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"Any person, firm or corporation, who undertakes to do or contracts with others to do, or ated as extra-hazardous in paragraph (b), sechave done for him, them or it, any work enumertion 3, requiring employment of employés in, on or about the premises where he, they or it, as principal or principals, contract to do such work, or any part thereof, and does not require of the person, firm or corporation undertaking to do such work for said principal or principals, that such person, firm or corporation undertaking to do such work shall insure his, their or its liaact to his, their or its employés and any such bility to pay the compensation provided in this person, firm or corporation who creates or carries into operation any fraudulent scheme, artifice or device to enable him, them or it to execute such work without such person, firm or corporation being responsible to the employé, his personal representative or beneficiary entitled to such compensation under the provisions of this included in the term 'employer' and with the imact, such person, firm or corporation shall be mediate employer shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation herein provided for and be subject to all the provisions of this

where another party was doing the construction work. Counsel for plaintiff in error seem to concede that if it was constructing a pavement it would come within the provisions of this clause of the act. The Industrial Board held, in effect, in its finding, that plaintiff in error was paving certain streets, for which the crushed stone was being hauled for a foundation. The contract which plaintiff in error entered into with the Bessmer Teaming Company for this hauling stated, in terms, that the Parker-Washington Company had a contract for paving those streets. Paragraph (f) of section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act makes the decision of the Industrial Board, if it acts within its powers, in the absence of fraud, conclusive upon the courts. The circuit court and the Supreme Court, in reviewing a proceeding of this kind, can only review questions of law. Whether legal evidence is offered to support the decision of the board, Counsel for plaintiff in error argue that where such evidence is properly preserved it cannot be liable within the provisions for review here, is a question of law, but if of this section unless it not only has failed to there is competent or legal evidence to sup- require the subcontractor to insure, as thereport the decision of the board, it is not with-in provided, but has also been shown to have in the province of the courts to pass upon its weight or sufficiency. Munn v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 70, 113 N. E. 110; Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173. As there was evidence in this record justifying the finding of the Industrial Board that the plaintiff in error was engaged in construction work, even though this evidence was controverted, we cannot inquire into this question of fact.

[2] We are of the opinion, also, that the occupation, enterprise, or business in which plaintiff in error was engaged at the time of the accident, if it was not engaged in construction work but only in the hauling of this crushed stone, can fairly be held to come within the provisions of clause 3 of said paragraph (b)-that is, that it was engaged in a business or enterprise of carriage by land. The enterprise cannot be considered a mere incident to the general business in which plaintiff in error was engaged. It was the business or enterprise itself. The Legislature undoubtedly had in mind the danger run by workmen who have to handle property on a large scale in carriage by land or water. This conclusion is not in any way in conflict with the reasoning or finding in Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 271 Ill. 312, 111 N. E. 128. If it was only the hauling of one load of crushed stone by a farmer or business man who was not engaged in construction or contracting work generally, undoubtedly then the proper conclusion would be to hold the hauling of such single load a mere incident to the main business.

[3] If plaintiff in error is liable, it must be held so not only because it comes within the provisions already quoted of said paragraph (b), but also within the provisions of section 31 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which provides:

act."

entered into a fraudulent scheme, artifice, or device, as therein provided. We cannot so hold. The section, in our judgment, clearly states that there are two classes of contractors that are liable, one class consisting of those who do not require subcontractors to insure, and another class consisting of those who have entered into a fraudulent scheme or device to evade responsibility to the employé. It would certainly be most unreasonable to require that before any contractor could be held under this section he must not only fail to require the subcontractor to insure, but must also attempt, by fraud or trickery, to defeat recovery by the employé. The absurdity of such an intention cannot be imputed to the Legislature.

[4] Counsel further argue that if plaintiff in error is liable under section 31, said section must be held unconstitutional as requiring an unreasonable and arbitrary classification, in that it sets apart contractors from all other classes of persons and imposes a burden upon them if they fail to require subcontractors to insure, thus arbitrarily distinguishing also one class of contractors from another class. This court has repeatedly held that the Legislature may legally classify persons so long as the law making the classification is general and has some reasonable relation to the end sought, so that the difference between the classes is not a purely arbitrary one. In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519; People v. Kewanee Light Co., 262 Ill. 255, 104 N. E. 680, and cited cases. A law is uniform when all persons brought within the relation and circumstances provided for are affected alike. It is uniform and general, not because it embraces all the governed, but that it may, from its terms, when many are embraced in its provisions, embrace all others who occupy

(274 III. 630)

SUBURBAN ICE CO. v. INDUSTRIAL
BOARD et al. (No. 10766.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1916.)

