"Nothing by the State; only what is done by missionaries. These people are children yet, and they cannot value or use these things."

I replied: "That may be true; but so also is the fact that thirty or forty years after this, when these people have increased and multiplied, as they always do steadily when there is peace and prosperity in the country, there will be a mass of ignorance and comparative barbarism, dangerous and difficult to deal with. And that is a problem which must be dealt with some day; better now, than when too late."

I can verify what I have said about education by another incident. Some years later I met the present esteemed Superintendent-General of Education in the Orange Free State. I asked him if he would kindly tell me the amount expended annually by the Free State on the education of the natives. He smiled, and said that was easily done. The amount was forty-five pounds annually in the form of a small grant-fifteen pounds to three native schools. You will understand how great is the difference as to the way in which the subject of native education is regarded in the Cape Colony, if I say that at Lovedale we receive from the Education Department over £2000 a year; while similar institutions receive lesser sums for the same object.

In mentioning these things I hope my meaning and motive will not be misunderstood. I know well that there are men in the Legislative Council or Volks-raad, as it is called, of the Free State with ideas far in advance of those of the majority, and who indirectly aid and approve of missionary work; and I take this opportunity of paying a tribute to the memory of its late President, Sir John Brand, whose wisdom and uprightness and calm forbearance were a blessing to South Africa.

The last point before us is this. Proceeding with the light we have gathered, what or which, we may ask, is to be the future dominant power in South Africa? Look again at the map. We have now four colours to choose from-red, orange, blue, and green. Southern Africa, if we had been wiser or more consistent, need not have been so varied in hue. It might have presented one uniform hue without real or substantial injustice to anybody, and with probably substantial benefits to many.

We may leave out the green. The Germans have no business there. And it would seem to indicate the low or even indifferent value they set on the good feeling and friendship of this country, that they have taken up a position next door to one of the oldest of British colonies. It is a position which is at once anomalous and dangerous both to them and to us. Without further acquisitions the territory is practically useless to them. And further acquisitions on their part means further concessions on ours, and further loss of good feeling between the two countries. For what are they waiting in the desert of Damaraland, where so little is to be got at present?

There is the yellow and blue to choose from, of the two Republics. Some would like to see the blue of the Transvaal becoming the important factor. But let us hope that the dominant power will be the British power, and not a Transvaal power, nor a hybrid union of the two, the name of which will mean one thing and the spirit and ideas of which will mean quite another. The question of the future is very much that of the

difference between British ideas and modes of government and the views and methods of government of which the Transvaal may be taken as the representative.

It can hardly be supposed that the little Cape Colony will either be able or be allowed to stretch its feeble arms northwards over any considerable portion of that vast area coloured red on the map. All this seems to point to the necessity for some kind of union or confederation in which, within the boundaries of each state as at present fixed, each state shall mind its own business, and try to live in peace and unity with its neighbours; and that these states, together with the vast areas beyond their boundaries, shall be under the control of the Imperial Government, represented by an officer-whether “ High Commissioner or "GovernorGeneral," or whatever other name may designate his functions and position. Sir Henry Loch and Mr. Rhodes are both in this country at present; and about these great areas stretching northwards beyond the Zambesi and as far as Lake Nyassa some points of agreement and settlement with the Imperial Government are probably being reached. On these I have neither the information nor the presumption to qualify me for expressing any opinion at present. But let us hope that the day is not very far distant when some sort of confederation will be reached. In Australia they have begun to move in that direction, and, though the difficulties are many, success may yet attend the effort. Should a similar movement be carried through in South Africa, the "troublesome province" may yet become the fourth member of that great group of States which Professor Seeley speaks of as forming Greater Britain beyond the seas. These are the Dominion of Canada; the West India Islands; the Australian Colonies, including New Zealand; with South Africa added as the fourth; while India, from its peculiar position, stands by itself as the fifth.

