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dishonest practices on the part of the licensee, is not invalid as delegating legislative power

to the board.

evidence was in regard to certain premises lessness in the construction of buildings, or for on Forty-Seventh street which were conveyed in exchange for the property here in controversy and constituted a part of the considera-` tion of the conveyance to the appellant. Appellee's title to these premises was immaterial and the appellant was not prejudiced by the ruling.

Decree affirmed.

(259 Ill. 15.)

KLAFTER v STATE BOARD OF EXAM-
INERS OF ARCHITECTS.

(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.)
1. LICENSES (§ 5*)-POLICE POWER-REGULA-
TION OF PURSUITS AND PROFESSIONS.

The state may, in the exercise of the police power, regulate pursuits and professions, and demand that persons engaged therein shall have a prescribed degree of skill and learning as determined by a board authorized to require an examination and to issue a license to those qualified.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 4, 19; Dec. Dig. § 5.*]

2. LICENSES (§ 38*)-POLICE POWER-REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS.

A revocation of a license granted under statutory authority to one engaging in a profession is but an exercise of the state's discretion, under its police power, as to whether the person holding the license is properly qualified to continue in the profession.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 74, 75; Dec. Dig. § 38.*] 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 318*)-LICENSESREVOCATION-"DUE PROCESS OF LAW." "Due process of law" in revoking a license, issued as a condition precedent to the right to pursue a profession, need not necessarily consist of judicial proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction; but the statute may authorize a state board possessing authority to examine applicants and issue licenses to revoke a license on specified grounds after a hearing, since a general law, administered in its regular course according to the form of procedure suitable to the nature of the case, conformable to fundamental rules of right and affecting all persons alike, is due process of law, and since the purpose of the constitutional requirement is to protect every person in his personal and property rights against the arbitrary action of any person or authority.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 949; Dec. Dig. § 318.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2227-2256; vol. 8, p. 7644.] 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ($ 79*) - JUDICIAL POWER-REVOCATION OF LICENSE BY STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS.

A revocation by the state board of examiners of architects of an architect's license issued to one is not an exercise of a judicial function, which does not include cases where judgment is exercised as incident to the execution of ministerial power.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 142; Dec. Dig. § 79.*]

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 62*)-LICENSES (§ 7*)-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY-STATUTES.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 91-102; Dec. Dig. § 62;* Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-15, 19; Dec. Dig. § 7.*1

6. STATUTES (§ 47*)-VALIDITY-CERTAINTY"GROSS INCOMPETENCY OR RECKLESSNESS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS.'

The provision is not invalid for uncertainty, since the words "gross incompetency or recklessness in the construction of buildings" imply that the license shall not be revoked for trivial causes, but only for some act that in the common judgment will be considered grossly incompetent or reckless.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 47; Dec. Dig. § 47.*] 7. LICENSES (8 38*)-ARCHITECT'S LICENSES— REVOCATION-GROUNDS.

The action of the state board of examin

ers of architects in revoking a license under the provision of Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 10a, $10, authorizing the revocation of a license for gross incompetency or recklessness in the construction of buildings, or for dishonest practices, must not be arbitrary, but only for cause supported by evidence submitted on hearing on charges; and where the charge is not sufficiently specific, the board, on request, must require a more specific charge; and where the discretionary power of the board is exercised with manifest injustice the courts will interfere.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 74, 75; Dec. Dig. § 38.*] 8. STATUTES (§ 64*)-INVALIDITY IN PARTEFFECT.

The invalidity of so much of the statute as gives the state board of examiners of architects discretion as to whether a new license shall be issued to one whose license has been revoked does not render invalid the entire act governing the licensing of architects, and authorizing the revocation of any license for gross incompetency or recklessness in the construction of buildings.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-66, 195; Dec. Dig. § 64.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County;
William E. Dever, Judge.

State Board of Examiners of Architects.
Suit by David Saul Klafter against the
From a decree of dismissal, complainant ap-
peals. Affirmed.

Le Bosky & Plumb and W. A. Bowles, all of
Chicago, for appellant. P. J. Lucey, Atty.
Gen., and Charles E. Pope, of Chicago (Henry
R. Baldwin, of Chicago, of counsel), for ap-
pellee.

