sense be directly in issue and present "a lates the formal steps in a judicial proceeding; the legal rules which direct the course of question which the court was compelled to proceeding to bring parties into the court, and decide." Sanford v. Kane, supra. Further-the course of the court after they are brought more, under the plea of estoppel in pais no judgment could be entered affecting permanently any interests to real estate.

practice of the reviewing court and not of the municipal court.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 110, 111; Dec. Dig. § 98.*] 4. STATUTES (§ 98*)-SPECIAL LAWS GOVERNING WRITS OF ERROR-CONSTITUTIONALITY. A contention that writs of error are new suits and may be made subject to valid statutes of limitation particular in their application, and that therefore section 23, Municipal Court Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 37, § 286), prescribing a shorter limitation for writs of error to that court than to other courts, is not in conflict with Const. art. 6, § 29, requiring uniform practice in all courts, since it is the limitation in favor of all persons recovering judgments in municipal courts and applies to all courts of review, cannot be sustained. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 110, 111; Dec. Dig. § 98.*]

Appeal from Branch D Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge.

Action by Peter M. Hoffman, for use of Chicago Gravel Company, against Jennie S. Paradis and others. Judgment for the plaintiff, who sued out writ of error, in the Appellate Court of the First District. Writ of error dismissed, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Ullmann, Hoag & Davidson, of Chicago, for appellant. Gustav E. Beerly and E. C. Mapledoram, both of Chicago (Lewis Rinaker, of Chicago, and Ellis S. Chesbrough, of counsel), for appellees.

CARTER, J. Appellant sued appellees in the municipal court of Chicago in a suit.in replevin and recovered judgment for $30 and costs, January 20, 1912. July 8th of the same year a writ of error was sued out by appellant in the Appellate Court for the First District to review the judgment. On motion of the appellees the writ of error was dismissed by the Appellate Court for want of jurisdiction, because it was sued out more than 30 days after the rendition of the judgment in the municipal court. A certificate of importance having been granted by the Appellate Court, the case has been brought here on appeal.

[1] Section 23 of the Municipal Court Act provides, as to cases of the fourth and fifth classes, that "the time within which a writ of error may be sued out in any such case shall be limited to 30 days after the entry of the final order or judgment complained of.” Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 717. The sole question presented for consideration on this appeal is whether the above provision of the Municipal Court Act limiting the suing out of a writ of error to 30 days is constitutional. [2, 3] Section 117 of the Practice Act provides that a writ of error may be sued out within three years "from the rendition of the decree or judgment complained of." Hurd's Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 1787. Section 29 of article 6 of the Constitution requires that the jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all

.

courts of the same class or grade must be general and of uniform operation. The jurisdiction of the several courts, the modes by which and the extent to which the controversy may be transferred for trial or for review from one tribunal to another, are included in what is called the "practice" of the courts. Lynn v. Lynn, 160 Ill. 307, 43 N. E. 482; Fleischman v. Walker, 91 Ill. 318. In law, the word "practice" is used as meaning that which regulates the formal steps in an action or other judicial proceeding; "those legal rules which direct the course of proceeding to bring parties into the court and the course of the court after they are brought in." 31 Cyc. 1153, and cases cited; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 443, 27 L. Ed. 506; 1 Bishop on Crim. Proc. (3d Ed.) § 2. Manifestly, the bringing of a case on a writ of error from the trial court to the Appellate or Supreme Court must be included within the term "practice." To compel cases to be brought on writ of error from the municipal court to the Appellate or Supreme Court within 30 days after the rendition of the final order or judgment, and to permit similar cases from all other trial courts to be so brought within three years, would be in violation of the provisions of said section 29 of article 6 of the Constitution, requiring uniform practice and procedure in the Appellate and Supreme Courts. This constitutional provision requires that all laws relating to courts shall operate uniformly on all cases in a particular Under section 34 of article 4 of the court. Constitution the Legislature is authorized to establish a different practice and procedure in the municipal court, only, from other courts of record in the state. But the suing out of a writ of error is a new suit (People v. Cosmopolitan Fire Ins. Co., 246 Ill. 442, 92 N. E. 922), and the practice and procedure in reference thereto are a part of the practice and procedure of the court out of which the Said section 34 of writ of error is sued. article 4 does not in any way apply to the practice or procedure in suing out a writ of error from the Appellate or Supreme Court. This court has several times held that various provisions of said section 23 of the Municipal Court Act requiring a writ of error to be sued out in accordance therewith were in conflict with the Constitution; that such writ of error must be sued out of this court or the Appellate Court under the provisions of the general Practice Act. People v. Cosmopolitan Ins. Co., supra; People v. Hibernian Banking Ass'n, 245 Ill. 522, 92 N. E. 305; David v. Commercial Mutual Accident Co., 243 Ill. 43, 90 N. E. 285; Clowry v. Holmes, 238 Ill. 577, 87 N. E. 303. Unless those cases were wrongly decided, section 23 of the Municipal Court Act, in so far as it limits to 30 days the time within which a writ of error may be sued out to review a final order or judgment of the municipal court, must be held unconstitu

