THE SCOTTISH

GEOGRAPHICAL

MAGAZINE.

BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

II. THE PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL BASIS OF NATIONAL UNITY.

BY EDWARD A. FREEMAN.

I FEEL it a great honour to be asked to write a paper in a series to the seeming object of which I am altogether opposed. Such a request shows a willingness to listen to what is to be said on the other side which is not common in modern controversy. It is a feeling which I thoroughly return. There is no living writer whom I read more gladly and with more profit than Mr. Dicey. I am a Home-Ruler; he is an Unionist. But I know that in his writings I shall always find the case for the other side as clearly and powerfully put as it can be. And that is a great help towards being able to put the case for one's own side clearly and powerfully. There would be fewer controversies in the world than there are, and those that could not be avoided would be carried on more reasonably than they are, if only each side thoroughly understood what the other side means, and further, what is sometimes harder still, if each side thoroughly understood what it means itself.

The heading of this article is one given to me, not one of my own choice. Considering the purpose of the series, the main practical object of discussion which it suggests would seem to be whether the actual conditions of the world, and specially its geographical conditions, will allow the existence of national unity, or such measure of it as may be implied in the word 'Confederation,' between certain communities scattered over very distant parts of the world. In discussing this question, as in discussing any other question, it is needful first of all to know what it is that we are discussing. That is, we must fully make up our minds as to the meaning in which we intend to use the chief words

VOL. VII.

2 B

which we use in the discussion. In this discussion let us see, first of all, what we mean by National Unity.

I have gone very fully in another place into the question as to what constitutes a nation;1 what I have said there I must often assume now. The word Nation is constantly used in very different senses, and much confusion arises from its use in different senses. In some cases it is simply used as equivalent to independent power. It is used thus when we speak of international relations, when we ask, purely for purposes of international law, of what nationality a man is. In answering such a question as this, the Swiss Confederation and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy each passes for a nation. The several Spanish-speaking commonwealths of North and South America pass for distinct nations. A Greek of the kingdom of Greece and a Greek who is a subject of the Turkish Sultan pass for men of different nationalities. So do an Italianspeaking man at Trent, another at Verona, and a third at Lugano. But this use of the word nation and its derivatives is confined to the formal range of international politics. As soon as we get beyond that formal range, as soon as we pass from what is to what has been, to what may be, or to what ought to be, our use of the word nation begins to be affected by other considerations. Το prove that men belong to the same nation, it is no longer quite enough to show that they are subjects or citizens of the same political power. To prove that they belong to different nations, it is no longer enough to show that they are subjects or citizens of different powers. A man's nationality becomes rather a good deal wider than the simple question to what minister or consul he must apply if he needs help in a foreign country. As soon as we begin to think of nationality in this wider sense, we feel that, besides the distinction of political powers, there is something else to be thought of which is not so easy to define. The thought of community of blood, of community of language, of fellowship in the events of past times, all come in. And yet we presently begin to feel that we cannot build up a theory of "National Unity" on any one of these things by itself. So to do would soon lead us as far astray as we should be led by the formal doctrine of international law. We gradually come to see that there is such a thing as an idea of a nation in the mind, but that such an idea hardly ever answers to anything that has any actual being on earth. Does it at all follow that the idea of a nation that we have in the mind is a mere dream, unpractical folly, and the like? A mere dream it certainly is in one sense; unpractical folly it certainly is not. The ideal notion of a nation is like any other counsel of perfection. Such a counsel is a model to which every man cannot attain, to which very likely no man can attain, but which every man is the better for keeping before him and getting as near to it as he can. It may therefore be worth while to try to give an ideal definition of a nation, even though it may be very hard, perhaps quite impossible, to find any existing nation which answers to it.

1 I refer, as I often have to do, to the Essay] on "Race and Language," which first appeared in the Contemporary Review for March 1877, and which is reprinted in my Third Series of Historical Essays, p. 173.

The ideal nation then, I would say, is to be found where a continuous territory is inhabited by a people united under one government, and all of them speaking the same language, a language which is not spoken by any other people.

It will be noticed that I am satisfied with unity of language, and that I say nothing about unity of race. The question of race is too deep for our present inquiry. It doubtless is a practical question. That is, there is every reason to think that strict community of blood,1 where it exists, has a real influence. But that influence works in such silent and uncertain ways that we cannot reckon on it as an element in our calculations. We must take the outward sign of language instead of it. Community of language is doubtless often a witness to real community of blood; it is very often only its substitute. We know that it is so in many cases; we suspect that it may be so in many others. But in practical matters it is the only test that we can go by. And we must take the word language in its rough practical sense. It does not shut out wide differences of dialect. It is enough if the speakers of each dialect understand the speakers of every other. Indeed I should rather say that it was enough if there is one central dialect which is understood by the speakers of all the others. In the sense with which we are concerned, all Great Britain and Ireland speaks English, except so much as speaks Welsh, Gaelic, or Irish. French and Provençal are historically as truly distinct languages as French and Italian; but, for our purposes, all France speaks French, except so much as speaks Basque, Breton, or Flemish.

Now, taking this definition of an ideal nation, it might be rash to say that there is nothing answering to it in any part of the world. But it is quite certain that there is nothing exactly answering to it among the civilized states of Europe and America. It is equally certain that some of those states come much nearer to the model than others. Among those which rank as Great Powers" the kingdom of Italy may from one side be said to reach it. The dialects of Italian are many and strongly marked; but, as language has been defined above, we may fairly say that the whole kingdom speaks Italian. And on the other side, though there is an Italia Irredenta, it is small compared with the large districts out of the German Empire which speak German. France, as far as Europe is concerned, comes on one side nearer to the model than Italy. There is a lost territory which France wishes to win back, but it can hardly be called a Francia Irredenta. Germany is further off from the model on both sides; Russia is on one side nearer to it than Italy, for

1 When I speak of "community of blood," I do so under the limitations drawn in the article above quoted. It is always possible that, even where there is community of race in the strictest sense of the word race to which we can reach, there may be no physical community of blood.

2 I do not forget that within the kingdom of Italy there is a district that speaks French (or Provençal), another that speaks German, and another that speaks Slave. But they are districts which are almost invisible, and which may be said to come under the rule, "De mini nis non curat lex." The non-French-speaking parts of France are much greater, and the non-English-speaking parts of the United Kingdom much greater again.