and coaled in the open sea. On the 20th and 21st it steered to the eastward; and on the 22nd, availing itself of another fine day, it coaled again.* The fleet then turned northward, and on the 24th or 25th was in the vicinity of Wusung, where transports destined for Shanghai were detached. The Japanese fleet, evidently by means of its scouts or lookout ships, came into direct contact with Rojdestvensky's fleet, for the first time after the latter's departure from the Annamese shore, some'where in the eastern sea to the south of Kiushiu on May 26.' On the same, if not the previous, day a report was telegraphed from Shanghai that a Russian force of twenty-seven warships had been sighted at the Saddle Islands, north of the Chusan group, rather more than 300 miles from the entrance to the Korean Straits. Consequently it must have been known in Japan in good time that Rojdestvensky had committed himself to an attempt to pass through the straits in question. What was now necessary was to ascertain the time at which he would appear in them, and which of the two channels, the one to the eastward or the one to the westward of Tsushima, he would select for his passage.

About 5 A.M. on May 27 one of the Japanese scouts, the 'Shinanu-Maru'-her name shows her to have been a commissioned merchant steamer-sighted the advancing Russians south of Quelpart Island. She immediately reported their appearance by wireless telegraph to Admiral Togo, adding that the strangers were apparently shaping a course so as to pass through the eastern channel between Tsushima and Japan. Two hours later, or about 7 A.M., the cruiser Izumi,' the left or port wing ship of an inner cordon of scouts, reported that the Russians had reached a point twenty-five miles north-west of Uku-Shima, which island is about forty-six miles south of Tsushima, and were proceeding in a north-easterly direction. Between 10 A.M. and 11 A.M. Vice-Admiral Kataoka, with a squadron which,' says a Japanese account, 'did not consist of powerful warships,' and, in fact, comprised, according to an official Russian report, the old and rather slow cruiser Matsushima' and' Hashidate,' besides, as we know from Japanese sources, the Itsukushima' and 'Izumi,' came in touch with the Russian fleet between Iki Island and Tsushima. Kataoka was accompanied by two 'sections' under Vice-Admiral Dewa, whose flag was flying in the 'Kasagi,' and Rear-Admiral (Masamichi) Togo. These sections contained the

6

These details are taken from a lecture delivered by Captain Ito at a meeting of the Toho Kyokai on June 26 (Japan Times' [ Weekly Ed.], July 1, 1905).

VOL. CCII. NO. CCCCXIV.

Y

fast cruisers of moderate or small size' Chitose,' Niitaka,' 'Otowa,' 'Suma,' and 'Akitsushima.' The Russians opened fire on these ships, and supposed that they had driven them away. What really happened was that the Japanese withdrew, proceeding well into the Korean Straits, in the expectation, which was not disappointed, that the Russians would follow them. 'Kataoka,' say the Japanese, 'led the Russians into a trap.' He may not have really done this, because Rojdestvensky was already committed to attempting the straits; but he was certainly able to give information of the greatest value to his commander-inchief. Speaking of Kataoka's, Dewa's, and (Masamichi) Togo's proceedings, Admiral Togo, the commander-in-chief, says:

"Notwithstanding the repeated firing by the enemy, these sections of our fleet maintained uninterrupted touch with the enemy as far as Okino-Shima, all the while constantly and minutely telegraphing to me about the condition of the enemy. In spite of the thick mist which confined the vision to within five nautical miles, the infor mation thus received enabled me at a distance of several tens of miles to form a vivid picture in my mind of the condition of the enemy. I was thus able, before I could see him with my own eyes, to know that the enemy's fighting sections comprised the whole of the Second and Third Squadrons; that they were accompanied by seven special-service ships; that the enemy's ships were disposed in a double column formation; that their main strength was placed at the head of their right column, with the special-service ships at their rear; that the enemy's rate of speed was about 12 knots; that the enemy were continuing to steam in a north-easterly direc tion, and so forth. On the strength of this information I was able to form a mental resolution to meet the enemy with the main strength of my fleet near Okino-Shima, at about two o'clock in the afternoon, and open the attack on the head of the enemy's left column.'

We are still ignorant of much of the procedure of the Russians; but in face of this clear statement of the advantages derived by the Japanese from careful scouting and intelligent use of the wireless telegraph, we may well be astonished at the absence of both on the other side. Several of the Russian ships were furnished with wireless telegraph apparatus; yet there is not a sign of their having used it to convey information, or even to disconcert their adversary's telegraphing operations.