Blum & Blum, of Chicago, for appellant. Kaplan & Kaplan, of Chicago (Frank & Lurie, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

tional and void. A further consideration of App. 664), and plaintiff appeals. Reversed the questions involved leads us to reaffirm and remanded, with directions. the principles set forth in those decisions. Counsel for appellant rely on Hosking V. Southern Pacific Co., 243 Ill. 320, 90 N. E. 669. The constitutionality of this particular provision of the Municipal Court Act was not passed CARTER, J. The appellee herein recovupon in that case; that question not being ered from the appellant, in an action brought necessary to a decision of the case, as the in the municipal court of Chicago under secwrit of error had been sued out within the tion 23 of the Municipal Court Act, a judg30 days. It was plainly stated, however, in ment for $188. Appellant sued out a writ that case, that the jurisdiction of the Appel- of error from the Appellate Court for the late Court to review judgments of the municFirst District. That court, on motion, disipal court did not depend upon the Munic-missed the writ because it was not sued out ipal Court Act.

within 30 days after the entry of the judgment. A certificate of importance was granted.

The sole objection urged here is that the 30-day limitation for suing out writs of error under said section 23, of the Municipal Court act is unconstitutional and void. This court has held said limitation unconstitutional in Homan v. Paradis, 102 N. E. 253.

The judgment of the Appellate Court must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to hear and dispose of the case upon its merits.

[4] It is argued that, as the writs of error are new suits, they can be held subject to valid statutes of limitation particular in their application, under the rule laid down by this court in International Bank v. Jenkins, 104 Ill. 143, and Id., 107 Ill. 291; that by similar reasoning a statute making a limitation in favor of persons recovering judgments in the municipal court of Chicago might be held valid as applying to all courts of review alike. It was there held that under a United States statute the limitation of two years as to suits by or against an assignee in bankruptcy would apply in any court where the question was raised. The basis of those decisions was that the federal statute governed; the court saying in International Bank v. Jenkins, 107 Ill. on page 294: "Congress had the unquestioned power to adopt this provi-1. sion governing the action of the states and their courts, because the power had been conferred on it by the federal Constitution. This is, then, a rule by which the state courts are governed and to which the state statutes must yield." That reasoning is not applicable here.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed, and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to hear and dispose of the case upon its merits.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(259 Ill. 237.)

GOLDSTEIN v. MULLER.
(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.)
STATUTES (§ 98*)-MUNICIPAL COURTS-AP-
PEAL-TIME-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITA-

TION.

The 30-day limitation imposed by Municipal Court Act, § 23 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 37, § 286) for suing out a writ of error is unconstitutional.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 110, 111; Dec. Dig. § 98.*]

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Rufus F. Robinson, Judge.

Action by Morris Goldstein against Israel Muller. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff sued out writ of error from the Appellate Court, which was dismissed (173 Ill.

beas corpus proceedings falsely states to the Where the custodian of a prisoner in hacourt that he has no other warrant for the arrest of the prisoner, and, after attempting to serve a warrant thereafter, states to the court that he had the warrant issued for the purpose of arresting the prisoner if he were discharged in the habeas corpus proceedings, he is guilty of direct contempt in the presence of the court, and cannot complain that the contempt proceedings were instituted by an attorney appointed by the court, and not in the name of, or sworn to, by the state's attorney, since the court could have committed him for contempt without any formal proceedings.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contempt, Cent. Dig. §§ 140-142; Dec. Dig. § 52.*] 2. CONTEMPT (§ 52*)-POWER TO PUNISH-JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON.

The fact that the custodian was not the person named in the writ of habeas corpus is not material to the jurisdiction of the court to the prisoner in court in answer to the writ. punish for the contempt, where he produced

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contempt, Cent. Dig. §§ 140-142; Dec. Dig. § 52.*]

Error to Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Kickham Scanlan, Judge.