1. MASTER AND SERVANT 411 WORK

like positions to those who are embraced.
Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N.
E. 695, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 994; People v.
Grover, 258 Ill. 124, 101 N. E. 216, Ann. Cas.
1914B, 212; People v. Vickroy, 266 Ill. 834,
107 N. E. 638. It is not necessary that a
law, to be general, should apply to every
person. Very few laws do so apply. It is
general if it acts upon all persons coming
within its scope. People v. Kewanee Light
Co., supra. While we do not here decide or
discuss the question whether only contractors
come within the provisions of' said section
31, we do hold that if the contention of coun-
sel for the plaintiff in error be correct and
only contractors come within the provisions
of said section it would not thereby be ren-
dered unconstitutional, for in our judgment,
in view of the public necessities and the end
sought to be attained, a substantial differ-2.

ence exists between the business of other
people and the business in which contractors
must be engaged to come within the provi-
sions of the section.

[5] Counsel for the plaintiff in error further argue that no notice of this accident was given within 30 days, as required by section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. That section provides, among other things, that such notice shall be given within 30 days with certain exceptions, and further provides:

"That the failure on the part of any person entitled to such compensation to give such notice shall not relieve the employer from his liability for such compensation, when the facts and circumstances of such accident are known to such employer, his agent or vice principal in the enterprise."

The evidence in the record shows, without contradiction, that the foreman of plaintiff in error in charge of the work at the place where such crushed stone was delivered was present at the place of the accident at the time or shortly after it occurred, and that the general superintendent of plaintiff in error knew the next morning about the accident, the name of the injured man, and how it happened. Counsel do not deny this, but insist that the knowledge of the superintendent or foreman was not such a knowledge as would bind plaintiff in error, apparently arguing that such persons had no control over or direct connection with the employés of said subcontractor. With this we do not agree. Section 24 must be read in connection with section 31. Those who are liable under said section are also liable under section 24 without notice, when the facts and circumstances of the accident are brought to the knowledge of the employer, as provided in the said section. Obviously, the foreman and superintendent of plaintiff in error must be held to be its agent and vice principal, respectively.

The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

MEN'S COMPENSATION-JUDGMENT ON CER-
TIORARI-AMENDMENT OF STATUTE.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 131, §
4, saving rights existing at the repeal of a
statute, but providing that proceedings there-
after shall conform so far as practicable to
the law in force when the proceedings are tak-
en, a judgment on certiorari to review a deci-
sion of the Industrial Board entered after the
amendment of the act of 1913 (Laws 1913, p.
335) by the act of 1915 (Laws 1915, p. 400)
should conform to the later act, and if entered
in conformity to the former may be set aside
after the term had passed and a new judgment
entered in conformity to the act of 1915.
Servant, Dec. Dig. 411.]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and
MASTER AND SERVANT 398-WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION CLAIM NECESSITY
WRITING.

OF

Under Workmen's Compensation Act 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 351) § 24, providing that no proceedings for compensation shall be maintained unless claim has been made within six months after the accident, or in the event that payments have been made under the act, unless within six months after the payments ceased, written claim for compensation has been made an original claim before any payments have been made need not be in writing. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. 398.] 3. STATUTES

226-CONSTRUCTION-CONSTRUCTION OF SIMILAR STATUTES.

Where a statute is adopted from another state or a foreign country, it will be presumed the Legislature intended it to receive the construction given by the courts of that state or country unless in conflict with the spirit and policy of our laws.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 307; Dec. Dig. 226.] 4. MASTER AND SERVANT 405(4)-INJURIES TO SERVANT-COMPENSATION-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE..

ing an extra team belonging to his employer, testimony that it was his duty, when he returned early from his afternoon's work, to take care of any extra team in the barn, is sufficient the accident arose out of and in the course of to sustain a finding by the Industrial Board that his employment, notwithstanding testimony that it was the duty of a teamster to water his own team and no other.

