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lant claiming that they were already over-1 St. Rep, 741; Words and Phrases, vol. 1, paid. To secure the performance of each of "Between."
full days intervening between the 8th day and the 13th day of the month. The courts have power to adopt and enforce reasonable rules, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, regulating applications for change of venue. Anglemyer v. Blackburn, 16 Ind. App. 352, 45 N. E. 483; Hamilton v. Miller, 24 Ind. App. 617, 56 N. E. 923; Perdue v. Gill, 35 Ind. App. 99, 73 N. E. 844.
the two contracts, appellant Marshall A. Fry  It is clear that there were only four gave bond upon which the other appellants were surety. These bonds were each payable to the state of Indiana, and were conditioned upon the faithful performance of the contract to which it applied, and upon the payment by the contractor of all debts incurred in the prosecution of the work including labor and material furnished. Appellees brought suit on each of these bonds, making the bondsmen parties defendant.. These two actions were consolidated by agreement and tried as one, resulting in a judgment in favor of appellees.
 The first error assigned is that the court erred in overruling appellants' separate and several demurrers to appellees' complaint. There were two complaints filed, one in docket No. 3,417 and the other in docket No. 3,483. An examination of the record shows that no demurrer was addressed to the complaint filed under the former number and that the court made no ruling on the demurrers which were addressed to the complaint filed under the latter number. No question was saved for presentation by this assignment, and, as the question is not presented by an independent assignment of error, we cannot consider the sufficiency of the complaint.
 The correctness of the ruling of the court upon the motion for a new trial is the only question properly raised by the assignment of error. The first cause assigned and argued relates to the action of the court in overruling appellants' motion for a change of venue from the county. The affidavit was filed on the 8th day of December, and the case was set for trial on the 13th day of the same month. The record shows that the motion was overruled upon the ground that the affidavit was not filed within the rules. The rule of the court upon which this action of the trial court was based is not set out in the bill of exceptions or otherwise made a part of the record. As all presumptions are in favor of the correctness of the ruling, we must presume that the action of the court was justified by the rule.
 Appellant on the day of the trial filed an affidavit for a continuance on account of an absent witness. The motion based on this affidavit was overruled, and this ruling was assigned as a cause for a new trial. The affidavit does not show sufficient diligence on the part of appellant to obtain the testimony of the witness. The affidavit shows that the witness was at Danville, Ill., and that the reason affiant did not take his deposition was because he could not locate him until the 9th day of December. It is not disclosed that he made any inquiries or exercised any diligence to locate the witness prior to that date. The summons was served on the defendant on the 24th day of September, almost three months before the affidavit for a continuance was filed. The affidavit does not show that any of the defendants, during that time, had made any effort to locate the witness and to obtain his deposition. The showing as to diligence is wholly insufficient, and the motion for a continuance was properly overruled.
We have considered all the questions properly presented by the record and briefs. We find no available error, and the judg ment is in all things affirmed.
(258 Ill. 611)
EDDLEMAN v. EDDLEMAN et al.
The owner of the W. 2 of a quarter section exchanged a single tract of about 2 acres in the southeast corner for a tract of 2.11 acres in the northwest corner of the E. 12. Each party inclosed the tract received by him by fences intended to be on the lines as they  From the briefs on file it appears that understood them to exist, but which did not the rule required that affidavits for change entirely coincide with the true lines. Thereafter the 2.11-acre tract was used in connecof venue must be filed in such time as to tion with and as a part of the grantee's home allow five full days to intervene between the place in the W. 12. After his death his other day on which the application is filed and the heirs, for the purpose of making a voluntary day set for trial. The word "between," when partition, conveyed to one of the sons the home used to define a period of time bounded by section. He took possession of such place, inplace, described as the W. 1⁄2 of the quarter two other periods, such such as between between two cluding the small tract in question, and he and named days, excludes the days specified at his successor in title had possession for over the beginning and at the ending of the peri- 30 years. Held, that his possession of the 2.11peri-acre tract was adverse to the other heirs, and od; and the ordinary rule as to the computa- was not that of a tenant in common; and hence tion of time by excluding one day of a pe- his successor in title had title thereto by adriod and including the other does not apply. verse possession. Winans v. Thorp, 87 Ill. App. 297; Weir V. Thomas, 44 Neb. 507, 62 N. W. 871, 48 Am.
Common, Cent. Dig. §§ 42-52; Dec. Dig. § [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Tenancy in 15.*1
Suit for partition by Jasper Eddleman against Jacob M. Eddleman and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed.
