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Isaurians, Cilicians, Cappadocians, and Galatians were compelled to march northwards, much against their will, and the Armeniacs and Cappadocians were noticed as louder than the others in their murmurs. As Michael and his generals issued from the city they were accompanied by all the inhabitants, as far as the Aqueduct.' Gifts and keepsakes showered upon the officers, and

and the Empress Procopia herself was there, exlorting the Imperial staff to take good care of Michael and " to fight bravely for the Christians."

Michael, if he had some experience of warfare, had 110 ability as it general, and he was more realy to listen to the advice of the ministers who had gained influence over line in the palace than to consult the opinion of two really competent ! military men who accompanied the expedition. These were Lev, general of the Anatolics, whom, as we have already seen, he had recalled from exile., and Jolin Aplikes, the general of Macedonia. During the month of Jily the army moved about Thrace, and was little less burdensome to the inhabitillits than the presence of an enemy. It was specially remarked by contemporaries that no attempt wils Imule to recover Mesumbria. Early in June Krum enterol Roman territory and luthi armies encamped near Versinicia," it place not, far from Hadrianople. At Versinicia, nearly twenty years before, another Emperor had met another Khan. Then Karilam had skulkel in al wool, and had not ventured to face Constantine. kruin, however, was holder than his preslecessor, and, contrary Lo Bulgarian hulit, did not slirink from a pitched battle. For fifteen days they stood over against one another, licither side venturing to attack, and the heat of summer rendered this incessant watching it trying ordeal looth for men and for horses. At last Jolin aplikes, who coinmanlel one wing, composed of the Macedonian and Thracian troops, lost his patience and sent a decisive message to the Emperor: "How lony are we to stand here and perish ? I will strike first in the name of God, and then do ye follow up bravely, and we can conquer.

We are ten times more numerous than

" For the position of kíluklus see above, pl. 101.

Theopoli. :00. or this affair we have two iwlegancdont accounts, one loy Theophanes, the other in the Fray.

ment of Scriptor Incertus. The latter is the fuller, and from it we learn thie details of the courage of John Aplakes (33:37 8479.) Jireček (Crschichte, 1.15) wrongly places the battle in July.

they." The Bulgurians, who stood on lower ground in the valley, fell before the charge of Aplakes and his soldiers who descended on them froin a slight elevation; but the brave stratégos of Macedonia was not supported by the centre and the other wing. There was a general flight without any apparent cause, and the Anatolics were conspicuous among the fugitives. Aplakes, left with his own men, far too few to hold their ground, tell tighting. The enemy were surprised and alarmed at this inexplicable behaviour of an irmy so far superior in numbers, so famous for its discipline. Suspecting some ambush or stratagem the Bulgarians hesitated to move. But they soon found out that the flight was yenuine, and they followed in pursuit. The Romans threw away their weapons, and did not arrest their tlight until they reached the gates of the capital.

Such wils the stringe battle which was fought between Haurianople in Versinicia on June 22, A.1). 813. It has illi interest ils one of the few engagements in which itļi army chiefly consisting of Slavs seems to have voluntarily opposed it Roman host on open ground. As il rule the Slars and Bulgarians avoided pitched battles in the plain and only engaged in mountainous country, where their habits and their equipment secured them the advantage. But Krum seems to have lmeen elatul by his career of success, and to have conceived for his opponents it contempt which proinpited him to desert the traditions of Bulgarian warfare. His iludacity was rewarded, but the victory was not clue to any superiority on his sile in strategy or linctics. llistorinns have failed to realise the dilliculties which besit the battle of Vorsinicin, or to explain the extraordinary spectacle of a Roman arruy, in all its force, routed in ill open plain by it for smaller army of Slave and Bulgarians. It will it commonplace that although the Bulgarians were nearly sure to have the upper land in mountainous defiles they could not cope in the plain with a Roman ariny, even much smaller than their own. The soldiers knew this well themselves," and it is impossible to believe that the Anatolic troops, disciplined by warfare against the far more formidable Saracens, were afraid of the enemy whom they met in Thrace.

1 Our sources alo not stille the order of battle, but we mily conclude that Michael commanded thie Centre, polakes inid Leo the two wings. Leo's wing consisted of thie Anatolies

anil, purhaps, the Cappadocians ; the Opsikiaus, Armeniacs, and others would have been in the centre.

? Ser. Incert. 338, wtev od ini κάμπου νικήσαι αυτούς έχομεν.

The only reasonable.explanation of the matter is treachery, and treachery was the cause assigned by contemporary report.' The Anatolic troops feigned cowardice and fled; their flight produced a panic and the rest fled too. Others may have been in the plot besides the Anatolics, but the soldiers of Leo, the Armenian, were certainly the prime movers. The political consequences of the battle show the intention of the Asiatic troops in courting this defent. The Emperor Michael lost credit and was succeeded lvy Leo. This wils what the Asiatic sol.liers desired. The religious side of Michael's rule was highly unpopular in Phrygia and the districts of Mount Taurus, anel Michael himself was, probably, a Thracian or Macedonian. The rivalry Victween the Aviatic in Europiane nobiles, which played an important part at a liter period of history, Wils perhaps already beginning; and it is noteworthy that the Thracians and Maceilonians under Aplikes were the only troops who did not tlec. Reviewing all the circumstances, so far as we know them, we cannot escape the conclusion that the account is right which represents the regiments of Leo, if not leo himself, as guilty of intentional cowardice on the field of Versinicia. It was planned to discredit Michael and elevate leo in his stead, and the plan completely succeeded.