Professor Seeley also says there are two schools of opinion in reference to our colonies, or the portions of the Empire which lie outside our own island. These are the bombastic-too severely so called, I think—and the pessimistic; but he might have added another, that to which he himself apparently belongs, and called it the sober, moderate, and commonsense school.

The first or bombastic is so named because it delights to express itself about "the Empire on which the sun never sets," and likes to hear "the beat of morning drum following the hours," as the dawn awakens the sleepers through all the longitudes round the circle.

The pessimistic school is that which has always regarded those portions of the Empire outside the island of Great Britain as outlying properties to be used solely for the benefit of the mother-country,—as troublesome and expensive properties, constantly in need of repair, and requiring a large host of caretakers in the shape of soldiers and sailors. This school regards these properties as acquired by rapacity and conquest, as burdensome and dangerous, and to be got rid of at any cost, and as soon as possible.

Neither the facts of history nor of the commercial relations of Great Britain favour the views of the pessimists. There has been long-continued

and comprehensible unwillingness on the part of the Imperial Government to extend the boundaries of the Empire. There have been too many retrocessions to allow of that view being accepted. The existence on the map before you of two republics imbedded in the heart of our South African territory is one proof among others of this unwillingness.

There is also the existence of a law which these pessimists forget or have never known. It may be called, for want of a better name, the law of life and growth. States no less than individuals obey this law, and cannot help themselves. No one of us here has ever been asked whether we shall grow, or how. We may take absurd ways to counteract that law, but we shall continue to obey it in some form, with results corresponding to our wisdom or our folly. It is the same with states as with individuals, till decay sets in, or death or destruction comes. And it is in virtue of this force that our South African Empire is what it is to-day; though it might perhaps have been better and stronger than it is to-day. Instead, therefore, of whimpering and grumbling, or growling over the vast heritage which God has given us, let us rejoice in it, and in the vitality and force it expresses, and thankfully accept the great duties and responsibilities it imposes.

ON THE COMPARATIVE VALUE OF AFRICAN LANDS.

(Read at a Meeting of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 16th March 1891.) BY A. SILVA WHITE, F.R.S.E.

(With a Map.)

ON the map which accompanies this paper I have endeavoured to define, as far as our present restricted knowledge can appreciate, the relative value of the vast lands of Africa which, year by year, are coming more and more under the influence of European Powers. Conscientious students of geography cannot fail to be astounded at the loose statements regarding Africa which, under the stamp of quasi-authorities, too often obtain currency, and tend to give the guileless public an entirely false or confused notion of the advantages and disadvantages attending the European domination. Even writers who are competent to give instruction regarding one or more of the well-defined regions of Africa allow themselves to be carried away by their enthusiasm, or become lost in their geography, and claim for their descriptions an application that is almost boundless. Yet, our present knowledge of Africa, imperfect and limited as we know it to be, is sufficiently comprehensive for us to recognise well-marked physical and political characteristics, which differentiate certain geographical areas within the vast continent. It is, therefore, quite possible to investigate what may be regarded as distinctive natural regions, and to compare them one with another. Such a method is, moreover, capable of adjustment to any particular point of view and of being focussed to the closest scrutiny. We are, in short, able to distinguish,

and consequently to appraise, the leading characteristics of comparatively small areas.

In estimating the comparative value of African lands, my standpoint has been that of the European diplomatist, who requires to look a little into the future. Our knowledge of the vast Interior is for the most part too imperfect to hazard even an estimate of its potential value, which only time can determine; but, on the Hinterland principle, these remote regions have even now a recognised political value. The energies of the European Powers in Africa are consequently directed, partly to the development of restricted regions bordering the coasts, and partly to the acquisition of territories which may at some future time be valuable as Hinterländer. The former are capable of appraisement, for in most cases they have been carefully exploited, but of the latter we know so little that a rough valuation is all that can be obtained at the present day.

