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(164 Ν.Ε.)

ing and maintaining lagoons and harbors for boats and for establishing and maintaining rules and regulations for the use and enjoyment of such lagoons and harbors by the public."

Section 1 of the act prescribes, as a condition precedent to acquiring title to the submerged lands and their use as a park, the making and filing of a plan showing a boulevard or driveway. The boulevard or driveway provided in the plan is evidently to form the outer boundary of the enlargement of the park provided for in the statute. This is made clear by the provision of section 1 that the plan shall provide for a breakwater, sea wall, or other protection sufficient to save the boulevard from destruction or waste by water. While by section 7 of the act the commissioners are granted the authority to make additional enlargements of the park, "but under the same conditions and limitations, and in the method prescribed" by the act, it is evident that such enlargement must be by such plan and action on the part of the commissioners as is required in the original enlargement. It is also necessary, in order that the intervening submerged lands be filled in and used as a park, that the commissioners shall, under section 2 of the act, secure, by contract with the adjoining land owners, deeds to their riparian rights, and in case of inability to contract with them such rights may be taken by condemnation, for which the commissioners must pay just compensation. The provision giving the power to the court, in case the land owners are infants or under legal disability, to make such transfer and fix the boundary line on petition of a guardian of such land owners, "upon such terms and conditions as it may deem reasonable and fair," contemplates that conditions not repugnant to the purposes of the act may be imposed upon the commissioners in the transfer of such riparian rights where the owners themselves are unable to contract for such conditions. It is also evident from the language of the act that where a contract within the purposes of the act is made, such contract becomes a part of the conditions upon which the riparian rights of the land owners have been secured. One condition is that the land shall be used only for park purposes according to the plan adopted.

[1, 2] It is urged that the statute, when complied with, vests this land in the park commissioners for park purposes, and that the proposed boulevard may be properly considered a park purpose. It will be noted that the language of section 1 is that the lands granted to the commissioners shall be held for "park purposes as hereafter in this act set forth." A park is defined as "a piece of ground in a city or village set apart for ornament or to afford the benefit of air, exercise or amusement." 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (1st Ed.) p. 407; Village of Riverside v. MacLain, 210 III. 308, 71 N. E. 408, 66 L. R. A. 288, 102 Am. St. Rep. 164. Section 3

declares what these park purposes are. They are (1) for the purpose of constructing and maintaining the boulevard provided in the plan; (2) for the purpose of filling, maintaining and holding the intervening submerged lands designated upon the plan as a public park; and (3) for creating and maintaining lagoons and harbors for boats and regulating the use thereof. Whether the commissioners in this case have a right to erect an embankment across the submerged lands inside the boundary boulevard when such submerged lands shall have been filled in depends not upon whether such a boulevard may be erected under general powers of the park commissioners, as provided by general statute relating to park purposes and granting to such commissioners the power to build boulevards, but whether such may be done under the powers authorized by this particular act. The rule is that where there is to be found in a statute a particular enactment, it is to be held operative as against the general provisions on the subject either in the same act or in the general laws relating thereto. Handtoffski v. Chicago Traction Co., 274 III. 282, 113 Ν. Ε. 620; City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co., 248 111. 264, 93 N. E. 753; City of Cairo v. Bross, 101 Ill. 475.

[3] It is alleged in the amended bill and admitted by the demurrer that the park commissioners propose to build a through boulevard across the submerged lands opposite the property of appellants on an embankment varying from 5 or 6 feet to 20 feet in height, with a separation of grade at street intersections by means of viaducts; that this through boulevard is to be of a width of 100 feet and at a distance of 122 feet from the boundary line of appellants' property, despite the provisions of the plan that the boulevard shall be constructed at a distance of approximately 1,000 feet east of such boundary line. It is also alleged that such embankment will interfere with the view from appellants' property and the air from the lake; that the boulevard proposed is not an ordinary park driveway but is of a character that will interfere with the use of the park property for park purposes. This boulevard, as described in the bill, can scarcely be said to be a driveway in this park for pleasure or park purposes. It appears from the allegations of the bill, as to the elevation of the embankment and construction of viaducts at street crossings, that the public in the enjoyment of the park would or could make no use of it, but that the embankment effectively separates the portion of the park lying east thereof from the 122 feet lying west of it, and that such 100-foot strip is not used for park purposes but for a public highway. The park commissioners hold this property in trust for the use of the public for park purposes. They have acquired it for that purpose from the state by statute and from the deeds of appellants of their riparian rights.

