meddling of a bureaucratic office in this country is of no use in either case. It can only diminish responsibility, deaden the motives to vigorous exertion, and possibly afford a cloak for misconduct. It is not probable that had the Governor General of India stood alone to answer personally at the bar of English opinion for his own offences, he would have dared to enter into the Afghan war.

Such experience as we have had seems also to shew that it will be expedient to let the Viceroy of India have his own military establishment, pay his own price for soldiers, and raise them how and where he finds best, the whole being of course subject, like the Empire itself, to the British Crown.

In this way we shall at least give India a despotism carried on by a line of able and honourable despots, amenable in the last resort to the tribunal of a public opinion much higher than that of the Indians themselves. The evils of mixing together the politics and establishments of two countries remote from each other, and totally opposed in their political character, will be diminished; India will be less bound up with England in all senses than it is now. The means of holding it will be drawn from the country itself; and the measure of the resources which the Empire can supply will be, as it ought to be, the measure of the Empire. In case the Viceroy of India should find it necessary to contract his dominions, he will be able to do this without so much impeaching the power or tarnishing the majesty of this country.

I do not shrink from using the term despotism, be

cause I am convinced that, provided the Viceroy be properly appointed; provided that he be chosen without reference to party or to rank, but solely with reference to his ability to govern India; and provided he be always liable to recall for incompetency and impeachment for misconduct, it is better that his authority should be really despotic. In a conquered country governed by the stranger liberty has no place, and to utter the name is a mockery and a profanation. In such countries the concession of oligarchic freedom to the members of the conquering race, only aggravates tenfold the slavery of the conquered. The sole chance of justice for the subject people is the existence of a power supreme over all alike, and capable of protecting the weak against the strong. The personal partiality of the supreme ruler for those of his own race is sure to be strong enough, without placing him legally under their irresponsible and unscrupulous control. A Parliament of English residents overruling the Governor General during the late mutiny would have filled all India with fire and blood.

In the case of India, the reasons against conceding oligarchical liberties to the members of the dominant race are peculiarly strong, because the English in India are not even permanent residents. They go there only to make fortunes as quickly as they can, and then return. They neither have, nor can have, any sort of patriotic feeling for India; they neither have, nor can have, any great anxiety for the lasting welfare of the people or the lasting prosperity of the country.

A grain of English interest would outweigh a ton of Indian interest in the balance of their minds.

In being denied liberty they would perhaps also be denied the instrument of suicide. Give them Parliaments, and they will have parties and party conflicts in the presence of the subject people. Probably as the party conflicts grow venomous, (and most venomous in so narrow a community they are sure to grow,) there will be appeals to the subject people; and appeals to the subject people are lighted matches applied to a mine. We have had some inkling of these tendencies already, and we seem to be in a fair way soon to have more.

To sum up the whole case in a few words. India is not a Colony or a nation but an Empire; and, as I have said before, if you are to have an Empire you must have an Emperor.

March 2, 1863.

I am, &c.

GOLDWIN SMITH.

APPENDIX I.

EXTRACT from an article in The Toronto Globe referred to in Letter III., on "Colonial Government," as illustrating the question between the two Provinces of Canada respecting the representation :—

"The Opposition party of Upper Canada have had their patience sorely tried during the past ten years. They have seen the Upper Province governed by a minority with reckless tyranny; its trade injured by bad legislation, its resources spent in defiance of its indignant protests, the legislation it needed denied, its institutions tampered with, its westward progress checked, its officials appointed, not on account of merit, but as a reward of treason. They have striven against these evils strenuously, and have accomplished much good by their efforts no doubt. We know that mischief has been done, but we know, also, that much more would have been done but for the activity and watchfulness of the Opposition. The past ten years have put on record a list of injuries inflicted on Upper Canada sufficient to excite indignation in the mind of the most moderate of mankind. We all know from what source these injuries have come. The less numerous and wealthy population of Lower Canada has the same number of representatives in the House of Assembly as that of Upper Canada; and the unity of the French Canadian section of the people does the rest. By favour of Sir Edmund Head, the old French party have retained absolute control of the formation of cabinets; and by the use of the power of the Executive have managed to secure a sufficient number of the representatives of Upper Canada to preserve a preponderance in the Legislature. They