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On the back of the note in suit the entries | 4. WORDS AND

were:

PHRASES "PREJUDICED"

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 271-273; vol. 8, p. 7569.]

5. JUDGMENT (§ 707*)-PERSONS BOUND-PER

SONS NOT PARTIES.

One not having been a party or privy to the original proceeding to foreclose a tax lien, in which decree is made finding that the time notice to her of the supplemental proceeding, of redemption has expired and the right to redeem is lost, and directing issuance of a deed, cannot in any way preclude her questioning the findings either in the original or supplemental proceedings.

"AGGRIEVED." "Henry Mandel, Augusta Mandel, December 11, 1894-100 dooler; February the legal sense, when a legal right is invaded A person is "prejudiced" or "aggrieved," in 1st, 1896-100 dooler; 1897-100 dooler; by an act complained of or his pecuniary in1898-100 dooler." It is stipulated that terest is directly affected by a decree or judgthese entries were made by Christian Mandel ment. "Aggrieved" means having a substantial and that the word "dooler" was used for dol- grievance; a denial of some personal or property right. lar. If, as plaintiff in error contends, the trust deed was merely designed to secure the payment of the $100 annuity, it is strange that the $1,700 note was executed at all. No explanation is made by the justice of the peace why the transaction was given this circuitous and complicated form when the trust deed might have been made simply to secure an agreement in relation to the annuity, leaving the $1,700 notes entirely out of the transaction. The justice of the peace further admits in his testimony that there was nothing in the lost agreement in relation to the surrender of the $1,700 notes after the payment of the annuity ceased. The evidence for plaintiff in error in support of the original bill specifically shows that there was another instrument in writing executed between the parties, but it fails to show with any degree of certainty that there was anything inconsistent in that agreement with the express terms of the $1,700 note and trust deed. There was no error in dismissing the original bill and granting a decree of foreclosure upon the cross-bill.

The decree of the circuit court, and the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the same, are affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(259 Ill. 332)

GLOS et al. v. PEOPLE et al. (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 1913.)

1. COURTS (§ 219*)—JURISDICTION ON APPEAL -FREEHOLD.

The supplemental decree in a proceeding to foreclose a tax lien, finding the time of redemption had expired and the right to redeem was lost, and directing issuance of a deed to the holder of the certificate of sale, involves a freehold so as to permit a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from dismissal of a bill of review.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. $$ 539-542, 545-547, 549, 550, 552-573; Dec. Dig. § 219.*]

2. COURTS (§ 219*)-JURISDICTION ON APPEAL -CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.

The question raised by appellants, whether a notice given the parties in a proceeding to foreclose a tax lien complied with the require

ments of the federal and state Constitutions as

to due process, gives the Supreme Court juris

diction of a direct appeal.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. 88 539-542, 545-547, 549, 550, 552-573; Dec. Dig. § 219.*]

3. EQUITY (§ 450*)-BILL OF REVIEW-PAR

TIES.

As a general rule, at least, only a party or his privy, and not a stranger to a decree, can file a bill of review to question it.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 1095; Dec. Dig. § 450.*]

Cent. Dig. § 1230; Dec. Dig. § 707.*]
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment,

6. QUIETING TITLE (§ 7*)-CLOUD ON TITLE.
A finding in a decree not being a cloud on
one's title when the decree is rendered will not
become such by mere lapse of time.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Quieting Title, Cent. Dig. §§ 14-33; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] 7. QUIETING TITLE (§ 7*)-"CLOUD ON TI

TLE."

A "cloud on a title" is a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, which, if valid, would affect or impair the title, but which can be shown by extrinsic evidence to be invalid; but, where the title claimed is invalid on its face, it does not amount to a cloud; so that there is no occasion for interference of a court (citing 2 Words and Phrases, pp. 1233-1235).

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Quieting Title, Cent. Dig. §§ 14-33; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] 8. QUIETING TITLE (8 7*)-CLOUD ON TITLEDECREE.