[4] Appellee urges that it does not take by this deed and contract, for the reason that it could have condemned the riparian rights of appellants. While the board could have so taken these rights it would have been required to pay just compensation therefor, and would then have held the property rights under the trust imposed by the act that the same be held for park purposes as in the act provided.

[5] Appellants also set out in their bill the contract entered into between their predecessor in title and the park commissioners, and allege that it was by means of this contract that their riparian rights were procured and that the granting of such riparian rights formed the consideration for the contract be tween their predecessor in title and the park commissioners, and that they therefore have a right to have such contract carried out. The contract recites that the park commissioners have decided to make an enlargement of the park in accordance with the act hereinbefore mentioned; that they had prepared a plan for the extension of the park as contemplated in the act and located thereon a boulevard or driveway over and upon the bed of Lake Michigan, and that the plans had been spread upon and become a part of the records of the commissioners of Lincoln Park, and the commissioners had made an estimate showing the cost of the construction of such boulevard and filling in and reclaiming the submerged lands, and that it is the intention of the commissioners to comply with said plans. The contract also recites that it is contemplated by the parties thereto that the boundary line between the abutting property of the property owners and the submerged lands shall be determined; that the property owners shall not erect any buildings within 25 feet of such boundary line when established. The deed shows that the transfer of the riparian rights is for park purposes. It was a conveyance of a valuable property right. It seems clear from a consideration of the contract, the plan required and the purpose contemplated by the act that the boulevard intended to be constructed is the one specifically set out in the plan. While these do not forbid the building of another boulevard, yet a boulevard which would interfere with the use of the intervening submerged lands as a park when the same shall have been filled in is contrary to the plan of the act to use such lands as a park, and the averment in the bill that the commissioners propose to build across these submerged lands, when so filled, an elevated structure which will interfere with the use of such lands for park purposes as contemplated in the act and will result in

injury to the property rights of land owners, is sufficient, if true, to authorize the granting of relief prayed in the bill. Streuber v. City of Alton, 319 III. 43, 149 Ν. Ε. 577, 41 A. L. R. 1405; South Park Com'rs v. Ward & Co., 248 III. 299, 93 N. E. 910, 21 Ann. Cas. 127.

[6] It is urged that appellants have no such interest as gives them the right to maintain a bill in equity for the relief sought. The bill avers that their property will be injured by the erection of this grade and constructing thereon a through boulevard. This is an averment of a special injury sufficient to give a court of equity jurisdiction to hear the cause. City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 111. 392, 48 N. E. 927, 38 L. R. A. 849, 61 Am. St. Rep. 185.

[7] While it may not be practicable, as a matter of engineering, to build the boulevard, with its breakwater, as planned, before filling in the intervening submerged lands, yet that fact does not give to the commissioners the right to build an elevated boulevard for through traffic not embraced in the plan over so much of the submerged lands as may have been filled in, in the manner charged in this bill. The park purposes for which such submerged lands are held are those which may be enjoyed by the public generally. The right to enjoy such lands as a park goes to all lands submerged when filled, and while the commissioners may construct pleasure driveways through this park, it seems evident from the allegations of the bill that the commissioners propose to build a highway or boulevard that will not be accessible from other parts of the park. The allegations of the bill, if true, show that the boulevard is to be constructed at a grade which will not admit of its general use in getting to and from different portions of the park as a pleasure drive through such territory. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the commissioners are not authorized, under the act by which they acquired title to these lands, to use them for such highway purposes or such other purposes as would defeat the use of any portion of them for park purposes. They have been given by the act a right to construct such a boulevard at the water boundary of their enlargement but not to appropriate the lands for a through boulevard which divides the park and prevents its free use by the public, as charged in this bill. Village of Riverside v. MacLain, supra. The bill, therefore, was sufficient in law to require an answer, and the court erred in sustaining the demurrer thereto.

The decree of the circuit court is therefore reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(164 Ν.Ε.)

