Slike stranica

by appellee, and that any question of inter-pellant's faculty, because physicans not conpretation of the gift, if not settled by the dis- nected with appellant's faculty furnished agreeing parties, should be settled by arbitra- more profitable patrons to the hospital, which tion, and that the gift should take effect upon the acceptance of the same, on the conditions specified, by appellee, and upon appellant agreeing to all conditions relating to its cooperation and affiliation with appellee.

request was denied by appellant. The bill further charges: That thereupon appellee refused to comply with the condition in said deed, and claimed that the condition therein did not mean all its staff must be selected from appellant's faculty, but only that appellee might select its staff from such faculty or otherwise, as it saw fit, and that its board. of trustees adopted the following by-law, viz.:

to make contracts with agents and employés and to appoint the medical staff of the hospital, and they are empowered to fill vacancies in the same as they may arise."

After setting forth the above facts the bill charges appellant is incorporated as an educational institution under the laws of this state for the purpose of establishing departments of study in all the arts and sciences; "The executive committee is also empowered that in pursuance of its charter it maintains educational departments, including a school of liberal arts, a law school, and a school of medicine; that the latter school is located at Dearborn and Twenty-Fifth That since the adoption of such by-law the streets, in the city of Chicago; that appellee is a charitable hospital organized under the executive committee of appellee has from laws of this state for "the gratituous treat- time to time appointed and kept on its staff ment of the medical and surgical diseases of physicans and surgeons not nominated by apthe sick poor," and is located in close prox- pellant or drawn from its faculty, and has the sick poor," and is located in close prox-without the consent of appellant discharged imity to the appellant's medical school; that

charges numerous conferences were had between representatives of the two institutions, without avail, until April 9, 1914, when James Deering made his deed of gift aforesaid; that at the time the gift was made Deering was aware of the differences that had arisen between the two institutions; that his gift

until recently the two institutions mantained from its medical staff physicans and surgeons nominated by appellant, and claims the right friendly relations, and to all intents and purposes operated as affiliated institutions. The to appoint whomsoever it pleases to the medbill further charges that in order to success-ical staff of such hospital and in other ways fully carry on a medical school it is necessa- has refused to observe the conditions and The bill further ry that its students not only be taught by obligations of said deed. text-books, laboratories, and lectures, but also that they have the opportunity of witnessing surgical operations and observing medical treatment in hospitals under expert physicans, called "bedside treatment," and in that way become familiar with the different diseases and their treatment; that all firstclass medical schools are operated adjacent was made in view thereof, and with the exto hospitals, where such facilities are afforded; that the use of hospitals for this purpose has become very general in the United States, and that by reason of these considerations appellant made its deed and contributed to the cost of building and equipping appellee's hospital. The bill further charges that after a hospital was constructed on the property the board of trustees of appellee adopted the following resolution, viz.:

"The executive committee is also empowered to make contracts with agents and employés, and to appoint annually the medical staff of the hospital on the nomination of such staff to be annually made by Northwestern University, and they are empowered to fill vacancies in the same as they may arise, on similar nomination by Northwestern University"

pectation that the increased income from his endowment would smooth over the difficulties and enable appellee without financial loss to carry on its charitable work and furnish the clinic teaching and facilities required by appellant; that the various conditions were inserted in the deed of gift for the purpose of re-establishing friendly relations between the two institutions; and that such gift creat

ed a charitable trust between the donor and the two institutions which should be enforced

by a court of equity. The bill further charges that notwithstanding appellee accepted the munificent gift of Deering it has refused to comply with the conditions of both of said deeds, and has refused to select its medical staff from the faculty of appellant, and to furnish its wards, amphitheater clinics, and bedside teaching to the medical stu-and that thereafter its hospital staff was dents of appellant, and has refused such stuselected from the faculty of appellant and dents access to its hospital wards and amphibedside and clinic teaching furnished to the theaters for the purpose of such teaching, by students of that institution; that in 1912 and reason of which the appellant has been oblig1913 serious differences arose between the ed to seek other hospitals and clinic services two institutions through lack of funds from and to spend large sums of money for such endowment and of profit in the operation of clinic services. The bill further charges the the hospital, and that appellee requested a acceptance of said gift by appellee upon the modification of the condition, to the end that terms and conditions laid down and specified all of its staff need not be drawn from ap-in said deed, and that it agreed by resolution

