the conclusion that the establishment we maintain is no more than adequate."

No decision was taken on the vote then before the House, but when it next came on (Feb. 23) it was evident that Mr. Stanhope's vindication of the policy of his department met with general acceptance. Before, however, the vote for men was agreed to, Lord Hartington (Lanc., Rossendale) asked what steps had been taken to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Organisation of the Naval and Military Departments, and with what result. The Commission had recommended the appointment of a naval and military council, which recommendation the Government had since stated would be carried out by the constitution of a committee of the Cabinet to deal with the matter. Lord Hartington wished to know whether this committee had been appointed, whether it had met, and, if so, what progress had been made towards a solution of the questions considered by the Commission, more especially with regard to the reorganisation of the War Office.

Mr. E. Stanhope (Lincolnshire, Horncastle) thought Lord Hartington placed too much importance on the appointment of a naval and military council, but as a matter of fact a committee of the Cabinet had been constituted to deal with general principles, and a committee composed of the highest naval and military officers to deal with matters of detail. With regard to the office of Commander-in-Chief, he thought it was agreed that it was undesirable to call upon the present holder of the office to resign, but what course should be pursued on a vacancy occurring the Government were not at present in a position to say. They were not prepared to appoint a chief of the staff, but arrangements had been made to modify the duties of the Adjutant-General, so as to place upon him a greater responsibility in respect to general military administration than formerly devolved upon him, and he was now primarily responsible for carrying out the important scheme of mobilisation upon which the War Office had been engaged for the last two years. It was also intended to constitute a Promotion Board, to be entirely independent of the War Office and of the Commander-in-Chief, which would consist of five general officers, three of them to be the senior officers in command in the United Kingdom, and two to be taken from the particular arm of the service to which appointments were to be made. With regard to the mobilisation scheme, he did not think it desirable to publish details, but he was satisfied that the War Office could now mobilise troops in a shorter time than had ever been known before.

Mr. Campbell-Bannerman (Stirling Burghs) dwelt upon the responsibility of the military officers constituting the headquarters staff of the War Office and their relations to each other and to the Secretary of State, and he expressed regret that Mr. Stanhope had not seen his way to carry into effect more of the recommendations of the Royal Commission.

Mr. Labouchere (Northampton) intervened with a motion to reduce the vote by 3,320 men, the number of British soldiers employed in Egypt; and Mr. J. Morley (Newcastle) supported it on the ground that our continued occupation of that countrywas a distinct departure from the former ministerial policy; but Sir J. Fergusson (Manchester), the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, declared that the occupation of Tokar and Handoub was necessary to protect Suakim, that our force in Egypt had been steadily reduced from 10,000 to a little over 3,000 men, and that our presence in the country was satisfactory to the Egyptian Government. The reduction was then negatived by 124 to 52; and when on a subsequent occasion (March 5) Mr. Labouchere provoked a long discussion on our continued stay in Egypt by moving the reduction of the Army Pay Vote by 100,000l., the motion was again negatived by 140 to 65, and a similar attempt by Sir Wilfrid Lawson was also defeated by a still larger majority. The remainder of Votes in Committee gave rise to no opposition or discussion, beyond an appeal by General Sir C. Fraser (Lambeth, N.) for a commission of inquiry into the alleged grievances of retired purchase officers (June 25), which was met by a promise from the Secretary of State to investigate personally each case of alleged hardship as it was brought to his notice.

The Navy Estimates for the year 1891-92 showed an apparent increase of 428,500l. over those of the preceding year, being 14,215,100l. as compared with 13,786,600l. A portion of the increase, however-78,000l. was only a transfer of expenditure for the custody of Naval Ordnance hitherto charged on the Army Votes. In his explanatory memorandum the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) carefully separated the different groups of ships in process of construction. There were (1) contract ships, according to the usual programme, of which the cost was met out of the annual votes; (2) contract ships paid for under the provisions of the Naval Defence Act of 1889, and repayable by an annuity charged on the Consolidated Fund; (3) Australian flotilla, of which the cost, defrayed out of Consolidated Fund, was repayable by an annuity chargeable on Navy Votes; (4) dockyard-built ships, charged against the Annual Votes.

