Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling

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Cambridge University Press, 26. tra 1996. - Broj stranica: 613
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International debt rescheduling, both in earlier epochs and our present one, has been marked by a flurry of bargaining. In this process, significant variation has emerged over time and across cases in the extent to which debtors have undertaken economic adjustment, banks or bondholders have written down debts, and creditor governments and international organizations have intervened in negotiations. Debt Games develops and applies a situational theory of bargaining to analyze the adjustment undertaken by debtors and the concessions provided by lenders in international debt rescheduling. This approach has two components: a focus on each actor s individual situation, defined by its political and economic bargaining resources, and a complementary focus on changes in their position. The model proves successful in accounting for bargaining outcomes in eighty-four percent of the sixty-one cases, which include all instances of Peruvian and Mexican debt rescheduling over the last one hundred and seventy years as well as Argentine and Brazilian rescheduling between 1982 and 1994.
 

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Sadržaj

Examining the importance of epochs
15
toward a model of debt
44
A situational theory of payoffs and intervention
61
A theory of situational change
84
Peruvian debt
138
Mexican debt rescheduling
163
Mexican debt rescheduling
237
Peruvian debt negotiations
287
Mexican debt rescheduling
333
Peruvian debt
376
Argentine debt rescheduling in
409
Brazilian debt rescheduling
457
Findings and avenues for future research
517
Appendix
561
Index
603
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