The supplemental decree in a proceeding to foreclose a tax lien is not to be considered alone in determining whether it is a cloud on title, but must be examined in connection with all the pleadings, original and supplemental.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Quieting Title, Cent. Dig. §§ 14-33; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] 9. EQUITY (§ 450*)-BILL OF REVIEW-PARTIES-STRANGER TO ORIGINAL PROCEEDING.

Considering all the pleadings in a proceeding to foreclose a tax lien, it being clear that the supplemental decree could not bind or affect in any way the interest of a person mentioned therein, the record showing she was not a parthat it could not be a cloud on her title, she ty, and that the decree as to her was void, so cannot maintain a bill of review, even if one not a party or privy can maintain such a bill when prejudiced or aggrieved by a decree or judgment.

Dig. § 1095; Dec. Dig. § 450.*]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent.

10. EQUITY (§ 454*)-BILL OF REVIEW-NE

CESSITY OF LEAVE.

While a bill of review for error on the face of the record may be maintained without leave, leave is necessary for such a bill on the ground of newly discovered evidence, or where the two grounds, errors of law on the face of the record and newly discovered evidence, are joined. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 1110; Dec. Dig. § 454.*]

11. EQUITY (§ 454*)-BILL OF REVIEW-LEAVE | costs. Emma J. Glos prayed and was allowed TO FILE-AMENDMENT OF BILL.

After objection to a bill of review because filed without leave, necessary because on the ground of newly discovered evidence, as well as for error apparent on the record, dismissal cannot be prevented by amendment to make it for error on the face of the record only. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. 1110; Dec. Dig. § 454.*]

12. EQUITY (§ 454*)-BILL OF REVIEW-LEAVE TO FILE-MOTION TO STRIKE.

Objection to a bill of review because filed without necessary leave need not be by demurrer, but may be by motion to strike from the files and dismiss.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 1110; Dec. Dig. § 454.*]

an appeal from the order dismissing the original bill, and Jacob Glos prayed and was allowed an appeal from the order dismissing the cross-bill. While there seems to have been no joinder of these two appeals, they have been treated in the record and briefs as if they were joined.

A statement as to the litigation which this bill has been filed to review will be found set out in Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Ill. 63, 97 N. E. 272. We deem it advisable, however, for a proper understanding of the questions raised, to restate some of the facts.

April 7, 1905, the state instituted proceed

13. EQUITY (8 367*)-DISMISSAL OF BILL-ings in the circuit court of Cook county, unCROSS-BILL.

As a general rule dismissal of an original bill carries with it a cross-bill.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. $$ 773, 774; Dec. Dig. § 367.*] 14. EQUITY (8 454*)-BILL

OF

REVIEW

CROSS-BILL-LEAVE TO FILE. If a cross-bill can stand after dismissal of the original bill of review, it must be because, in legal effect, it is in its nature an original bill, and so is subject to motion to dismiss because filed without leave, necessary because in part on newly discovered evidence.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 1110; Dec. Dig. § 454.*]

15. EQUITY (§ 454*)-BILL OF REVIEW-MO

TION TO DISMISS-PARTIES.

One whom the bill of review and cross-bill have made a party, and alleged to have certain interests, may make the motion to dismiss them, though she may have no interest; the court having made no finding to that effect.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 1110; Dec. Dig. § 454.*] Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook Conty; Richard S. Tuthill, Judge.

der section 253 of the Illinois Revenue Law, to foreclose certain tracts alleged to be forfeited to the state; the taxes thereon having remained unpaid for four years, from 1900 to 1903, inclusive. Various owners and persons claiming an interest in the premises were made defendants; the case being entitled People v. Evans et al. In these foreclosure proceedings Jacob Glos was served, but Emma J. Glos was not made a party. Jacob Glos filed an answer, admitting that he claimed an interest in the premises, but denying that the same was subject to a lien of the state for taxes. The matter was referred to a master in chancery, who reported to the court, and a final decree was entered October 11, 1905, ordering the premises to be advertised and sold by the county treasurer unless the taxes were paid within a certain time. Jacob Glos prayed and was allowed an

appeal from that decree but never perfected

it. Under said decree a public sale was held by the county treasurer of Cook county; the Bill of review by Emma J. Glos against purchaser being Walter Langlois, who was the People and others. From orders dismiss-not a party to the proceedings. He assigning her bill and the cross-bill of Jacob Glos, they appeal. Affirmed.

