ter Edith Prettyman 140 acres, and to Edith Prettyman and her husband, Henry D. Prettyman, 40 acres of the land in question. By his last will and testament he devised 80 acres of this land to his daughter Daisy Hill and 20 acres to his son Walter Blakeley. As to the remaining 20 acres he died intestate and this portion of the land descended to his nine children. Shortly before his death he was informed that he held only an estate during the life of Henry Mansfield, Jr., in these lands. He was advised to secure deeds from the heirs at law of Henry Mansfield, Sr., who, he was told, owned the reversion in fee, and thus perfect his title. Before this could be accomplished Blakeley died, and his children have since procured deeds from the heirs at law of Henry Mansfield, Sr., to the lands in question, they deeding to Edith Prettyman and Henry D. Prettyman the lands conveyed to them by Rufus Blakeley, to Daisy Hill and Walter Blakeley the lands devised to them, respectively, and to all the children of Rufus Blakeley the 20 acres as to which he died intestate. These deeds recited that it was the purpose and desire of the grantors to convey to the grantees the reversion in fee to the premises conveyed and no other interest whatever, so that the life estate so held by the grantees under conveyances, devises, and inheritance from Rufus Blakeley should merge in the reversion in fee and be extinguished and prematurely de

stroyed, and that the grantees be vested at once with the legal estate in fee simple in possession, and that any contingent future interest be destroyed and held for naught. Two of the children of Henry Mansfield, Jr., by his first marriage, who have become of age, also executed conveyances to the children of Rufus Blakeley of the lands in question. After these conveyances had been secured the Blakeley children filed this bill in the circuit court of Mason county to construe the will of Henry Mansfield, Sr., and to quiet their title to these lands. The court found the issues for the complainants in the bill, and decreed that the estate given by the will of Henry Mansfield, Sr., in these lands at the death of Henry Mansfield, Jr., to the children of Henry Mansfield, Jr., if any such children should survive him, and the estate given by the will in said lands to the brothers and sisters, or their descendants, of Henry Mansfield, Jr., in the event of his death without issue him surviving, were each and all contingent remainders, and that the particular estate which supported said contingent remainders was the life estate vested by the will in Henry Mansfield, Jr.; that said life estate became vested in Rufus Blakeley by virtue of the deed of July 21,

dren of Henry Mansneld, Jr., should any such survive him, and the contingent remainders in the brothers and sisters, or their descendants, of Henry Mansfield, Jr., were prematurely extinguished by the merger of the estate for life of Henry Mansfield, Jr., and the reversion in fee, by virtue of the conveyances from the heirs at law of Henry Mansfield, Sr., in the children of Rufus Blakeley. The title to the lands was accordingly quieted in the children of Fufus Blakeley according to their respective ownership.

This appeal has been perfected by the guardian ad litem of the three minor children of Henry Mansfield, Jr. The sole question presented for determination is whether the devise to the children of Henry Mansfield, Jr., should any survive him, and the devise to his brothers and sisters or their descendants, should he die without issue, created contingent remainders, and, if so, whether such contingent remainders have been destroyed by the conveyances from the heirs at law of Henry Mansfield, Sr., to the owners of the life estate devised to Henry Mansfield, Jr.

[1-3] The devise to the children of Henry Mansfield, Jr., clearly creates a contingent remainder. Whether the devise to the brothers and sisters, or their descendants, of Henry Mansfield, Jr., creates a contingent remainder, depends upon the meaning to be given to the words "die without issue,” as

used in the eleventh clause in connection with the devise. If these words are used by the testator to mean die without children surviving, and are meant to import a definite failure of issue at the time of the death of the life tenant, then the devise to the brothers and sisters, or their descendants, creates a contingent remainder. That this is the sense in which these words are used seems to us to be apparent. In constru

ing this will and determining the meaning which should be given to the words "die without issue,” all the provisions of the will must be looked to, and, if possible, the meaning which the testator intended to give these words should be applied. If, upon making such examination, it appears clearly from the entire will that the testator intended the limitation over to take effect only in case Henry Mansfield, Jr., should die without issue surviving him, that intention should be given effect. Stafford v. Read, 244 Ill. 138, 91 N. E. 91. In this same clause the testator pro vides that the lands devised to his children shall be held by them solely for their natural lives, and after their death to go to their children, if any survive them, or, in the event of the death of any of his children before the taking effect of the will, then to his or her or their child or children surviving,

