in 1923 and cost approximately $225,000, and these machines have been in regular operation since their installation. In addition, in the year 1926 there was installed a "ditto" machine for use in making copies of various records required in connection with park and country town special assessments and city special assessments. By the installation of this machine method, and the making thereby of skeleton forms containing the names, addresses, legal descriptions, tax extensions, etc., required by any or all of the four departments of the county having to do with tax matters, duplication of work and repeated manual copying of the same names, addresses, descriptions, and tax extensions were avoided, at a saving to the county during the space of five years of approximately $3,750,000, and for the year 1926 of $1,050,970. At the time of adopting the method of machine operation service, the providing of an organization to operate and maintain the necessary machines and equipment was investigated by the county board, the circuit court, and the respective tax departments. Since these departments require the use of the equipment at different periods of each year, the question of procuring and retaining experienced machine operators for each department, as required, was as material as the provision of the equipment for each department. As all the forms, beginning with the original assessment and closing with tax collection records, contained the same descriptions, names of owners and taxpayers, and other particulars, the only practical plan was for the county to establish a central organization to render the mechanical service of printing the forms and duplicates required by the different county offices for the successive steps in the assessment and collection of taxes throughout the year, and the duty of maintaining and operating the central addressograph and tax machine division for rendering such service was imposed by the county board on the superintendent of public service, with the responsibility of operating the various machines and originating the skeleton records for use of the respective tax departments, including the county treasurer. The employees of this division are appointed under civil service, and are subject, as to assignment and salaries, to the superintendent of public service, but the schedules and extent of machine operation service in originating the various tax records are determined under the direction and approval of the respective tax departments. The names, addresses, descriptions, and tax extensions required for the preparation of tax receipts, notices of application for judgment of sale of delinquent lands, and delinquent lists to be filed in the county court are placed by the central addressograph and tax machine division of the office of the superintendent of public service on the appropriate forms, books,

and records and supplied to the county treasurer as needed by him, so that assistants and employees are not required in his office to perform again the work done by machines, with greater accuracy and less expense. In 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926, when the county treasurer and other county officers filed with the judges of the circuit court their applications for the allowance of employees in their offices, the duties of said officers and the nature of the work to be done by them was fully considered by said judges, and in determining the number of employees for said offices the judges took into consideration the fact that the forms required by the county clerk, county treasurer, board of assessors, and board of review in the performance of their duties in the assessment of property would be printed by the central addressograph and tax machine division and furnished to each of said officers and boards. Such action of the judges was acquiesced in by the county treasurer and other county officers and regarded and followed by the county board in making appropriations for said years and determining the compensation of the deputies and assistants of such county officers. Likewise, the judges of the circuit court, after hearing all the facts and evidence relating thereto, determined, by a rule entered of record on February 1, 1927, the number of deputies and assistants required by the county treasurer for the full performance of all of the duties of his office. Thereafter, the county treasurer filed with said judges a supplemental petition, in which, as therein stated, he directed the attention of the judges to what he alleged to be the duties of the county treasurer as required by law in connection with the preparation and mailing of tax receipts, notices of advertisement for sale of delinquent lands and the delinquent list to be filed in the county court, and asked for a supplemental rule allowing him thirty-six men as additional deputies and assistants in his office for the preparation and mailing of tax receipts but not asking for any additional help to prepare said notices or delinquent lists. Upon the hearing of said supplemental petition the judges had before them and considered all of the facts and the law applicable thereto, and after a full hearing thereon entered an order denying the petition for a supplemental rule. The cause was heard on bill and answer, and it was stipulated that all allegations of fact in the bill and answer shall be taken as true.

