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(159 Ν.Ε.)

of the southwest quarter; to U. LL. G. Mitchell the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter; to W. T., John N., Robert L., Mary A., Rosetta, and John B. Mitchell, jointly, the east half of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter and the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter, giving to John B. two-sevenths thereof and the other joint owners one-seventh each, "all subject to the homestead right of Leanna Mitchell." On February 17, 1891, John B. conveyed by quitclaim deed his undivided two-sevenths interest in the 60 acres assigned to him and the children of himself and Leanna Mitchell, jointly, in the partition decree, to Rosa Lee and Daisy B. Mitchell, the two children that were born after the death of I. D. Mitchell. This deed was recorded in 1893. After the partition proceedings, U. L. G. and A. C. Mitchell and Nancy Humphreys immediately took possession of the land assigned and set off to them by the decree. Leanna Mitchell and her children continued to reside upon the portion set off to them jointly with their father, upon which the homestead estate was located. In 1894 A. C. Mitchell conveyed the land assigned to him by the decree, and by that conveyance and other mesne conveyances the surface of his tract was conveyed to Charles Kraebski and the minerals thereunder to Louise Dye, who are now in possession. In April, 1898, John B. died.

On November 30, 1898, Leanna Mitchell filed her bill in the circuit court of Franklin county, praying for an assignment of homestead and dower to her in the entire 240 acres. In her bill she set up the deed of her former husband to his children in 1874, the decree of divorce obtained by her against him on the ground of desertion, the seizin of the land by him during their marriage, the ex parte partition proceedings by which the land was divided, and her continued residence upon the land until the filing of her bill. She made as parties defendant to her bill all of the children of John B. to whom he made the deed and all of his children by her, and all those persons in possession of the land by reason of conveyance from A. C. Mitchell. All of the children of John B. that were made defendants to the bill were adults, except the twin children, Rosa Lee and Daisy B. Mitchell, and such adults entered their appearance in the case. She was awarded homestead and dower in the land, and commissioners were appointed to allot the same. The commissioners in their report, which was approved by the court, set off to her as her homestead the east half of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter and the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter; and for her dower in the 240 acres they set off and assigned to her the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter which had been as

signed to U. L. G. Mitchell in the partition suit of 1889.

The 60 acres of homestead set off to her had been assigned jointly to John B., W. T., John N., Mary A., Rosetta, and Robert L. Mitchell, as already stated; each of them being assigned an undivided one-seventh interest therein, except John B., who was assigned an undivided two-sevenths thereof, which he afterwards conveyed to Daisy B. Mitchell (now Daisy B. Doctorman) and Rosa Lee Mitchell (now Rosa Lee Barret). The assignment of her homestead and dower did not encroach on the assignments of land to A. C. Mitchell and Nancy Humphreys in the partition suit of 1889, and it did not encroach on the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter assigned in that partition suit to U. L. G. Mitchell. In 1904 the latter conveyed 100 feet across the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter to Levi Z. Leiter, grantor of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, for $150. In 1911 Rosetta Mitchell Harrelson died intestate, leaving surviving her William Harrelson, her husband, and Wicklift, Edgar, Edna, and Mary Harrelson, her children and only heirs at law. In January 1918, Leanna Mitchell died. She occupied the 60 acres, which were allotted to her as homestead, continuously from the time the same was assigned until her death. It should be further stated that the children to whom John B. deeded the land in 1874 were children by a former wife, and that his other children above named are children by his last wife, Leanna Mitchell.

At the May term, 1918, of the circuit court of Franklin county, John N., W. T., and Robert L. Mitchell, Mary Webb, Rosa Lee Barret, Daisy B. Doctorman, William Harrelson, and Wickliff, Edgar, Edna, and Mary Harrelson, minors, by William Harrelson, their father and next friend, and W. T. Mitchell, administrator of the estate of Leanna Mitchell, filed their bill against A. C. Mitchell, U. L. G. Mitchell, Nancy M. Humphreys, and others who claimed title under them, and alleged in their bill that the deed of 1874 was a mere sham and pretense, and was never delivered; that possession of the land was never surrendered pursuant thereto that the land deeded was of less value than $1,000, and the homestead of John B. and Leanna Mitchell, and that the deed thereto did not convey any title to the grantees; that John B. continued to reside upon the land and control the same until his death, and paid the taxes thereon; and that the complainants in the bill had no knowledge of the deed of 1874 until the filing of this their bill. They further alleged that they had no knowledge of the pretended ex parte partition of the land in 1889, and that the bill in that proceeding, by reason of various omissions and evasions, was a fraud upon the court, and that the minor children were not served with process, and only appeared therein by their mother as their next friend, whose interest in the proceedings was adverse to them, and that none of the minors knew of the proceedings until the filing of this bill; that the decree in the ex parte partition proceedings of 1889 was null and void, and a cloud on their title. They prayed that the deed of 1874 and the record thereof in the recorder's office, and the decree for partition of 1889, be removed as clouds upon their title; that the title to the portions sold be confirmed in the present owners, etc.; and that a division and partition of the land be made among the parties in the respective portions set out by the bill. A. C. Mitchell and Nancy Humphreys filed separate answers and separate cross-bills. The death of U. L. G. Mitchell was suggested, and Clarence and Valley Mitchell, his heirs at law and administrators, were substituted, and they filed an answer and cross-bill.