CARTWRIGHT, J. May Lowden Betz, one of the four children of Henry B. Lowden, with her husband, John Betz, filed a bill in equity in the circuit court of Marshall county for partition of four tracts of land in which she claimed an interest under the will of her grandfather, William D. Lowden, and made the other three children, and all persons having any present or future interest, defendants. The adult defendants were defaulted, and a guardian ad litem was appointed for the infant defendants, and he filed an answer, to which a replication was filed. The cause was then referred to the master in chancery to take the evidence and report his conclusions of law and fact. The master made his report, and a decree was entered in accord with his conclusions, finding the interests of the parties and appointing commissioners to make partition. There was no question concerning a tract of 160 acres, the title of which was in the children of Henry B. Lowden; but their interest in the three remaining tracts was an undivided interest, and the chancellor by the decree found the interests of all the parties in those tracts. The commissioners reported that the three tracts which are in controversy were not susceptible of division without manifest prejudice to the parties in interest, and the court entered an order of sale, which was executed by the master in chancery. Upon the report of the sale being filed, Rebecca Lowden Scholes, one of the defendants who had been

defaulted and who had been found to have a life estate in an undivided one-half of the three tracts, appeared and entered her motion to vacate the order and decree of sale; the material grounds of the motion being that she had not consented to a sale of her life estate and that the parties entitled to the fee in remainder after her life estate could not then be ascertained. The motion was denied. She also moved to set aside the sale and objected to the same, but her exceptions to the report of the sale were stricken from the files. A writ of error was sued out of this court by the defendants, Rebecca Lowden Scholes, George Scholes, Jay Scholes, Mrs. Jay Scholes, and Walter Scholes, who were interested in the undivided one-half of the three tracts.

[1] The tracts of land in question were owned by William D. Lowden, who died on January 19, 1873, leaving a last will and testament, by which he devised the same as fol

"I give and devise to my wife, Nancy H. Lowden [here follows a description of the three tracts in question, containing 76 acres, 20 acres, and 27 acres, respectively], to be used and enjoyed by her during the term of her natural life; and from and immediately after her decease i give and devise the same to my son and daughter, Henry B. and Rebecca Lowden, share and share alike, in case both shall be living at the time of their mother's decease, and if one of my said children shall decease before its said mother, then the whole of the same to such survivor in case the brother or sister deceased shall leave no issue of his or her body at the time of its said mother's death living, to be used and enjoyed by them (my said children) during the term of their natural lives, and from and immediately after their decease I give and devise the same to the issue of their bodies, their heirs and assigns forever, and in case of failure of issue of the bodies of my said children, or either of them, then to the county of Marshall, in the state of Illinois, for the use of the inhabitants thereof, hereby meaning that a life estate in said lands after the decease of my said wife shall vest in my said children or the survivor, (the deceased being childless,) and after their death that the same shall vest immediately in fee simple in their children or the child or children of either, the other leaving no child, and that they shall succeed each other in the other's life estate upon the decease of one childless, and upon their decease leaving no child or children or descendants of such child or children then to said Marshall county, as aforesaid."

Nancy H. Lowden, who was given a life estate, was afterward married to Harmon J. Adams, and died in 1905. The son, Henry B. Lowden, and the daughter Rebecca Lowden, who was married to Walter Scholes, survived their mother. Henry B. Lowden died in 1907, and left a widow, Laura Lowden, since married to William Farling, and his children, the complainant May Lowden Betz and the defendants William B. Lowden, Leona Lowden, and Nancy Lowden, his heirs at law. Rebecca Lowden Scholes is living and has two sons, George Scholes and Jay Scholes, both adults, and she is 56 years of age.

The findings of the decree were that the four children of Henry B. Lowden were entitled to one-half of the premises in fee simple, in equal parts; that Rebecca Lowden Scholes was entitled to a life estate in the

other half; and that her children who should be living at her death would be entitled to that half in equal parts. After these findings, however, the decree declared that the defendant Rebecca Lowden Scholes should be endowed of one full, equal one-third part of the undivided half; that the children of Henry B. Lowden should each be endowed of the full, equal one-fourth part of the undivided one-half; and that the defendants George Scholes and Jay Scholes, and any other children that might be living at the death of Rebecca Lowden Scholes, should be endowed of the undivided one-half of the tracts, subject to the life estate of their mother, Rebecca Lowden Scholes. There is a misuse of the word "endowed" in the decree, and an evident error in declaring that Rebecca Lowden Scholes should be endowed of one full,

Other parts of the decree, however, show that these were errors, and that it was intended that Rebecca Lowden Scholes should have a life estate in the undivided one-half with a contingent remainder in that half to any children who might survive her, with the further qualification that if she leaves no children the remainder will vest in the children of Henry B. Lowden.

