L work on the 29th day of June remained in the custody and possession of the defendants, whose duty it was to exercise ordinary care to preserve and protect it from injury, and to allow the consignees a reasonable time within which to inspect it and take it away; and, in case they neglected to receive or take it within such time, then it was the duty of the defendants to discharge it in store or warehouse, where it would still be protected from the elements. It consequently appears to us that the defendants have no ground of complaint as to the rges made, and that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. concur. All (116 N. Y. 428) BERNHEIMER et al. v. RINDSKOPF et al.1 Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division. Nov. 26, 1889.) ants of their responsibility to take care of it while it lay in the harbor of New York, and was not yet taken out of the boat, and until it was removed, either by the plaintiff or defendants, they were liable for the proper condition of the cargo; and that, if it was damaged by rain while lying in New York, the defendants were liable. Exceptions were taken to these charges, and also to the refusal of the court to charge that "after bulk had been broken, and part of it removed, and after a reasonable time had then elapsed to unload or remove the remainder of the cargo, the liability of the carrier, as uch, ceased." It does not appear to us that these charges, when read and considered together, present any ground for error which calls for a reversal of the judgment. The rule doubtless is that the common carrier of freight by boat must, in order to relieve himself from liability, deliver the goods at the ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS — PREFplace designated, in good condition. Un- 1. In an action to set aside an assignment by a doubtedly there may be a constructive deliv-partnership as in fraud of certain firm creditors, ery which would terminate his responsibility as a carrier, but it must be such as would in law be recognized as a delivery. If the consignee neglect to accept or to receive the goods, the carrier is not thereby justified in abandoning them, or in negligently exposing them to injury. If they are not accepted and received when notice is given of their arrival, he may relieve himself from responsibility by placing the goods in a warehouse for and on account of the consignee; but so long as he has the custody a duty devolves upon him to take care of the property, and preserve it from injury. Tarbell v. Shipping Co., 110 N. Y. 170-182, 17 N. E. Rep. 721; Hathorn v. Ely, 28 N. Y. 78; Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio, 45; Price v. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322: Fenner v. Railroad Co., 44 N. Y. 505. carted away. ERENCES-PARTNERSHIP. the burden is on plaintiffs to prove their allegation that a note preferred in the assignment was inown private interest, without the consent of his dorsed by one partner in the firm's name for his copartners. 2. The note was originally indorsed by one of terest, and renewed on an indorsement by the firm, the partners individually, for his own private inwho sustained intimate business relations with the promisors. The firm renewed its indorsement at a time when it was insolvent, and the old note was extended for one year. Held that, in the absence surrendered by the holder, and the time of payment of evidence that the holder knew of the firm's insolvency when the indorsement was renewed, a preference of the note in the assignment was not fraudulent. 3. Nor was the validity of the assignment affected by the fact that it described the note as having been discounted by the holder, and that it directed an absolute payment, whereas the liability was only contingent. Appeal from supreme court, general term, first department. A. Blumenstiel, for appellants. Nathaniel Myers, for respondents. As to whether or not the consignees proceeded with reasonable diligence to unload the cargo was, as the trial court stated, a question, under the circumstances of the case, for the jury. In order to remove the BROWN, J. This action was brought by mait from the boat, it had to be bagged and the plaintiffs, who are judgment creditors of Whether this could be done the firm of Rindskopf Bros. & Co., to set with safety, in a rainy day, was a question aside a general assignment made by that firm of fact. It appears that Sunday and one to the defendant Jacob W. Mack, September holiday had intervened, and that one or two 19, 1884, on the ground that it was made to days had been rainy, so that we think a find- hinder, delay, and defraud creditors. It is ing that the consignees had not unreasonably alleged that this result was sought to be acdelayed the unloading of the boat is justitied complished by preferring, in the assignment, by the evidence. On the 6th day of July, as numerous claims, some of which were fictiwe have seen, the cargo was found so damptious, and for none of which the firm was as to cause it to be rejected by the inspector of the parties. The consignees had the right to have the malt inspected as it was taken from the boat before accepting it. The entire cargo could not well be inspected at the same time, for that which was on top may have been dry and in good order, while that in the bottom of the boat might have been wet and spoiled. The inspector stood by and examined it as it was taken from the boat, and it was only such as passed his inspection that was accepted by the consignees. That which remained in the boat at the close of liable. The defendants introduced no evidence on the trial, and the court found as facts that none of the preferences were fictitious, or for an amount for which said firm was not justly liable, and were not made for the purpose of reserving any portion of the property for the benefit of the assignors, or for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding their creditors. The burden of establishing, by competent and sufficient testimony, the allegations of the complaint, rest 1 Affirming 41 Hun, 646, mem. The first and main