Proceedings by the People of the State of Illinois against Edward S. Gard for contempt of court. Judgment against the defendant, and he brings error. Affirmed. For opinion of affirmance of Appellate Court, see 175 Ill. App. 486.

James Hartnett, of Chicago, for plaintiff in | bar of the court, but not state's attorney or error. P. J. Lucey, Atty. Gen., Maclay Hoyne, Attorney General, to represent the people in State's Atty., of Chicago, and Arthur R. Roy, a proceeding against plaintiff in error for of Quincy, for the People. contempt of court. On the same day Miller filed a charge, which is called in the briefs FARMER, J. The principal facts in this an information, against plaintiff in error for case are that prior to November 21, 1910, contempt, setting up the facts above stated, William Schubert was arrested and detained but more in detail, and a rule was entered by the police of the city of Chicago on sus- requiring plaintiff in error to show cause by picion of having robbed a man named Bates. December 2d why he should not be adjudged The arrest and detention were not by virtue guilty of contempt of court. The hearing of any warrant issued by a court. On said was not finally concluded until February 2, 21st day of November Schubert applied to 1911, when plaintiff in error was adjudged the criminal court, then presided over by guilty of contempt and sentenced to 60 days Judge Scanlan, for a writ of habeas corpus. in jail. He thereupon applied to Judge Petit, The writ was issued, and while it ran against a circuit judge of Cook county, for a writ Leroy T. Steward, general superintendent of of habeas corpus, who issued the writ, and on police, the prisoner was, in response to the the 11th day of February entered an order writ, produced in open court by plaintiff in discharging plaintiff in error from imprisonerror, who at the time orally stated to the ment under and by virtue of the judgment court that Schubert was arrested and detain- and order of commitment in the contempt ed without a warrant because he was sus- proceeding. An original proceeding was then pected of the crime of robbery; that the wit-instituted in this court in the name of the ness who was depended upon to identify him was out of the state, but, if given time, he (plaintiff in error) would secure the witness who was expected to make the identification, Thereupon Judge Scanlan continued the hearing to the 23d day of November and remanded the prisoner. On the 22d day of November the plaintiff in error made complaint to and caused to be issued by the municipal court two warrants against Schubert-one for vagrancy and one for adultery. He appears to have given one of these warrants to a police officer named Loftus, and kept the other one in his possession. On the 23d day of November plaintiff in error again produced the prisoner in court in obedience to the writ of habeas corpus. The witness by whom it was expected to identify Schubert as having committed the crime of robbery. was present, but was unable to identify him. When the identification failed to be made, Judge Scanlan inquired of plaintiff in error if he had any other charges against Schubert. Plaintiff in error answered that he had not, by shaking his head in the negative. Thereupon an order was made discharging Schubert, and with a copy or memorandum of the order he and his counsel went to the jail to have the jailer discharge him. Plaintiff in error preceded them to the jail, and there proposed to arrest Schubert under one of the warrants he had sworn out of the municipal court the day before, and which he had had in his possession ever since it was issued. Upon being remonstrated with by Schubert's counsel and told that he was guilty of contempt of court in deceiving the court by his answers to the court's inquiries, he was induced to go with counsel for Schubert before the court, where counsel related what had occurred. adjudged guilty was committed in the presAffidavits of these matters were prepared and sworn to by Schubert and his counsel, and on the 30th of November the court ap

people, upon the relation of the state's attorney, for a writ of mandamus against the sheriff of Cook county, commanding him to apprehend plaintiff in error and deliver him to the jailer, to be imprisoned in accordance with the order and judgment of Judge Scanlan in the contempt proceeding. This court held the record showed Judge Scanlan had jurisdiction to render the judgment and order of commitment, that Judge Petit had no jurisdiction in the habeas corpus proceeding to order the discharge of plaintiff in error, and that the judgment discharging plaintiff in error was absolutely void. The writ of mandamus was issued as prayed. People v. Zimmer, 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529. Afterwards plaintiff in error sued a writ of error out of the Appellate Court for the First District to review the juugment of the criminal court in the contempt proceeding. That court affirmed the judgment, and a further writ of error was sued out of this court.

In his brief plaintiff in error attacks both the judgment of the criminal court in the contempt case and the judgment of this court in the mandamus case; but, as the writ of error only properly brings before us for review the correctness of the judgment of the criminal court, that question only will receive our consideration.

It is insisted the criminal court was not legally constituted because the state's attorney was not present. The placita in the record recites that he was present.