Of the contract-built ships under the old programme, only one, the Blenheim, remained unfinished at the close of the financial year 1890-91, and before the close of the year 1891 she was ready for delivery to the Admiralty authorities. Of the work done by contract under the Naval Defence Act a still better record was forthcoming. Of the seventeen second-class cruisers building, eight had been launched, and one, the Laona, was practically complete, and it was anticipated that before the close of the financial year 1891-92 all would be delivered over by the contractors. Three out of the four first-class battle-ships were considerably advanced, and by March 1892 five first-class cruisers would be also launched. The whole of the contract programme

E

of the Naval Defence Act was in hand, with the exception of six torpedo gun-vessels, which at any time might be constructed and completed in eighteen months. Some modifications of the original designs had been found advisable in the second-class battle-ships, and in the first-class and second-class cruisers, the naval manœuvres of the preceding summer having suggested the need for the maintenance of a high rate of speed in a seaway. The work done in the Government dockyards was not less satisfactory. The number of ships of all classes to be built in the dockyards under the Naval Defence Act by March 31, 1894, was thirty-eight, made up of four first-class battle-ships, two second-class do., four firstclass cruisers, and twelve second-class do., of the Apollo and Astræa classes, four of the Pandora class, and twelve torpedo gun-boats. Of these, Lord George Hamilton was able to announce, twentyeight were already in hand and approaching completion, and of the remaining ten, five cruisers of the Apollo class would be commenced during the year 1891-92, and five torpedo gun-boats during 1892-93. The total number of ships to be constructed under the Naval Defence Act by contract and in dockyards was seventy, of an estimated displacement of 316,000 tons, and costing 21,500,000l., inclusive of armament and equipment. The substitution of larger and heavier boilers than originally estimated, and the rise in 'the price of materials, had disturbed the original estimate, but the First Lord thought that an anticipated saving of 817,000l. on the armament of the ships would reduce by a third the increased expenditure on hulls, boilers and machinery, estimated at 920,000l.

The completion of the Australian flotilla, consisting of five cruisers and two torpedo gun-boats, had been delayed by various causes, especially by the difficulties arising from their boilers. Nevertheless the whole fleet was ready for delivery in the course of the spring.

On April 1, 1891, the Admiralty assumed entire control of the custody of all naval ordnance stores at Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, and Woolwich; and it was intended to make similar arrangements with regard to the other ordnance depôts. at home and abroad. No less than 240 guns of various sizes from 4-inch of 26 cwt. to 16-25-inch of 110 tons had been delivered to the navy, the 4-7-inch quick-firing being the most numerous, whilst of the larger ordnance 10-inch guns were reported as most serviceable and most easily worked.

Amongst the new works projected were naval victualling stores at Sydney, N.S.W., new barracks at Portsmouth, Whale Island, and Keyham Harbour, and the completion of the docks at Malta and Bombay.

At the beginning of the year the number of ships in commission was 277, having complements amounting to 43,296 men, and in view of the prospective requirements of the fleet when the new programme was fully in action, Lord George Hamilton

proposed to raise the number of men and boys of all classes, including the Royal Naval Reserve, from 68,800, which had been fixed for the year 1890-91, to 71,000 for the current year, to be gradually increased up to 75,000.

After referring to the changes carried out in the constitution of the Mediterranean and Channel Squadrons, Lord George Hamilton stated that a careful inquiry into the limits and areas of our foreign stations had suggested two further alterations on strategical, commercial, and political grounds. The limits of the Cape Station on the East Coast of Africa ended at Delagoa Bay; but on the West ran up to 20° North latitude-in other words, 55° North of the headquarters of the Station. A separate command on the North-West Coast, with headquarters at Ascension, was to be created, and on the East Coast the Cape Station would be extended to the equator. No increase of ships in commission was required by this arrangement, which took effect from April 1. The other change was a subdivision of the existing Pacific Station, by which the whole of the West Coast of South America, together with the East Coast, was placed under a new command at the Falkland Islands.