The Illinois Central Railroad Company answered the bill, setting up title to the 100-foot strip across the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter conveyed by U. L. G. Mitchell to its grantor, and prayed that it title be confirmed. The separate answers and cross-bills admitted the allegations of fact as to the conveyance of the land in 1874, the partition proceedings of 1889, the decree for dower and homestead to Leanna Mitchell, but denied that the deed was a mere sham or pretense and not delivered, and alleged that the deed operated as a conveyance, and that the partition proceedings were valid, and denied that the complainants were ignorant of the deed and of the other proceedings aforesaid. They claimed the benefit of the statute of limitations (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, с. 83, § 1 et seq.) both as to the 7-year and the 20-year statute, and alleged that they had been in the actual, notorious, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the land ever since the assignments made to them, and that they had paid all taxes thereon up to the filing of the complainants' bill. The court, after hearing evidence, entered a decree confirming the title to the right of way of the Illinois Central Railroad Company; confirmed the title in Nancy M. Humphreys to the 40 acres assigned to her; confirmed the title in Clarence and Valley Mitchell to the 80 acres assigned to U. L. G. Mitchell in the partition proceedings, as his heirs at law; confirmed the title in the 60 acres assigned to A. C. Mitchell in the partition proceedings of 1889; held that the partition proceedings of 1889 were binding on the parties thereto; and decreed partition of the 60 acres assigned to the widow as homestead among the complainants, finding that they were the owners of the same in the proportions set forth in the bill. All of the complainants duly excepted and have perfected this appeal.

[1-3] The undisputed evidence in the rec

ord is that the 240 acres of land was worth between $10 and $13 an acre at the time John B. Mitchell executed the deed to his four children, in 1874. It is undisputed that John B. and his wife, Leanna, had a homestead interest of the value of $1,000 in the tract of land at the time the deed was made. The allegation in the bill that the deed was not delivered is not supported by any evidence in the record, but, on the contrary, it is shown that the same was recorded in the recorder's office of Franklin county. The law therefore presumes that the deed was delivered, and this presumption is very strong in case of a voluntary settlement by a father upon his children. Valter v. Blavka, 195 ILL. 610, 63 N. E. 499. Every complainant in this bill, except Rosa Lee Barret and Daisy B. Doctorman, were adult parties defendant to the bill for dower and homestead filed by their mother in 1898, and they entered their appearance to that bill. They are therefore charged with notice of the contents of that bill, which recited the proceedings in the partition suit of 1889 and the contents of the deed of 1874, and of all the other matters set forth in the bill. Those adult complainants are also charged with constructive notice of the contents of the decree in question, which is a matter of record in Franklin county, and they have had actual notice of the possession and claim of ownership of U. L. G. Mitchell, A. C. Mitchell, and Nancy Humphreys of the respective land assigned to them in that partition proceeding for more than 28 years. The minor defendants in that partition suit were represented by their own mother as their next friend, and their mother was not otherwise a party to that proceeding. She, as their next friend, paid the costs of that partition suit that were charged to the minors she represented, as shown by the record, as she was not a party to that suit individually. The charge that her interests in that suit were adverse to the minors she represented as next friend cannot be sustained, as there is no proof sustaining the charge. All the errors in the ex parte proceeding for partition that are charged by the complainants in this suit are matters apparent on the face of that record, and there was no proof of fraud whatever on the part of any one connected with that suit. It is apparent that the errors committed in the ex parte proceeding were errors of the attorneys representing the parties, and there is no evidence of fraud on the part of those attorneys. The rule is well settled in this state that an infant cannot attack a decree to which he was a party, either for fraud or for errors of law apparent on the face of the record, unless attacked by such infant before he attains his majority, or within the period after his majority allowed by law for the prosecution of a writ of error for reversal of such decree. Haines v. Hewitt, 129 Ill. 347, 21 N. E. 930, and cases cited. The minor children, Rosa Lee Barret

