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of an express trust, and appellant contends
that this case comes within the exception.
We do not concur in that view. In the ap-

BUCUR v. INLAND STEEL CO.
(No. 13010.)

Appellate Court of Indiana, in Banc. Nov. 2, plication, appellant does not aver that he

1927.

Master and servant 400-One merely assum-
ing to act for widow In applying for compen-
sation for employee's death was not "real
party in interest" (Burns' Ann. St. 1926, §§
258, 259).

Where application did not show that ap-
plicant was trustee, and there was no evidence

at hearing that he was trustee for deceased em-
ployee's widow, and, so far as evidence showed,
applicant merely assumed to act for and on be-
half of widow in applying for compensation for
employee's death, applicant was not "real par-
ty in interest," under Burns' Ann. St. 1926, §§
258, 259, and hence compensation was properly
denied.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words
and Phrases, First and Second Series, Real
Party in Interest.]

Appeal from Industrial Board.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law by George Bucur, representing
the interests of Anisia Boeriu, widow of
Niculae Boeriu, deceased employee, claimant,
opposed by the Inland Steel Company, em-
ployer. From an order of the Industrial
Board denying compensation, claimant ap
peals. Affirmed.

Ibach, Gavit, Stinson & Gavit, of Ham-
mond, and James M. Ogden, of Indianapolis,
for appellant.

William J. McAleer, Francis J. Dorsey,
Gerald A. Gillett and James J. Clark, all of
Hammond, for appellee.

REMY, J. Niculae Boeriu lost his life as
the result of an accident which arose out of
and in the course of his employment by ap-
pellee. Thereafter, on behalf of the widow
of Boeriu, appellant filed with the Industrial
Board an application for compensation, the
application being entitled: "George Bucur,
Representing the Interests of Anisia Boeriu,
the Widow of the Late Niculae Boeriu, De-
ceased, v. Inland Steel Company." A demur-
rer to the application on the ground of de-
fect of parties was overruled, and the board,
having heard the evidence, found that Bucur
was not the real party in interest and made
an order denying compensation.

The sole question presented by this appeal
is whether the claim for compensation could
be filed and prosecuted by Bucur on behalf
of the widow, as the record shows it was
done in this case. One of the exceptions to

the general provision of the Code of Civil
Procedure of this state (sections 258 and 259,
Burns' 1926) requiring actions to be brought
in the name of the real party in interest is
that an action may be brought by the trustee

was a trustee, and at the hearing there was
no evidence that he was trustee for Anisia
Boeriu. So far as the evidence is concerned,
appellant merely assumed to act for and on
her behalf.

The Industrial Board correctly held that
the appellant was not the real party in in-
terest.
Ind. 645, 81 N. E. 661, 11 Ann. Cas. 1089;
See Campbell v. Fichter (1907) 168
Marion Bond Co. v. Mexican Coffee & Rubber
Co. (1902) 160 Ind. 558, 65 N. E. 748.
Affirmed.

(327 Ill. 122)

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
BUILDINGS v. SPANOGLE et al.
(No. 17863.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 22, 1927.
1. Highways 103-Department of public
works and buildings may under Sixty Million
Dollar Bond Issue Act, designate new high-
way to construct portion of road (Laws 1917,
p. 696, §§ 2, 9, 11).

Under the Sixty Million Dollar Road Bond
Issue Act (Laws 1917, p. 696), the department
sections 2, 9, 11, thereof, open or lay out new
of public works and buildings may, in view of
highways on which to construct portions of
state highways as contemplated by the act.

2. Statutes 109-Constitutional provision
that act embrace one subject only, prohibits
act containing provisions not fairly included
in title.

Constitutional provision that no act shall
embrace more than one subject, which shall be
expressed in the title, prohibits passage of an
act containing provision not fairly included in

the title.

3. Statutes 109 "Subject of act" means.
matter or thing forming groundwork of act,
and may include provisions germane to sub-
ject as generic head.