CARTER, J. This was a bill filed by appellant in the superior court of Cook county, praying for an injunction restraining the state board of examiners of architects from proceeding with his trial upon a citation issued by said board and served upon him, requiring him to appear in open public trial on certain charg

es on January 24, 1913. An answer was filed, and after a hearing the chancellor dismissed the bill for want of equity, at complainant's costs. The appeal has been brought direct to this court, on the ground that constitutional questions are involved.

The provision of Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 10a, § 10, providing for the licensing of architects, which declares that any license granted by the state board of examiners of architects may be revoked for gross incompetency or reckFor other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

The bill alleged that appellant had been engaged in the practice of architecture as a profession in Illinois under a license issued to him in 1907 by said board of examiners and yearly renewals thereof; that section 10 of the act providing for the licensing of architects and regulating the practice of architecture as a profession, in force July 1, 1897, as amended, is void, especially that part which provides that "any license so granted may be revoked by unanimous vote of the state board of examiners of architects for gross incompetency or recklessness in the construction of buildings, or for dishonest practices on the part of the holder thereof," etc. Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 87.

Counsel contend that appellant's right, as a licensed architect, to practice his profession is inherent, protected by the Constitutions of this state and of the United States, and that he cannot be deprived of this right, except by judicial proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction; that the state board of examiners of architects under said act is not a judicial body. They further argue that the above provision of section 10 of the act is void for uncertainty. Practically every argument urged by counsel on these questions has been passed on adversely to their contentions by this court in People v. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 995, where this court held constitutional a provision of the Medical Practice Act authorizing the state board of health to refuse or to revoke licenses to practice medicine. Counsel, however, state that they do not seek to have that opinion overruled, but think it can be fairly distinguished, both on the law and the facts, from the case now under consideration. We do not agree with them on either of these points.

[1] It is conceded that this court, in People v. Lower, 251 Ill. 527, 96 N. E. 346, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1203, has held this statute is not in violation of the state or federal Constitution as to due process of law in requiring an examination and license before one can practice architecture in this state, but it is argued that the authority to require an examination to obtain a license is entirely different from depriving one of that right after he has been duly licensed; that the latter act is a penalty; and that one cannot be deprived of his right to follow his profession, after he has been once duly licensed, other than by a judgment of forfeiture by a judicial tribunal. The right of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people by prescribing such regulations as will secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, and to that end to exact in many pursuits and professions a certain degree of skill and learning, is upheld by the great weight of authority as an exercise of the police power of the state. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231, 32 L. Ed. 623; People v.

[2] This court held in People v. Apfelbaum, supra, that there was no distinction between granting a license and revoking one already granted; that each was the exercise of the police power; that the object in both cases was to exclude an incompetent or unworthy person from the practice of his profession. See, also, to the same effect, State v. State Medical Examining Board, 34 Minn. 387, 26 N. W. 123; Meffert v. Packer, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 811, affirmed in 195 U. S. 625, 25 Sup. Ct. 790, 49 L. Ed. 350. license is not revoked as a punishment, but in the exercise of the state's discretion, under its police power, as to whether the person holding the license is properly qualified to continue in his profession. Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct. 573, 42 L. Ed. 1002.

[3] Appellant's argument that due process of law in revoking a license must necessarily consist of judicial proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be sustained. This court said in People v. Apfelbaum, supra, on page 27 of 251 Ill., on page 998 of 95 N. E.: "Due process of law does not necessarily imply judicial proceedings. Orderly proceedings according to established rules which do not violate fundamental right must be observed, but there is no vested right in any particular remedy or form of proceeding. A general law, administered in its regular course according to the form of procedure suitable and proper to the nature of the case, conformable to the fundamental rules of right and affecting all persons alike, is due process." The authorities in other jurisdictions are in accord with this holding. "Due process is not necessarily judicial process." Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. 390, 47 L. Ed. 563. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the decision of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice must be held to be due process of law." Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232. "Due process of law in each particular case means such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs." Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) 506. "Due process of law" is equivalent to "the law of the land." The purpose of the constitutional requirement as to due process of law is to protect every person in his personal and property rights against the arbitrary action of any person or authority.