Albert M. Kales, of Chicago (John R. O'Connor, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants. Charles L. Bartlett and Sherman C. Spitzer, both of Chicago, for appellee Tefft. John S. Brown, of Chicago, for appellee Zaleski. Enoch J. Price, of Chicago, for appellee Clark. Robert Humphrey, of Chicago, for appellee Langlois.

A

ed his certificate of sale to B. H. Collier and S. B. Tefft, who paid the taxes after the sale and up to and after the time of redemption had expired. On October 16, 1909, an order was entered by said circuit court in the case of People v. Evans et al. finding that due notice had been given of the expiration of the time of redemption and authorizing the issuance of a tax deed to the premises so sold under said foreclosure proceedings. deed was thereafter executed by the county CARTER, J. This was a bill filed by treasurer of Cook county to Tefft and ColEmma J. Glos on April 17, 1911, in the circuit lier; Tefft afterwards deeding an undivided court of Cook county, to review for errors half interest to Robert Zaleski and Collier a alleged to be apparent on the face of the rec- half interest to Edwin M. Clark. Later, ord, and for alleged fraud, the proceedings Clark filed a bill for partition in the superior and decrees in the case of People v. Evans court of Cook county against Zaleski and et al. April 18th Jacob Glos filed a cross- others, including Jacob Glos and Emma J. bill attacking the same decrees for substan- Glos. Jacob Glos and Emma J. Glos both tially the same reasons as alleged in the orig- filed answers to the partition suit, denying inal bill. November 12, 1912, two orders that Clark and Zaleski were the owners of were entered by the trial court, one striking said premises. Thereafter an order was enthe original bill of Emma J. Glos and dis- tered dismissing said Emma J. Glos as a missing the same at her costs, and the other party from said partition suit. A decree striking the cross-bill of Jacob Glos at his was entered in said partition suit, finding

that Clark and Zaleski were the owners in fee simple of said premises, free and clear of all claims, liens, and incumbrances of defendants in said proceedings. On appeal to this court by Jacob Glos that decree was affirmed. Clark v. Zaleski, supra.

In the original bill for review filed herein by Emma J. Glos the files and proceedings in People v. Evans et al. were set up, except the notice of the application for said order of October 16, 1909. The bill alleged that she owned an undivided one-third interest in the premises in question, acquired by quitclaim deed from her husband, Jacob Glos, dated May 29, 1902, and recorded June 2, 1902; that she had never had any notice of the foreclosure suit until in October, 1910.

when she was summoned in Clark v. Zaleski,

supra, in which case she averred that a trial had been had and a decree was then about to be entered. She prayed that the proceedings and decree in People v. Evans et al. be reviewed and reversed and that she might be allowed to make her defense. The crossbill of Jacob Glos adopted, by reference, the statement of the pleadings and proceedings in People v. Evans et al. as set forth in the original bill of Emma J. Glos, and alleged that he and Emma J. Glos were the owners in fee of the premises; that he had no knowledge of the entry of the order of October 16, 1909, until he was served in October, 1910, in Clark v. Zaleski. The cross-bill had substantially the same prayer for relief as did the original bill.

To the original bill Edwin M. Clark filed a general and special demurrer, alleging that Emma J. Glos could not sustain her bill because she was not a party to the original suit; that the complainant had not performed or offered to perform the decretal orders sought to be reviewed; that she was barred by gross laches, and had not set forth any error apparent or other reasons sufficient to authorize or justify a review and reversal of said decree as prayed for. Robert Zaleski and Walter Langlois filed general and special demurrers setting up the same grounds as were set up by Clark, and further alleging that said bill did not contain all the files and proceedings in the foreclosure suit. They all three filed a general and special demurrer to the cross-bill of Jacob Glos, raising practically the same points that they raised by the general and special demurrers to the original bill.

