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er she acquired thereby any independent cause to an injury received by an employé while outof action, cannot be determined in this pro-side the state, since the provisions of the act ceeding. Neither can the question of the collectively disclose a purpose to confine the validity of the check given to her by her hus-operations of the act within the state.
band be settled in this proceeding. It follows that the decree dismissing the bill with costs was right.
Decree affirmed with costs of the appeal.
Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Edward P. Pierce, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act; William S. Gould, employé, B. F. Sturtevant, employer, and the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, insurer. From a decree of the Superior Court, the In re AMERICAN MUT. LIABILITY INS. American Mutual Liability Insurance Com
(215 Mass. 480)
CO. In re GOULD. In re B. F.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. Sept. 12, 1913.)
pany excepts. Exceptions dismissed.
Sawyer, Hardy & Stone, of Boston (Edward C. Stone, of Boston, of counsel), for insurer. Geo. P. Drury, of Boston, for em
1. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 2504, New, vol.
While Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) pt. 3, 11, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14, only requires the bare presentation to the superior court of certified copies of an order or decision of the Industrial Accident Board, it is not improper that a petition be filed setting forth briefly the nature of the questions to be decided.
2. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 250, New, vol. 16 Key-No. Series)-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-Procedure.
In view of the equitable phraseology of the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) as amended by St. 1912, cc. 571, 666, the beneficient purposes of the act, which can be enforced better through the relief afforded by equity, and the character of the proceeding itself, and the parties thereto, causes under the act in court should, in the main, be treated as equitable, rather than legal in nature, procedure, and final disposition.
3. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 6*) — APPEAL WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. Under Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) pt. 3, § 11, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14, providing that any party in interest may present certified copies of an order or decision of the Industrial Accident Board, and all papers connected therewith, to the superior court, whereupon that court shall render a decree in accordance therewith, etc., the suit must be brought to this court by appeal from the decree of the superior court, and not by exceptions, since the act precludes the possibility of exceptions by requiring the superior court to enter a decree.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 22; Dec. Dig. § 6.*] 4. INSURANCE (§ 435*)-WORKMEN'S COMPEN SATION ACT-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY. Since a policy, issued by a mutual liability insurance company under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an employer in this state, insuring all injuries received by its employés, provided only for performance of the requirements and payment of the compensation designated in the act, and did not refer to an accident happening to an employé while outside the state, whether the policy did cover such an accident depended on whether such payment was enjoined by the act.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1144; Dec. Dig. § 435.*] 5. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 872, New, vol. 16 Key-No. Series)-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) as amended by St. 1912, cc. 571, 666, has no extraterritorial effect, and is not applicable
RUGG, C. J. This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, St. 1911, c. 751, and St. 1912, cc. 571 and 666.
 1. At the threshold lies a question of practice. The insurer, being a party in interest, presented its petition to the superior court, together with certified copies of the decision of the Industrial Accident Board. The petition alleges the interest of the employé, employer and insurer, the date of the decision and the insurer's desire to have determined questions of law set out in the decision. Part 3, § 11, as amended by St. 1912, C. 571, § 14, provides that "any party in interest may present certified copies of an order or decision of the board, and
all papers in connection therewith, to the superior court whereupon said Court shall render a decree in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such decree shall, have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court, except that there shall be no appeal therefrom upon questions of fact." While this section does not require anything more than the bare presentation of the copies of the designated proceedings of the Industrial Accident Board, it is not improper that a petition be filed setting forth briefly the nature of the questions to be decided. When the case came on to be heard in the superior court a decree was entered in accordance with the decision of the board. The judge also allowed a bill of exceptions, stating that it was for the purpose of enabling this court to determine the proper manner of bringing before it proceedings of this sort.
 The Workmen's Compensation Act has a procedure all of its own. Where the act is adopted by the parties, a relation arises between the employé and the employer, under which in the event of a personal injury to the employé there shall be speedy ascertainment of the new kind of compensation created by the act, coupled with a voluntary relinquishment by both parties of the right to
tions are taken, there can be no final decree until exceptions are disposed of. The present act, however, requires a decree, which in the ordinary case must be final in its nature, to be entered by the superior court. This precludes the possibility of exceptions. It follows that the suit must be brought here by appeal from the decree of the superior court, and not by exceptions. As exceptions could not be allowed legally, the case is here rightly on appeal.