The "subject of an act" means the matter
or thing forming groundwork of the act, and
may include many provisions that are germane
to it, and are such that, if traced back, will
lead the mind to the subject as the generic
head.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words
and Phrases, First and Second Series, Subject
(Of Statute).]

4. Statutes 109-Title fairly indicating gen-
eral subject and reasonably covering all pro-
visions of act is sufficient compliance with
constitutional requirement.

The title need not be an index to or as com-

prehensive in matters of details as the body of
an act, but if it fairly indicates the general
subject and reasonably covers all provisions,
and does not mislead the General Assembly or
people, it sufficiently complies with constitu-

(158 N.E.)

tional requirement that act embrace one sub- Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen. (John L. ject only, which shall be expressed in the title. Brearton, of Savannah, of counsel), for ap5. Statutes 107(1)-Unless act contains pellee. matters not properly connected with title, it does not violate constitutional provision that it embrace one subject only.

Unless act contains matters which have no proper connection with or relation to title, or title itself contains subjects without proper relation to each other, constitutional provision that no act shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in title is not

violated.

6. Statutes 109- General Assembly must determine how broad and comprehensive the object of a statute shall be and particularity employed in title defining it.

The General Assembly must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive the object of a statute shall be, and how much particularity shall be employed in the title defining it. 7. Statutes 109-Act having single subject may contain many diverse provisions if they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the subject.

Act having single general subject indicated in the title may contain many provisions, however diverse, if they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the subject, and may be considered in furtherance of it by providing for the method and means of effectuating it.

8. Statutes 123(4)—Provisions In Sixty Million Dollar Road Bond Issue Act, authorizing changes in location of routes, held germane to general subject of act (Laws 1917, p. 696).

Provision of the Sixty Million Dollar Road Bond Issue Act (Laws 1917, p. 696), authorizing minor changes in location of routes found necessary to carry out provisions of act, held germane to purpose of act as expressed in its title, to construct hard-surfaced roads on state public highways.

9. Highways 103-Department of public works and buildings held under evidence to have acted within authority in locating part of road over private property (Laws 1917, p. 696).

Department of public works and buildings held under evidence to have acted within power and authority of Laws 1917, p. 696, in changing location of portion of route as defined by the act and establishing it over private property.

Appeal from Carroll County; Orion M. Grove, Judge.

Petition of the Department of Public Works and Buildings against Charles A. Spanogle and others, to ascertain compensation to be paid for a right of way. From a judgment assessing damages, James L. McKean and Ray F. Allison appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Turnbaugh & Eaton, of Mt. Carroll, and W. A. Blodgett, and McCalmont & Ramsay, all of Morrison, for appellants.

DE YOUNG, J. The department of public works and buildings of this state filed its petition in the county court of Carroll county under the Act of June 22, 1917, known as the Sixty Million Dollar Road Bond Issue Act (Laws of 1917, p. 696; Cahill's Stat. 1925, p. 2101) to ascertain the just compensation to be paid certain landowners for right of way to constitute a part of route No. 40 as defined in the act. Certain of the defendants filed a joint and several answer setting forth objections to the petition and concluding with a motion to dismiss it. The objections were overruled, and the motion was denied. Thereafter a jury assessed the damages of the several landowners. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were made and denied, and judgment was rendered upon the verdict. James L. McKean and Ray F. Allison, two of the landowners, prosecute this appeal.