[1] The appellant's contention that the action of the county board in establishing the central addressograph and tax machine division is without authority of law is based upon the proposition that the acts authorized to be done by that division are acts which are fixed by law to be done by the county treasurer, and that the latter is entirely independent, in the performance of these duties, of the county board, which has no powers except those expressly conferred by statute or necessarily implied from the grant of those expressly conferred. Marsh v. People, 226 Ill. 464, 80 Ν. Ε. 1006; County of Cook v. Gilbert, 146 111. 268, 33 N. E. 761. The county treasurer, by virtue of his office, is the county collector of taxes in his county, and his duties as such collector are prescribed by various sections of the Revenue Act. By section 7 of article 10 of the Constitution it is provided that the county affairs of Cook county shall be managed by a board of commissioners of fifteen persons.

Section 25 of the act in relation to counties (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 34) provides that

Seventh, the board of commissioners shall establish and provide for the appointment of a committee on finance and a committee on public service. There shall be a superintendent of public service, to be appointed by the president, by and with the consent of the board of commissioners, who shall hold his office for one year and until his successor is appointed. He may be suspended or removed by the president. He shall give a sufficient bond for the perform

ance of his duties and be subject to the oversight and supervision of the committee on the public service. It shall be the duty of the superintendent, under authority of the board of commissioners, to purchase, receive and distribute all supplies necessary for the use and serv

ice of Cook county and its various institutions,

of whatever nature, including all supplies necessary for dieting the prisoners confined in the jail of said county, and, to keep on and after the first Monday in December, 1910, accurate accounts of and vouchers for the same, which shall be open to the inspection of the president and the committee on public service and to the public. He shall also perform all other duties relative to the public service which may be assigned to him by the board of commissioners, who shall make and maintain regulations for the conduct and government of the department of public service not inconsistent with this act."

These provisions conferred the power and Imposed the duty on the county board to furnish to the officers of the county all supplies necessary to the performance of their duties. The manner in which they were to be furnished was a part of the county business expressly committed to the county board. The forms of the triplicate receipts necessary for the use of the county collector, and the printed statement of the rates of the various taxes and the total tax rate, the advertisement of the list of delinquent lands, the tax judgment, sale, redemption, and forfeiture record, and the report to the clerk, with the affidavit verifying it, and the other documents printed and provided by the central addressograph and tax machine division, were forms suitable and necessary for the use of the collector. It was for the county board to determine, in the exercise of its judgment, whether it could furnish these supplies for the use of its officers more advantageously through the superintendent of public service by the organization of a department for that service, or by authorizing each officer or board to provide his or its own supplies, or by some other plan. An immense quantity of the supplies is required each year. Many of them are duplicates, the same form being used by different officers. Before the organization of the tax machine division much of the work was done

by hand, with pen and ink, and a large force

of employees was engaged in each office duplicating the work done in another office. This was the only method for doing the work. The inventions of the addressograph. duplicating machines, adding machines, and other devices, and the application of electricity to their operation, have made possible greater expedition and accuracy and a great saving of expense, and the necessary duplicates for use in the various offices can be made at the same time as the originals. The machines are expensive, and as they would be needed at different times in the year in the various offices and for only a part of the year, the purchase and use of them for each office sep

arately would result in unnecessary expense.

The organization of the central addressograph and tax machine division, under the superintendent of public service, for furnishing supplies to all the county officers in connection with the assessment of property and the collection of taxes, was within the powers ex

pressly conferred on the board by the Legisla

ture.

During 1923 machines and equipment were installed at an initial cost of $225,000, which have been in regular use and operation ever since by the board of assessors, the board of review, county clerk, and county treasurer, with increasing efficiency and economy, at a saving to the county of $3,750,000 during five years and of $1,050,970 in the year 1926. [2] The county treasurer is not independent of the county board. He is only the col

to enact such ordinance, under Cities and Villages Act, art. 5, § 1, cl. 65 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 24, § 65), was automatically withdrawn by state, and exclusive power to make such regulations for city became vested in department of trade and commerce, under Laws 1919, p. 692, §§ 1, 2, and Civil Administrative Code (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 127) § 56.