ground upon which the assignment is assailed is that the preference to Max Nathan for the sum of $25,000, the amount of a promissory note made by James Thompson & Co., and indorsed in the name of Rindskopf Bros. & Co., is not based on a firm liability valid as against firm creditors. It appears that in December, 1881, upon the application of the defendant Buchman, a member of the assigning firm, and for the benefit of his daughter, Mr. Nathan loaned $25,000 to James Thompson & Co., and received therefor their note, indorsed by Buchman, payable one year after date. This note was renewed in January, 1883, and about the time of its maturity, in 1884, Nathan refused to renew it, unless it was indorsed by the firm of Rindskopf Bros. & Co.; and thereupon Mr. Buchman, in Nathan's presence, indorsed on the renewal note the name of said firm, and Nathan surrendered the old note, and accepted the renewal for one year. At that time Rindskopf Bros. & Co. were insolvent, but Nathan was not aware of that fact. The firm did not then contemplate an assignment, but hoped to be able to pay their debts in full. The plaintiffs attack the validity of the preference of this note in the assignment on three grounds: First, that the assignors were not liable on the note unless all the members of the firm authorized and consented to the indorsement, and that the burden was on the defendants to establish authority in Buchman to make the indorsement; second, that, assuming that the firm authorized the indorsement, it was in effect an appropriation of partnership property to the payment of the debt of an individual partner, made when the firm was insolvent, and hence a fraud upon the firm creditors; third, that there was a fraudulent misstatement in the deed of assignment of the nature of the liability of the assignors upon the note. ed upon the plaintiffs, and, the findings of | ing such consent rests on the holder of the the trial court having been affirmed by the note. The respondents do not deny these general term, the judgment must be sus- legal propositions, but they do deny their aptained in this court, unless the evidence will plication to this action. They would be apadmit of no other inference except that which plicable, and full effect would be given to plaintiffs claim for it. them, if Nathan was suing the firm on the note, and the firm liability was denied. But the issue here is a very different one from what it would be in an action by Nathan against the firm. The plaintiffs, and not the firm, are attacking the validity of the note. As between Nathan and the firm, the firm liability and the validity of the indorsement is admitted. Nathan is not called upon to prove anything. He is not a party to the suit, and is not before the court in any caparity, and cannot be heard. The issue is solely between the plaintiffs and the assignee. The attack is upon the assignee's title to the firm property, and to his right to administer upon it under the trust-deed. The trust-deed is alleged to be fraudulent because of the admission and direction to pay a fictitious debt. The admission of the validity of the indorsement is the fraudulent act which plaintiffs claim destroys the assignee's title to the property. In substance, plaintiffs allege that the assignee is not entitled to retain the firm property and dispose of it in accordance with the terms of the assignment, for the reason that the purpose to which he is directed to apply it is a fraudulent one, and the fraud is alleged to consist in directing the payment of a debt for which the firm was not liable, and which is in fact a debt or liability of an individual member of the firm. Obviously, upon such an issue, the burden is upon the plaintiffs to establish their their complaint. Among all the cases cited in the appellants' brief, there is not a single authority holding that in an action of this character the burden is on the assignee to prove the validity of the assignment or the liability of the firm for the debts the assignee is directed to pay. None, I think, can be found. The assignment is valid upon its face, and the presumption as to its entire validity must prevail until the contrary appears by evidence; and in this action an inference cannot be drawn that the firm are not liable on the note from proof of the fact that it does not represent a firm The plaintiffs have cited a multitude of au- debt, because non constat it may have been thorities to show that a holder of a note of a indorsed with the consent and by direction firm, given by one partner for his private of all the members of the firm, and that fact debt, or for a matter outside of the firm bus- must be negatived before the assignee is put iness, and known to be such by the holder, upon his defense. In the absence of all evimust, in an action upon the note against the dence on that question, the only proof before firm, prove that the other partners who did the court was the acknowledgment of the not sign consented to be bound by the con- debt in the assignment, and the presumption tract. Such is undoubtedly the law. Each of the validity of that instrument required partner is the agent of the firm only as to the court to assume the consent of the firm matters within the scope of the partnership to the indorsement. Fraud cannot be prebusiness, and if one partner gives a partner-sumed. It must be proven, and, if there is ship note for his own debt, without the con- left room for the inference of an honest insent of his copartners, it is void in the hands tent, the proof of fraud is wanting. Schultz of any party having knowledge of the pur- v. Hoagland, 85 N. Y. 469; Baird v. Mayor, pose for which it was given. Such a note 96 N. Y. 567; Kingsley v. City of Brooklyn, does not bind the other partners without 78 N. Y. 215; Bank v. Talcott, 22 Barb. 550; their consent, and the burden of establish- Crook v. Rindskopf, 105 N. Y. 476, 12 N. E. I shall briefly discuss these questions in the order in which they are stated. Rep. 174. The evidence on this branch of the case, so far from affording the appellants ground for an exception, would not have sustained a finding that the indorsement was without the firm's consent. On that question the plaintiffs introduced no evidence. settled. Ransom v. Van Deventer, 41 Barb. 307; Wilson v. