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analogy is in that class of cases where a person solvent at the time contemplates engaging in some hazardous business, and before doing so settles property in order to put it out of the reach of his prospective creditors (Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 481), but in such a case the design is plainly fraudulent. A settlement is not fraudulent, it must be borne in mind, because it defeats creditors. Every settlement puts property out of the reach of creditors. That is the very object of it.

Lord Russell of Killowen was not one of those judges whose wealth of learning passes into the substance of the law, leaving it enriched for all time to come. His faculties were great, but different from those of a Willes, a Blackburn, a Westbury, or a Cairns. And yet his premature death is a grave loss, not only to the strength and dignity of justice, but to the science of law. For the late Chief Justice had two qualities which are even more important in judicial high places than technical learning. Like all really great advocates, he seized on the vital points in complex bodies of fact with swift and sure apprehension; and when he was dealing with interests larger than those of individual clients, this power was at the service of a wide and liberal vision. His address to the American Bar Association, published in these pages (L. Q. R. xii. 311), is a worthy exposition of the traditional and sound conception of the law of nations as against the lamentably narrow views to which some English statesmen and judges have committed themselves in recent times. Here, too, we are specially bound to remember that he was foremost among the minority of persons in authority who have striven, in the face of professional prejudice and public apathy, to establish an efficient system of training for English lawyers. Sooner or later this will be done, but without Lord Russell of Killowen's masculine sense and untiring eloquence we sorrowfully confess that for the present the prospect seems more distant.

At the annual meeting of the American Bar Association, held at Saratoga Springs, New York, August 31, 1900, Professor James Bradley Thayer, of Massachusetts, moved the adoption of the following minute:

'The American Bar Association has heard with peculiar sorrow of the death of Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of England, and desires to enter upon its records some permanent expression of honour and esteem for his memory.

The members of this Association had followed and known well

that brilliant career which made Sir Charles Russell the conspicuous and admired leader of the English Bar, and they had rejoiced at the elevation of one so competent to the great office which he held with such distinction at the time of his death. Four years ago we welcomed him here as our chief guest. Recalling now the noble address which he delivered to us on the 30th of August, 1896, and the deepfelt enthusiasm inspired in the hearts of all who listened to him, the members of this Association desire to express their admiration for the manner in which he has filled his high office, their grateful recollection of his visit here, their affectionate regard for his memory, and their respectful sympathy with the Bench and Bar of England in so great a loss to our common profession.'

The minute was duly seconded and was unanimously adopted by a rising vote.

Mr. Francis Rawle, of Philadelphia, moved the adoption of the following minute:

'On July 27, a banquet was given in London in the ancient hall of the Middle Temple by the Bench and Bar of England to their brethren of the Bench and Bar of the United States. The American Bar Association desires to place upon its record its hearty acknowledgement of this fraternal act and a cordial reciprocation of the sentiments which prompted it.'

The minute was duly seconded and was unanimously adopted.

The public who watched with interest the controversy carried on between Sir Edward Fry and the solicitors and others who have attempted to defend the taking by agents of secret commissions in respect of work done on behalf of their principals, should bear in

mind two facts.

1. All money received by an agent, when contracting for a principal without the knowledge of his principal, from the other party to the contract, is the money of the principal, and may be recovered by him, not only in a Court of Equity, but also in any Common Law Court.

2. The illegality, no less than the immorality, of the receipt of a commission by an agent depends wholly upon its secrecy. Any agent, whether he be a solicitor or a cook, can satisfy the requirements at once of the law and of honesty by telling the principal for whom he acts of the commission that he receives, and obtaining his employer's leave to retain it.

These two facts dispose of every attack on the principle of the bill brought forward by the late Lord Russell of Killowen, and meet nine-tenths of the fallacies by which solicitors have tried to answer the unanswerable arguments of Sir Edward Fry.