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1. Counties 113(4)-Establishment of cen-
tral addressograph division in office of county
superintendent of public service held within
powers
county commissioners' statutory
(Const. art. 10, § 7; Counties Act, $$ 25, 26,
61; Revenue Act 1872, §§ 155, 163, 182, 188,
190, as amended).

Establishment of central addressograph and tax machine division in office of Cook county superintendent of public service to furnish supplies to all county officers in connection with assessment and collection of taxes held within powers expressly conferred on county board of commissioners by Const. art. 10, § 7, and act in relation to counties, sections 25, 26, 61 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 34), as against contention that acts authorized to be done by division are required to be done by county treasurer, as ex officio tax collector, under Revenue Act 1872, §§ 155, 163, 182, 188, 190, as amended by Revenue Act 1898 and its amendments (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, с. 120, §§ 143, 151, 170, 176, 178).

2. Counties113(4)-County board may require county treasurer to procure supplies, including duplicate tax receipts, through central addressograph division in office of superintendent of public service (Const. art. 10, § 7; Counties Act, §§ 25, 26, 61).

County board, which is manager of county funds and business, may require county treasurer to procure his supplies, including duplicate tax receipts, through central addressograph and tax machine division, established by it in office of superintendent of public service as authorized by Const. art. 10, § 7, and act in relation to counties, §§ 25, 26, 61 (Smith-Hurd's Rev. St. 1927, c. 34); treasurer not being required to write out, mail or even sign such receipts personally.

Appeal from Second Branch Appellate Court, First District, on appeal from the Circuit Court, Cook County; Harry M. Fisher, Judge.

Suit by Julius Kreeger, in behalf of himself and all other taxpayers of Cook county, against Henry A. Zender, as superintendent of public service of Cook county, his deputies and employees. From a judgment of the Appellate Court sustaining a decree dissolving a temporary injunction and dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Henry A. Berger, of Chicago, for appellant.

ent of public service of Cook county, and his deputies and employees, from continuing the operation of the central addressograph and tax machine division of the office of superintendent of public service and from in any manner performing any of certain duties mentioned in the bill which are alleged to be statutory duties imposed by law on the board of assessors, board of review, county clerk, and county treasurer in connection with the assessment of property for taxation and the levy and collection of taxes, the mere enumeration of which, consisting of numerous items, occupies three pages of the printed abstract, and to restrain the board of commissioners of Cook county from ordering the issue of warrants for the payment of employees in the central addressograph and tax machine division of the office of the superintendent of public service for the fiscal year 1927, from making appropriation for the year 1928 for the compensation of employees of said division, from ordering the issue of warrants for the payment for tax machines equipment and other paraphernalia for said division and from making appropriations therefor during the fiscal year 1928, the circuit court of Cook county entered a decree dissolving the temporary injunction granted upon the filing of the bill and dismissing the bill for want of equity, from which Julius Kreeger, the complainant, appealed to the Appellate Court, and has appealed to this court from a judgment sustaining the decree.

The legal question upon which the case turns is the power of the county board to create the central addressograph and tax machine division of the office of the superintendent of public service and to provide for the performance by such division of the acts complained of.

The complainant is a resident and taxpayer in Cook county and the bill is filed in behalf of all other taxpayers as well as himself. The defendants answered, admitting or denying the various allegations of the bill, and the cause was heard upon bill and answer. From the bill and answer it appears that the county board, by resolutions adopted and contracts made in 1923 and subsequent years, organized a department under the superintendent of public service known as the central addressograph and tax machine division, caused to be installed for the use of that department addressing equipment and appurtenances, such as motor-driven graphotypes, motor-driven addressographs for personal property plates and general tax plates, and drawers and cabinets for addressograph plates, provided for the organization of personnel and employees of the division,

Taylor, Miller, Busch & Boyden, of Chicago (Francis X. Busch and Cassius M. Doty, fixing the number of positions, the annual

both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

salaries and the duties to be performed, and made appropriations for the payment of such salaries and the purchase of equipment and supplies and the payment of the expenses

DUNN, J. After a hearing upon a bill filed to restrain Henry A. Zender, as superintendFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

of the division, and that it was the purpose of the county board, and of Zender, acting under its authority, to maintain the division and expend the money of the county in its

maintenance.