(159 Ν.Ε.)

and Daisy B. Doctorman, were not parties to the ex parte partition proceeding, and were evidently not made parties thereto for the reason they were not in being when I. D. Mitchell died, and were therefore not his heirs. They never did have any interest in the land deeded to their three brothers and sisters of the half blood by their father in 1874, except in the 60 acres assigned to their mother as a homestead, for the reason that the deed was valid, and conveyed to those four children a good title to the 240 acres of land, except that part composing the homestead of Leanna Mitchell. None of the other heirs of John B. had any interest in the land conveyed to the four children by him in 1874, except in the land covered by the homestead of their mother, until the death of I. D. Mitchell, when they became his heirs and entitled to their share, as such heirs, in the undivided one-fourth interest of which he died seized.

[4, 5] It is not, and cannot be, questioned successfully that in 1889, when the ex parte proceedings were had for partition of the land of which I. D. Mitchell died seized and the land deeded to his two brothers and sister, in 1874, that the deed from the father to his children of land on which the father resided with his wife, in which deed his wife did not join and had acquired a homestead, was void as to the homestead of the value of $1,000, and was valid as to all of the land except the homestead, if at the time of the conveyance the entire tract was worth more than $1,000. Anderson v. Smith, supra. It is for this reason we have stated that John B.'s deed to his four children in 1874 was valid except as to the homestead tract of Leanna Mitchell. The rights of the four children were also subject to an inchoate right of the widow to dower, which became an actual existing right of the widow on the death of her husband. The serious error committed in the ex parte partition suit of 1889 was in partitioning the land among the brothers and sisters of the whole blood, the father, and the brothers and sisters of the half blood, heirs at law of I. D. Mitchell, "subject to the homestead right of Leanna Mitchell." The deceased and his brothers and sister of the whole blood owned no interest in the homestead. Leanna Mitchell should have been made a party to that proceeding, and her homestead set off to her in one tract, and the remainder of the land divided and partitioned among the parties aforesaid. The brothers and sisters of the deceased, of the half blood, should then have been decreed their one-fortieth interest, each, in the land, their father should have been decreed his two-fortieths interest in the land, and his two brothers and sister of the whole blood

should have been decreed their one-fortieth interest, each, in the land of their deceased brother, plus their one-fourth, each, deeded to them by their father in the deed of 1874, or eleven-fortieths, each, of all of the land outside of the homestead. In the ex parte partition proceedings John B., and the five children of Leanna and John B. were assigned a seven-fortieths interest of the entire 240 acres, "subject to the homestead rights," and this seven-fortieths interest was designated as the homestead tract, which was assigned jointly to the six of them, giving to the father two-sevenths of that tract. The three children of the whole blood were each assigned eleven-fortieths of the entire tract, "subject to the homestead rights," and, in those assignments they received all the land of which the deceased died seized.

This mistake, after all, is not so serious as it may at first sight appear. Had the partition suit been conducted properly, as already stated, the brothers and sisters of the half blood of the deceased would each have had a decree for a one-fortieth of the land outside of the homestead. The children of the whole blood would each have been decreed eleven-fortieths and their father two-fortieths of the land outside of the homestead. Such a partition would have left the homestead tract not partitioned. At the death of Le anna Mitchell, every heir of John B. would have been entitled to partition of the homestead tract. John B., who was bound by the partition decree of 1889, deeded to the twin girls his two-sevenths interest in the homestead tract, which was all the interest he then had in it. By the decree now before this court the children of Leanna Mitchell, including the twin children, had partitioned among them, only, the entire homestead tract, each receiving a one-seventh thereof, and the three living children to the deed of 1874 took no interest in the homestead by this partition suit now under consideration. So one mistake in a way offsets the other; the real hardship to the children of Leanna Mitchell in the partition suit of 1889 being that the land assigned to them was in the homestead tract, the possession of which they could not enjoy until the death of their mother.

We do not deem it necessary to discuss the questions of adverse possession, payment of taxes, and statute of limitations, raised in the pleadings and discussed in the briefs. Our conclusion is that all parties to the decree of 1889 are bound thereby, and that that decree in no manner affected the rights and interests of Rosa Lee Barret and Daisy B. Doctorman.

