducement, not otherwise ". Now, Mr. Alexander may think this a plain question, admitting a plain answer;

but, for my own part, I should have declined answering it in any form. Moreover, I do not consider that any step would be gained on either side by answering it, either with or without a qualification. My reason is that it contains two terms that need in the first instance to be defined; while the question in dispute would be equally raised in the act of defining these. The first is the term "could," or its equivalent, "ability," "power". The meaning of this term is pretty well agreed upon, as being simply "what will happen in certain circumstances" it is Aristotle's potentiality, as opposed to actuality. "I am able to walk across the room,' means that, in a certain state of mind, I would or do walk across. When I am asked, Could I have touched the right side of my nose at the time when I touched the left? the meaning is simply this, Would I, in some definite state of mind, have actually touched the right? To answer this in the affirmative would not commit me either to Free-will or to Necessity. The discussion would merely be shifted to another point, namely, what is the state of mind that would have been followed by my touching the right side? Was it the identical state of my feelings that was followed by my touching the left side, or a different state of feelings? Most probably, we should suppose that the state of feeling, or else the intellectual direction given to the feeling, was distinct; but what the distinctness consists in is really the whole matter at issue.

But the vagueness of the question appears in another way; namely, What is meant by "I"? Libertarians and Necessitarians, in the fight that they make over this word, reveal their hopeless discrepancy of opinion. In one view, "I" is the conjunction of the facts of Mind, as analyzed into Feeling, Volition, and Intellect, coupled with a bodily organism. In Mr. Alexander's view, this is not all: there is behind a "mystery of the human personality," which it is not permitted to us to analyze further. With such a reservation in the background, what "I" could do or not do, is very little to the purpose. My motives I know; but a personality transcending my motives, yet coming in as a make-weight in my decisions, I do not know.

Another point of difference between the contending parties, even after they have agreed upon the reign of law in human actions, is connected with the "Moral Consciousness" and "Moral Responsibility". It was with reference to these two notions, that Hamilton postulated Freedom, notwithstanding its being in itself inconceivable.

It seems to me, on the other hand, that the meaning and scope of Moral Consciousness and Responsibility should be argued apart from the Freedom of the Will. The divergence of opinion on the subject turns upon a distinct class of considerations. It is averred by one party that "moral," in the sense of right and wrong, is based upon prohibitions enforced by punishment; and that its essential meaning all through must have reference to this fact. It is fully allowed, and carefully explained, that the moral sentiment or conscience, in the better portion of mankind, contains an element of love, good-will, and spontaneous beneficence; but not so as to disguise its real foundations. For, when we ask why a thing is right, and not simply benevolent, we must descend to the circumstance of enforcement by some lawgiver. In opposition to this, it is contended by Mr. Alexander and others that this legal interpretation ignores and pushes out the moral point of view. It may be so; yet, that particular debate should be conducted, not under the Free-will controversy, but under the controversy as to the nature of Conscience: I do not see what either Freedom or Necessitation has to do with it. In responsibility to God or to man, I for one see everything that is distinctively meant by "moral"; those that hold otherwise need not introduce Free-will in order to say what "moral " is or includes, over and above the legal constraint, real or imagined.

The question of Free-will against Necessity is far more apparently implicated in one aspect of Moral Responsibility— the just grounds of punishment. This is a very mixed problem; and the part of it that bears strictly upon the character of the Will seems to me the least difficult. If a man's conduct is ruled by motives, the way to control him is to supply such motives: if he is not to steal, make the act of