Where a teamster was killed while water

Servant, Dec. Dig. 405 (4).]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and

5. MASTER AND SERVANT 417(7)—WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION-FINDINGS OF INDUS-
TRIAL BOARD-CONCLUSIVENESS.

The finding of the Industrial Board that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, if supported by legal and competent evidence, is conclusive on the court.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. 417(7).]

6. MASTER AND SERVANT 375(1) - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EXTRAHAZARDOUS EMPLOYMENT "BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION' -"EXTRAHAZARDOUS BUSINESS OR OCCUPA

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A manufacturer of ice, which is an "extrahazardous business or occupation" under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 3(b), is liable un

der that section for compensation to an employé | judgment of July 16, 1915, being in proper injured while taking care of the employer's form under the common-law writ of cerhorses in the barn on the same premises as the

ice plant in connection with his employment as tiorari, was a final and binding judgment teamster, which required him to load ice at the and is still in force because the circuit court plant and deliver it to consumers, since the was without jurisdiction to set aside that entire enterprise of the employer must be con- judgment after the term had passed. Under sidered the "business or occupation" of manu- the provisions of section 4 of chapter 131 facturing ice.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. 375(1).

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Business.]

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge.

Proceeding by Blanche C. Gylfe under the Workmen's Compensation Act to recover compensation for the death of Albert W. Gylfe, opposed by the Suburban Ice Company, employer. An award of the committee of arbitration confirmed by the Industrial Board was confirmed by the Circuit Court on certiorari by the employer, and the employer brings error. Affirmed.

Waite & Donovan, of Woodstock, for plaintiff in error. Cheney & Evans, of Chicago (F. J. Griffen, of Chicago, of counsel), for

defendants in error.

(Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 2577), as construed by this court, a proceeding begun under the statute before its repeal, by amendment or otherwise, proceeds in matters of practice, after the repeal takes effect, according to the new law. Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322. The judgment of July 16, 1915, having been entered after the repeal of the act of 1913, the judgment of the circuit court should have been entered in the form provided by said amendment of July 1, 1915. The trial court therefore did not err in setting aside the former judgment and entering the judgment in conformity with the provisions of the

amended act.

[2] Counsel for plaintiff in error urge that the Industrial Board had no jurisdiction in this case, as no written claim for compensation was filed with the Industrial Board

within six months from the date of the accident. Section 24 of the act of 1913, which CARTER, J. October 27, 1914, Blanche C. was in force at the time this accident occurGylfe, widow of Albert W. Gylfe and admin-red, provided:

act shall be maintained unless claim for com-
pensation has been made within six months aft-
have been made under the provisions of this
er the accident, or in the event that payments
act, unless written claim for compensation has
been made within six months after such pay-
Laws 1913, p. 351.
ments have ceased."

The record before us shows, without controversy, that the widow in person presented her claim for compensation verbally to the secretary and treasurer of plaintiff in error within about two weeks after the death of her husband, but that no written claim was filed with plaintiff in error until more than six months had elapsed after the accident occurred. The provisions of the statute quot

istratrix of his estate, commenced a proceed- "No proceedings for compensation under this ing before the Industrial Board of Illinois to recover from plaintiff in error compensation for injuries to her husband which resulted in his death April 28, 1914. After a hearing before a committee of arbitration an award of $3,500 was granted, which was confirmed by the Industrial Board April 10, 1915. On May 10 of the same year plaintiff in error filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook county for a writ of certiorari to review this decision of the Industrial Board. July 16 following, the circuit court found that said board had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter and did not exceed its jurisdiction in making its finding and award, and thereupon ordered the writed above do not state that a written claim, quashed. From that decision plaintiff in error, being unaware of the amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act which took effect July 1, 1915, prayed an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, which appeal, on motion of the plaintiff in error, was dismissed January 25, 1916. Thereafter a motion filed by plaintiff in error in the circuit court of Cook county to set aside the order of July 16, 1915, as not being entered in compliance with said amendment of July 1 to section 19 of the Workmen's Compensa-sarily be in writing. This provision of the tion Act, was allowed. Later the circuit court entered an order finding that the Industrial Board had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, following the provisions of said amendment of July 1, 1915. This last judgment of the circuit court, and

the record upon which it was entered, have been brought to this court by writ of error. [1] Defendant in error urges that the

in the first instance, must be filed. This section of the statute, however, does provide later that if payments have been made under the provisions of the act, then a "written" claim must be made within six months after such payments cease. The requirement that the claim should be written, under the later provisions in this same sentence, would seem to indicate that the Legislature did not intend that the claim made within six months of the accident must necesIllinois Compensation Act was taken substantially from section 2, paragraph 1, of the British Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, which section was re-enacted in the British Compensation Act of 1906, reading as fol

lows:

of compensation for an injury shall not be "Proceedings for the recovery under this act maintainable * * unless the claim for compensation with respect to such accident has

been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury."