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· The question really is, how far of Levi's rowut, ono allverse :ind one Lxo was himself privy in the conduct favourable: (a) that I.co's retrent was of his truojis. Hirsch coquits Leo of treacherous ; (B) that loc was posted itte lokaria (. 123). The clatit arc ils olistirnice from the army loy follows: (1) Tlieopodanes dous Imt lint Michail :11111 bibelen not to take part at intentional cowarılive on the part in the combat--at least this seems to of ooilleer goneral or slidiers. But we be the meaning. Ilirsch thinks that 11111st rememmor tipt. Theophanes (a) was derived from some poilsquinarlo wrote the end of his history just at or Sproollegelicht. (3) lu Cont. Th. (14), tle time of Loro's accession, and says there are likewise two accounts: (a) nothing unfavourable to that monarcii. Lco led the flight, The Baoileiav dei (2) The Serijitor Incertus acı'uses the πως επιζητών. This time autlor proθέμα των ανατολικών, without specially fesses to have got from a written 1910sitioning the commandes. As thic source, (99 páows (from Ignatius ?). autdoor is violently borstilo to Leo, (P) Leo and his solliers stoord their tleis wileuce is in loco's favour. (33) ground bravoly: it was the soldiers Ignatius, l'ilu Vierpuhuri. c. 31, ac. commanded by the Emperor who flori. cou sees lao as the author of the lo feat Jly conclusion from all this is that (γ. 16:3): της ήττης Λέων πρωτεργάτης Leo wils really in the plot, but Pavel γενόμενος παντί τω στρατοπέδω την μετ' his cards so cleverly tliat nobody could αισχύνης φιγής: εμαιεύσατο, (4) Genesios porove anything against liim, although states that there were two reports There were the gravest suspicions.

§ 4. The Bulgarian Siege of Constantinople (A.D. 813)

After his victory over the army of Michael, the king of the Bulgarians resolved to attempt the siege of two great cities at the same time. He had good reason to be elated by his recent successes against the Roman Empire; he might well dream of winning greater successes still. He had achieved what few enemies of the Empire in past time could boast that they had done. He had caused the death of two Emperors and the downfall of a third; for he inight attribute the deposition of Michael to his own victory; and within two years he had annihilated one Roinan army and signally defeated another. In point of fact, these successes were duc rather to luck than to merit; the Bulgarian king had shown craft but no conspicuous ability in generalship; the battles had not been won liy superiority in tactics or luy signal courage. But the lilcts could not be ignored; the head of in Roman Emperor was il drinking-cup in the palace of l’liska, and a large Roman army had been routed near Hadrianople.

It was an ambition of Leo the Armenian, as has been already noticed, to emulate the great Isaurian Emperors of the previous century; and fortune gave him, at his very accession, an opportunity of showing how far he could approach in military prowess the Fifth Constantine, whom the Bulgarians had found so formidable. Kruin left his brother to blockade the city of Hadrian, and advanced hiinself to lay siege to the city of Constantine. He appeared before it six days after the accession of the new Emperor. In front of the walls he made a display of his power, and in the park outside the Golden Gate he prepared sacrifices of men and animals. The Romans could see from the walls how this “new Sennacherib” laved his feet on the pargin of the sea and sprinkled his soldiers; they could hear the acclamations of the barbarians, and witness the procession of the monarch through a line of his concubines, worshipping and glorifying their lord.' He then asked the Emperor to allow him to fix his lance on the Golden Gate as an emblem of victory; ånd when the proposal was refused he

I These details are given by the church of Ss, Cosmas and Damian Scriptor Incertus (342). Krun's head. (ib. 343). quarters seem to have been near the

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retired to his tent.' Having produced no impression by liis hcathen parade, and having failed to daunt New Rome, he threw up a rampart and plundered the neighbourhood for several days. But there was no prospect of taking the queen of cities where so many, greater than he, had failed before, and he soon offered terms of peace, demanding as the price a large treasure of gold and raiment, and a certain number of chosen damsels. The new Emperor Leo saw in the overtures of the cnemy a gooil opportunity to carry out a design, which in the present age public opinion would brand as an infamous act of treachery, but which the most pious of contemporary monks, inen by no means disposed to be lenient to Leo, regarded as laudable.' The chronicler Theophanes, whom Leo afterwards persecuted, silid that the failure of the plot was due to our sins.

The Emperor sent a message to Krum: “Come down to the shore, with a few unarmed inen, and we also unarmed 'will proceed by boat to meet you. We can then talk together and arrange terms.” The place convened was on the Golden Horn, just north of the sea wall; and at night three armed men were concealed in a house * outside the Gate of Blachern, with directions to issue forth and slay Krum when a certain sign was given by one of Leo's attendants.

Next day the Bulgarian king duly rode down to the shore, with three companions, iminely liis treasurer,' a Grock donerter, Constantine l'atzikos, who lud marriel Krmni's sister, and the 8011 of this Constantine. Krum dismounted and silt on the ground; his nephew held his horse ready, “saddled and bridled.” Leo and his party soon arrived in the Imperial barge, and while they conversed, Hexabulios, who was with Leo, suddenly covered his face with his hands. The motion offended the sensitive pride of the barbarian; highly offended he started to his feet and leaped upon his horse. Nor was he too soon; for the gesture was the concerted sign, and the

| Theopili. 50:3. Simcon transcribes • Theophanes, however, clearly Theophanies with inconsiderable verbal wrote these pages in the first years of changes (Leo Gr. 207).

Leo's reign. 3 και κοράσια επίλεκτα τοσότητά τινα.

εν δωματίοις τισιν των Γάλλης. These facts and the letails of the attempt to slay Krum are recorded lig

λογοθέτης. the Scriptor Incertus. Loparev (op.cit. στρωμένον χαλινωμένον (Scr. Inc. 345) suggests that Kruni was insist.

343). ing on the fullilment of the treaty of 7 Doubtless Johın Hexabulios (sec hormisos or, as he thinks, of Tervel. above, p. 27).

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