William D. Lyerle, of Jonesboro, for appellant. Hileman & Crawford and James Lingle, of Jonesboro, for appellees.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Union County; The proof shows that Jacob Eddleman, Sr., William N. Butler, Judge. at the time of his death owned other lands than the W. 1⁄2 of the S. W. 4 of section 35 and the small tract in controversy, and that in 1882 there was a voluntary settlement or partition among the heirs, by which they agreed to, and did, convey to the son Calvin, for his share of his father's land, and the further consideration of his agreement to support and care for his mother during her lifetime, the home place where Jacob Eddleman, Sr., and his family resided. Prior to 1851 Jacob Eddleman, Sr., owned the W. 2 of the S. W. 4 of section 35, and a man named Sowers owned the E. 1⁄2 of the S. W. 4 of section 35. There was a spring in the northwest corner of Sowers' 80, and in 1851 Eddleman exchanged with Sowers a small tract of 2 or more acres off the south part of the east side of the W. 1⁄2 of the S. W. 4 for the 2.11-acre tract in controversy. Eddleman at once took possession of the 2.11 acres, but in building the fence on the east line it ran in a northeast and southwest direction, and at the south line of the tract the fence was located west of the east line, and at the north line it was east of the line, so that as fenced it included at the north end more land than Eddleman had acquired from Sowers, and at the south end part of the tract was left in Sowers' inclosure. As fenced by Jacob Eddleman, Sr., this 2.11-acre tract formed a part of his home place, and was inclosed with his land in the W. 1⁄2 of the S. W. 4. There was a spring on this small tract, and Jacob Eddleman, Sr., built and maintained a milkhouse thereon, and the tract was used as a horse lot in connection with the other buildings upon or immediately adjacent to said tract. Sowers took possession of the land he acquired of Jacob Eddleman, Sr., in exchange for the tract in controversy, and he and his successor in title have remained in possession until the present time. The respective inclosures of Eddleman and Sowers, from the time the exchange was made, were in accordance with the lines as they understood them to exist after the exchange. The 2.11-acre tract obtained by Eddleman from Sowers in the northwest corner of the E. 1⁄2 of the quarter section was intended to be 13 rods wide, east and west, by 26 rods long; but as fenced by Eddleman it was less than 13 rods wide at the south end and more than 13 rods wide at the north end.
FARMER, J. This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Union county, dismissing for want of equity a bill filed by appellant for the partition of a tract of land described by metes and bounds and containing 2.11 acres, situated in the northwest corner of the E. 1⁄2 of the S. W. 4 of section 35, township 13 S., range 1 E. of the third principal meridian. The bill alleged Jacob Eddleman, Sr., died intestate, seised in fee of said 2.11-acre tract and other lands, in 1875; that he left a widow and complainant, and several other children named, as his only heirs; that the widow and some of the children have since died; and that by the death of some and by conveyances by other of the heirs of Jacob Eddleman, Sr., complainant and defendants, Jacob M. Eddleman and Tobias Eddleman, sons, and Thomas Eddleman, a grandson, of said Jacob Eddleman, Sr., became seised in fee of said 2.11 acres in the followng proportions: Complainant of an undivided five-ninths, Jacob M. Eddleman of an undivided two-sevenths, Tobias Eddleman of an undivided one-seventh, and Thomas Eddleman of an undivided one sixty-third part. The bill prays for partition. Jacob M. Eddleman answered the bill, averring, in substance, that in a partition and settlement among the heirs of Jacob Eddleman, Sr., in 1882, they conveyed to Calvin Eddleman, for his share of his father's land, and also in consideration of his agreement to take care of the widow during her life and bury her at her death, the W. 2 of the S. W. 4 of section 35, township 13 S., range 1 E. of the third principal meridian; that at the time of making the deed it was intended to include and convey the 2.11-acre tract, and to exclude a 2-acre tract that had been previously conveyed off the south part of the east side of said W. 2 of the S. W. 14 to one Sowers, but that the scrivener who wrote the deed omitted to mention and describe said two small tracts. The answer avers that said 2.11-acre tract has been for more than 50 years, and still is, fenced and In 1907 complainant bought 12 acres off inclosed with the said W. 2 of the S. W. 4; the north end of the Sowers 80, and when that at the time the deed was made to Cal- it was surveyed the west line of the 80 was vin Eddleman the possession of the 2.11-acre located west of the east line of the Eddletract was delivered to him; that he remain- man inclosure. Complainant claims that up ed in undisputed possession of and claimed to that time it was not known that the to own it until his death in 1891; that after Eddleman inclosure included any part of the his death his heirs were in possession, claim- E. 1⁄2 of the S. E. 14; that the conveyance ing ownership, until December 28, 1908, of the heirs to Calvin Eddleman, which when they conveyed it to respondent, since described only the W. 2 of the S. W. 14, which time he has been in possession, claim- was intended only to convey said W. 12, and
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 508*) — RECORD-ABSTRACT.