The proceedings for the assessment of property and the levy and collection of taxes are governed by the general Revenue Act of 1872 as subsequently amended and as modified by the Revenue Act of 1898 and its amendments (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 120, § 1 et seq.). Section 155 of the act of 1872 as amended (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 120, § 143) provides:

"It shall be the duty of every county collector to prepare tax receipts in triplicate for all taxes assessed, which shall be filled out in accordance with the requirements of section 163 of this act, one copy [of] which shall be mailed by such collector at least thirty days prior to the date upon which unpaid real estate taxes become delinquent, to the owner of the property taxed, or to the person in whose name such property is taxed, another copy of which shall be used by said collector in receipting for the tax paid, and the remaining copy thereof to be retained by such collector. Provided, further, that there shall be printed upon each such receipt, or upon a separate slip which shall be mailed to each person assessed with the copy of the receipt hereinabove provided, a statement of the rates of the various taxes and the total tax rate."

By section 182 of the same act the county collector, who is the county treasurer, is required to publish an advertisement giving notice of the intended application for judgment of sale of delinquent lands and containing a list of the lands and lots upon which the taxes or special assessments remain due and unpaid, the names of owners, if known, the total amount due thereon, and the year or years for which the same are due. Section 188 is as follows:

"Sec. 188. The collector shall transcribe into a book, prepared for that purpose, and known as the tax, judgment, sale, redemption, and forfeiture record, the list of delinquent lands and lots, which shall be made out in numerical order, and contain all the information necessary to be recorded, at least five days before the commencement of the term at which application for judgment is to be made; which book shall set forth the name of the owner, if known; the proper description of the land or lot, the year or years for which the tax or special assessments are due; the valuation on which the tax is extended; the amount of the consolidated and other taxes and special assessments; the costs and total amount of charges against such land or lot. Said book shall also be ruled in columns, so as to show the withdrawal of any special assessments from collection, the amount paid before the rendition of judgment; the amount of judgment, and a column for remarks; the amount paid before sale and after the rendition of said judgment, the amount of the sale, amount of interest or penalty, amount of cost, amount forfeited to the State, date of sale, acres or part sold, name of purchaser,

amount of sale and penalty, taxes of succeeding years, interest and when paid, interest and cost, total amount of redemption, date of redemption, when deed executed, by whom redeemed, and a column for remarks, or receipt of redemption money."

Section 190 provides:

"On the first day of the term at which judgment on delinquent lands and lots is prayed, it shall be the duty of the collector to report to the clerk all the lands or lots, as the case may be, upon which taxes and special assessments have been paid, if any, from the filing of the list mentioned in section one hundred and

eighty-eight up to that time; and the clerk shall note the fact opposite each tract upon which such payments have been made. The collector assisted by the clerk, shall compare and correct said list, and shall make and subscribe an affidavit" in the form prescribed by the section, verifying the list.

The bill alleges that it is the duty of the county clerk, the board of assessors, and the board of review to prepare all books, records, documents, and collector's warrants in relation to the assessment of property for taxation, and the duty of the county treasurer, who is ex-officio county collector, to prepare and mail tax receipts for all taxes assessed, to publish an advertisement giving notice of the application for judgment for the sale of delinquent lands, to prepare a delinquent list to be filed in the county court, and the report to the county clerk of all the lands and lots on which taxes and special assessments remain due and unpaid, but that all of these functions and duties have been performed by the central addressograph and tax machine division, and that during the years 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, and 1927 appropriations were made to said division aggregating large sums of money for the performance of duties imposed by statute on the county clerk, county treasurer, board of assessors, and board of review, and during the same years appropriations were also made for the performance of said duties to the county treasurer, resulting in duplicate and double appropriations for the performance of the same duties. It is further alleged in the bill and admitted in the answer, that on March 21, 1927, the finance committee of the county board reported that for the year 1927 the cost of tax record service imposed by law upon the county treasurer but performed by the addressograph and tax machine division was $39,964.66; "that during said year 1927 large numbers of tax bills have been prepared and written and skeletonized, containing descriptions of lands and lots, the extension of taxes, and aggregate amounts of said taxes, by the central addressograph and tax machine division, under the office of the superintendent of public service, for use by the county treasurer in mailing and delivering same to owners of said lands and lots, which mailing and delivery is required under said chapter 120, and there was also prepared by said central addressograph and tax machine division, under the office of the superintendent of public service, large numbers of personal property tax bills for use of the county treasurer, to be mailed and delivered to the persons owing said personal property taxes; and your orator avers the fact to be that these said tax bills, both real estate and personal property, were not used by said county treasurer, but that said county treasurer, claiming the said superintendent of public service had no right, power, or authority to prepare the same, did prepare another set of tax bills containing said legal descriptions, the extension of taxes, the aggregate amount, and did also prepare another set of personal property tax bills, all of which he used in mailing and delivering the same to the owners of said lots and lands and to the persons owing said personal property taxes, and that by reason of such action large numbers of tax bills were unused and wholly wasted and large expenditures of money in the preparation thereof by the central addressograph and tax machine division, under the office of the superintendent of public service, were likewise wholly wasted, to the injury of this complainant;" that under the Constitution and laws of the state the num