Route No. 40 is described in section 9 of the Act of June 22, 1917, as "beginning in a public highway on the north line of the city of Sterling and running in a northwesterly direction to Milledgeville, thence to Chadwick, thence north to connect with route No. 27, and beginning at a highway on the north line of the city of Mt. Carroll and running north to Stockton." This route as laid out by the department of public works and buildings through the village of Milledgeville, and to the northwest of that village is indicated by the letters QSABC on the following plat:

MILLEDGEVILL

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

From point C the route follows a public, tion entered into the appellee's considerahighway west about 31⁄2 miles to the village tion of the routes north and south of the

of Chadwick. Through the territory shown by the plat, the route is laid out over public streets and highways with the exception of the portion between the letters A and B, which is located over private property. This portion is slightly in excess of 2 miles in length. The appellee seeks to acquire from the appellants by the instant proceeding approximately the westerly 4,250 feet of the easterly one-half of the portion of the route between A and B-that is, about 2,850 feet from the appellant McKean and the remaining 1,400 feet from the appellant Allison.

railroad. Route No. 40 as laid out involves the construction of a subway under the railroad between points Q and S at an approximate cost of $20,000. The subway, when built, will eliminate a dangerous grade crossing which now exists in the village of Milledgeville. The business district of the village lies north of the railroad, and the subway on the route as proposed will afford the people who live south of the railroad or approach from that direction safe access to the center of the village. While a high school is located between points A and S upon the route as laid out, and in the location of a through highway the proximity of a school is avoided whenever feasible, yet in this instance the playground is to the rear of the

Prior to the final determination to locate route No. 40 as indicated by the letters QSABC and thence west, the location of the route south of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad over streets and public high- | building, and the pupils attending this school ways, as indicated by the letters QRXYB, had been considered by the appellee, and arrange ments had been made to acquire the private property necessary to allow curves of sufficient radii at street and highway intersections. The distance between the portion of the route AB and the highway south of the railroad varies from 500 to 2,300 feet. The plan to locate route No. 40 over the highway last mentioned was never approved by the appellee.

are not wholly immature, for their ages range from 14 to 18 years. Route No. 40 might be located north of the railroad over existing public highways exclusively, as indicated by points ADEFC, but, if so located, there would be, over and above the route as laid out, three additional right-angle turns, which would increase the dangers of operation, an additional $18,000 would be required for construction, and the annual cost of maintenance would be $200 greater. Moreover, the district engineer testified that route No. 40 is a federal-aid road, and that the federal government promotes the separation of the grades of trunk line highways and railroad crossings wherever possible.

that this turn, to accord with sound engineering practice, would require a radius of not less than 300 feet and the consequent taking of ground on which a house is situated, and that a turn with a radius of from 300 to 500 feet, as compared with the ordinary one at the intersection of two streets, increases the distance within which the driver of a vehicle may view the turn, and hence permits travel at a greater rate of speed and makes operation more safe when the weather is inclement or the pavement is slippery. Proceeding west from point Q to point R, thence north to point X, and thence northwesterly to point Y, a turn would be made at each point. The dis

O. F. Goeke, the appellee's engineer for the district comprising ten counties in the northwestern part of the state, including Carroll county, testified that he supervised the preparation of the plans for route No. 40; that, as the result of experience, the appellee had From the testimony of the district engineer, formulated a policy concerning the location it appears that, if route No. 40 had been loand building of the bond issue trunk high-cated south of the railroad, a right-angle turn ways which sought to make them suitable, to the west at point Q would be necessary, not only for present, but also future, traffic, and which kept in view the interest of the state as a whole rather than the interest of the particular community. He further testified that, when it was determined to locate a route, the appellee notified the district office to make an investigation of the comparative merits of the locations that could be reasonably considered as feasible from an engineering, technical, and practical point of view; that the preliminary investigation of the various routes involved, among other things, a consideration of the length of the road, the amount of grading and bridge work to be done, and the dangers of railroad crossings at grade; that, following this in-trict engineer further testified that safe opvestigation, maps and a detailed report concerning the best location for the route were prepared; that, from the different locations considered, a first, second, and third choice were requested by the appellee; and that from all the data and information obtained, the route was finally designated by the appellee.

