APPENDIX. REYNELL TAYLOR'S writings, referred to on page 264, are as follows: : 1. 'Derah Ishmael Khan.' Published in 1852, and addressed to his successor in the district, Major J. Nicholson. 135 et seq.) (See pages 2. A paper upon the Native Army, entitled: 'Memorandum on His Excellency Sir William Mansfield's Proposition for Remodelling Military Cantonments.' As this paper,' writes Reynell Taylor, 'was printed by authority three times, without any suggestion of mine, I hope it is not conceited to suppose that it contains views that are looked upon as common sense.' The paper was published first at Umballa in 1867. 3. Reply to a letter of the Secretary to Government, Punjab, asking his opinion upon the question, 'Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat or Candahar.' Published 1875. Taylor gave it as his opinion that we should not be able to obtain the willing consent of the Ameer and his counsellors to the appointment of British Residents in the country,' and he foreshadowed, in a remarkable manner, what would be the probable result of such a course. 'I am quite clear,' he says, 'that it would be a deeply unwise act to force the matter; and further, as the necessity, if it occurred, of revenging injury done to our representatives would be a grievous misfortune to us, I am strongly of opinion that it is most expedient to avoid putting our officers in A A positions which might endanger such a result. I need not say how unfortunate the scandal would be to us, if we had to go to war with our reputed allies to punish them for dealing treacherously with the officers whom we had put forward to assist in what was supposed to be our common interests.' Eight years previous to this (1867) Taylor had written a memorandum for Sir John Lawrence upon the Afghan character. He admired the fine qualities of the race, but he had the poorest opinion of their political morality. I am not aware that this last was published. 4. 'Memorandum on a Paper by Sir Henry Rawlinson on Central Asian Progress of Russia.' A pamphlet published at Calcutta in 1875, though dated Umballa, November, 1868. Taylor's opinion was, that subsidise and drill the Afghans how you may, they would prove no opposition to the onward wave of Russian aggression when once Russia had made her arrangements and had resolved to advance on Cabul. The distance is nothing to Russia if the road be her own, which she certainly will make it.' She can afford to go on quietly making her preparations, having all the time the advantage of 'being up in the attics, and descending to her work, while we are downstairs and out in the street, and must ascend narrow and difficult flights of steps, with no good landing-places, in order to get even up to the first floor.' He gave the Afghans credit for wishing to keep out the Russians, and would like to see Russia and ourselves enter into 'a purely Asiatic treaty,' by which a good belt of independent country might be preserved between us. He thought that, when Russia did push forward, she would soon wear out her welcome, and find the large mountain clans, occupying important passes, the same thorn in her side that we had; and that though he believed Russia could establish herself in Afghanistan and hold it for a time, her position would be subject to the same great difficulties and weakness that others have felt, and that she would be as liable as any other nation to be thrown on her haunches by serious revolt.' Russia might be forced to advance into Afghanistan, when she would immediately become mistress of the Koorrum and Khost Valleys, and be in uncomfortable proximity to our outposts. He points to Persia as being a possible move on our side, and he deprecates our stopping at the foot of the mountains to meet the Russians, even though 'a forward movement involved more extended operations when the actual strain should come.' His feeling about the occupation of Koorrum, coupled with the establishment of a British envoy and contingent at Cabul, was that in the event of any strain we should be involved in active interference in the military position above the passes. The continued occupation of the stage beyond the passes, in order to fight the Russians when they did come, he did not believe feasible for us, though he allowed that it would be 'the true policy of any nation playing its own game with its own nine-pins.' A fine, preponderantly European, force above the passes, if it could be kept up to its full strength without weakening our garrisons in India, was undoubtedly the best course; but we must needs, in prudence, shape our garment to suit the especial breadth and quality of our material. My inclination,' he concludes, 'in making arrangements with the Afghan chiefs would be to let them know distinctly that we have no intention of advancing beyond our own border. Of course, if we found it convenient, we could do so eventually; but I would guard against any possibility of the Afghans having it in their power to say that we had proved a broken reed to them when their difficulties came to the worst point, and that thus the help they had counted on had failed them.' 5. Memorandum on a Proposition to Arm the Troops of a Native State with Breech-loaders, and to Brigade them with British Troops.' Published in 1876. Taylor was averse to this proposition. He considered that the armies of native states were a possible source of weakness, though he fully allowed that they might prove useful to us on occasions in the future as they had in the past. He contended that it was best to leave them to themselves, and to avoid giving them the idea that they were in any way necessary to us. 6. 'Notes on the Afghan Question.' Published 1878. Taylor was of opinion that, from our previous friendly relations with the Ameer, we had a right to remonstrate against the prominent reception of the Russian mission, and to back that remonstrance by action. He thought war was scarcely avoidable unless our ultimatum was of a conciliatory character; but he doubted its being expedient, and deeply regretted our having to take up arms. If the Ameer's mind could be set at rest on the two points-the independence of Afghanistan, and freedom from the enforced presence of British representatives in his country, he would be as unanxious to admit Russian influence as he had been to accept even a semblance of British tutelage. He thought we had ourselves driven the Ameer into the arms of Russia by pressing the demand for the admission of our officers as political residents. He knew Shere Ali's character too well to believe that he would accept any ultimatum, and he again urges our 'shunting him into a siding' and coming to an agreement with Russia instead of engaging in 'an expensive and profitless war.' He did not think that our prestige would suffer by not fighting, but, on the contrary, that our prestige for prudence and circumspection would be damaged by our doing so. He agreed with those writers who deprecated war with the Afghans, because he failed to see that the provocation we had received was of a character to work up a feeling of vengeance. He also maintained his former opinion, that our present frontier was the best for us, because it furnishes in itself remarkable facilities for defence. He fully maintained that we had a right of remonstrance about the Russian mission, unless it was shown that after the Peshawur conference we had broken off our previous connection. He agreed with those who thought that if we did not occupy Afghanistan, materially or politically,' Russia would do so, and he was fully aware how inconvenient to us a predominant Russian influence at Cabul would prove. This dilemma could only be cleared by securing the immunity of Afghanistan from foreign occupation, and arranging on our side an efficient influence in her counsels. If Russia and Afghanistan combine against us, then one of two courses is open-either to occupy Afghanistan or to content ourselves with the frontier that has fallen to us. 'Of these two plans,' he writes, 'I distinctly give my opinion, as I did ten years ago, in the face of all difficulties and drawbacks, in favour of the latter course.' He did not hold with any middle course, viz. the rectification of the frontier and the occupation of positions within the hills, but advocated 'a good tooth-breaking fortress' at Peshawur, or between Peshawur and Jumrood, for the Khyber; the occupation of the natural position at Thull for the Koorrum Valley, and a like protection for the Goomul Pass. As to the Bolan, which he considered as undoubtedly the route for the invasion of India by a large army, Quettah is so placed as to command its northern entrance. The pamphlet closes with a description of the many advantages of our present frontier. In a postscript, dated December 4, 1878, Taylor concludes :'As far as my judgment goes, the quiet game of guarding our own frontier, and doing what we could with Afghanistan from that base, without going to war with its ruler, would have been the best for us to play; still, I must allow that the apparently inimical and dangerous action and language of the Turkestan authorities form a strong justification of the conviction which appears to have been adopted by our own Government, to the effect that either we must make an equally strong counter-move, or suffer ourselves tamely to be supplanted in that influence in the affairs of Afghanistan which we had enjoyed for years, and which had been fully and unreservedly accorded to us by Russia herself.' |