11. Municipal corporations 590-City, divested of power to make ordinances regulating explosives, could not by its own action reacquire such power (Cities and Villages Act, art. 5, § 1, cl. 65; Laws 1919, p. 692; Civil Administrative Code, § 56).

City, having been divested of power, under Cities and Villages Act, art. 5, § 1, cl. 65 (SmithHurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 24, § 65), to make ordinances regulating storage of explosives by state under Laws 1919, p. 692, and Civil Administrative Code (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, с. 127) § 56, could not by its own action reacquire such

power.

12. Municipal corporations 592(1)-Ordinance regulating storage, sale, etc., of olls, held invalid where state department had exclusive power on subject (Laws 1919, p. 692, §§ 1, 2; Civil Administrative Code, § 56).

Ordinance of city of Mattoon, regulating storage, sale, etc., of gasoline and other oils, held invalid and of no effect, where exclusive power to make such regulations was in state department under Laws 1919, p. 692, §§ 1, 2, and Civil Administrative Code (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, с. 127) § 56.

that in his opinion public interests required the appeal be to this court.

It is contended by appellants that the Legislature has taken the power of regulation from cities with reference to the storage,

keeping, and sale of gasoline, volatile oils, and illuminating oils, which are attempted to be regulated by the ordinance, and has vested it in the department of trade and commerce of the state, and that there was no power or authority in the city of Mattoon, at the time the ordinance was enacted, to pass

the same.

Clause 65 of section 1, article 5, of the Cities and Villages Act (Smith's Stat. 1927, p. 340), which was first enacted in 1874, gave city councils power as follows:

"To regulate and prevent storage of gunpowder, tar, pitch, resin, coal oil, benzine, turpentine, hemp, cotton, nitroglycerine, petroleum, or any of the products thereof and other combustible or explosive material and the use of lights in stables, shops, and other places, and the building of bonfires; also to regulate, restrain and prohibit the use of fireworks, fire-crackers, torpedoes, Roman candles, sky-rockets, and other pyrotechnic displays."

Sections 1 and 2 of "An act to regulate the storage, transportation, sale and use of gasoline and volatile oils," in force July 1, 1919 (Laws 1919, p. 692), provides:

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of

Suit by John Kizer and others against the City of Mattoon to enjoin defendant from attempting to enforce an ordinance. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Le Forgee, Black & Samuels, of Decatur, and Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellants. Carus S. Icenogle, City Atty., and Harry I. Hannah, both of Mattoon, for appellee.

HEARD, J. In the circuit court of Coles county, appellants, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, sought to enJoin the city of Mattoon from attempting to enforce an ordinance of that city which purported to regulate the keeping, storage, sale, handling, and transportation of gasoline, benzine, kerosene, fuel oil, petroleum, or other volatile oils within the city of Mattoon, required a permit and license therefor, and imposed a penalty for the violation of the ordinance. A bill of complaint, an amended bill of complaint, an amendment to the amended bill, and an answer thereto were filed. After a hearing on the issues by the court, a decree was entered dismissing appellants' bill as amended for want of equity. An appeal was prayed and allowed to this court; the judge who heard the cause certifying that the validity of an ordinance was involved, and

Assembly: That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corporation to keep, store, transport, sell or use any crude petroleum, benzine, benzol, gasoline, naphtha, ether or other like volatile combustibles, or other compounds, in such manner or under such circumstances as will jeojardize life or property.

"Sec. 2. Except in cities or villages where

regulatory ordinances upon the subject are in full force and effect the department of trade and commerce shall have power to make and adopt reasonable rules and regulations governing the keeping, storage, transportation, sale or use of gasoline and volatile oils."