In Powell v. Main Colliery Co., 1900 App. Cas. 366, the injured workman sent an informal written notice to his employer stating that he claimed a certain sum per week as compensation for injuries received at the employer's colliery. It was there held that the claim for compensation need not be in the form required by ordinary legal procedure. Since that decision the courts of that country have held that the notice given the employer by the employé may be verbal and need not be in writing. Lowe v. Myers & Sons (1906) 2 K. B. 265; Thompson v. Goold & Co. (1910) A. C. 409; Luckie v. Merry (1915) 3 K. B. 83.

[3] It has long been a settled rule of construction that where a statute is adopted from another state or from Great Britain it will be presumed that the Legislature intended it to receive the construction given it by the courts of that state or country unless in conflict with the spirit and policy of our laws. Tyler v. Tyler, 19 Ill. 151; People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313, and cited .cases. As the provisions of the British act had been construed as not requiring a written notice of the injury, several years before our Legislature enacted the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act here in question, taking it substantially unchanged from the British act, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended that the same construction be given it here. We have heretofore so construed this provision of the statute. Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173. As there is no question that the administratrix made this claim claim for compensation verbally to plaintiff in error within six months from the date of the injury, the Industrial Board was not without jurisdiction to consider the matter because of the failure to file a written claim until more than six months had elapsed.

kept in said horse barn. Albert W. Gylfe was a teamster employed by plaintiff in error to deliver ice and coal. At the time of the accident he was feeding a team in the barn when one of the horses kicked him in the head with such violence that he died about three weeks thereafter.

[4] Counsel contend that the accident in this case did not arise out of and in the course of the employment of the person injured, and that for that reason the Industrial Board had no jurisdiction of the case. The team which Gylfe was feeding when the accident took place was a new team which had not been assigned to any of the teamsters. There is testimony in the record that it was the duty of each teamster to feed his own team only, and no other. There is also testimony to the effect that when a teamster came back to the barn early from the afternoon's work, as Gylfe had done on this occasion, it was his duty to care for any extra horses that might happen to be in the barn. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the accident occurred in the course of Gylfe's employment.

[5] The Industrial Board specifically found that the accident which resulted in Gylfe's death arose out of and in the course of the employment, and since there is competent and legal evidence to support that finding of fact it is conclusive upon the court. Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board (No. 10749) 113 N. E. 976.

[6] Plaintiff in error had never elected to come under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and so, if it is to be held liable, it must be because the occupation, business, or enterprise in which it was engaged was one of those enumerated in paragraph (b) of section 3 of said act. It is conceded by its counsel that in the business of manufacturing ice it was engaged in an occupation, business, or enterprise that would bring it under said paragraph (b) of section 3, but it is insisted that an individual or a corporation may be engaged in several branches of business, one of which is extrahazardous and others of which are not even

the provisions of said paragraph (b). Here the duties of the deceased required him to work in and around the plant where the ice was manufactured, and included the load

The Industrial Board found that the business of plaintiff in error was such as to make it liable under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Counsel for plain-hazardous and therefore not coming within tiff in error insist that the finding was wrong on this point. Plaintiff in error is engaged in the manufacture and sale of ice, and in the sale of coal, coke, and wood. It has a compression plant for making ice at Laing of ice and the care of the horses in a Grange, Cook county, Ill. This plant contains an engine of about 150-horse power. Located on the same piece of land is an ice storage house and office building, a coal warehouse and a horse barn belonging to plaintiff in error. The horse barn is entirely disconnected from the ice plant. A railroad switch runs by the coal warehouse. Plaintiff in error delivered ice and coal at retail and ice at wholesale by means of horse-drawn trucks. For this purpose it

large stable on the premises of plaintiff in error immediately adjacent to the main ice plant. We cannot see how it can fairly be held that the employment in which the deceased was engaged was not a part of plaintiff in error's business or occupation of manufacturing and selling ice. Considered in the most favorable light for plaintiff in er ror's argument on this point, the work in which the deceased was engaged was a part of the occupation or enterprise of the plain

79(1)-ABANDONMENT.

