The Commission report that the consumption of wheat in the United Kingdom is, speaking roundly, about 30,000,000 quarters annually, and that of this 20 per cent. may be taken as homegrown; as to meat (beef, mutton, and bacon), of rather more than 2,250,000 tons consumed, the home production rather exceeds one-half; and that whilst the existing stock in the country at any one time of the principal raw materials previously mentioned might, at the present rate of consumption, last some months, the supply of wheat at home, either at the ports or in the hands of the millers and growers, at certain seasons of the year falls as low as seven weeks' consumption. Is, then, the danger a real one that the United Kingdom may be reduced in a few weeks by starvation to capitulate, like a fortress that has stood a long siege? If so what steps should be taken to protect us against so great a danger? Ought we to accept the analogy between the United Kingdom and a great fortress, and deliberately and in time of peace store ourselves at the least with food and the absolute necessaries of existence, in order that the nation may live during the time that it remains cut off from the rest of the world?

The reports of the Commission-for there are several-and still more the evidence it has published, will go far to reassure reasonable men that so long as the nation maintains a powerful navy there is little fear of such calamitous consequences as have been anticipated. No doubt, a war against one or more of the great Powers of the world would entail in many ways and under any circumstances hardships and suffering on the great mass of our people, whilst on the other hand many individuals would make their fortunes. This is necessarily the effect of every great war. The alternative of peace may sometimes be an impossible one, but in itself war cannot but be a great calamity to the commercial and industrial nation which engages in it. The reference to the Royal Commission assumed, it will be observed, the maintenance of a strong fleet,' and it was asked what additional security was required. Virtually the answer given by Lord Balfour and the majority of his colleagues is to the effect that a sufficiently strong fleet is our true safeguard. With such a fleet we need have little to fear from the serious interruption of our supplies or the destruction of our commerce. Into the sufficiency of our naval preparation it was, of course, not the province of the Commission to inquire. That is the business of the Admiralty, of Parliament, of the nation. It is there that national effort should be concentrated; and it would be a waste of power to take measures, both dubious

6

and costly, to protect ourselves from dangers against which a 'strong fleet' is a complete protection.

Sir James Mackay, President of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, expressed an absolutely boundless confidence in the ability of a strong British fleet to protect, during war, our shipping, and to keep open almost without let or hindrance the flow of food and merchandise to our shores. So long as the fleet was supreme' even the rate of insurance of British shipping would not be materially increased. If the navy 'declared the Mediterranean to be safe there would be no difficulty in British ships going there.'* Sir John Hopkins, formerly in command of the Mediterranean fleet, spoke less confidently. Were we at war with France and Russia, even assuming that our Channel and Mediterranean fleets were masters of the situation to a certain extent,' he held that a British ship coming through the Mediterranean with provisions ‘would run great risks.' It was highly probable, he had been informed, that in such circumstances the P. & O. would not come up the Mediterranean at all. On this matter Sir Cyprian Bridge, formerly director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty, who has served in the Mediterranean, and who has more recently held the chief commands on the Australian station and in the China seas, held a different opinion. Here and there doubtless a ship would be captured; it had always been so in past wars, though British naval supremacy was established. There had been captures of Japanese ships in the recent war with Russia; but these captures could not be on a large scale, such as would tell perceptibly on the fortunes of the war. Sir Cyprian held strongly the prevailing doctrine that our primary duty would be to destroy the enemy's naval power, and that when this had once been accomplished, there would be little injury done to our commerce or home supplies by the occasional and almost chance capture of a British trading vessel. He had very little fear of the policy of commerce-destroying' with which we had been threatened. Our policy would be to concentrate our battle fleet and establish our superiority of power; but we should maintain also a sufficiency of cruisers to enable us to hunt down or render harmless any Alabamas' which might threaten our trade. A considerable number would be required. 'You do 'not hunt a fox,' observed the Admiral, with a single hound, and when he is being hunted he leaves the henroosts alone.' The evidence always comes round to the same point. 'I cannot 'conceive,' says Sir Cyprian, of any national insurance or

* Evidence of Sir James Mackay, G.C.B.

'indemnity which would be equal in good effect to keeping the navy up to the proper strength. There is no way in which money can be spent so effectively to insure the security of our merchant navy in time of war.' And this is the view which recommended itself to the majority of the Royal Commission. When we contemplate the risk of the invasion of the United Kingdom we assume that through some disaster the navy has lost command of the Channel for at the least several days. But the danger of destruction, which some people consider still greater, from the hostile interruption of the national supplies of necessaries from across the seas, presupposes that, for at least some months, our navy is powerless to keep open our ports to the vast imports which high prices would naturally bring to our shores. It is held by all the Royal Commissioners that anything like a blockade of the United Kingdom is impossible. The extent of our coast line, the geographical position of the British Islands, and the assumed existence of a strong fleet' put this entirely out of the question. The Commissioners understand by a strong fleet a fleet which is always strong enough to take 'the offensive against the enemy's ships.' * The conclusion of the Report seems inevitable (par. 148), viz.

'Whatever our naval strength might be, some captures would certainly take place. But with a strong fleet we find no reason to fear such an interruption of our supplies as would lead to the starvation of our people, nor do we see any evidence that there would be any serious shortage.'