[4] A revocation by the state board of examiners of architects of appellant's license would not be the exercise by that body of

facts and apply the law to the facts when as- [ the law shall be, and conferring an authority certained often devolves upon other depart- or discretion as to its execution, to be exerments of government than the judiciary. Judgment and discretion are required often of every public official. It would be difficult to draw the precise line separating the judicial from other departments of government. France v. State, 57 Ohio St. 1, 47 N. E. 1041. No one, so far as we are aware, has ever attempted it. Official duties are, in general, classed under three heads: Executive, legislative, and judicial. Such classification is not exact, and the duties of many officers cannot be exclusively arranged under any of these three heads. 2 Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) 752. Judicial power does not apply to cases where judgment is exercised as incident to the execution of ministerial power. Owners of Lands v. People, 113 Ill. 296. The granting or revocation of a license by a state board similar to the one here in question was held by this court in People v. Apfelbaum, supra, not to be the exercise of judicial power, as that term is understood in reference to the distribution of the powers of government. See, to the same effect, among many other authorities: People v. Board of Dental Examiners, 110 Ill. 180; State v. State Medical Examining Board, supra; Kettles v. People, 221 Ill. 221, 77 N. E. 472; Douglas v. People, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N. E. 341, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1116, 116 Am. St. Rep. 162; City of Aurora v. Schoeberlein, 230 Ill. 496, 82 N. E. 860; People v. City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 416, 84 N. E. 1044; Meffert v. Packer, supra; Kennedy v. State Board, 145 Mich. 241, 108 N. W. 730, 9 Ann. Cas. 125; State v. Goodier, 195 Mo. 551, 93 S. W. 928; People v. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah, 291, 39 Pac. 918; Spurgeon v. Rhodes, 167 Ind. 1, 78 N. E. 228; Bradley v. City of Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 33 Sup. Ct. 318, 57 L. Ed. 603. [5, 6] The further argument is made that the statute is void for uncertainty, in that it does not define what is meant by "gross incompetency or recklessness in the construction of buildings," the portion of the statute on which the charge against appellant was founded. It is most earnestly insisted that such a charge is so uncertain as to be void, as it does not advise him so that he can prepare for his defense. This argument finds support in certain decisions of the California and Kentucky courts. The weight of authority, however, in other jurisdictions is in favor of the validity of statutes with wording similar to the one here in question. See review of authorities in note to Hewitt v. State Board (Cal.) 7 Ann. Cas. 750. The argument on this point seems to be based partially on the ground that the Legislature cannot delegate power to the state board of examiners of architects. We do not think the power to legislate is conferred by this act upon that board. "The true distinction is between delegation of power to make the

cised under and in pursuance of the law." Sutherland on Stat. Const. § 68; People v. Grand Trunk Western Railway Co., 232 Ill. 292, 83 N. E. 839; State v. Briggs, 45 Or. 366, 77 Pac. 750, 78 Pac. 361, 2 Ann. Cas. 424, and note; Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N. E. 718. This court, in People v. Apfelbaum, supra, construed a statute practically as general in its wording as not void for uncertainty. This court has held that under the City Civil Service Law it was not required, in advance, to specify in written rules every case which would be deemed cause for removal. Joyce v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 466, 75 N. E. 184; Kammann v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 63, 78 N. E. 16. In People v. Board of Dental Examiners, supra, we held that the meaning of the word "reputable" was not so uncertain as to make the law void; that whether a dental college was reputable was a question of fact to be decided by the board. In People v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 17 N. E. 786, in construing a statute regulating the practice of medicine, it was held that the words "unprofessional or dishonorable conduct" must be construed to mean some act or conduct that would in the common judg ment be deemed unprofessional or dishon orable. Manifestly the court assumed that those words were not so general as to make the statute void for uncertainty. In Block v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, page 263, 87 N. E. 1011, page 1015 (130 Am. St. Rep. 219), it was argued that an ordinance which provided that the chief of police could prohibit the exhibition of any obscene or immoral picture fixed no standard by which the chief of police could act. The court said: "Manifestly it would be impossible to specify in an ordinance every picture or particular variety of picture which would be considered immoral or obscene, and no definition could be formulated which would afford a better standard than the words of the ordinance." The same reasoning applies to the words "gross incompetency or recklessness in the construction of buildings." These words clearly imply that the license shall not be revoked for trivial causes. What actions or conduct of an architect will bring him within the meaning of these words must be left to the sound discretion of the state board. It must be some act or conduct that in the common judgment would be considered grossly incompetent or reckless. It is a practical impossibility to set out in a statute, in detail, every act which would justify the revoca. tion of a license. The requirements of the statute can only be stated in general terms and a reasonable discretion reposed in the officials charged with its enforcement. The statute in question is not void for uncertainty.