(164 Ν.Ε.)

ber of deputies and assistants of the county clerk and county treasurer is determined by rule of the circuit court, to be entered of record; that for the year 1928 the county treasurer has filed a petition with the circuit judges for an allowance of employees in his office sufficient to perform all the duties imposed upon him by law, including the duties which have been imposed upon the division and performed by it; that it will be the duty of the judges to allow such petition and of the county board to allow and make appropriations for their reasonable compensation, and that the county board will also make appropriations for the performance of the same work by the division.

The answer denied that it was required by statute that the various officers prepared the forms, the duty of preparing which was delegated by the board to the superintendent of public service acting through the addressograph and tax machine division, and averred that prior to 1923, and before the invention and development of the improved machinery, devices and methods for doing the work of the various departments of the county relating to the entire process of the assessment and collection of taxes, the various entries required in each successive step were done manually, by pen and ink. This not only required a large number of assistants but also involved a great repetition of work, owing to the fact that the names of taxpayers, de scriptions of property, amounts of assessments and other related matters were duplicated over and over again in the successive stages of the taxing process. By this method

164 Ν.Ε.-2

it was necessary for either the county clerk or the county treasurer to have this work done by hand and to have at the expense of the county a great number of deputies and assistants to do this particular work, and the method also was subject to many errors and involved a very large amount of time and expense. There were afterwards invented and devised machines for printing the various documents thus required in the taxing process by the so-called addressograph, duplicating, or "ditto" machines, adding machines, and other devices, whereby, when the first set of documents at the initial stage of the process was originated, there could also be made the necessary duplicates for use by the various county officers, including the county treasurer, for the performance by them of their respective duties. This method of providing the forms used in the process of assessment and collection of taxes also obviated the errors and delays necessarily involved in the manual process, and thus produced, when used by the various county officials, certainty of accuracy in all of the documents, a great saving in time and an enormous saving to the county in money. The county board, therefore, in 1923 adopted this mechanical system of having the work done, and the system has increased in efficiency and use throughout the county offices from the time of its adoption. The machinery and other devices required for this method were purchased by the county at a very large expense and have been for a number of years duly installed in the county offices, where their effective use is available to the county clerk, county treasurer, board of assessors, and board of review, and failure on the part of any or either of said officers or boards to use the same and avail himself or themselves of the forms, blanks and other documents thus originated and duplicated can only result in imposing upon the county and the taxpayers a very heavy and entirely useless expense. Since 1923 the county treasurer, county clerk, board of assessors, and board of review have availed themselves of this service in all matters connected with their duties as to the assessment and collection of taxes, thereby effecting a large saving to the county, and the discontinuance of this service and this method of originating and duplicating the enormous detail of papers required in the taxing process would involve great confusion, delay, and increased expense. By authorization of the county board there was installed during 1923 a complete set of addressograph tax-extending and tax-billing machines and equipment necessary to render machine operation service in the origination of the various tax records, bills, notices and other tax books, as required by the board of assessors, board of review, county clerk and county treasurer. This equipment included 1,200,000 real estate and personal property addressograph plates

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