 2. The facts are that the employé, a citizen and resident of this commonwealth, made a contract here with the employer, a Massachusetts corporation, for rendering to it his personal services, and accepted the benefits of the act. In the course of his employment he received the injury for which this claim arises, in the state of New York. He was principally employed in Massachusetts, but at times incidentally worked in New York and other states. The Industrial Accident Board found that the insurer had been paid by the employer for insuring all injuries received by its employés in the course of their employment, whether within or without the commonwealth. This factor is not of much significance because the obligation of the policy does not refer to anything occurring outside the state, and provides only for performance of the requirements and payment of the compensation designated in the act. If the act enjoins the payment of compensation for injuries received outside the state the insurer has contracted therefor, otherwise it has not.
trial by jury as to matters covered by the act. I grounds better practice. But where excepOne main purpose of the act is to establish between employé and employer, in place of the common law or statutory remedy for personal injury, based upon tort, a system whereby compensation for all personal injuries or death of the employé received in the course of and arising out of his employment, whether through unavoidable accident or negligence or otherwise (except through his serious and willful misconduct), shall be determined forthwith by a public board, and paid by the insurer. For the accomplishment of these ends a simple method is furnished operating without delay or unnecessary formality. The practice should be direct and flexible in order to adapt the remedy to the needs of the particular case. In one aspect a case under the act resembles an action at law, for it seeks ultimately the payment of money. Payments, however, in most instances are by installments. In another aspect it is akin to the specific performance of a contract, designed to cover the whole range of misfortunes likely to arise in the course of employment in a state with many and diversified industries. Moreover, the compensation is to be paid not directly by the employer, but by the insurer, who is either the "Massachusetts Employés' Insurance Association" created by part 4 of the act or any liability insurance company authorized to do business within the commonwealth. The employé has no immediate relation with the insurer. He is the beneficiary under a contract between the. employer and insurer. A beneficiary under any instrument to which he is not a direct party more naturally looks to equity rather than to law for relief. Part 3, § 11, requires a "decree" to be entered, and refers to the proceeding as a "suit." A decree in our practice is entered commonly in equity alone. Judgment is the word expressive of the end of an action at law. Suit, while a word of comprehensive signification, is applied usually in our practice to proceedings in equity, while action is the word descriptive of proceedings at law. Our statutes in general, although perhaps not with absolute uniformity, refer to proceedings in equity as suits, see R. L. c. 159, and to those at law as actions, see R. L. c. 167. Giving due weight to the equitable phraseology employed in this section, to the beneficient purposes of the act, which can be enforced better through the relief afforded by equity, and to the character of the proceeding itself and the parties thereto, it follows that in the main causes under the act in court should be treated as equitable rather than legal in nature, procedure and final disposition.
 The act provides only for an appeal, and makes no reference to exceptions. Although exceptions are permitted in our system of equity, that is a statutory engraftment, not according to general chancery pro
The question is whether the act governs the rights of parties touching injuries received outside the state. It may be assumed for the purposes of this judgment that it is within the power of the Legislature to give to the act the effect claimed for it by the employé. Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386, 54 L. R. A. 934, 79 Am. St. Rep. 309.
 The point to be decided is whether the language used in the act indicates a purpose to make its terms applicable to injuries received outside the state. This must be determined by a critical examination of the words of the statute in the light of its humane purpose. There is nothing which expressly states that the act governs the rights of the parties touching such injuries. This is significant. In the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, it is not to be presumed that statutes respecting this matter are designed to control conduct or fix the rights of parties beyond the territorial limits of the state. Boston & Maine R. R. v. Trafton, 151 Mass. 229, 23 N. E. 829; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 572, 56 N. E. 888, 49 L. R. A. 301; Young v. Boston & Maine R. R., 168 Mass. 219, 46 N. E. 624; Stone v. Old Colony St. Ry., 212 Mass. 459-464, 99 N. E. 218; Merrill v. Boston & Lowell, 63 N.
