he is not required to quit his ordinary occupation | their families, but whose character, courage to act as a detective and search for offenders. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Sheriffs and Constables, Cent. Dig. §§ 45, 49, 51, 54-56, 58, 127; Dec. Dig. §§ 28, 86.*]

or reputation for physical prowess are such as to make them efficient conservators of the public peace. The theory on which the office 3. REWARDS (§ 11*)-RIGHTS TO REWARD- now is based (apart from the functions of CONSTABLES. serving papers) is that a number of comWhile ordinarily peace officers cannot col-petent men scattered through the territory lect additional compensation for services ren- of each of the country towns, charged with dered in the performance of their regular duties, yet a contract to pay a public officer for such duties, is an important factor in making services rendered outside and not inconsistent them safe for residence by law-abiding with his official duty is valid. Consequently a people. constable, who ferreted out offenders, relying on a reward offered by the town, may recover; detective duties not being within the scope of a constable's official obligation.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Rewards, Cent. Dig. §§ 14, 15; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]

[2, 3] The office of constable is an ancient one, but its duties have been modified from time to time by custom and statute. The constable is a public officer. Any person elected to the office is liable to a forfeit of money if he refuses to serve. R. L. c. 25, § 97. He is not entitled to compensation for Action by Harry S. Hartley against the services rendered to the town in the perInhabitants of Granville. Verdict for plain-formance of general duties as peace officer, at tiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampden County; Patrick M. Keating, Judge.

Harry B. Putnam, of Westfield, for plaintiff. Arthur S. Kneil, of Westfield, for defendant.

RUGG, C. J. This is an action to recover the amount of a reward which the selectmen of the defendant in 1909 offered "to any person furnishing evidence that will convict the person or persons who" had set recent fires in that town. The plaintiff was duly elected and qualified as a constable of the defendant town for that year. There was no evidence tending to show that any regular compensation was paid to the plaintiff as constable, or that he had any special arrangement with the defendant for pay, or that his duties were any other than such as by the common and statute law of the commonwealth are incumbent upon constables.

all events in the absence of special contract. Riopel v. Worcester, 213 Mass. 15, 99 N. E. 478. The theory of the law is that those chosen to such office by their fellow citizens will accept and execute the office either from a sense of public duty or under the compulsion arising from the pecuniary forfeit entailed by a refusal, and not from hope of money gain. Farnsworth v. Melrose, 122 Mass. 268. These considerations reinforce the conclusion that the obligation is not incumbent upon the constable to give up his ordinary occupation and spend substantial time in search for evidence which may or may not lead to the detection of criminals, nor perform the work commonly done by detectives. The general rule with reference to peace officers is well settled that a promise or reward for additional compensation to a public officer for services rendered in the performance of his duty cannot be enforced, either [1] The general duties of such an officer as being without consideration or conare to be vigilant to preserve the peace, to trary to public policy. Pool v. Boston, 5 prevent the commission of crime, and to ar- Cush. 219; Dunham v. Stockbrige, 133 Mass. rest all offenders in his town who might be 233; Davies v. Burns, 5 Allen, 349; Brophy arrested without warrant, and to procure v. Marble, 118 Mass. 548. This rule is based warrants in other instances of crime commit- upon sound considerations and ought not to ted. The quaint description of his duties be narrowed in any respect. But it is also given in early definitions is "to keep the true that a contract to pay a public officer for king's peace." To keep the peace in its services rendered outside and not inconbroad sense means to quell riots and dis-sistent with his official duty is valid and may turbances of every nature, to prevent the be enforced. A reward offered for such servcommission of crime and to see that offenders ice is also enforceable. Studley v. Ballard, in their several districts are arrested and 169 Mass. 295, 296, 47 N. E. 1000, 61 Am. St. prosecuted. They possess somewhat exten- Rep. 286, and cases there cited. Neville v. sive powers. See 1 Blackstone's Com. 356. Kelly, 12 C. B. N. S. 740; Russell v. Stewart, But in our country communities constables 44 Vt. 173; Kasling v. Morris, 71 Tex. 584, as such are not expected nor required to de- 9 S. W. 739, 10 Am. St. Rep. 797; Bronnenvote a considerable portion of their time to berg v. Coburn, 110 Ind. 169, 11 N. E. 29; the work of their office. In this regard they Smith v. Vernon County, 188 Mo. 501, 87 S. stand on a basis quite different from the W. 949, 70 L. R. A. 59, 107 Am. St. Rep. members of an organized police force. It is 324; Kinn v. First Nat. Bank, 118 Wis. 537, matter of common knowledge that the coun- 546, 95 N. W. 969, 99 Am. St. Rep. 1012; try constable in this commonwealth is elected Burkee v. Matson, 114 Minn. 233, 130 N. W. oftentimes from among those who labor regu- 1025. The many cases cited and relied on larly to earn a livelihood for themselves and by the defendant are not in conflict with this

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 85, 163, 164; Dec. Dig. § 101.*] 6. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 201*)-INJURIES-in which the question is prefaced and apPROXIMATE CAUSE-NEGLIGENCE OF FELLOW

the question or the essence of it was stated | The plaintiff offered evidence tending to show hypothetically to him. If his answer was irresponsive or incompetent the defendant should have moved to have it stricken from the case.