On her first appearance in this proceeding S. B. Tefft made a motion to strike both the bill and cross-bill from the files and dismiss the same because they were filed without leave of court first obtained upon sworn petition and due notice; because the complainant was not a party or privy of any party to said original foreclosure proceedings; because neither the complainant nor cross-complainant had performed the decretal orders

A freehold was not

to the decretal orders in the foreclosure sult, Tefft and Collier had conveyed their respective interests to Clark and Zaleski, between whom there had been a partition decree, which cut off all interests claimed in said foreclosure. After a hearing on this motion the circuit court struck the bill and cross-bill from the files, and Emma J. Glos and Jacob Glos appealed to this court, as stated above. [1, 2] It is suggested in the briefs of appellees, but not, argued, that this court is without a jurisdiction on direct appeal as this case does not involve a freehold, a franchise, the validity of a statute, or the collection of public revenue. involved, in the sense of the Constitution and statute controlling appeals, in the original foreclosure proceedings. The supplemental foreclosure decree, however, found that the time for redemption had expired and the right to redeem was lost, and directed the county clerk to issue to said Collier and Tefft a deed for the premises. That supplemental decree involved a freehold so as to permit a direct appeal to this court. Sanford V. Kane, 127 Ill. 591, 20 N. E. 810; Smith v. Jackson, 153 Ill. 399, 39 N. E. 130. The conlants as to whether a notice given the parties stitutional question is also raised by appelin the foreclosure proceedings complied with the requirements of the United States and state Constitutions as to due process of law. This court has jurisdiction of the case.

The principal question for consideration is whether or not the trial court properly struck the original bill and cross-bill from the files and dismissed the proceedings. We shall first consider this question, as it applies to the original bill.

[3] The bill alleges, and all counsel concede, that Emma J. Glos was not a party to the original foreclosure proceedings which are here sought to be reviewed. Counsel for appellees contend that as she was not a party or privy to any party to the original proceedings she has no right to file this bill of review. On the other hand, counsel for appellants argue that while Emma J. Glos was not a party to the litigation she was directly and affirmatively affected by the proceedings, and therefore she had a right to file her bill. The general rule is that none but parties and privies can have a bill of review. 3 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 590; 16 Cyc. 521. In Goodrich v. Thompson, SS Ill. 206, at page 208, where a bill of review had been filed questioning a former foreclosure proceeding in which the plaintiffs in the bill of review had not been made parties, this court said: "The other parties complainant, Bella and Florence Goodrich, were not parties to the original proceedings, consequently they are not affected by the decree-and, not being parties, they cannot maintain a bill of review." In Daniell's Chancery Pleading & Practice (6th Am. Ed.) vol. 2, p. 1579, the author says that a bill of review or a bill in the nature

view.

person who was a party or privy to the for- | shows that a person not a party has been mer suit, and where any other person con- prejudiced he has a right to file a hill of residers himself aggrieved by the decree he must proceed by original bill." To the same effect is Jones v. Fayerweather, 46 N. J. Eq. 237, 19 Atl. 22. Story, in his work on Equity Pleading (10th Am. Ed.) § 409, states the rule as follows: "No persons except the parties and their privies in representation, such as heirs, executors, and administrators, can have a bill of review, strictly so called. But other persons in interest and in privity of title or estate who are aggrieved by the decree, such as devisees and remaindermen, entitled to maintain an original bill in the nature of a bill of review so far as their own interests are concerned. And even persons having an interest in the cause, if not aggrieved by the particular errors assigned in the decree, cannot maintain a bill of review, however injuriously-the decree may affect the rights of third persons."

are

*

There is no doubt that the general rule is that a stranger to a decree cannot file a bill of review to question that decree. If, If, however, the decree attempts to adjudicate his rights, even though he is not a party, then is he so affected by the decree as to permit him to file a bill of review? There are authorities which tend to support the contention that if a person is prejudiced or aggrieved by such decree he can file a bill of review. 2 Beach on Modern Equity Practice, § 881; Peak v. Percifull, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 218; McCoy v. Allan, 16 W. Va. 724. See, also, Chancellor v. Spencer, 40 W. Va. 337,