[7] The action of the board in revoking a

ing material, and an employé engaged in mov
A driver in a coal mine, engaged in remov-
ing a water car, used to sprinkle the tracks and
entries in the mine, are not, as a matter of
law, fellow servants.

Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1034, 1045, 1051, 1052,
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and
1054-1067; Dec. Dig. § 287.*]
3. NEGLIGENCE (§ 136*)-CONTRIBUTORY NEG-
LIGENCE-QUESTION FOR JURY.

Whether one confronted with a sudden

for cause only, and based upon evidence sub-12. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 287*)-FELLOW mitted. People v. McCoy, supra; People v. SERVANTS-WHO ARE. Apfelbaum, supra. The statute here requires 20 days' notice to the holder of the license before it is revoked, as to the character of the charge and the time and place of meeting of the board, and he is also entitled to subpoena witnesses and be heard in person or by counsel. If the charge against the holder of a license, on a hearing such as this, is not sufficiently specific to permit him to prepare properly his defense, it is the duty of the board of examiners, on request of the holder of the license or his counsel, to require the charge to be made more specific. If the discretionary power of the board is exercised with manifest injustice, the courts will interfere when it is clearly shown that the discretion has been abused. Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners v. People, 123 Ill. 227, 13 N. E. 201; People v. Healy, 230 Ill. 280, 82 N. E. 599, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.)

603.

[8] Appellant further contends that section 10 is unconstitutional, in that it gives the state board discretion as to whether a new license shall be issued to one whose license has been revoked. That question is not involved in this case, as appellant has no grievance in this respect. Even if, in this particular, the provision could be regarded as unconstitutional, we would not hold the entire act for that reason void. Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84, 11 N. E. 881; Kettles v. People, supra; Brand v. Brand, 252 Ill. 134, 96 N. E. 918. We therefore do not find it necessary to discuss that question.

No reasons have been suggested, and none have occurred to us, which require us to hold that any of the provisions of the statute questioned in this proceeding are in violation of either the state or federal Constitution. The decree of the superior court will therefore be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

(259 Ill. 126)

LOESCHER v. CONSOLIDATED COAL CO. (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT (§§ 137, 185*)-INJURY TO SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANTS-NEG

LIGENCE.

Where a mine boss directed a driver in the mine to go into an entry with his cars and remove material, and directed employés to move a water car, used to sprinkle the tracks and entries, he must exercise reasonable care to see that the employés operating the water car place it far enough away from the tracks used by the driver to avoid any danger of a collision; and where he fails to do so, and the driver is injured in consequence thereof, the employer may not escape liability on the theory that the driver and the employés were fellow servants.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 269, 270, 273, 274, 277, 278, 385-421; Dec. Dig. §§ 137, 185.*]

peril acted with such care as a reasonable man would have used under the circumstances, and was not guilty of contributory negligence, is ordinarily for the jury.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 277-353; Dec. Dig. § 136.*1 4. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 289*)-INJURY TO SERVANT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE QUESTION FOR JURY.

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Whether a driver in a coal mine, engaged in removing material in the mine, was guilty of contributory negligence, precluding a recovery for injuries received on jumping from his car, held, under the evidence, for the jury.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1089, 1090, 1092-1132; Dec. Dig. § 289.*]

5. TRIAL (§ 260*)-INSTRUCTIONS-REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS COVERED BY THE CHARGE GIVEN.

It is not error to refuse a requested charge substantially covered by instructions given. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 651-659; Dec. Dig. § 260.*1 6. TRIAL (§ 252*)-INSTRUCTIONS EVIDENCE. uncontradicted testimony is properly refused. A requested instruction in conflict with the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 505, 596-612; Dec. Dig. § 252.*]

Error to Appellate Court, Fourth District, on appeal from City Court of East St. Louis; M. Millard, Judge.

Action by Max Loescher against the Consolidated Coal Company. There was a judgment of the Appellate Court (173 Ill. App. 526) affirming a judgment of the trial court after requiring a remittitur, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Wise, Keefe & Wheeler, of East St. Louis, (Mastin & Sherlock, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error. Webb & Webb, of East St. Louis, for defendant in error.

CARTER, J. Defendant in error brought this suit against plaintiff in error in the city Court of East St. Louis to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while in the latter's employ in its coal mine in Macoupin county. The trial resulted in a verdict of $5,000, on which judgment was rendered. On appeal the Appellate Court of the Fourth District required a remittitur of $1,500, and affirmed the judgment The case has been of the lower court.

brought here on petition for certiorari.