My map illustrates in a graphic manner what, in my opinion, is the relative value of African lands to any European Power having control over them. Before explaining the scheme upon which it has been constructed, it may be desirable to state the general principles that have guided me in my investigation.

I conclude that the value of Colonial possessions is regulated by the capacity of the suzerain or dominant power to make use of them, and is discounted by its incapacity in this respect. All humanitarian motives may be set aside as not being pertinent to the present inquiry.

Now, we know, from long experience and from the testimony of history, that in the past, and presumably for many years to come, the coastal lands of Africa have been, and must continue to be, the most valuable to a European Power, and that they increase in value in direct ratio to their contiguity to navigable rivers. The possession of a political base on the coast is, I need scarcely add, absolutely essential for the operations of any European Power in the Interior. Isolated enclaves of territory decrease in value the further removed they are from the coast or from navigable waterways leading directly to the coast.

Again, it has been abundantly demonstrated that, throughout the greater part of Tropical Africa, there are very few regions where European colonisation is possible. It is only when we enter the subTropical and Temperate Zones, or ascend the high-plateaus above a certain altitude-districts which are necessarily at a distance from the coasts that we find regions adapted to colonisation by Europeans.

It follows, therefore, that, however valuable a district may be in itself, its value is discounted in proportion to its degree of inaccessibility. At the present day, and for some time to come, the great arterial river-highways conducting into the interior of Africa, starting from a base on the coast, indicate, and will continue to indicate, the routes by which European enterprise must enter on its conquest of remote regions. The possession of these natural highways is therefore of prime political importance. Artificial highways, such as railways, can of course be constructed; but such construction, involving the outlay of capital, itself discounts the intrinsic value of the lands they traverse. At the same time, since easy and

practicable communications are the main factors in the development of remote regions, other than continuous fluvial highways may serve these ends: as, for instance, a valuable land-and-water route like that by the Zambezi and Great Lakes, or along the comparatively healthy axis of elevation in South-East Africa.

The first step in my inquiry was to mark off distinctive regions. These, in the main, correspond with the drainage-areas, and are all capable of being studied under sub-regions. The following were the regions selected for comparison:-Mediterranean Littoral, North-West Africa, Sahara Desert, Lower Egypt, Red Sea Littoral, Upper Nile basin, Upper Guinea, Niger basin, Central Sudan, Lower Guinea, Eastern Horn, Congo basin, Zambezi basin, East Coast, N'gami basin, South-West Coast, South Africa.

Having obtained, in the above territorial divisions, large characteristic areas that are capable of being compared one with another, both from physical and political points of view, I selected what appeared to me to be the main factors determining the value of these lands to a European Power. But, these factors not being of equal relative importance, it was necessary to assign to each a fair proportion of the highest aggregate value. The following table exhibits the main conditions to which I have alluded, and their percentages of value:

A. CLIMATIC PHENOMENA :

Temperature, 10; Range of Temperature and Relative
Humidity, 5; Absence of Malaria, 5:

B. NATURAL COMMUNICATIONS:

C. NATURAL RESOURCES:

Animal (including elephants, or ivory) and vege

table, 10; Mineral, 10: .

Percentages of Aggregate value.

20

10

20

D. EXTERIOR TRADE AND COMMERCE :

Chiefly volume of Trade (exports and imports),

10

E. INDIGENOUS POLITICAL CONDITIONS:

Religion or faith, 5; Native culture, 10; Relations
with Europe, 5: .

20

F. FOREIGN POLITICAL CONDITIONS:

Character and extent of European domination or
settlement, 10; Capacity for development of
European institutions, 10:

20

Highest value = 100

It is, however, obvious that, having in this way obtained the mean average value of extensive natural regions, these estimates would be subject to considerable modification when one attempted to apply them locally. Each group of graduated values, applying to a distinctive natural region, became more and more affected as it approached another such group, not unlike the crumpling of strata under pressure of opposing forces. The final result is shown on the map, so far as such an inquiry can be

VOL. VII.