William D. Lowden by his will devised a life estate in the land to his wife, with a remainder for life to his son and daughter, contingent upon their surviving their mother. They did survive her, and thereupon their estates for life became vested. The estate of each was for his or her own life, and there was a several devise after the decease of either of them to the issue of their bodies, their heirs and assigns forever. On the death of either leaving issue, the remainder in his or her half would pass to such issue, and, in default of issue surviving, the land was devised to the county of Marshall. The will provided that the children should succeed each other in the other's life estate upon the decease of one childless, which was impossible, because upon the death of one the other could not succeed to a life estate which terminated by the life tenant's death. The testator undoubtedly meant that upon the decease of one childless the other should succeed to a life estate in the premises in which the deceased had a life estate. Henry B. Lowden having died leaving children, the un

divided one-half of the lands became finally vested in them in fee simple, but it cannot now be known in whom the other half will finally vest. If Rebecca Lowden Scholes leaves children surviving her, it will vest in them. If she leaves no children, it will vest in the children of Henry B. Lowden. No interest in the land can vest in the county of Marshall, because the devise over to the county was to take effect only in case of the failure of issue of both the son and daughter, and, as Henry B. Lowden left surviving children, the happening of the condition is impossible. The widow, Laura Lowden Farling, has no interest, for the reason that her husband, Henry B. Lowden, was not seised of an estate of inheritance but only of a life estate. The undivided one-half of the land belongs to the children of Henry B. Lowden in fee simple, and Rebecca Lowden Scholes has a life estate in the other half and the remainder in that half is contingent.

[2, 3] The plaintiffs in error contend that the land is not subject to partition for the reason that the persons who will take the fee cannot be determined until after the death of Rebecca Lowden Scholes; and that is true as to the undivided one-half devised to Rebecca Lowden Scholes and the issue of her body surviving her. It cannot be determined until her death in whom the re

not subject to partition. Seymour v. Bowles, 172 Ill. 521, 50 N. E. 122; Ruddell v. Wren, 208 111. 508, 70 N. E. 751; Richardson v. Van Gundy, 271 Ill. 476, 111 Ν. Ε. 494. Partition can only be made between cotenants or joint tenants, and one who would be presently entitled to an estate if a contingency should happen has only a possibility of an estate, and is not a tenant of any estate, either in possession or remainder. It is not true, however, that the remainder after the life estate of Henry B. Lowden, which is now finally vested in fee simple in the four children who survived him, is contingent in any sense and not capable of being separated from the undivided half in which the remainder is contingent. In the cases above cited the remainders in the whole estate were contingent, and partition could not be made which would finally determine the rights of any party nor the extent of the respective shares or interests, which is not the case here. Neither the existence of the life estate nor the fact that the fee is determinable on some future event will be an obstacle to a partition on the application of one in whom a remainder is vested and where the estate is of such a character that the court can determine the extent of the interest. Scoville v. Hilliard, 48 Ill. 453; Drake v. Merkle, 153 Ill. 318, 38 N. E. 654; Deadman v. Yantis, 230 Ill. 243, 82 N. E. 592, 120 Am. St. Rep. 291; Askins v. Merritt, 254 Ill. 92, 98 N. E. 256; Cummins v. Drake, 265 Ill. 111, 106 N. E. 456. The partition act contemplates that one having a vested interest may have partition so that his interest may be set off and be available to him, since it provides that every person who upon any contingency may be or become entitled to any beneficiary interest in the premises shall have his interest set forth, and where the share or interest is uncertain' or contingent or the ownership or inheritance shall depend upon an executory devise or the remainder shall be contingent, so that the parties cannot be named, the same shall be stated in the bill, and, if partition cannot be made without manifest prejudice to the owners, a sale thereof shall be made and the proceeds be divided according to the respective rights of the parties. The children of Henry B. Lowden had an estate in fee simple in the undivided one half of the land not subject to any contingency and Rebecca Lowden Scholes had a vested estate for her life in the other undivided half, and both were estates in possession.

[4] The fact that other children may yet be born to Rebecca Lowden Scholes who will survive her and become entitled to a share of the portion in which she has a life estate did not prevent the setting off of that portion in which such after-born children might acquire an interest. The statute pro