21 S. E. 1011.

Appellants contend that under the reasoning of Bruschke v. Der Nord Chicago Schuet

[4-6] A person is prejudiced or aggrieved, in the legal sense, when a legal right is invaded by the act complained of or his pecuniary interest is directly affected by the decree or judgment. 2 Cyc. 1266, and cases cited; State v. Central Vermont Railroad Co., 81 Vt. 459, 71 Atl. 193, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 949; Wiggin v. Swett, 6 Metc. (47 Mass.) 194, 39 Am. Dec. 716. "Aggrieved" means having a substantial grievance; a denial of some personal or property right. 4 Cyc. 82, and cases cited. Assuming that a person not a party or privy to the original proceedings but having been prejudiced or aggrieved, as those terms are understood in law, by a former decree or judgment, can file a bill of review, does it follow from this record that Emma J. Glos is so prejudiced or aggrieved by the foreclosure proceedings that she is entitled to file such a bill?

could have applied to the county clerk for

As has been stated, all parties concede that the record in the foreclosure proceedings shows that Emma J. Glos was not made a party thereto. The answers of some of the defendants in those proceedings insisted that the original bill therein was defective because she was not made a party. It is contended that the supplemental proceedings referred to her in such a way as to place a cloud upon her title to the real estate in question. The supplemental decree of October 16, 1909, stated that she had been notified of said supplemental proceedings by leaving a copy of the notice with her, calling attention to the fact that the supplemental decree would be applied for in said circuit court. Counsel for zen Verein, 145 Ill. 433, 34 N. E. 417, a per- appellants contend that no such notice was son not served with summons in a chancery that it was optional with the purchaser at ever served upon her. They argue, however, suit, and who does not appear but is mention- the tax foreclosure sale whether supplemened in the decree in such a way as apparently tal proceedings would be instituted; that he to adjudicate his rights, has a standing to file a bill of review. In that case, apparently, Der Nord Chicago Schuetzen Verein was named as defendant in the original bill in the being instituted. This position is in accord prayer for process but not in the opening with the holding of this court in Clark v. paragraph of the bill, and it was shown there Zaleski, supra. The opinion states with refwas no service of process upon it. A solici-erence to the advisability of such supplementor made a written entry of "appearance of the defendants in the above cause." On the hearing of the bill of review it was shown that the solicitor entering the appearance of the defendants had no authority to appear for the Verein and did not intend so to do. The bill of review was filed, not only by the Verein, but also by its officers and directors and their successors, some of whom, at least, had been parties to the original bill. No question appears to have been raised on the trial of that cause as to the authority of the Verein to file the bill of review because it was not a party to the original proceed-ceedings. ings. While that decision, on the facts, is When it is necessary, in foreclosure pronot conclusive, it furnishes some support to ceedings held under section 253 of the Rev

a deed without said supplemental proceedings

tal proceedings (253 Ill. 82, 97 N. E. 279): "The practical advantages of such course are apparent. Such an order, being within the jurisdiction of the court, is binding upon parties and privies, and precludes them from afterwards relitigating all questions that were or might have been raised in such proceeding." As Emma J. Glos was not a party or privy to the original foreclosure proceedings, the alleged notice as to said supplemental proceedings could not in any way preclude her from questioning the finding elther in said original or supplemental pro

proof in rebuttal. If the proceedings on which a claim is founded are on their face totally. void, so that any person inspecting the record and comparing it with the law is at once apprised of the irregularity, there is no cloud. Cooley on Taxation, 542. If the instrument or proceeding is on its face plainly illegal or void there is no cloud, and there is no occasion for the interference of a court to nullify or set it aside." Roby v. South Park Com'rs, 215 Ill. 200, 74 N. E. 125; Pixley v. Huggins, 15 Cal. 127; Lawrence v. Zimpleman, 37 Ark. 643; Thompson v. Etowah Iron Co., 91 Ga. 538, 17 S. E. 663; 2 Words and Phrases, 1234, and cases cited; Black on Tax Titles (2d Ed.) § 440.