The decree of the circuit court should be, and is, affirmed. Decree affirmed.

(328 111. 11)

MICHAELS v. HILL et al. (No. 18512.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1927.

1. Constitutional law 48-Doubtful con-
struction of constitutionality of act must be
resolved in favor of its validity.

It is duty of court to so construe acts of
Legislature as to uphold their constitutionality,
if such can reasonably be done, and, if their
construction is doubtful, it is to be resolved in
favor of the law, as court will assume to de-
clare statute void only in case of clear conflict
with Constitution.

2. Statutes 109-To render act void as not
embraced in title, it must be incongruous
with, or have no proper connection with or
relation to, title (Const. art. 4, § 13).

To render an act or a portion thereof void
as not embraced in the title, as required by
Const. art. 4, § 13, it must be incongruous with,
or have no proper connection with or relation
to, the title, and, if by any fair construction the
provisions of such act have a necessary or
proper connection with or relation to the title,
it is not open to this objection.

3. Statutes

subject shall be expressed in the title, in that it
contains two unrelated subjects, one dealing
with power of municipality to incur indebted-
ness, and the other as to duties of county clerk
in extension or scaling of taxes.

7. Statutes 141 (3)-Constitution, requiring
amended or revived law to be inserted at
length, does not require endless reiteration
of amended statutes (Const. art. 4, § 13).

The purpose of provision of Const. art. 4,
§ 13, requiring that laws revived or sections
amended shall be inserted at length in new act,
is to avoid confusion arising from patchwork
legislation, but does not require practically end-
less reiteration of amended statutes, nor that,
when a new act is passed, all prior acts in any
way modified by it shall be published at length
in amendatory act.

8. Statutes 141(2)-Act which Is complete
law in itself is not violative of constitutional
provision requiring amended statutes to be in-
serted at length in new act (Const. art. 4, §
13).

If a new act is a complete law in itself, con-
stituting an entire act of legislation on the sub-
ject with which it purports to deal, it will be
deemed good, and not subject to prohibition of

109-Act may contain many Const. art. 4, § 13, requiring amended statute
parts which grow out of and are germane to
title; "subject" (Const. art. 4, § 13).

The word "subject," in Const. art. 4, § 13,
providing that no act shall embrace more than
one subject, which subject shall be expressed in
title, signifies the matter or thing forming the
groundwork, and an act may contain many
parts which grow out of it and are germane to
it, and which, if traced back, will lead the mind
to it as the generic head.

[Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words
and Phrases, First and Second Series, Subject
(of Statute).]

4. Statutes 109-Title of act need not form
index to all provisions contained in act
(Const. art. 4, § 13).

The title of an act, to comply with Const.
art. 4, § 13, requiring act to contain but one
subject which shall be expressed in title, need
not be so worded as to form an index to all
provisions contained in it, and mere mention-
ing in title of related particulars is not a stat-
ing of plurality of subjects.

5. Statutes 109-Matters germane to title
may be included in act, and title may include
matters relating to same general subject.

All matters are properly included in act
which are germane to title, and those matters
may be included in title which relate to the
same general subject.

6. Statutes 107(1), 11012(1)-Act and ti-
tle dealing with power of municipality to in-
cur indebtedness and duties of county clerk
in extension of taxes held unconstitutional as
containing more than one subject not ex-
pressed in title (Laws 1927, pp. 723-727;
Const. art. 4, § 13).

Laws 1927, pp. 723-727, and its title, held
violative of Const. art. 4, § 13, prohibiting acts
from embracing more than one subject, which

to be inserted at length in new act, notwith-
standing it may repeal by implication or modify
the provisions of prior existing laws.

9. Statutes 141 (1)—Amended laws must be
inserted at length in new act, when latter Is
merely an attempt to amend old law (Const.
art. 4, § 13).

If a new act is merely an attempt to amend
the old law on the subject treated, and requires
the old act to be read with the new in order to
determine its provisions or to give new act ef-
fect, then amended law must be inserted at
length in new act, as required by Const. art. 4,
§ 13.

10. Statutes 141(2)-Section which in itself
is complete enactment relating to power of
municipalities to incur indebtedness held not
subject to constitutional provision requiring
amended statutes to be inserted at length in
new act (Laws 1927, pp. 723-727, § 3; Const.
art. 4, § 13).