eration of vehicles at each of these corners would require a turn with a radius of 500 feet, that such a radius in each of these instances would involve the taking of private property, and that two curves in a trunk line highway within close proximity of each other, such as those at points R and X, should be avoided wherever possible. Route No. 40, It appears from the evidence that physical if located as indicated by points QRXY, conditions and various features of construc- would cross the railroad by means of a via

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(158 N.E.)

duct at point B. This overhead crossing would require an extensive fill at each approach, and its cost would be about the same as that of a subway. The crossing would be nearly 3 miles west of the village of Milledgeville, and, if built, the grade crossing in the village would remain. If the route had been located south of the railroad, it would pass a common school in the village of Milledgeville, a short distance west of point Q.. The presence of children in large numbers so near a through highway would increase the danger of personal injury or loss of life. The existence of sewers in certain streets of the village was, in the opinion of the appellee, another obstacle to this location of this route, for in making house connections with these sewers, trenches would be dug to the middle of the street under the hard-surfaced pavement. These reasons, among others, were deemed sufficient by the appellee to reject the plan to locate route No. 40 south of the railroad.

Appellants make various contentions for a reversal of the judgment. These contentions may be reduced to the following: (1) The Act of June 22, 1917, requires the construction of the state-wide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads upon public highways of the state, and it does not authorize the department of public works and buildings to open or lay out new highways upon which to construct any portion of those roads; (2) if the act attempts to authorize the department to open or lay out new roads and to condemn the right of way therefor, the provisions to that end are not mentioned in or contemplated by the title of the act, and are therefore unconstitutional and void; (3) the departure from the public highways in the location of route No. 40 is not a minor change such as is contemplated in or authorized by the Act of June 22, 1917; and (4) even though such change should be held to be a minor change within the terms of the act, yet it is not necessary to carry out the provisions of the act, and for that reason is unauthorized.

[1] The title of the act by authority of which the instant proceeding was instituted

is:

"An act in relation to the construction by the state of Illinois of a state-wide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads upon public highways of the state and the provision of means for the payment of the cost thereof by an issue of bonds of the state of Illinois." Laws of 1917, p. 696; Cahill's Stat. 1925, p. 2101.

Section 1 of the act provides that a statewide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads shall be constructed by the state upon its public highways "along the hereinafter described routes, as near as may be. * By section 2 it is provided, among other things, that the construction of the statewide system of roads, and all work incidental thereto, shall be under the general supervi158 N.E.-34

sion and control of the department of public works and buildings, subject to the approval of the Governor. Section 9 provides that the general location of the routes upon and along which the proposed roads are to be constructed shall be substantially as described in that section, so as to connect with each other the different communities and the principal cities of the state, save that the department of public works and buildings shall have the right to make such minor changes in the location of said routes as may become necessary in order to carry out the provisions of the act. This section defines the courses of the several routes and fixes their termini. Section 11 provides that, whenever the making of any part of the proposed improvement, or the locating of a route or any part thereof, will require that private property be taken or damaged, the department of public works and buildings, in its name, shall have the right to purchase the necessary land, or, if the compensation therefor cannot be agreed upon, to have it ascertained, and to acquire and pay for the property in the manner provided by law for the exercise of the right of eminent domain.

The provisions that the state-wide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads shall be constructed upon public highways along the routes described, "as near as may be;" that the general location of the routes shall be substantially as defined; that the appellee may make such minor changes in the location of a route as may become necessary to effectuate the provisions of the act; and that the power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire private property for a route or part of a route, show that primarily the durable, hard-surfaced roads must be constructed on public highways, but that departures therefrom, under certain conditions, are authorized. The avoidance of physical obstacles, the attainment of proper grades, alignment, and construction, the elimination of dangerous conditions, the safe operation of traffic, the saving of excessive and unnecessary costs and expenses of construction and maintenance, and the interest of the state rather than of the particular community, are considerations, among others, which impelled the General Assembly to allow some discretion in the location of a route for a durable, hard-surfaced road. The departures from public highways contemplated by the Act of June 22, 1917, usually constitute a small proportion of the whole route, forming an integral part thereof, and they are not independent public highways. The appellants' first contention cannot be sustained.

