Without such combinations, considering the Michigan association as it is, the New York competition is enough to keep the price from becoming exorbitant. Add to this the abovementioned fact that the association has no power to limit production, and the fact that new wells are being sunk continually, whose owners can be forced to join the association, if inclined to remain outside, only by a tedious and expensive fight on prices, and the dangers to consumers from the association seem slight. Doubtless, the manufacturers who have been in effect forced into it, and who feel that without an association in the state more profit could be made, are inclined to think that such a combination is oppressive. These manufacturers, however, form but a small proportion of those in the state.

The conclusion to which one must come, then, regarding the influence of the association is this: it is probable that the average consumer is but slightly affected, though it is possible that he has to pay a little more for his salt than would otherwise be the case; it is certain that, with the exception of a few who are uncommonly well situated, the manufacturers are decidedly benefited by the association. Certain it is that most of them are well content, and that the association never stood firmer than it does to-day. J. W. JENKS.

Addendum. For much valuable material regarding the history of the salt interest of Michigan, I am indebted to the courtesy of Mr. W. R. Burt, and Mr. D. G. Holland, president and secretary, respectively, of the Michigan Salt association. Besides the records of the association, these gentlemen put into my hands some scrap-books, without which I could not have obtained many of the facts regarding its early history. Mr. Holland, too, was kind enough to take time to tell me and write me facts regarding the management of the association which could not have been learned elsewhere. Acknowledgments are also due to Mr. L. H. Gould, assistant salt inspector, and to the salt manufacturers and dealers who have kindly furnished me information.

PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR NOMINA

TIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE IN NEW

YORK CITY.

HE city of New York has undergone many transforma

THE

tions, political and social, since the blissful reigns of Wouter Van Twiller, William the Testy and Peter the Headstrong. It is not my purpose to describe the many changes, though these few pages may emphasize to the readers of A History of New York the difference between politics of the days of Diedrich Knickerbocker and those of the present time.

Constitutional government tends to become a rule of parties; and where this phase of government has prevailed longest, as in England, this tendency is most marked. And just as the political history of the United States is included in the rise and fall of the Federalist, the Democratic, the Whig, and the Republican parties, so is that of the city of New York in the development and disappearance of their local organizations. As a result of the extension of the elective principle to judicial and administrative as well as political offices, party rule in America has become "machine rule;" and our state and city history affords a graphic illustration of this development. The officers elected for the government of New York city alone are seventy in number: viz., the mayor, the comptroller, the president of the board of aldermen, one alderman in each of the twentyfive districts, a sheriff, a county clerk, a register, four coroners, a district attorney, six justices of the superior court, six justices of the court of common pleas, six justices of the city court, one district court civil justice in each of the eleven judicial districts, a recorder, two judges of general sessions, a city judge, and a surrogate. In addition to these the city voters choose at the same time their national and state officers: the electors for president and vice-president of the United States

and nine congressmen, the governor, secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, attorney-general, state-engineer and surveyor, the judges of the supreme court and court of appeals, and twenty-four assemblymen and eleven senators, elected according to districts.

The importance of the nominating machinery in America receives especial emphasis when this endless catalogue of public officials, dependent on party nomination and chosen by popular election, is brought into contrast with the list of elective offices in the European constitutional states. Neither in England, France nor Germany, do the electors vote for candidates for any executive, administrative or judicial office; election is confined to the legislative offices. In London, Paris and Berlin, the voters choose by election the city aldermen and, in the two last mentioned cities, the members of some unimportant councils. They vote also for the city representatives in the national legislature in London, for the members of Parliament; in Paris, for those of the Chamber of Deputies; and in Berlin, for those of the Imperial Diet and also for members in the Prussian Diet. Public elections are not held in these cities to fill any other offices, national or local.

Political institutions are the outgrowth of political conditions.<< The New York party organizations and their method of nominations to public office are clearly the result of the number and the importance of the elective offices; and they have no counterpart in London, Paris or Berlin. A national party organization, based on state, county, and ward or district associations, all equally well disciplined, each with a permanent executive committee and a permanent chairman, usually the party dictator, — this, the American party organization, nominating and electing all national, state, and local officers, is unknown in England, France or Germany. Political clubs, devoted to their party principles, exist in these European countries, and they are the only form of permanent party organization. They advocate doctrines dear to the Liberal or the Conservative, in England; to the Bonapartist, the Monarchist or the Republican, in France; to the Conservative, the National-Liberal, the Ultramontane or

whatever else the party, man styles himself, in Germany. They support and encourage party principles, not individuals; although, at times, they use their influence in nominations and lend their assistance in the campaign to the party candidates. No club established merely to nominate candidates to public office could take root in those countries, where the elections are infrequent and the elective offices few, any more than a party organization created solely to nominate candidates for the presidency could flourish in America. These clubs are to be found in the principal cities; their basis is not party suffrage, but club membership; though partly social in purpose and spirit, the conditions of admission are political; their connection with other associations of the same party, if there be any, is very slight.

In England, the leading clubs are located in London. The best known are the Carlton, the Conservative, the Junior Carlton, St. Stephens, the Reform, the Devonshire and the Liberal. Nominations, though frequently made by the clubs or at their suggestion, emanate at times from other sources; it may be from self-nomination, from family influence in the rural districts, or from a conference of party voters in the cities.

In France, the political clubs represent about the same influence and activity; they are to be found chiefly in Paris. The members of the Chamber of Deputies, in groups called comités, determined by party sympathy and neighborhood relations, usually make the nominations and manage and conduct the national elections.

In Germany, the party organism is almost equally undeveloped. The leading political parties have clubs in the more important cities. They frequently suggest available candidates, and the names suggested are submitted to public meetings, whose function is understood to be ratification rather than discussion. Except perhaps at the annual reunion of the party leaders, known as the Parteitag, held for the adoption of the party platform, conventions and delegates are unknown. Even at these meetings the various clubs are not always, nor as a rule, officially represented; the leading members of the party throughout the empire assemble there without formal call or

credentials. This is the German substitute for national conventions and delegates.

Neither in Paris nor in Berlin nor in London are there any permanent political associations which arrogate to themselves the right to make all nominations to public office; nor is there any absolute uniformity in the method of the selection of candidates. The political clubs, in so far as nominations are made by them, represent aristocratic rather than democratic influences. Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain, advocates of radicalism in party organization as well as in party policy, desired to establish an association to be based on the suffrages of the voters of the Liberal party and not merely on club membership. But their avowed purpose was "to submit to the federated associations political questions and measures upon which united action may be considered desirable." Even their elaborate plan was intended to define and ascertain the party principles, not to select the party candidates.

The early forms of party activity in the United States, and especially in the state and city of New York, were equally simple. Nominations were usually made by legislative caucus : by congressmen for national elections, and by state legislators for state officers. But at that time the political constitution of the state and city was totally different, and much more in harmony with the institutions of the European states of to-day. For more than thirty years after the adoption of the constitution of the United States, the only municipal officers chosen by election in New York city were the aldermen and the constables. All other local and all state officials, except the governor, assemblymen and senators, were appointed by the council of appointment. Early in this century, Aaron Burr, and later Martin Van Buren and the Albany regency, used the enormous powers of this council to influence the action of the caucus. This interference and the radical changes made by the constitution of 1821, which widened the suffrage and largely increased the number of elective offices, strengthened the demand of the people for a more representative nominating body. In that year, with the rallying cries of "no more legislative nomina