The transfer of the custody of naval ordnance from the Army to the Navy, it was urged by some, should be pushed much further; and measures should at once be taken by which the Navy should immediately undertake the defence of the great naval ports, and be, in time of war, responsible for the safety of the base of their own operations. To these suggestions Lord George Hamilton replied in a memorandum :—

"I admit that if such a change could be carried out it would tend to secure unity of action and responsibility, and would, in an emergency, secure at the great naval ports the rapid utilisation of all available resources for whatever movement the exigency of the moment might require.

"But it is a proposal that involves so immense a change that it is not under any conditions practicable in the immediate future. The transfers of men and money, material and buildings which it entails would revolutionise the proportions the Army and Navy now bear to one another, and many experienced naval officers are averse to the change. Moreover, its increased cost in one direction is certain, whilst the counterbalancing savings are problematical. Still, looking to the fact that nearly every foreign Power has adopted the principle of placing their naval authorities in charge of maritime defences, care should be taken that the various alterations which from time to time must occur in the organisation both of the Army and Navy do not increase the obstacles to such a transfer of duties. Further investigation and experience can alone determine whether the change is desirable in the common interests of both services, and nothing in the meantime should be done to prejudice that future decision."

The discussion of the Naval Estimates was appropriately pre

ceded by the launch (Feb. 26) of the line-of-battle-ship Royal Sovereign, and the Royal Arthur, originally named the Centaur, a first-class cruiser, two of the finest vessels of their respective types in the Navy. For the first time for thirty years the Queen was present at such a ceremony. The Estimates themselves gave rise to very little debate in the House of Commons (March 2). Although several speeches offered points of criticism, there was no serious opposition to the Government proposals. Sir William Harcourt, it is true, threw out a new view of the functions of a fleet, which he would limit to the defence of our own coasts and those of our Colonies; and he contended that it would be impossible to maintain a fleet able to protect our mercantile marine. Our supplies of all kinds, he said, would not be interfered with by war, except that they would be conveyed in neutral ships which would come under the protection granted by the Declaration of Paris. But he found little support on his own side of the House, and Lord George Hamilton ridiculed the idea that our carrying trade could be transferred to neutral bottoms at a moment's notice; and he strongly demurred to the idea that our imports would not be seriously affected by a maritime war. A somewhat stronger point was taken by the Opposition on a subsequent occasion (March 9), when the First Lord of the Admiralty, in moving a Supplementary Estimate of 350,000l. for the year 1890-91, explained that, whilst this sum was required for the service of the closing year, there was an estimated unexpended balance of 543,2461. for the present year, which, in consequence of an omission in the Naval Defence Act, would be carried forward and placed to the credit of the Act, the Treasury having decided that no part of the unexpended balances could be appropriated in any one year in which less than 2,650,000l. was voted for shipbuilding and dockyard purposes, or in which a less sum than 650,000l. was voted for armaments. In the present year the Admiralty had not taken the 2,650,000l. for shipbuilding and dockyard purposes; and, as the unexpended balances could not be touched, it was necessary to vote the present excess of 350,000l. as a supplementary estimate.

Mr. Shaw-Lefevre (Bradford, C.) thereupon argued that the Naval Defence Act did not authorise the Admiralty to dispose of the unexpended balances or to pay for work of the current year out of the estimates of future years, and he complained that this system had confused the estimates and prevented the possibility of yearly comparisons being made.

Sir William Harcourt (Derby), forgetting that the very same point had been raised by the Opposition on the Naval Defences Bill two or three years previously, followed up the same line of attack. The Government had then made it perfectly plain that their policy was to withdraw certain items of naval expenditure in reference to the construction of ships from the annual review of Parliament, so as to ensure something like continuity and un