Laws 1927, pp. 723-727, § 3, is in itself a
complete enactment relating to power of mu-
nicipalities coming within its description to in-
cur indebtedness, and no other law need be
read in connection with it to determine its lim-
itation, and hence it is not subject to provision
of Const. art. 4, § 13, requiring amended laws
to be inserted at length in new act.

11. Statutes93(34) -Statute limiting.in-
debtedness of counties and municipal corpo-
rations having less than stated population
held not unconstitutional as special or local
legislation (Laws 1927, pp. 723-727, § 3;
Const, art. 4, § 22).

Laws 1927, pp. 723-727, § 3, limiting the
indebtedness of counties having population of
less than 500,000, and cities, townships, school
districts, and other municipal corporations hav-
ing population of less than 300,000, held not to

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(159 Ν.Ε.)

contravene Const. art. 4, § 22, as being special or local legislation, in that it works an unreasonable discrimination without a reasonable basis for classification.

12. Statutes 64(1)-Entire statute will not be declared unconstitutional because of valid ity of portion, where the two are distinct and separate.

Where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, entire act will not be declared invalid if the two are distinct and separate, and latter may stand, although former becomes of no effect.

13. Statutes 64(10)-Entire act must be declared unconstitutional, where both title and body each express and embrace two subjects (Laws 1927, pp. 723-727; Const, art. 4, 8

13).

Since both title and body of Laws 1927, pp.

723-727, each express and embrace two subjects, the entire act must be declared void as contravening Const. art. 4, § 13.

of a tax sufficient to pay the principal of said bonds and interest thereon, of which action a record was made according to law; that $17,000 of the bonds have been executed, issued, and delivered to the purchaser thereof and paid for by him and $28,000 of the bonds have not been delivered or executed; that, although demand has been made on the defendants to execute and deliver the bonds in compliance with said proceedings, they and all of them refuse so to do. The peti

tion avers that the full value of the taxable property in the school district is $2,360,820 and the assessed value thereof as last extended previous to the election authorizing the bonds is $1,180,410; that the aggregate

indebtedness of the district is a bond issue

of $12,000, exclusive of the $45,000 author

ized at the election by the voters of the district; that taxes have been levied, collectible in the year 1928, for educational and build

Appeal from Circuit Court, Du Page Coun- ing purposes sufficient to pay the ordinary ty; William J. Fulton, Judge.

Petition for writ of mandamus by S. Hunter Michaels against Gilford H. Hill and others. The petition was dismissed, and petitioner appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Locke & Baker, of Glen Ellyn, and Rankin & Lustfield, of Chicago (Richard F. Locke, of Glen Ellyn, of counsel), for appellant.

H. S. Pettis, of Wheaton, for appellees.

STONE, J. The appellant filed a petition in the circuit court of Du Page county for a writ of mandamus to compel the appellees, members of the board of education of school district No. 44 in that county, and others, to issue certain school bonds theretofore authorized by vote of the district. The defendants to the petition filed a general demurrer thereto, which was sustained, and, the appellant having stood by his petition, it was dismissed. He brings the cause here for review.

The petition, after averring the existence of the school district and facts concerning its organization, alleges that, pursuant to a petition of more than 300 voters of the district, the board of education called a special election to vote on the propositions of selecting and purchasing a new schoolhouse site, the building of a new schoolhouse and the issuance of $45,000 in bonds of the district. This election was held on May 14, 1927, and a majority of the voters voted in the affirmative on all the propositions, thus authorizing the board of education to issue bonds of the district in the sum of $45,000, dated June 1, 1927. The petition avers that the board thereafter adopted a resolution providing for the issuance of the bonds, prescribing their form, directing that the same be executed and delivered, and directing the levy

operating expenses of the district.

At the 1927 session of the Legislature an act was passed amending an act concerning the levy and extension of taxes and adding thereto a new section designated as section 3. Laws of 1927, pp. 723-727. This new section is as follows:

"No county having a population of less than 500,000 and no city, township, school district or other municipal corporation having a population of less than 300,000, shall become indebted in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding two and one-half (22) per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness."

This act was approved and became effective on July 7, 1927. Counsel for appellant say that the effect of this act, so far as this

bond issue is concerned, is to reduce the bonding capacity of the school district from $59,020.50 to $29,510.25, and that it is for this reason that the appellees have refused to issue the remainder of the bonds.

The only question raised here is as to the constitutionality of the act of 1927. The grounds upon which appellant contends it is

unconstitutional and void are, first, that it contravenes section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, which provides in part:

"No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed; and no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act."

The second ground upon which the invalidity of the act is urged is, that it contra

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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