Still, danger might accrue from a rise in the price of food due to exaggerated alarm, and the consequent effect upon the people. Can this be avoided either by a great system for the national storage of grain, or by the nation undertaking itself to bear the cost of captures, and so guaranteeing shipowners and merchants against all loss at the hands of the enemy? Sir Henry Seton Karr disagrees with paragraph 148, and holds, logically enough, that its approval involves the conclusion that beyond a strong fleet no additional security need be sought; and an important minority of the Commission, including the Duke of Sutherland, Mr. Chaplin, and Mr. Wharton, concur with Sir Henry Seton Karr in advocating, as a far better protection than national indemnity or national insurance, the free storage of grain in this country. This might be achieved, they think, by placing an import duty of 28. a quarter on wheat, and remitting it in part, or entirely, when the wheat, stored free of charge, has been retained in national store

*Paragraph 115, Report of Royal Commission.

houses a shorter or longer time. Thus wheat taken out of store within a month would pay the full duty of 2s. After four months it would escape the duty altogether; and a proportionate reduction of duty would be made on grain taken out in intermediate periods. The minority of the Commission report accordingly in favour of the adoption of a proposal of this kind made by Mr. Cunynghame, himself a member of the Commission. His own recommendation involved a 4s. duty on imported wheat and flour; but on further consideration, we presume, he has seen his way to believing that a 28. duty would suffice to secure the ends aimed at. It has, it seems, become increasingly the habit of exporters of grain, especially in the United States, to store their grain on their own side of the Atlantic, and not to transfer it to England till it is needed to satisfy the immediate demand; and the object sought is to induce exporters to England, by the offer of free storage here, and the consequent saving of storage expenses there, to keep very large stocks in England, and so provision us beforehand for the contemplated siege.

Now all this requires a good deal of thinking out. As the main Report suggests, it may well be that the proposed national granaries will be largely filled at the expense of the stocks at present held in this country at the ports and by the millers and bakers. And on general principles we should be disposed to question whether the placing of a 48. or a 2s. import duty on corn would tend, on the whole, to fill England with grain. Mr. Chaplin, the Duke of Sutherland, and Sir Henry Seton Karr are, as becomes leading members of the Tariff Reform League, anxious on quite other grounds than those of national defence to impose a corn tax; and it may be that their leanings in that direction colour their views as to the general benefits to be expected from the acceptance of the 'first plank' of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of fiscal reform. Mr. Jeffreys* proposed that farmers should be induced, by Government subsidy, to keep their corn unthreshed in ricks from one harvest to another. The farmer would receive 4s. 6d. for every quarter retained in rick for twelve months certain, of which amount it was calculated that 1s. 6d. would be for loss of interest, 28. for loss caused by rats, and 18. remuneration to the farmer. The burdened taxpayer, ignorantly impatient of taxation, might grumble not a little at what he would undoubtedly consider the establishment at the public expense of a handsome provision for the maintenance of rats! Doubtless the majority of the Commissioners are, on the whole, right, whilst they do not deprecate

* Evidence of the Right Hon. A. F. Jeffreys, M.P.

experimental attempts at storage, to bestow greater attention on the proposals of national indemnity and national insurance. These projects, whilst aiming at the same result, proceed on different lines. The nation may take into its own hands the business of insuring British ships and merchandise against war risks in return for a moderate premium; or it may undertake, without making any charge for so doing, to indemnify shipowners and cargo-owners for their actual loss by hostile capture or destruction. If the insurance plan were adopted, since the nation would not need to make a profit out of the business, and as the premiums would be calculated upon the total of expected losses, and would not be forced up by panic, the rate of insurance would remain moderate and steady; and one cause of the enhancement during war of freights, and consequently of the price of food and other supplies, would be avoided, to the general benefit of consumers. It is impossible to examine these proposals at length on the present occasion. The majority of witnesses, and the Royal Commissioners themselves, prefer the proposal of 'National 'Indemnity' to that of National Insurance.' It is recognised that in all probability a 'panic' rise of price of staple articles of food will take place at the outbreak of a maritime war, though this will, of course, at once increase the exertions made to pour supplies into the country. Should these high prices and the consequent suffering to the people continue it might result in danger to calmness and self-possession just when these 'qualities would be of the greatest importance' (see paragraph 254). We quote the concluding paragraphs of the principal report (paragraphs 266 and 267):

'We are of opinion that a system of National Indemnity against loss from capture by the enemy would operate both as an additional security to the maintenance of our over-sea trade and as an important steadying influence upon prices, and we wish to place distinctly on record our opinion that the advantages to be gained from some well-considered scheme of the kind seem to us very largely to outweigh any objections that have been stated to us. We do not feel ourselves competent to draw out the precise terms of such a scheme, but we look rather in the direction of National Indemnity than in that of National Insurance. We recognise that National Insurance may at first sight appear more attractive, since the amount received by the State in premiums would be something to set against what might have to be paid on account of losses. But this economy seems to us to be more apparent than real when it is remembered that the amount paid in premiums, both on the goods carried and the ships in which they come, is almost certain to be paid by the consumer. Similarly it has been suggested that National Insurance, owing to the payment of a premium by

VOL. CCII. NO. CCCCXIV.

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