[1] It is also contended contended the judgment should be reversed because the complaint was not sworn to, and was not filed in the name of and prosecuted by the state's attorney. The contempt of which plaintiff in error was

ence of and within the personal knowledge of the court. The complaint so charged, and the judgment so recites fully and in detail.

court in part recites that the court asked | plaintiff in error to purge himself of conplaintiff in error, who was standing within tempt, and in our opinion he failed to do so.

a few feet of him, if he had any other charges against Schubert; that plaintiff in error responded by shaking his head in the negative, meaning and intending the court to understand that he had no further charges or process against the prisoner under which he could or should be held; that the court so understood the action of plaintiff in error and acted accordingly, when, in fact, the latter had the day before caused two warrants to issue from the municipal court for the arrest of Schubert-one for vagrancy and the other for living with a woman in a state of adultery-and had one of the warrants in his possession when he made false answer to the court's inquiry, acting upon which the court discharged Schubert; that plaintiff in error a half hour later, when he appeared before the court at the time Schubert's coun

sel complained of the intention and attempt of plaintiff in error to arrest Schubert under one or both warrants he had caused to be issued the day before, stated to the court that he had said warrants issued for the purpose of arresting Schubert after his discharge if the court discharged him in the habeas corpus proceeding, and that he would have arrested said Schubert had he not been prevented from doing so by Schubert's counsel. Conduct which tends to embarrass or obstruct the court in the administration of justice, or which tends to bring the administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, constitutes a direct cohtempt and is punishable as such. Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 48 N. E. 137, 39 L. R. A. 197. The acts constituting the contempt having been committed in the presence of the court were a direct contempt, and the order of commitment could have been lawfully made without the preliminary proceedings that were had. Tolman v. Jones, 114 Ill. 147, 28 N. E. 464; State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 416, 49 Am. Rep. 257; People ex rel. Greely v. Court of Oyer, 27 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 14; Neel v. State, 9 Ark. 529, 50 Am. Dec. 209; 9 Cyc. 19.

[2] It is also argued that as the writ of habeas corpus was not directed to plaintiff in error, but to the general superintendent of police, the court had no jurisdiction to render the judgment. It is a sufficient answer to say that plaintiff in error appeared in answer to the writ, produced the body of the prisoner in court, and answered as the prisoner's custodian. It was immaterial to the jurisdiction of the court in the contempt proceeding that plaintiff in error was not named in the writ of habeas corpus.

Conveyance Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 30) 6, provides that where by the common law one might become seised in fee tail of land under a conveyance, he should be deemed to be seised thereof for life only, the remainder to pass in fee to the person or persons to whom the estate tail on the death of the first grantee first would pass according to the common law. Held that the intention of the Legrevive conditional fees, with power of the life islature was to abolish estates tail, and not to tenant to alien on the birth of issue and repurchase so as to obtain a fee simple, and to substitute for the fee tail a life estate in the grantook the remainder by the terms of the grant, tee, with remainder in fee simple to those who so that where a deed conveyed property to B. for life, without power to sell or mortgage, their assigns forever, there being living issue with remainder to the heirs of B.'s body and of B. at the time the conveyance was made, the remainder in fee vested in them at once, before B.'s death, and was not contingent. Dig. §§ 358, 359; Dec. Dig. § 127.*]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent.

Error to Circuit Court, McLean County; Colostin D. Myers, Judge.

Suit for partition by Rolland Moore, by his next friend, and others against Herman L. Reddel and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.

T. Fred Laramie and Ode L. Rankin, both of Chicago, for plaintiffs in error. Joseph W. Fifer, of Bloomington, for defendants in error.

CARTWRIGHT, J. The record in this case presents the question whether the remainder limited by a deed from Joshua Brown to the heirs of the body of his son, Marshall Brown, was vested in the children of the grantee before his death, or was contingent, and the decision depends upon the following facts:

On October 5, 1881, Joshua Brown executed the deed conveying the real estate, from and after his death, to Marshall Brown, "to have and to hold to him, the said Marshall Brown, for and during the term of his natural life, but without power to sell, alienate, mortgage or in any manner incumber said estate or render same liable for the debts of said Marshall Brown, with remainder to the heirs of the body of said Marshall Brown and their assigns forever." Joshua Brown died in 1897, and Marshall Brown took possession Ample time and opportunity were given of the land. Marshall Brown was married, *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

The contention that the judgment is erroneous because it appears that plaintiff in error did not by audible words reply to the court's inquiries but only shook his head does not deserve serious consideration.