the ordinance directed the roadway to be paved An objection to a paving assessment that to a width of 42 feet, whereas the roadway had been previously established at 38 feet, and the engineer's estimate and recommendation connot be reviewed where the abstract did not tained no reference to a proposed change, would show that the width of the roadway had been changed.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1181, 1182; Dec. Dig. § 508;* Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 137.]
Appeal from Cook County Court; John E. Owens, Judge.
Action by the City of Chicago against Marshall S. Marsh and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
by Jacob Eddleman, Sr., in the E. 1⁄2 of the said quarter section. He does not deny that Calvin Eddleman took possession of the tract in controversy, and that he and those claiming under him have had possession of it for more than 20 years; but he contends that Calvin Eddleman's possession was that of a tenant in common, was for the benefit of his cotenants, and was not adverse to them. If the facts proven sustain that contention the decree was erroneous, and would have to be reversed; but we do not think appellant's position is sustained by the proof. It is probably true that neither Calvin Eddleman nor any of the other heirs knew the exact location of the line between the 80-acre tracts; but it could not have escaped their notice and knowledge that the dividing line between Sowers and Jacob Eddleman, Sr., was not the line dividing the Montgomery, Hart & Smith, of Chicago, two 80's, for Eddleman had inclosed a part for appellants. Philip J. McKenna and of the north end of the east 80, and Sowers George P. Foster, both of Chicago (William part of the south end of the west 80. After H. Sexton, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago, of the exchange between them each owned sub-counsel), for appellee. stantially 80 acres in the quarter section, and we think the proof clearly supports the conclusion that the deed made by the heirs to Calvin Eddleman was understood and intended by both grantors and grantee to convey to Calvin all the land owned by his father in that quarter section. He did not, therefore, take and continue in possession of the land in controversy as a tenant in common for the benefit of his cotenants, but he took it claiming to own it by virtue of the deeds from his cotenants in common, and his possession was adverse to them until his death, and his heirs who succeeded to his title continued in adverse possession until they sold to defendant Jacob M. Eddleman, and he has continued in possession under claim of ownership to the present time. The period of adverse possession under claim of ownership of the tract of land in controversy has been nearly 30 years. This, under all the authorities too familiar to require their citation, is a complete bar to the claim of the complainant.
The decree of the chancellor, dismissing the bill for want of equity, was right; and it is affirmed.
DUNN, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cook county overruling the legal objections of the appellants and confirming an assessment for the cost of paving Belmont avenue, in the city of Chicago.
The first objection argued is that the estimate of the engineer was insufficient as to the construction of new catch-basins, the adjusting of catch-basins, and constructing and connecting catch-basin inlets. The identical objections were considered and overruled in City of Chicago v. Underwood, 258 Ill. 116, 101 N. E. 261.
 The only other objection argued is that the ordinance directed the roadway to be paved to a width of 42 feet, whereas the roadway had been previously established at 38 feet, while the estimate of the engineer and the recommendation of the board of local improvements contains no reference to the proposed change.
 The abstract does not show that this objection was made in the county court or that the width of the roadway was changed. Its width prior to the ordinance does not appear.
(259 Ill. 68)
CITY OF CHICAGO v. MARSH et al. (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.) 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 508*)-OBJEC-| TIONS NOT MADE AT TRIAL.
Where the abstract on appeal did not show that an objection to a local improvement assessment was made in the county court, it would not be reviewed on appeal.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1181, 1182; Dec. Dig. § 508;* Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. 8 137.]
(259 Ill. 211)
CITY OF BENTON v. BLAKE et al. (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.) 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 507*)-LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS-CONFIRMATION OF CERTIFI
CATE OF COST-FINDINGS-REVIEW.
Under Laws 1903, p. 105, § 84, declaring that the order of the county court in proceedings to confirm the certificate of the cost of a local improvement shall be conclusive on the parties, an order of confirmation is final on the question whether the improvement conforms
substantially to the ordinance and cannot be reviewed by appeal or writ of error.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1178, 1179; Dec. Dig. 507.*1
2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 760*) - LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS -CONFIRMATION OF CERTIFICATE OF COSTS-ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.