· One important issue at the trial was the On an appeal by a beneficiary under a will cause of the breaking of the emery wheel. from a decree granting an allowance to the tes

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

tator's widow for her necessities following the | to have them provided for by an allowance in testator's death, that view of the evidence most the probate court, so long as there is perfavorable to the widow should be adopted.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 713-723; Dec. Dig. § 194.*]

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court. Proceeding by Lillian M. Glover against Seymour Glover. From a decree granting a widow's allowance to the petitioner, defendant appeals. Modified.

Anderson, Sweetser & Wiles, Elbridge R. Anderson, and Geo. A. Sweetser, all of Boston, for appellant. John A. Coulthurst, of Boston, for appellee.

sonal estate undistributed in the hands of
the executor or administrator.
cation for a widow's allowance ought to be
An appli-
made at an early stage of the proceedings
before the probate court, and it ought not to
be granted, if it comes so late that the grant-
ing of it will cause embarrassment or diffi-
culty in the settlement of the estate. Indeed,
ordinarily the occasion for it ceases to exist
within a short time after the appointment of
the executor or administrator. But if a
widow has borrowed money for the relief of
her necessities, or received it through char-
ity, there is no reason why the means of re-
paying it should not be furnished her by an
allowance out of her husband's estate to the
same extent as if she had applied for the al-
lowance before she obtained the means of
relief." To the same effect see Welch v.
Welch, 181 Mass. 37, 62 N. E. 982.

[2] It is of course the rule that the decree of the single justice is not to be overturned unless it is plainly wrong.

LORING, J. This is an appeal from a decree granting to the petitioner a widow's allowance in the sum of $1,500. The case is before us on the evidence introduced before the single justice who made the decree, excepting however that the exhibits introduced in evidence before him have not been printed. The evidence is far from satisfactory. It leaves in a state of confusion the facts on which the questions of the petitioner's right to an allowance and of the amount of it depend. The appellee has not objected to the failure to print the exhibits, and we take the case as it is presented to us without objec-parently was in July, 1912, two years and tion on the part of either party.

[3] Clarence Glover, the husband of the petitioner, died on November 20, 1909. The petition now before us was filed a year and ten months later (on September 22, 1911), and the hearing before the single justice ap

seven months after the husband's death. It is important to bear this in mind because much of the evidence introduced before the single justice showed the actual necessities of the petitioner at that time (nearly three years after the husband's death) in place of her actual necessities "at or immediately after the death of her husband." There were no children of the marriage. The petitioner waived the provisions made for her in her husband's will, and thus became entitled to $5,000 and half of the remaining personal property and of the remaining real estate. R. L. c. 140, § 3, cl. 3, as amended by St. 1905, c. 256; Walden v. Walden, 213 Mass. 418, 100 N. E. 649.

[1] The law governing the questions which we have to decide is settled. In Dale v. Hanover Nat. Bank, 155 Mass. 141, 29 N. E. 371, Knowlton, J., said that an allowance, if made, is to be made "to provide for the necessities of the widow and minor children for a short time until they have an opportunity to adjust themselves to their new situation." In Chase v. Webster, 168 Mass. 228, 231, 46 N. E. 705, 706, Barker, J., said: "It is a question of the widow's actual necessities." It was held in Porter v. Porter, 165 Mass. 157, 42 N. E. 565, that although the widow was in necessitous circumstances and did not have proper clothing and was $100 in debt, two years and four months after the husband's death a second widow's allowance could not be made. Allen, J., in delivering the opinion of this court in that case, said, at page 159 of 165 Mass., and page 565 of 42 N. E.: "The allowance is to be made in view of the condition of things at or immediately after the death of her husband." But it was held in Lisk v. Lisk, 155 Mass. 153, 29 N. E. 375, that an allowance could be made where the petition for an allowance was filed by the widow two years and eight months after the husband's death; and Knowlton, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in that At the time of her husband's death the case said, at page 154 of 155 Mass., and page petitioner owned three houses, all in Wal376 of 29 N. E.: "It has never been held that, tham, one on Main street, one on Orange because the necessities of a widow have been street, and one on Clark lane which was subrelieved through the charity of friends, or ject to a mortgage of $500. The house on in some other way outside of herself, she is Main street had 12 rooms and was the house deprived of the right given her by the statute in which the petitioner and her husband

It appears that the petitioner came to this country in 1900 or thereabouts, and that she could not then either read or write. We assume that she could do both at the date of her husband's death. It appeared that she had not kept any account of her receipts and expenditures, and in answer to this question put to her by her own counsel, "You don't keep any books for the property you claim to own?" she testified, "My education is so limited I could not tell one thing from another; I keep my own figures; * I have it in my head."

were living at the time of his death. The and claims held by other persons amounting petitioner continued to live in this house to $1,557.98. until May, 1912, i. e., for two years and five months after her husband's death. At the time of the hearing the petitioner was "charging $25 a month" for this house.