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587. firm, and hence it is not fraudulent in law if firm property is applied to pay the debt. We must, in considering this branch of the case, assume the firm to be liable on the note when the assignment was made; and we are thus brought to the question whether the proof as to the circumstances under which that liability was contracted were such as to But the question here is, do the facts bring this case conclusively within that rule? There is no principle of law which forbids a partnership from entering into obligations But it is argued the note may have been outside of the scope of the partnership busiindorsed with the consent of all the partners, ness, provided it is done with an honest purand be a valid contract between them and pose, and with the consent of all the memthe holder. Still as it was made when the bers of the firm. And partnership property firm was insolvent, and to secure a liability may be transferred to pay a joint debt for of an individual partner, it is in law fraudu- which the firm is liable outside of the partlent against the firm creditors. Menagh v. nership business, and the joint creditors will Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146, is the principal au- obtain a good title to the property. Saunders thority cited to sustain this claim. That ac- v. Reilly, 105 N. Y. 12-18, 12 N. E. Rep. tion was one for the conversion of property 170. And when there is a good consideraagainst the sheriff of Ontario county, and tion to support a contract of the firm outside arose out of sales of firm property under ex- of the scope of the firm business, I take it a ecutions in favor of firm creditors. The firm creditor, having no lien upon the firm plaintiff made title to four-fifths of the prop- property, has no legal ground for complaint erty through a sale of the interest of two of if firm property is appropriated to pay such the partners under chattel mortgages given obligation, even though the firm was insolvby said partners to their individual creditors ent at the time it entered into the contract. when the firm was insolvent. Before the The contract being legal, and there being no executions were issued to the sheriff, the re-actual fraud, it may be enforced against the maining partner sold and transferred his interest in the firm property to a person not a member of the firm. The plaintiff had judgment, which was affirmed at the general term. It was sought in this court to sustain the judgment on the theory that as the equities of firm creditors can only be worked out against firm property through the equities of the partners, that as all the mem-establish against firm creditors fraud, either bers of the firm had severally conveyed to in law or in fact. If the proof had shown different persons their respective interest in that Nathan knew of the insolvency of the the firm property before the levy by the sher- firm at the time he renewed the note, and iff, the equities of the partners to have the that an assignment was then impending, or property applied to pay firm debts had been had there been no consideration for the inreleased or waived, and with them had gone dorsement, a different conclusion would have the equity of the creditors that was depend- been permitted. But there was no evidence ent upon them, and consequently the pur- that Nathan knew the firm was insolvent, chaser from the individual partners had be- and it appeared that, upon accepting the recome vested with the corpus of the property. newal note, he surrendered the old note, and This claim was asserted on the authority of extended the time for the payment of the debt Coover's Appeal, 29 Pa. St. 9. The absurd for one year. This made him a holder for results which would follow such a rule were value, and constituted a good consideration shown by the opinions of Judges RAPALLO for the new note. Bank v. Place, 86 N. Y. and ALLEN, and this court held that the pur-444. In Menagh v. Whitwell, supra, and all chaser took only the interests of each partner kindred cases, there was substantially a after the firm debts were paid and the eq- donation of firm property to pay the debt of uities between the partners adjusted, and an individual partner, without any conthat the corpus of the property, notwith-sideration moving to the firm. Here there standing the transfer by the several partners of their individual interest, still remained firm property, and subject to levy on execution against it by firm creditors. In that case the firm were not liable to the mortgagees through whom plaintiff made his title, and there was no transfer of firm property to pay a debt of the firm, and it is not an authority in a case where the firm has made itself liable for the debt which the firm property was appropriated to pay. The rule that it is a fraud upon firm creditors for a mem-peared that the business relations between ber of a firm to take firm property, and apply it to his individual debt, or for an insolvent firm to apply firm property to the payment of the debt of any individual partner, is well was a consideration, and in this very essential fact the case under consideration differs from all the cases cited by the appellants in which the principle cited has been applied. All of them are cases where the assignment itself preferred debts of individual partners, or where the property was transferred directly to pay individual debts. The conclusion that indorsing the notes was fraudulent in law, as against the creditors of the firm, is not, therefore, permitted. It further ap Rindskopf Bros. & Co. and Thompson & Co. were more or less intimate, and we cannot say that the assignors did not receive a benefit from the renewal of the note and the ex tension of the payment of the debt for a year. | alleged owner, upon which an attachment has been The failure of Thompson & Co. and of Buch- levied in plaintiff's favor, and that the amount of man to pay the note in question might have the claim is due from the owner to plaintiff. 