Where error was assigned to the court's holding that the certificate of completion as to the cost of an improvement was true, and the only reference thereto in appellant's brief was a statement that the various sums which had been paid out of the assessment fund to persons named, amounting to a specified sum, and the extras paid to another amounting to a specified sum, were unlawfully paid and should be credited back to the assessment fund, without any reasons to support the claim, the statement was no more than the assignment
and cannot be considered.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. $ 3095; Dec. Dig. § 760.*]
Appeal from Franklin County Court; Thomas J. Layman, Judge.
Proceedings by the City of Benton against W. B. Blake and others for confirmation and approval of the cost of a local improvement in the City of Benton. From a judgment of confirmation, defendants appeal. Affirmed. W. F. Dillon, of Benton, for appellants. A. H. Baer, of Belleville, for appellee.
COOKE, C. J. This is an appeal from an order of the county court of Franklin county confirming and approving the certificate of cost of a local improvement in the city of Benton and finding that the improvement conforms substantially to the requirements of the original ordinance for its construction.
 The principal complaint is that the improvement does not conform substantially to the requirements of the ordinance. On this question the order of the county court is final and cannot be reviewed by appeal or writ of error. Laws 1903, § 84, p. 105; City of Peoria v. Tichenor, 251 Ill. 495, 96 N. E. 247.
 One of the assignments of error is that the court erred in holding that the certificate of completion as to the cost of the improvement is true and correct. The only reference to this assignment in the appellants' brief is the following: "The various sums which have been paid out of the assessment fund to L. T. Putnam" and various
ground upon which to reverse the judgment. These being the only matters complained of, the judgment of the county court is af
(259 Ill. 219)
PEOPLE, for Use of CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, v. HOLTEN et al.
(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.) 1. COURTS (§ 219*)-JURISDICTION-SUPREME COURT-REVENUE CASES.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction, on direct appeal from the district court, in cases in which the revenue is directly involved, as where the question arises between a recognized official authority or municipality authorized to assess and collect taxes and the taxpayers, but not where the controversy is merely as to what municipality shall receive the money.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 539-542, 545-547, 549, 550, 552573; Dec. Dig. § 219.*]
2. COURTS (§ 219*)-JURISDICTION-SUPREME COURT-CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.
diction, on direct appeal to it, in a suit against The Supreme Court would not have jurisa town tax collector and his sureties to recover an alleged balance of taxes collected, on the ground that the taxpayers are being deprived of their property without due process of law by the retention of the money; the money not being the property of the taxpayers, but being alleged to belong to the city.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 539-542, 545-547, 549, 550, 552-573; Dec. Dig. § 219.*]
3. PLEADING (§ 189*)-DEMURRER-QUESTIONS RAISED.
A demurrer tenders an issue of law upon the facts alleged which are admitted so far as well pleaded, and the question whether taxpayers could sue a tax collector to protect the rights of a city to taxes collected cannot be raised by demurrer.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. § 400; Dec. Dig. § 189.*] 4. TAXATION (§ 570*)-RECOVERY OF TAXESACTIONS-PARTIES-"PERSONS AGGRIEVED."
Taxpayers are not "persons aggrieved," so as to be entitled to sue on a tax collector's bond for their own use under Revenue Act, § 262 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 120), providing aggrieved may prosecute suit against a tax colthat towns, corporate authorities, or persons lector receiving funds for their use by suit on the bond in the name of the people; nor does Rev. St. 1911, c. 24, § 172), authorize such Cities and Villages Act, art. 10, § 4 (Hurd's suit by taxpayers, merely referring to actions brought in the name and for the benefit of the city.
Cent. Dig. §§ 1122-1129; Dec. Dig. § 570.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, 5. PLEADING (§ 382*)-DECLARATION-CON
The facts alleged in a declaration determine its character. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, Dec. Dig. § 382.**]
other persons named, "amounting to $2,415.40, and the extras paid to the Granite City Lime & Cement Company, amounting to $532.92, are unlawfully paid and should be credited back to the assessment fund." With no reasons given to support it, this statement amounts to no more than an assignment of error. If counsel does not have sufficient confidence in his position to point out wherein the court erred in this particu- Suit by the People, for the use of the City lar, he cannot expect us, unaided, to explore of East St. Louis, against Frank Holten and the abstract and the record to find some others. From a judgment sustaining a de
Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County; George A. Crow, Judge.
murrer to the declaration, plaintiff appeals., 201 Ill. 480, 66 N. E. 217; Trustees of Schools Reversed and remanded. v. Board of School Inspectors of Peoria, 208 Ill. 73, 69 N. E. 781; People v. Helt, 203 Ill. 111, 67 N. E. 741.