In the last week of July and the first days of August two legal congresses were held in Paris, one for the comparative history of law, being a section of a more general historical congress, the other for comparative jurisprudence, under the auspices of the Society of Comparative Legislation. No harm was done by the overlapping of their subject-matter, as it was easy to take part in both. Some time must elapse before the proceedings of either are published in a complete form. As every system of law in Europe, and at least one in Asia, was represented, the topics were sufficiently various. Slavonic learning was particularly strong in the persons of Mr. Kovalevsky-well known of old to English scholars—and Mr. Bogišić, who has returned to Paris after a term of office as Minister of Justice in Montenegro. The Congress of Comparative Jurisprudence has done one thing which, we hope, will be permanently fruitful. A project to the effect (to put it shortly) of establishing a central intelligence office for law and legislation was submitted by Mr. Kelly of the New York Bar, supported by M. Lyon-Caen, with certain modifications which the proposer accepted, and favourably received in principle. A special committee was appointed at the final meeting of the Congress to consider it and take such further action as might seem desirable.

The Institut de Droit International has, by a large majority of votes, condemned the theory of Renvoi1. At the Cambridge meeting in 1895 a strong committee was appointed, on the motion of Professor Buzzati, of Pavia, to consider the question, and at Copenhagen, in 1897, it presented an 'Avant-Rapport,' principally with a view to obtaining fresh instructions as to the scope of the inquiry, which some members of the committee thought should include, while others thought it should exclude, the interpretation to be placed by courts upon existing legislative provisions upon the subject. The latter view was adopted by the Institut, and the carefully reasoned report upon the theory of Renvoi, Rinvio, or Rück- und Weiterverweisung, presented at the Hague in 1898, was drafted accordingly. It is distinctly hostile to the doctrine, which it formulates as follows: La loi étrangère que la LEX FORI déclare applicable pour juger un rapport juridique donné n'est pas la disposition étrangère de droit civil, mais la disposition étrangère de droit international privé correspondante à la disposition de droit international privé de la LEX FORI.'

The discussion of the report, after extending over two days at the Hague, was resumed at Neuchâtel in the present year, and

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resulted in the adoption by the Institut of the following resolution: 'Chaque législateur, en édictant ses règles positives de droit international privé, doit indiquer quel est le droit matériel directement applicable par ses tribunaux dans les différents cas de conflits; il ne peut pas soumettre l'application du droit matériel, qu'il a indiqué comme applicable, à la condition que ce droit soit déclaré applicable aussi par la législation dont il fait partie.'

It seems convenient to repeat in a conspicuous place that it is not desirable to send MS. on approval without previous communication with the Editor, except in very special circumstances; and that the Editor, except as aforesaid, cannot be in any way answerable for MSS. so sent.

335

PERSO

THE CORPORATION SOLE.

ERSONS are either natural or artificial. The only natural persons are men. The only artificial persons are corporations. Corporations are either aggregate or sole.

This, I take it, would be an orthodox beginning for a chapter on the English Law of Persons, and such it would have been at any time since the days of Sir Edward Coke 1. It makes use, however, of one very odd term which seems to approach self-contradiction, namely, the term 'corporation sole,' and the question may be raised, and indeed has been raised, whether our corporation sole is a person, and whether we do well in endeavouring to co-ordinate it with the corporation aggregate and the individual man. A courageous paragraph in Sir William Markby's Elements of Law begins with the words, 'There is a curious thing which we meet with in English law called a corporation sole,' and Sir William then maintains that we have no better reason for giving this name to a rector or to the king than we have for giving it to an executor. Some little debating of this question will do no harm, and may perhaps do some good, for it is in some sort prejudicial to other and more important questions.

A better statement of what we may regard as the theory of corporations that is prevalent in England could hardly be found than that which occurs in Sir Frederick Pollock's book on Contract. He speaks of 'the Roman invention, adopted and largely developed in modern systems of law, of constituting the official character of the holders for the time being of the same office, or the common interest of the persons who for the time being are adventurers in the same undertaking, into an artificial person or ideal subject of legal capacities and duties.' There follows a comparison which is luminous, even though some would say that it suggests doubts touching the soundness of the theory that is being expounded. If it is allowable to illustrate one fiction by another, we may say that the artificial person is a fictitious substance conceived as supporting legal attributes.'

It will not be news to readers of this journal that there are nowadays many who think that the personality of the corporation Markby, Elements of Law, § 145. 3 Pollock, Contract, ed. 6, p. 107.

1 Co. Lit. 2 a, 250 a.

А а 2

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