The opposing fleets being now nearly in each other's presence, it is necessary to state their strength. Of the Russian force we have a detailed enumeration, which may be accepted as per fectly accurate, given by Admiral Togo in his official report,

*In a supplementary report Admiral Togo gives the names six special-service Russian ships and one auxiliary cruiser.

of

in which he names and accounts for every Russian ship and auxiliary vessel present in the battle. It is less easy to ascertain the exact amount of the Japanese force. The wise and well-maintained secrecy which has been so notable a factor of the success of Japan in this war has not even yet been entirely given up. If we take the name of every ship mentioned in Admiral Togo's report and in the report on the casualties amongst officers and men, we may feel fairly confident that we can make out an exhaustive list of the Japanese ships, larger than destroyers, engaged in the battle; at any rate, we shall not have included in it any that were not. When we come to the Japanese torpedocraft-destroyers and torpedo-boats-we are met by a special difficulty. Both in the list of the killed and wounded and in Admiral Togo's report, the destroyers are in some cases mentioned by name and in others merely by the number of their flotillas. Torpedo-boats are rarely specified, but, with few exceptions, are referred to as being in flotillas or groups. The number of individuals in a flotilla is not reported. We believe that it was not exactly uniform. By taking the lower number, three, we shall not exaggerate the aggregate Japanese torpedo-craft force. The Russians, it may be remarked, in one report put it at forty to sixty, and in another as high as seventy to ninety craft.

In order to give a fairly accurate picture of the relative fighting efficiency of the two fleets, the vessels composing them will be divided into groups as follows:

The Japanese counted this ship as about equal to the Imperator Nicholas I. By an order of the Japanese Minister of Marine, dated June 6, 1905, the 'Iki' (late 'Nicholas I.') is placed on the list of battleships next to the Chinyen,'

Omitting the Japanese despatch vessel, the above lists give us twenty Russian ships against twenty-eight Japanese.

In addition to these there were on each side several specialservice vessels. One of those on the Russian side was equipped as an auxiliary cruiser and is classed apart. One was a repairing ship, and one or two were tugs. As some of the Russian vessels were sunk, and all were fired upon and mostly lost officers and men, their casualties go to fill up the total reported, and both they and their crews have to be taken into account.*

Six

vessels.

RUSSIAN.
special-service
"Kamschatka,' 'Irtish,'
(?) 'Anadyr,'' Rusi,'' Korea,'
Suveri.'

One auxiliary cruiser.-' Ural.'

JAPANESE.

Seven special-service vessels.'Kumano-Maru,' ManshuMaru,' 'America-Maru,' 'Kasuga-Maru,' 'ShinanuMaru,'' Tainan-Maru,' 'Yawata-Maru.'

*There were also two Russian hospital ships, both of which were brought into port by the Japanese. One was detained for breaches of international law, the other was released.

The Russians maintain that the four transports and two tugs that accompanied the fleet were a great drawback and 'hindrance of operations.' No such complaint of their specialservice vessels comes from the Japanese. On the contrary, one of them, the 'Shinanu-Maru,' already mentioned as having sighted the enemy early on May 27, did such good service that her officers and men received the special honour of a kanjo, or letter of thanks, a distinction highly prized in the army and navy of Japan.

The guns carried by the two fleets, apart from their destroyers and special-service vessels, were:

It will be seen that the Japanese had a considerable preponderance in guns of the medium and lighter natures; whereas of the heavier natures, 10-inch and 12-inch, the Russians had a majority almost equally marked. It is worth notice that each side had in its modern-type battleships the same number of the powerful 12-inch guns-viz., sixteen, the remainder being scattered amongst less important ships. Guns are not the only offensive appliances in the armament of modern men-of-war. All the battleships on both sides and, with few exceptions-and those only on the Japanese side-the cruisers also were equipped with tubes for launching torpedoes. Of these the Russians had ninety-four and the Japanese ninety-seven. As far as is known, throughout an action continuing for two days not a single torpedo was launched from any one of these 191 tubes, and, if any were launched, no torpedo so used destroyed an enemy. The installation of a torpedo armament on board battleships and cruisers has modified in no small degree their internal design, and has been in that and in other ways a cause of great expense. The introduction of it is to be traced to insufficiently considered inferences from events in the American civil war, in which the destructive effect of explosion produced in close proximity to the under-water part of a ship's hull had been repeatedly observed.

The battleships of both fleets, even those of the latest date