John Hay, of Belleville, for appellant. Silas Cook, Whitnel, Browning & Gillespie, and Kramer, Kramer & Campbell, all of East St. Louis, for appellees.
CARTWRIGHT, J. This suit was brought in the circuit court of St. Clair county, in the name of the people of the State of Illinois, for the use of the city of East St. Louis, against Frank Holten and the sureties on his official bond as collector of taxes of the town of East St. Louis for the year 1910. The declaration alleged the appointment of Frank Holten to the office of city treasurer of the city of East St. Louis, by which he became ex officio collector of taxes of the town of East St. Louis; that the bond was executed and approved, and that he collected the taxes for the year 1910 levied by said city. The breach assigned was failure to pay over to the city of East St. Louis the sum of $9,147.57, an alleged balance of the city taxes collected by him and in his hands. Twelve of the defendants filed what they called pleas to the jurisdiction of the court; seven joining in one plea and five in another. These pleas challenged the jurisdiction of the court by alleging that certain taxpayers named in the declaration were not authorized to prosecute the suit for the city of East St. Louis, and that the attorney filing the declaration did not have authority to use the name of the city as a party. The plaintiff demurred to these pleas, and the demurrers were sustained. The defendant Frank Holten, who did not join in the pleas, filed a motion to dismiss the suit upon the same grounds on which the other defendants disputed the jurisdiction. His motion overruled. Thereupon the defendants filed a general and special demurrer to the declaration, which was sustained, and, the plaintiff electing to stand by the declaration, judgment was entered in bar of the action and for costs. This appeal was prosecuted from the judgment.
 The principle on which cases of that kind have been decided is that the controversy must relate to the question whether money demanded belongs to the revenue or not which is precisely the question here. So far as the question whether a suit relates to the revenue is concerned, there is no distinction between money in the hands of a tax collector claimed as revenue and the same money demanded from the original taxpayers as revenue. The question to be determined in this suit is whether a certain sum alleged to be in the hands of the collector is revenue of the city of East St. Louis. If it is not revenue plaintiff cannot succeed in the action, but if it is revenue it belongs in the treasury of the city; and there is a plain distinction between this case and suits between different taxing authorities claiming money admitted to be revenue. The motion was resisted on constitutional grounds, but there is no constitutional question involved. This court would not have jurisdiction on the ground that taxpayers are deprived of their property without due process of law by the retention of the money by the collector. It is not the case of an unauthorized tax under which the property of individuals may be seized for an illegal purpose, and the money claimed is not the property of the taxpayers but has been paid over to the collector as taxes, and is alleged to be the property of the city in his hands. The motion is denied.
The special grounds of demurrer alleged were the same as those which were presented by the pleas and motion. The declaration alleged that the people of the state of Illinois, by certain named persons alleged to be taxpayers, for the use of the city of East St. Louis, complained of the defendants, and the special causes of demurrer were that those persons had no authority to prosecute and maintain the suit. That is the only basis of  A motion was made by the appellees to any argument in this court in support of the It is not transfer the cause to the Appellate Court for ruling sustaining the demurrer. the Fourth district on the ground that the contended that the facts alleged in the appeal does not involve any question giving declaration do not constitute a good cause of this court jurisdiction, and we reserve the action, but it is argued that the suit is being motion to the hearing of the case. This prosecuted by persons who have no right to court has jurisdiction on direct appeal in institute it. There is no question of the legal cases relating to the revenue, and this means capacity of the people of the state of Illinois that the revenue must be directly affected. to sue on the bond for the use of the city of It is directly involved where the question | East St. Louis, nor any objection to the real arises between a recognized authority or parties to the suit. municipality authorized by law to assess and collect taxes and those of whom the taxes are demanded. Where the controversy is merely over the question what municipality shall have money derived from revenue, and there is no question whether the money is revenue or not, this court has no jurisdiction by direct appeal, because the suit does not relate
[3, 4] A demurrer tenders an issue of law upon the facts alleged in the pleading demurred to, which, so far as well pleaded, are admitted to be true. It is an objection that the pleading against which it is directed is insufficient, in law, to support the action or defense, and that the demurrant should not therefore be required to further plead, and in