The Clark lane property was rented for $30 a month until November 1, 1911; i. e., for two years after the death of the husband. The Orange street property was a fourtenement building. All the tenements had been let from the death of the husband until September, 1911, a year and ten months after the death of her husband. The monthly rent of all four tenements was $66. At some time not disclosed in the evidence a tenant moved out of one of these four tenements, owing the petitioner 14 months' rent, at $17 a month.

To sum up the facts as to the petitioner's real estate: For two years and five months she lived in a house which let for $25 a month, or $300 a year, and she was in receipt of a gross income from the other two of $96 a month, or $1,152 a year, subject to the loss of $238 rent at some period not disclosed in the evidence. The petitioner testified without objection that she figured up that she received from these three pieces of real estate from the death of her husband "to the present time, the 1st of July," 1912, $2,790, and had paid out $2,355.82. At the time of her husband's death the petitioner had $4,300 in the bank, and in January following her husband's death she received $1,990 under a policy of insurance on her husband's life. This she kept for two or three months and then put it in the bank.

When asked what her style of living was "during the few months" before her husband's death, the petitioner testified: "Why, we had an automobile; we traveled; we had a horse and team; we had dogs. We traveled a great deal, and I had a maid, and we had a man to take care of the grounds; off and on I had a gardener and a chauffeur part of the time. We spent about $500 or $600, perhaps over, perhaps less," a month. "When we traveled, of course, we spent a great deal more money. We went to Jamaica, which was a very expensive trip; and we went to the Thousand Islands, and of course that was expensive. Then we took trips to the beaches sometimes and to the theaters once or twice a week, and we always had swell dinners." And she testified in effect that the money for these expenditures came from "my laundry." She further testified, when asked what her style of living had been since her husband's death: "Very poorly; I have lived in the kitchen; I had no coal to burn in the furnace; I bought two tons last winter; I had no money to buy coal with; I had no man to do things around the house; I had to do all the work of cooking and everything else. And I have had no dogs, no horse, no automobile-I have got nothing; half the time I have had no food; I have borrowed the dress on my back; I have $1.15 hat, and I paid $1 at Raymond's for these slippers I have on, and that is the way I am living to-day."

There are hints here and there through the evidence of litigation in addition to the litigation begun by the petitioner against the estate. The petitioner testified that she handed the $4,300 cash which she had on hand at her husband's death to Mr. Elmore, who it appeared was an attorney at law and executor of her husband's will. She testified, however, that it was not handed to him as executor, and that she gave it to Mr. Elmore because "he said he had to get some money because the Glover brothers were crooks, and they would do a lot of bad things if he didn't get the money from me." Mr. Elmore was a witness in the case, but no explanation of this was given by him.

The husband left real estate appraised at $5,500, and personalty at $33,205.64. Of this personalty, appraised at $33,205.64, the petitioner claimed that she owned property amounting to $21,300, consisting of 198 shares of stock in a laundry corporation taken at par, and an automobile appraised at $1,500. Of the remaining personalty appraised as belonging to her husband's estate (amounting to $11,905.64) $8,150 was the appraised value of 60 shares of American Telephone & Telegraph Company, and $3,755.64 was the value of personalty the nature of which was not disclosed in the evidence. As a widow's allowance takes precedence of debts, the claims against the husband's estate, although of some, are not of vital, importance. The executor testified that a claim had been put in for expenses of administration down to the appointment of the executor, amounting to $8,051.08, not including some additional legal services incurred by the estate in litigation against it begun by the petitioner. Of this $8,051.08 the sum of $4,650 was a charge made by the executoring since her husband's death" related in the for his services, and beyond that it did not appear what the $8,051.08 consisted of, or how it was made up. In addition there was a claim against the estate on a note for

[4] In view of the amount allowed by the single justice the view of the evidence should be taken which is most favorable to the petitioner. Although that view of the evidence is to be taken, there are some aspects of it which must be considered. Manifestly the petitioner was not a person of social standing, a fact referred to in Dale v. Hanover Nat. Bank, 155 Mass. 161, as of some importance. Her account of "her style of liv

main to a period long after that which is to be considered in determining the granting of a widow's allowance, viz., the time "at or im· mediately after the death of her husband."