Section 56 of the Civil Administrative Code (Smith's Stat. 1927, p. 2626), which was enacted in 1921, reads:

one here under consideration. The enactment and validity of the sections of the acts above quoted are not questioned, but it is contended by appellee that by the enactment of the law of July 1, 1919 (Laws 1919, p. 692), and of section 56 of the Civil Administrative Code, the Legislature did not repeal clause 65 of section 1 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages Act, and that there is not such clear repugnancy between the provisions of these laws that they cannot all be carried into effect. By clause 65 of the Cities and Villages Act above quoted ample power was conferred upon the city of Mattoon to pass an ordinance such as is involved in the instant case. That clause has never been expressly repealed by the Legislature, and the city still has such power if it has not been repealed by implication or the power withdrawn by the Legislature. Repeal of laws by implication is not favored, and it is only where there is a clear repugnance between two laws and the provisions of both cannot be carried into effect that the later law must prevail and the former be considered repealed by implication. People v. Burke, 313 Ill. 576, 145 N. E. 164. Where two statutes are enacted which have relation to the same subject, the earlier continues in force unless the two are clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to each other, or unless in the later statute some express notice is taken of the former plainly indicating an intention to repeal it, and where two acts are seemingly repugnant, they should, if possible, be so construed that the later may not operate as a repeal of the former by implication. Town of Ottawa v. County of La Salle, 12 Ill. 339; Village of Glencoe v. Hurford, 317 Ill. 203, 148 N. E. 69. It is not enough to justify the inference of repeal that the subsequent statute covers some, or even all, of the questions covered by the former. There must be an irreconcilable repugnancy. While municipal ordinances must be in harmony with the general laws of the state, and in case of a conflict the ordinance must give way, the mere fact that the state has legislated upon a subject does not necessarily deprive a city of power to deal with the subject by ordinance. Police regulations enacted by a city under a general grant of power may differ from those of the state upon the same subject, provided they are not inconsistent therewith. City of Chicago v. Union Ice Cream Manf. Co., 252 Ill. 311, 96 N. E. 872, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 675; City of Decatur v. Schlick, 269 111. 181, 109 N. E. 737. There is no such repugnancy between clause 65 of the Cities and Villages Act and the sections of the Civil Administrative Code as would render the former invalid. The latter do not purport to regulate the keeping,

storage, transportation, sale, or use of volatile oils in all cities. There is no revision of the whole subject by these sections which evinces an intention to substitute entirely the provisions of the act of 1919 for those of the Cities and Villages Act.

[9-12] The power to pass ordinances such as the one here in question was delegated to cites by the state through its Legislature. Where the state delegates such power to a municipality, it may resume it through legislative action, and thus deprive the municipality of the right to exercise it. City of Chicago v. Phenix Ins. Co., 126 Ill. 276, 18 N. E. 668; Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 188 III. 444, 58 N. E. 1004, 80 Am. St. Rep. 182. Prior to July 1, 1919, the exclusive power of regulation here involved was lodged in cities and villages by virtue of clause 65 above quoted. By its act to regulate the storage, transportation, sale, and use of gasoline and other volatile oils, in force July 1, 1919, the state withdrew from municipalities this exclusive power of regulation and gave to the department of trade and commerce exclusive power to make and adopt reasonable rules and regulations governing the keeping, storage, transportation, sale, or use of gasoline and volatile oils, except in cities or villages where regulatory ordinances upon the subject were in full force and effect. In accordance with such authority, the department of trade and commerce immediately adopted and put in force on July 1, 1919, comprehensive rules and regulations on the subject, which were applicable to and effective in the entire state, except in municipalities where regulatory ordinances on the subject were in full force and effect. The city of Mattoon on July 1, 1919, not having in full force and effect regulatory ordinances on the subject, its delegated power to enact such ordinances was automatically withdrawn by the state, and the exclusive power to make such regulations for the city of Mattoon became vested in the department of trade and commerce. The city of Mattoon, having been divested of this power by the state, could not by its own action reacquire such power, but could only regain it by subsequent action on the part of the Legislature. The city council, at the time it adopted the ordinance in question, having no power to adopt the same, it was invalid and of no effect. The circuit court therefore erred in holding it valid, and in not granting the relief prayed for in appellants' amended bill of complaint.

The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.