(125 N.E.)

was one upon conditions, for a failure to comply with which a forfeiture of the property might be declared, but that a court of chancery is not the proper tribunal to decree a forfeiture.

to be bound by and to carry out the terms and details mentioned therein; and the bill also charges that appellant, by reason of its affiliation and contractual relations with appellee, will derive many advantages and receive an adequate consideration for carrying out the [1-3] A charity is "a gift to be applied conconditions imposed by said deed upon appel- sistently with existing laws for the benefit of lant, and in consideration of these advantag- an indefinite number of persons, either by es agreed to the conditions relating to co-oper- bringing their minds and hearts under the ination of appellant and appellee as in said fluence of education or religion, by relieving deed expressed. their bodies from disease, suffering, or conThe prayer of the bill is for alternative re-straint, by assisting them to establish themlief. Appellant prays that without waiving selves in life, or by creating or maintaining the condition of its said deed or any right it public buildings, or by otherwise lessening may have, either at law or equity, in the the burdens of government" (Congregational premises, the conditions of said deeds be con- Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board strued and appellant's rights thereunder de- of Review, No. 12584, 125 N. E. 7: Crerar v. clared, and that the title to said land be Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34 N. E. 467, 21 L. R. declared to revert to appellant, or that appel- A. 454), and a charitable trust would be one lee may be required by the mandatory injunc- created for the purpose of carrying out one tion of the court to comply with the terms of or more of these objects. While appellant the conditions in said deeds, and particularly and appellee are both, in a sense, charitable that it be required to select its medical staff corporations and are working for the purpose exclusively from the faculty of appellant and of carrying out one or more of these charitato furnish bedside teaching in its wards and ble purposes, it does not follow that a conamphitheater clinics to the students of appel- tract of transaction had between them for the lant to the extent required by it, or that ap- purpose of better enabling them to carry out pellant be compensated for the land deeded, the objects of their creation will give rise to together with all sums of money paid or con- a charitable trust which a court of chancery tributed to aid in the construction of the will enforce. A corporation of this character building and equipment of said hospital, and is created by law for a definite purpose, and that it be relieved from the obligations im-it cannot donate its funds to another corporaposed upon it by the deed of gift from said tion organized for similar or other purposes, Deering to appellee, and be discharged from except that such donation assist to carry out all connection with appellee, and that their mutual obligation be canceled, or that the court grant such other relief in the premises as equity may require.

Appellee filed its demurrer to the bill, which was sustained, as hereinbefore stated. Deering answered, admitting most of the material allegations of the bill, and in addition thereto filed his cross-bill, setting up substantially the same facts as were set forth in the original bill, and praying substantially the same relief.

the purpose for which such corporation was created. Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 Ill. 225; Board of Education v. Bakewell, 122 Ill. 339, 10 N. E. 378. In the case at bar appellant was organized for educational purposes, and property received by it is held in trust for that purpose, and cannot be devoted to other purposes. The donation to appellee would not further the corporate purposes of appellant unless made for the purpose of providing additional teaching facilities for appellant, and can only be sustained upon the ground that it The first question presented is the construc- was so made. It is conceded that one of the tion of the deed from appellant to appellee best methods of conducting a medical school and a determination of the rights of the par- is to supplement the study of text-books and ties under such deed. While the instrument lectures by the observation of actual bedside recites a nominal consideration of $1 and treatment of patients and surgical operations other valuable considerations, it is made upon in a well-conducted hospital. In other words, the express condition that appellee shall con- in order to successfully conduct a medical struct a hospital building and maintain and school it is necessary that the school have operate the same, draw its hospital staff hospital facilities for affording its students from the faculty of appellant's medical school, opportunities to observe the actual treatment and furnish facilities for clinic teaching of of patients under the care of skilled physithe students of that school, the last two con- cians. Appellant with this end in view made ditions constituting the real and substantial the conveyance in question to appellee, by consideration for the conveyance made. Ap- which the latter undertook to erect and mainpellant insists that by reason of these pro- tain a suitable hospital, to draw its medical visions a charitable trust was created be- staff from the faculty of appellant, and to aftween it and appellee which a court of chan- ford to the students of that institution opcery has jurisdiction to enforce. On the oth- portunity for the observation of the actual er hand, appellee insists that no charitable treatment of patients in that hospital. The trust was created, but that the conveyance conveyance was in no sense one made for a 125 N.E.-2

charitable purpose, but, on the other hand, [ Fed. 801, does not conflict with this view. In was one made solely for the purpose of better that case a forfeiture of an oil lease had been enabling appellant to carry out one of its corporate purposes, and as such did not give rise to a charitable trust between the two institutions.