titled "Modification of Remedies" and which | ployés of alien employers who while working abolishes certain common-law rights of ac- within this commonwealth may receive pertion and defenses for "subscribers" and their sonal injuries arising out of and in the employés who do not claim such rights in course of employment. If our act is to be writing, can relate only to injuries received interpreted as having extraterritorial force, within the commonwealth. The correlative similar effect must be accorded to like laws provisions which follow and which are sub- of other states. There would be difficulty in stitutional in their nature for the common reading such an exception into the phrase of law remedies and defenses, naturally would our statute. By part 2, § 20, of the act be expected to cover the same field in the ab- agreements by employés to waive the provisence of clear words indicating a larger sions of the act are made invalid. This section does not easily permit the inference that contracts under the statutes of other states to abide exclusively by the terms of such statutes were thought of and intended to be excepted by the Legislature. The definitions of our act evidently were not framed with the end of covering the matter now under discussion. Employé is defined as including "every person in the service of another under any contract of hire," with certain exceptions. Part 5, § 2, par. 3. See St. 1913, c. 448. The natural significance of this is that it includes a service being performed in this commonwealth. Section 21, to the effect that no payment under the act shall be liable in any way for debts of the employé, does not readily lend itself to the idea that the Legislature intended the act to have extraterriin establishing such an exemption elsewhere. Great difficulties might arise These provisions collectively disclose a purpose to confine the operation of the act to the territory of this commonwealth. They fall far short of manifesting a plain legislative intent to control the relations of parties as to injuries received outside of Massa
A consideration of the act in detail fails to disclose any plain intent to that end. On the contrary, several provisions indicate solely intrastate operation. Part 2, § 19, provides that the employé who has received an injury shall submit himself on request to an examination "by a physician or surgeon authorized to practice medicine under the laws of the commonwealth." It hardly can be inferred from this language that the Legislature intended that physicians or surgeons from Massachusetts should journey to the place of injury, or that those authorized to practice under the laws of other states should make the examination. Part 3 of the act, which relates to procedure, and which as has been pointed out creates a wholly new method of procedure, deals only with boards and courts within this commonwealth. No provision is made for enforcing rights as to injuries occurring outside the state. Part 3, 87, requires that the hearings of the committee on arbitration "be held in the city or town where an injury occurred." Obviously, this cannot relate to injuries received outside this commonwealth. Section 11 as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, provides that in the event of resort to the courts copies of the papers shall be presented "to the superior court for the county in which the injury occurred or for the county of Suffolk." The words "for the county of Suffolk" may be presumed to be inserted for convenience, as the officers of the Industrial Accident Board are in Suffolk and courts are continually in session in that county, and not for injuries occurring outside the state. Section 18 requires the employer, within forty-eight hours, not counting Sundays and legal holidays, after the ac-. cident resulting in personal injury, "to make a report in writing to the Industrial Accident Board." Part 4, § 18, authorizes the directors of the Massachusetts Employés' Insurance Association, created by the act, to make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the prevention of injuries on the premises of the subscribers, "and to this end its inspectors shall have free access to such premises during working hours." This section is in furtherance of that part of the purpose of the act as set forth in its title for the prevention of industrial. injuries. But it cannot be operative outside of Massachusetts. Moreover, our act discloses no purpose to
This conclusion is confirmed by other considerations which point to the improbability that the Legislature would have expressed such an intention (if it existed) in any but the plainest words.
It is apparent, from a comparison of the two acts, that our own follows in important particulars the provisions of the English act. That act (although it has been held generally to be inoperative outside the United Kingdom) in express terms applies to masters, seamen apprentices in the sea service under certain conditions, and definitely points out the manner of proving and enforcing claims for injuries occurring therein with reference plainly to those outside the United Kingdom. See 6 Edward VII (1906) c. 58, § 7. If it had been the intention of the Legislature to include such injuries within the purview of the act, definite language in the English act to this end hardly would have been overlooked. Workmen's Compensation Acts had been enacted in many foreign countries before 1911, and the texts of these had been printed in a report of the U. S. Com. of Labor and (as shown by the report of the Massachusetts Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents) were known to the framers of our act. Several of these foreign acts made
dents outside their territory.1 It is a violent | ready manifested between the several states assumption, under these circumstances, that is considerable. To say that such acts are the Legislature intended its similar law to intended to operate on injuries received outapply to injuries received in foreign juris- side the several states enacting them would dictions without express words to that effect. give rise to many difficult questions of conThe subject of personal injuries received flict of laws. It would require a large deby a workman in the course of his employ-pendence upon the comity of other states in ment is within the control of the sovereign enforcing our act and in refraining from enpower where the injury occurs. "It must forcing their own as to a subject which certainly be the right of each state to de- commonly is wholly under the control of the termine by its laws under what circumstances several states, and with which, it has been an injury to the person will afford a cause of pointed out, a substantial number have alaction." Davis v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 143 Mass. ready manifested a purpose to deal by a new 301, 9 N. E. 815, 58 Am. Rep. 138. See Cormo and special legislation. No court of any v. Boston Bridge Works, 205 Mass. 366, 91 N. sister state, so far as we are aware, has had E. 313. Most of the compensation acts of the occasion to pass upon the precise question states of the Union contain no provision re- here presented. specting injuries received in a foreign juris. diction, although several exempt persons en-states carry their domiciliary personal ingaged in interstate commerce where federal jury law with them into other jurisdictions, laws shall be construed to furnish exclusive confusion would ensue in the administration remedies (Ill. Sts. of 1911, pp. 314-326, § 2; of the law, and at least the appearance of inKansas St. of 1911, c. 218, § 7; Michigan equality among those working under similar Laws of 1912, No. 3, pt. 6, § 4; Washington conditions. If such a result had been intendLaws of 1911, c. 74, § 18), while some expressed by the General Court, it cannot be doubted ly limit the operation to employment within the state. Nev. Laws of 1911, c. 183, § 3; Washington Laws of 1911, c. 74, § 2; Wisconsin Laws of 1911, c. 50, § 1.