The alleged injury occurred on the night of December 17, 1910. Defendant in error was a driver in the coal mine on the night in question, and was directed by the night boss

It is first contended that the proof does not show that the master knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care could have known, that the water car was on the track in such a way as to cause the accident; that the night boss was never closer to it than 60 or 70 feet. With this we cannot agree. The evidence on this question justified submitting the case to the jury.

[1, 2] It is next urged that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. The weight of the evidence tended to show that defendant in error had gone into the first west entry with his cars by the direc tion of the night boss, Powell, who was vice principal of plaintiff in error, and that the moving of the water car and the empty car at the point of the accident was done under Powell's direction. The water car was left in a place where it was dangerous, while it remained there, to any one who came out of the west entry on a car. With Powell's knowledge of the situation, it cannot be said that reasonable care on his part did not require that he should see that the men operating the water car should place it further away from the junction of the tracks, where there would have been no danger of a collision with the cars of defendant in error. This being true, there is no question of fellow servant in this record. Furthermore, if that question were in the record, we do not think this court would be justified in holding, on the proof, under the rule laid down by this court as to fellow servants, that the men who were in charge of and moving the water car were fellow servants of defendant in error. Linquist v. Hodges, 248 Ill. 491, 94 N. E. 94; Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302, 34 Am. Rep. 168.

to remove certain dirt from what is called in error's cars come down out of the west the "first west on the north entry." There entry, and saw the flagging signal given. was in that mine what was called the "main north entry," running north from the shaft bottom, with two railroad tracks laid therein, one called the "empty track" and the other the "loaded track." Some distance north of the shaft bottom an entry called the "first west" branched off, having a track leading into it by a switch from the main north entry. On the occasion in question defendant in error took two cars, to which he hitched a mule by means of a chain, and with four other men proceeded to the place in the first west entry, where he had been directed by the night boss, Powell, to load the cars with dirt. He used no lines, but controlled the mule by speaking to it. After the cars were loaded, defendant in error drove out of the entry, riding on the front end of the first car; three of the men who assisted him riding on the second car and the other on the first car. As they went down the grade from the west entry, he "spragged" some of the wheels with pieces of wood, to slacken the speed of the cars. As the west north entry nears the junction with the main north entry, there is a short curve in the track. As the defendant in error came around the curve, he saw a light, giving him a flagging signal, 10 or 15 feet in front of him. He immediately called "whoa" to the mule, which was then going at a fast walk. As the mule did not stop, he jumped off of the car, and at the same time the mule turned around, in the same direction, and shoved defendant in error down in such a way that his left hand was caught under one of the wheels and crushed in such a manner that he lost the first finger at the second joint, the second finger entirely, while the third finger was broken at the first joint, and remains stiff. The wrist was also injured in such a way as to become stiff. The evidence tends to show that a water car, used for sprinkling the tracks and entries, was standing on the track in the north entry not far from the entrance to the west entry. It was not there at the time defendant in error went into the west entry. The man who flagged defendant in error's cars was 10 or 15 feet north of the water car at the time he gave the signal. Defendant in error testified he did not see the water car at the time he jumped, but only the signal. There is also some evidence tending to show that about three minutes before the accident the night boss had been told that an empty car stood on the track in the north entry, which prevented the water car from passing, and that he gave directions to switch the empty car into the east entry. In the meantime the water car was left standing near the mouth of the west entry, and apparently just after switching the empty car the accident occurred. The night boss was still

[3, 4] Plaintiff in error further argues that defendant in error was guilty of contributory negligence in jumping from the car when he did. When a person is confronted with a sudden peril, he cannot be expected to act with the same degree of caution and presence of mind as one who has full opportunity for the exercise of his judgment. Ordinarily it rests with the jury to say whether he acted with sufficient promptness and with such care for his personal safety in extricating himself from the danger in question as a reasonable man should have used under the circumstances.

Asmossen v. Swift & Co., 243 Ill. 93, 90 N. E. 250; Wesley City Coal Co. v. Healer, 84 Ill. 126. On this record the question of the contributory negligence of defendant in error was properly submitted to the jury.

[5, 6] Plaintiff in error contends that the court erred in refusing three instructions which it requested. Two of these instruc tions, so far as they properly covered the

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