[4-6] Appellant contends that by reason of the charitable character of the two institutions the provisions of the deed may be construed to be covenants and not conditions, and as such may be enforced in a court of chancery. Appellee, on the other hand, contends and properly, we think-that the provisions are conditions subsequent, and that appellant is limited to the remedy provided in its deed, viz. a forfeiture of the property, and that a court of chancery is not the proper tribunal for enforcing such forfeiture. While there are cases construing conditions in instruments of conveyance as covenants (Associate Alumni v. General Theological Seminary, 163 N. Y. 417, 57 N. E. 626; Hoboken v. Hoboken, 70 N. J. Eq. 630, 62 Atl. 1), our attention has been called to no case in which a conveyance was made upon an express condition, with the further provision that for a failure to comply with such condition the title to the land should revert to the grantor, in which such condition has been held to be a covenant. The general rule, as stated in Associate Alumni v. General Theological Seminary, supra, is, if the trustees of a charity abuse the trust, misemploy the charity fund or commit a breach of the trust, the property does not revert to the heir or legal representative of the donor unless there is an express condition of the gift that it shall revert to the donor or his heirs in case the trust is abused. And in Sanitary District v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 278 Ill. 529, 116 N. E. 161, we held that in case of doubt as to whether a certain provision in a deed is a condicovenant it will be construed to be a covenant to prevent the destruction of the estate, but that where there is an express stipulation for a forfeiture of the estate and its immediately vesting in the grantor, all doubt as to whether the provision is a covenant or condition is removed, and the provision will be held to be a condition. In the case before us the deed provides for a reverter upon failure to comply with the condition in such deed, and the conveyance must be held to be one upon condition subsequent. A covenant differs from a condition in that in a proper case a court of chancery may enforce the specific performance of the former, while it will not of the latter, for the reason that to do so would work a forfeiture of the estate (Sanitary District v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., supra), and a court of equity will not lend its aid to enforce a forfeiture (Douglas v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 127 Ill. 101, 20 N. E. 51; Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 230 Ill. 334, 82 N. E. 837). The case of Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 72 C. C. A. 213, 140

declared, and relief was sought only for the purpose of establishing, as a matter of record, that a forfeiture had been declared and of securing a cancellation of such lease as a cloud upon the title of the lessor.

[7, 8] It is further charged in the bill that between April, 1900, and May, 1901, appellant gave appellee, for the purpose of enabling it to comply with the conditions of the deed and to aid in constructing and equipping its hospital, the further sum of $30,000, and that at the time appellee received this money it knew the extent of appellant's powers, and that it had no authority to devote any portion of its funds to any purpose other than its corporate purposes; that the sum so given was received with knowledge that it was given for the purpose of obtaining clinic facilities in such hospital for the students of appellant's medical school; that immediately after the hospital was constructed its staff was drawn from the faculty of appellant, and opportunities afforded to the students of appellant's school for the observation of bedside and clinic treatment of patients in the wards and amphitheaters of the hospital, and that this relation continued until the disagreement arose as to the meaning of the provision in the deed that the "staff of the hospital be drawn from the faculty" of appellant, appellee contending that this provision did not require that all its staff should be drawn from such institution, but only that it was authorized so to do if it saw fit. Apparently the failure of the two institutions to agree as to the meaning of this provision has led to this litigation. When the language of the provision of the deed is read in the light of the situation of the parties at the time it was made, we think there can be no serious controversy as to its meaning. Appellant was desirous of securing additional facilities for bedside and clinic instruction of its students, and the evident purpose of the insertion of this clause in the deed was to insure that the students of that institution would receive their bedside and clinic teaching in the hospital under the guidance of members of the faculty of the school of which they were students. To this end it provided that "the staff of the hospital" should be drawn from the faculty of appellant's medical school, the word "staff" being used in its comprehensive sense and including all persons who should be selected as members of such staff. And such, indeed, was the construction placed upon this language by both the parties to this deed until this controversy arose. It is further charged in the bill that since the controversy over the construction to be given this deed has arisen, appellee has failed and refused to draw its hospital staff from the medical faculty of appellant or to afford to the students of that institution opportunities of observing the bed