Workmen's Compensation Acts have been discussed generally throughout this country. It is said in Report of the Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents made in accordance with Resolves of 1911, cc. 66 and 110, pp. 77 and 93, that in thirteen states besides Massachusetts laws of this general character have been enacted, while in eleven others commissions have been appointed to investigate the subject and to draft laws. These various acts, although having certain features in common, nevertheless differ widely in many essential aspects. Some are compulsory. Some prohibit contracts for a different form of compensation, and make criminal under severe penalties failure to comply with their terms. Some provide for strict state insurance, while others do not. The amount of compensation afforded and the circumstances under which it is to be awarded The diversity of public policy al
1 France Acts of 1898, 1902, 1905 and 1906, title 3,
24 Annual Report of U. S. Com. of Labor, vol. 2
If employés and employers from different
that it would have been disclosed in unambiguous words. The trend of the development of the law, historically considered, has been away from a personal law, and toward a territorial law, before which all are equal. See General Survey of Continental Legal History, pp. 80-83. A reversion to such an ancient theory is not lightly to be inferred. It is of the essence of law, where the common law prevails, that it should be common to all similarly situated.
All these considerations combined forbid
the inference that the Legislature, having failed to use plain and unmistakable words to that end, intended our act to govern the rights of the parties as to an injury received in another jurisdiction.
It has been held that the English Workmen's Compensation Act has no extraterritorial effect, save as to certain classes in shipping service (Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son,  2 K. B. 61; Schwartz v. Rubber, Gutta Percha & Telegraph Works Co.,  2 K. B. 299; Hicks v. Maxton,  124 L. T. Rep. 135), while the contrary has been held respecting the German act (Schweitzer v. Hamburg American Co., 78 Misc. Rep. 448, 138 N. Y. Supp. 944). The
character of these acts and decisions affords no light upon the present inquiry.
This proceeding has not been brought to this court without reasonable ground, and no cost is assessed under part 3, § 14. Decree should be entered to the effect that the employé has no claim against the insurer. The exceptions must be dismissed. So ordered.
4915 Mass. 497)
re EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Limited. In re MCNICOL et al. In re PATTERSON, WILDE & CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. Sept. 15, 1913.)
1. MASTER AND Servant (§ 871⁄2, New, vol. 16 Key-No. Series) - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
Under Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) pt. 2, § 1, an injury is received "in the course of employment" when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform; it arises "out of" the employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury, and excludes an injury not fairly traceable to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally
exposed apart from the work.
2. STATUTES (§ 226*)-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES ADOPTED FROM OTHER STATES AND COUNTRIES.
Since the exact words of Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) pt. 2, § 1, are found in the English Workmen's Compensation Act, decisions of English courts, before the adoption of our act, are entitled to weight. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 307; Dec. Dig. § 226.*] 3. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 872, New, vol. 16
(8 Key-No. Series) WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT."
Where an employé was assaulted and killed by an obviously intoxicated fellow workman, whose quarrelsome and dangerous disposition when intoxicated was well known to the employer, the injury arose "out of and in the course of his employment" under Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) pt. 2, § 1, since, as the injury could be found to be the natural result of the employment of a peaceable workman with a choleric drunkard, there was a causal connection between the injury and the conditions under which deceased was required to work.
4. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 25034, New, vol. 16 Key-No. Series)-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-DEPENDENTS.
Under Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) pt. 2, § 7, providing that a child or children under the age of 18 years shall be conclusively presumed to be dependent upon the parent with whom he is, or they are, living at the time of the death of such parent, there being no surviving dependent parent, the conclusive presumption of dependency is conditioned upon the nonexistence of a surviving dependent parent.
5. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 6*) - WORKMEN'S
A suit under Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) must be brought from the superior court to the appellate court by appeal, not by exceptions.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 22; Dec. Dig. § 6.*] 6. MASTER AND SERVANT (& 2504, New, vol. 16 Key-No. Series)-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-CONSTRUCTION.
Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) pt. 3, § 11, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14, providing that, when copies of the "decision of the Industrial Accident Board and all papers in connection therewith" have been transmitted to the superior court, "said court shall render a decree in accordance therewith,"
RUGG, C. J. This is a proceeding under St. 1911, c. 751, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, known as the Workmen's Compensation Act, by dependent relatives for compensation for the death of Stuart McNicol.
 1. The first question is whether the deceased received an "injury arising out of and in the course of his employment," within the meaning of those words in part 2, § 1 of the act. In order that there may be recovery the injury must both arise out of and also be received in the course of the employment. Neither alone is enough.
It is not easy nor necessary to the determination of the case at bar to give a comprehensive definition of these words which shall accurately include all cases embraced within the act and with precision exclude those outside its terms. It is sufficient to say that an injury is received "in the course of" of" the employment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It arises "out of" the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises "out of" the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.  The exact words to be interpreted are