2. Where the trial court has found that the precipitated the failure of Rindskopf Bros. & sheriff attached the "claim" of D. & Co., and all Co., which the evidence shows they at that their property in defendant's hands, the levy as time hoped to avoid. The trial court was en- fendant in payment of a draft due D. & Co., held found is sufficient, though the check given to detitled to give weight to such considerations in for collection, was not taken into actual custody, determining the intent of the assignors, and as required by Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 649, when the evidence was sufficient to negative the attaching notes or instruments for the payment of inference of a fraudulent purpose on their lection of the draft, was not capable of manual demoney, as the "claim, " though resulting from colpart in making the indorsement. I think, livery. therefore, the exception to the findings of the court that the preference of the Thompson note was for a debt for which the firm was justly liable, and was not fraudulent, and to the refusal to find that the firm received no consideration for such indorsement, cannot be sustained. 3. Findings of fact by the trial court are not cepted to in the court below. reviewable on appeal unless they have been ex 4. Where a draft is given by the drawer to an agent to forward to a third person for collection, it is subject, in the hands of the third person, to levy for a debt due from the drawer. 5. The finding that the draft was delivered by the drawer to an agent for collection is not inconsistent with the finding that it was so delivered, to be forwarded by the agent to a third party for collection by him. Nor is the objection well taken that there was a fraudulent misstatement of the nature of the liability on the indorsement of the note. The preference in the assignment was as folAppeal from judgment of the supreme lows: "Max Nathan, of said city of New court in the first judicial department, affirmYork. For the sum of $99,900.86, ***ing judgment entered on decision of the court $25,000 thereof for the amount of a certain in favor of the plaintiffs. The action was promissory note for that amount made by the brought by leave of that court to recover, for firm of James Thompson & Co., dated Janu- application upon a judgment recovered by ary 21st, 1884, payable twelve months after plaintiff Naser against Deneken & Co., the its said date, indorsed by said assignors, and amount of a claim alleged to have been coldiscounted by and held by said Max Nathan." lected by the defendant for Deneken & Co., Criticism is made upon the word "dis- and upon which it is also alleged that an atcounted," and that the direction to pay is tachment, issued in the action in which such absolute, whereas the liability was contin- judgment was recovered, had been levied. gent. There is no attempt made to make it It appears that Deneken & Co. drew on Naser appear that the note was for the accommoda- a draft, as follows: "London, 19th June, tion of the assignors, and the statement of 1880. At sight pay this first of exchange, the liability was not calculated to mislead. second and third not, to our order, eight hunOn the face of the note Thompson & Co. dred and seventeen pounds, nine shillings, were the real debtors, and upon payment the sterling, value in ourselves, which place to assignee would be entitled to take and en- account, as advised by DENEKEN & Co., 7 force the note against that firm. Beaver street, New York. To James Naser." Numerous other preferences in the assign- The draft was indorsed, "Pay Messrs. Mcment are claimed to be fraudulent, and at Culloch & Co., or order, value on account. considerable length and with great earnest- DENEKEN & Co.;" and was handed to McCulness have been pressed upon the attention of loch & Co., who indorsed upon it, "Pay the the court by the learned counsel for the ap- First National Bank of New York, or order. pellants. The questions presented are main- MCCULLOCH & Co.," and sent it to, and it ly ones of fact. We have considered them was received by, the defendant; and afterall fully, but find nothing which would justi-wards the drawee delivered to the defendant, fy the reversal of the judgment. Upon those matters we concur in the opinion of the learned judge who heard the case at special term. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur. (116 N. Y. 492) NASER et al. v. FIRST NAT. BANK,1 and it received in payment of the draft, his certified check for $3,986, and immediately thereafter the sheriff levied the attachment. The judgment in that action was afterwards recovered against Deneken & Co. for upwards of $10,000, and, after the defendant had refused to deliver or pay to the sheriff the amount of such claim to apply upon the (Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi- execution issued on such judgment, this ac sion. Nov. 26, 1889.) ATTACHMENT-DRAFTS RECEIVED FOR COLLECTION. 1. In an action brought by leave of the court by plaintiff in the name of himself and the sheriff, under Code Civil Proc. N. Y. §§ 655, 677, to subject the amount of a claim held by defendant for collection, which has been attached in defendant's hands, to the satisfaction of a judgment recovered against the owner of the claim, the complaint is sufficient if it alleges that defendant has in its possession the amount of a claim belonging to the 1Affirming 42 Hun, 658, mem. tion was commenced. The plaintiffs recovered. Fisher A. Baker, for appellant. Samuel Untermyer, for respondents. BRADLEY, J., (after stating the facts as above.) The motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute à cause of action was properly denied. It alleges that the defendant had in its possession and control the would then become the debtors of their prin- There is some conflict of authority on the claim or demand against Naser, belonging to him to collect it. In some of the states it is In the present case there was no disaffirm- |