(125 N.E.)

side treatment of patients in the wards and amphitheaters of the hospital, and that it persists in such refusal. The bill shows a clear violation of the condition of this deed and of the gift of $30,000, which was made in the expectation that appellee would furnish facilities for bedside and clinic teaching for the students of appellant's medical school so long as desired, and the latter gift, being made without any condition of reverter, created a continuing obligation which a court of equity has jurisdiction to enforce.

[ocr errors]

time the gift was made Deering was deeply interested in the affairs of appellant, and fully cognizant of the difficulties which had arisen between the two institutions with regard to the manner of the selection of the staff of the hospital and also of the embarrassed financial condition of appellee, occasioned, as appellee claimed, by the manner in which its staff was selected, and he was prompted to make the gift by a desire on his part to re-establish friendly relations between the two institutions and to provide appellee [9] The next question presented is the with funds with which to carry on its charirights of the parties under the reciprocal ob- table work. This is evidenced by the numerligations imposed upon them by the Deering ous provisions inserted in the gift intended deed. By this deed he specifically provides to accomplish that end, and which could have that the income from the property conveyed been inserted therein for no other purpose. shall be used for furthering the charitable By his deed of gift Deering created a chariwork of the hospital and for procuring appli- table trust, under which each of the instituances needed in that character of work, and he tions was in a measure a beneficiary. Appelplaces the burden of carrying out this trust lee received additional funds with which to upon appellant and appellee. He further re- carry on its charitable work, in consideration cites that it is his belief that the best hos- of which it was to become a teaching hospital pital is one that has close relations with a and afford facilities for the purpose, and apgood medical school, and that the best med- pellant was to be benefited to the extent that ical school is one that has close relations it was to be given facilities for bedside and with a well-conducted hospital. He endeav- clinic teaching in the hospital, in consideraors to establish close and friendly relations tion of which it became bound "to provide between the two institutions by providing an adequate staff" for the hospital. This that the president of appellant, the dean of meant a staff adequate for the needs of the its medical department, and one additional hospital, and it clearly meant the entire staff. member of its board of trustees shall always. The obligations imposed upon each of these be members of the board of trustees of appel- institutions by the gift were mutual and of lee, and that the president of appellee, its such a character that either might maintain superintendent and one additional member a bill against the other to enforce performof its board of trustees shall always be mem-ance of the conditions of this gift in accordbers of the board of trustees of appellant, and ance with the terms of the trust. If on the requires that these parties shall constitute a committee on friendly relations between the two institutions, and shall be attentive to their affairs, and shall meet at least once each month for the purpose of considering

[ocr errors]

hearing of this cause' on its merits the proof sustains the allegations of the bill, the appellant is entitled to a mandatory injunction, requiring appellee to comply with the terms of the conditions under which the gift of $30,000 and the gift under the Deering deed were accepted by appellee.

matters of mutual interest to the two institutions. He further provides that appellee shall be a teaching hospital, and both in its charity work and elsewhere in the hospital shall give General is a necessary party to this action. [10] It is further contended the Attorney all proper facilities for teaching consistent for the reason it is one involving a public with the welfare of the patients. He provides trust. The case of Newberry v. Blatchford, for the operation and conducting of a free 106 Ill. 584, is cited in support of this propodispensary and laboratories by the joint ac- sition. In that case the Attorney General tion of the two institutions, using a portion had not been made a party to the original of the income from his gift for that purpose. action concerning a public trust, and it was He requires the medical department to main- there pointed out that in bills asking the adtain and enforce a high standard of studies vice or direction of a court of equity as to for the admission of students, and to pro- the administration of a public charity, and vide an adequate staff for the hospital, ex- especially where waste or mismanagement pressing the further hope that in time an ap- was apprehended or the decree would affect pointment to the faculty of the school shall the interest of the cestui que trust, the Atoperate as an appointment to the staff of the torney General, or other public officer whose hospital. He makes it a condition to this duty it is to have a care in such matters, is gift becoming operative that appellee accept a proper party, either complainant or defendthe conditions imposed, and that appellant ant. But such is not the rule where the charagree to the conditions specified in this deed ity is in the hands of a trustee charged by of gift. In other words, the joint action and the donor specifically with its management agreement by both institutions are necessary for the cestui que trust. It is only where the before the gift becomes operative. At the parties having charge of the fund unite in