[2-8] The constitutional provision that no act shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title, prohibits the passage of an act containing provisions not fairly included in the title. Milne v. People, 224 Ill. 125, 79 N. E. 631; Rouse v.

Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 81 N. E. 1109; Sutter v. People's Gas Light Co., 284 Ill. 634, 120 N. E. 562; Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271, 8 A. L. R. 466. The subject of an act means the matter or thing forming the groundwork of the act, and may include many provisions that are germane to it and are such that if traced back will lead the mind to the subject as the generic head. People v. Solomon, 265 Ill. 28, 106 N. E. 458; Perkins v. County Com'rs, 271 Ill. 449, 111 N. E. 580, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 27. The general purpose of the constitutional provision is accomplished when a law has but one general subject which is fairly indicated by its title. The title is not required to be an index to or as comprehensive in matters of detail as the body of the act, but, if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the General Assembly or the people, it is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. Unless the act contains matters which have no proper connection with or relation to the title, or the title itself contains subjects without any proper relation to each other, the constitutional provision is not violated. The General Assembly must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive the object of the statute shall be and how much particularity shall be employed in the title defining it. An act having a single, general subject indicated in the title may contain many provisions, however diverse, if they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the subject and may be considered in furtherance of it by providing for the method and means of effectuating it. People v. Stacker, 322 Ill. 232, 153 N. E. 354; Manaster v. Kioebge, 257 Ill. 431, 100 N. E. 989; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565, 27 N. E. 217;

Unusual conditions upon public highways may create the necessity for deviations therefrom in locating the route of a hard-surfaced road. To assert that such changes have no proper connection with or relation to the title of the act is unreasonable, for, on the contrary, when necessary, they are conducive to the consummation of the purpose expressed in the title. The provision which authorizes such changes to be made is germane to the general subject of the act.

[9] The appellants' third and fourth contentions, that the location of a portion of route No. 40 over private property is not a minor change such as is contemplated by the act, and that, even if it should be held to be such a change, it was unauthorized because unnecessary to carry out the provisions of the act, need not be considered at length. The considerations which led the appellee to locate the route over the private property in question have been reviewed. Some discretion must necessarily be vested in the agencies to which the consummation of a plan so extensive as the construction of a state-wide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads is committed. Arbitrary action in that respect may be prevented or restrained. Upon the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it cannot be said that the appellee acted arbitrarily. When all the conditions are considered, it acted within its power and authority. People v. Department of Public Works and Buildings, 320 Ill. 117, 150 N. E. 655.

The judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Suffolk. Oct. 21, 1927.

1. Trusts 217(3)-Trustees held empowered under will to continue testator's mining investments and to convert them into investments in consolidated mining companies.

Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, supra; OLD COLONY TRUST CO. et al. v. SHAW Perkins v. County Com'rs, supra; Sutter v. People's Gas Light Co., supra. There has been a general disposition to construe this constitutional provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which the provision was adopted. Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) p. 209. It is the purpose of the Act of June 22, 1917, as stated in its title, to construct a state-wide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads upon public highways of the state. The subject of the act, because of its nature, would be expressed generally in the title. To permit minor changes in the location of a route to be made should be considered as a necessary, implied power to carry out the purpose expressed in the title of the act, rather than as an enlargement of the subject or as the creation of a right not contemplated by the title.

Under will authorizing trustees in discretion, as long as they think wise, to continue to hold stock, in mining companies, even though same be unproductive, and to invest all money in such property as they think wise, trustees were empowered to continue testator's investments in copper mining companies as permanent investments, and to convert or exchange that stock into stock or interest in mining corporations formed by merger or consolidation of mining companies, shares of stock of which was owned by testator, and which companies owned large, if not controlling, share in consolidated companies.

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