make a person a party thereto to adjudicate would fall of its own weight, without any his rights or interests in property, if he is not made a party he cannot be precluded as to his rights or interests by a statement in the supplemental proceedings, entered after the sale of the property, that he has had notice of such supplemental proceedings. Not being a party to the decree of foreclosure and sale, the supplemental proceedings could have no force or effect whatever upon his rights, which would remain the same as if the foreclosure proceedings and sale had never been had. Wehrheim v. Smith, 226 Ill. 346, 80 N. E. 908. This is conceded by counsel for appellants. They do not argue that the alleged notice is binding. They claim, however, that other parts of said supplemental decree of October 16th attempted to adjudicate Emma J. Glos' interests in the property. That decree states, among other things: "The court further finds that the following named persons, to wit, Lynden Evans, * * Jacob Glos, Emma Glos, August Timke, trustee, also claim some right, title, or interest in and to said above-mentioned lots during said redemption period, but that said last-mentioned persons were not the owner, nor was any of them, in truth or in fact, the owner or owners of said abovementioned lots, or any of them, or part or parts thereof." Counsel for appellants contend that because of this statement, and the further recitation in said supplemental decree that the court "has jurisdiction of the subject-matter herein and all the parties hereto; that all parties to this cause have had due notice of the presentation of and hearing upon said petition," said supplemental decree will stand as a cloud upon the rights of Emma J. Glos, "which may by the lapse of time and the presumption of the validity of the decree ripen into a practical adjudication of those rights." This argument is, in effect, that the decree had no binding effect at first but with the lapse of time will become binding. If this finding in the decree was not a cloud upon Emma J. Glos' title when the decree was entered, then the mere lapse of time would not prejudice her rights. If the law were otherwise, then no person's rights or property would be safe unless he made daily or weekly examinations of the decrees and judgments entered in the different courts having jurisdiction where his property was located, to see whether or not he was incidentally mentioned in such decrees and judgments. Such is not the law.

[7] A cloud on a title is a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, which, if valid, would affect or impair the title, but which can be shown by extrinsic evidence to be invalid. Allott v. American Strawboard Co., 237 Ill. 55, 86 N. E. 685. Where the title claimed is invalid on its face, so that it can never be successfully maintained, it does not amount to a cloud. "In such a case an

[8] The decree of October 16, 1909, in said foreclosure proceedings cannot be considered, standing by itself, in order to decide whether it is a cloud upon the title of appellant Emma J. Glos, but must be examined in connection with all the other pleadings in that case, both original and supplemental, for its force or lack of force can only be shown by a comparison with such other pleadings. Both the bill and cross-bill herein pray that all the proceedings in the foreclosure cause "be reviewed and reversed." "In England the decree embodies the substance of the bill, pleadings, and answers. In the courts of the United States the decree usually contains a mere reference to the antecedent proceedings, without embodying them. But for the purpose of examining all errors of law, the bill, answers, and other proceedings are, in our practice, as much a part of the record before the court as the decree itself, for it is only by a comparison with the former that the correctness of the latter can be ascertained." Story's Eq. Pl. (10th Ed.) § 407; Dexter v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 303, Fed. Cas. No. 3,856. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a decree or judgment which finds that certain persons have been duly notified and made parties to the proceedings can be contradicted and overcome by other parts of the record proper, such as the summons on file (Spring Creek Drainage District v. Highway Com'rs, 238 Ill. 521, 87 N. E. 394, and cases cited); that the record is construed and tried by itself (Barnett v. Wolf, 70 Ill. 76; Harris v. Lester, 80 Ill. 307).

[9] Considering all the pleadings in said foreclosure proceedings along with said decree of October 16, 1909, it is clear that said decree could not bind or affect in any way the interests of Emma J. Glos, as the record shows that she was not a party to the proceedings, and further shows that it was alleged in the answer (in said foreclosure proceedings) of one of the defendants that the bill therein was defective because she was not made a party. These pleadings show clearly, on their face, that said decree, so far as it affected Emma J. Glos' interests,

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