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

abuses of their trust and there is no one hav- and the cause is remanded to the circuit ing a right to sue in his own name concerning court of Cook county, with directions to overit, that the Attorney General is a necessary rule the demurrer. party. In the suit before us one of the beneficiaries under the gift, which is to a certain extent charged with the administration of the trust, is seeking to be allowed to discharge the duties imposed upon it by the terms of the trust. For this reason the Attorney General is not a necessary, although he would have been a proper, party to this proceeding.

(290 I11. 227)

WALL v. CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO. (No. 12199.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 27, 1919. Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1919.)


[11, 12] It is further contended that the demurrer was properly sustained for the reason that the bill is multifarious. This contention 1. COURTS 8-ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHT OF is based upon the fact that in one bill relief is asked under the provisions of the deed A right of action which has accrued under from appellant to appellee and the deed from the statutes of a sister state will be enforced, Deering to appellee. No inflexible rule has unless prohibited by law, or unless it is against been laid down for determining whether or morals or natural justice, or unless it is against not a bill is multifarious, and each case the general interests of the citizens of the must be determined largely upon its own state.


Statutes of Ohio, giving a cause of action for death, are not regarded in Illinois as against morals or natural justice, or hostile to the general interests of the citizens, and will be enforced, unless enforcement is prohibited by law.



Injuries Act, § 2, has no extraterritorial



The law of the place where a right was acquired or a liability incurred will govern as to the right of action, while all that pertains merely to the remedy will be controlled by the law of the place where the action is brought. 5. COURTS 8- JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS FIXED BY LEGISLATURE SUBJECT TO FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

facts. The aim of a court of equity is to ad- 2. DEATH 35-RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DEATH minister complete relief in one suit and investigate and determine all matters which form the basis for the complainant's right to relief, and as a general rule the court will in a single suit investigate and determine all questions incidental to the main controversy and grant all relief incidental to the accomplishment of the main object of the bill. Courts of equity allow great liberality in joining several matters in one bill when all of the matters grow out of the same transaction and all parties are interested alike in the same right and the relief to be granted against each is of the same general character, and the mere fact that two or more matters are joined in the same bill to prevent a multiplicity of suits will in no wise prejudice the defendant, and will not render the bill in chancery multifarious. King v. Rice, 285 Ill. 123, 120 N. E. 449. In this case appellant is seeking to establish its right to avail itself of the advantages of the use of appellee's hospital as a teaching hospital, and to nominate the medical staff of such institution. It bases its right to do so upon the several transactions set out in the bill, had with the appellee. As to each of these matters it seeks the same relief against the defendant. By joining all of these transactions in one suit a multiplicity of suits is avoided, and adjudication of all matters incidental to that which constitutes the main matter of controversy in this case is accomplished in a single suit. No prejudice could result to appellee by having all of these matters joined in one suit and the rights of the parties thereunder adjudicated and in this way a multiplicity of suits avoided. In our opinion the bill, tested by the principles side the state. laid down in the authorities, is not multifari-7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW


Each state, subject to the restrictions of the federal Constitution, determines the limits of jurisdiction of its courts, the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them, and how far its courts, having jurisdiction of the parties, shall hear and decide transitory actions, where the cause of action has arisen outside the state, and different states may have different policies, and the same state may have different policies at different times, provided that any policy the state may choose to adopt must operate the same way on its own citizens and those of other states.



The Injuries Act of 1853 gave no vested right to any one interested in recovering damages for death by wrongful act occurring out




The court erred in sustaining the demurrer There is no vested right in a public law to the bill. The decree is therefore reversed, which is not in the nature of a private grant,

For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

« PrethodnaNastavi »