There is no abandonment of a public highway where the public continues to travel the road under a claim of right.

must be considered in order to reach a rea- 15. HIGHWAYS
sonable conclusion as to the meaning and
construction of any of its provisions.
The men in the building of plaintiff in er-
ror where the machinery was located and
the ice manufactured were certainly within
the act. The workmen around the building
and caring for the property were within the

act. Those whose duties took them to the

plant to take away the product were within the act, and we can reach no other conclusion than that the duties of the deceased were of such a nature, so related to and connected with the occupation of plaintiff in error, as to require that plaintiff in error, under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, shall be held liable for the injury.

The reasoning in Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 271 Ill. 312, 111 N. E. 128, does not tend to uphold any such conclusion as is argued here by counsel for the plaintiff in error. On the contrary, the reasoning there is in full harmony with the conclusion already stated as to the proper construction of this act.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. 88 279, 283, 286, 287; Dec. Dig. 79(1).]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Whiteside County; Frank D. Ramsay, Judge.

Suit by Clarence W. Hansen against Charles H. Green and others. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

A. M. Blodgett, of Fulton, and W. A. Blodgett, of Morrison, for appellants. C. C. McMahon, of Fulton, for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J. The appellee filed his bill in this case in the circuit court of Whiteside county against the appellants, who are the owners of the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of section 5, township 22, range 4, alleging that he was the owner of lands lying east of said tract upon which he had two dwelling houses and other buildings and upon which he lived with his family in

The judgment of the circuit court will be one of the dwellings; that he traded and affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(275 Ill. 221)

HANSEN v. GREEN et al. (No. 10815.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 24, 1916.) 1. HIGHWAYS 17-ESTABLISHMENT-PRE

transacted his business at Fulton and Thomson; that for more than 65 years there had been in constant use a public highway from his lands across said tract, intersecting the public highway known as the Bluff road; that the public traveled the highway before the United States government parted with the title and had used the same as such highway continuously since that time; that In a suit to enjoin a defendant from inter- the commissioners of highways of the town fering with plaintiff's right to travel across de- had had possession of the highway for more fendant's land, evidence held sufficient to estab-than 20 years and repaired the same; that lish a highway by prescription along the line said highway leading to and from his lands

SCRIPTION-EVIDENCE.

of travel claimed.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. § 24; Dec. Dig. 17.] 2. HIGHWAYS 8-ESTABLISHMENT - PRE

SCRIPTION-REQUISITES.

A prescriptive right to a highway may be acquired where the use is adverse with the knowledge of the one in possession of the land, although the land is uninclosed, and there was no public proclamation of the claim of right to use the land.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. § 11; Dec. Dig. 8.]

3. DEDICATION 15-HIGHWAYS-INTENT TO DEDICATE.

To establish dedication of a highway, there must be proof of an actual intention to dedicate, or acts and declarations estopping the owner from denying such intention, and no in

ference of intention can be drawn where the lands are uninclosed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. 15.] 4. HIGHWAYS

154-OBSTRUCTION-GATES

PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT.

Erection of a gate across a public highway which the public must open and close is a nuisance, and no prescriptive right can be acquired to maintain such gate.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. § 418; Dec. Dig. 154.]

was the only public highway that passed through or near his lands and furnished the only practicable or feasible road to travel from his lands to Fulton or Thomson or any other market or trading point; and that the defendants on August 25, 1915, served a notice upon him that the highway would be closed by them within 30 days and prohibited him from entering on the premises on and after September 25, 1915. The bill alleged the road was a public highway. The prayer was that defendants should be enjoined from hindering or preventing the complainant, his tenants, agents, and servants, and other persons desiring access to or egress from his land, from freely traveling across the tract of land in question on the regularly traveled road between the complainant's land and the Bluff road. A temporary injunction was issued, and the defendants answered, admitting that there had been a road or trail leading from the Bluff road across and over the tract of land to the complainant's lands and toward the east therefrom before the United States government parted with the title and since, but denying the existence of the public

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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