Chapter V. ordinations of Chandeesur are approved, as also are those of Phakooree and several others. In Chapter XI. an ordination of Beeba-dur Tunnagurkar is approved, and in other places the ordinations of others.

Without having gone into the matter very carefully, I imagine that the compilers of the Gentoo Code adopted and approved the opinions that they considered the best, from whatever sources derived, and were in no degree conscious of being obliged by the views of any 'school' or company of writers. They do not appear to me to give any special prominence to the views of Jīmūta Vāhana; whilst, on the other hand, they did not even know the name of the (socalled) famous author of the Mitākṣarā, which, in their ignorance, they supposed to have been written by one 'Mirtekhera Kar.' The name that I have noticed most frequently in the Gentoo Code is that of 'Pachesputtee Misr.'

Readers who wish to learn more about the question, I would refer to Mr. Mandlik's work, which deals with it most satisfactorily. This writer also protests emphatically against the English notion of 'schools of law,' and knows of nothing, from a native point of view, beyond a pronounced divergence of usage in the East and in the South, consequent on the territorial distribution of the Gauḍa and Drāviḍa families of Brahmans.

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Since I wrote my View I have heard no more of the Karnataka and other schools,' and I venture to hope that this False Principle will never more be

upheld by the High Court. Probably it will be content for the future to continue to speak of the 'Madras school,' which expression, in so far as the Madras High Court adheres to views that differ widely from the views in vogue in the rest of India and in the Privy Council, represents a solid fact, and in itself is not open to objection.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAW FOR NON-BRAHMANS.

My second False Principle is that: The so-called Hindu law is applicable to all persons vulgarly styled Hindus, and to their descendants, however remote and whether pure or impure.'

In dealing with this I have called special attention to the circumstance that Mr. Justice Holloway, at the end of an elaborate judgment delivered in a suit between Maravans (see above, p. 175), was constrained to observe that he was conscious of the 'grotesque absurdity of applying to these Maravans the doctrines of Hindū law. It would be just as reasonable to give them the benefit of the Feudal law of real property.' He added, unfortunately: At this late day it is, however, impossible to act upon one's consciousness of the absurdity.'

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It is not possible to say what was in the mind of this illustrious jurist when he penned these memorable words. But, it is not unreasonable for one who knew him to guess that, when he looked at his judgment, and then thought of the notoriously rude and barbarous character of the tribe to which the parties belonged, the humorous side of his mind was excited, and he could not resist indulging in a little joke

at his own expense, but immediately qualified it by adding the excuse that the 'grotesque absurdity' of the whole business could not be avoided at this late day.' Anyhow, I prefer this guess to Mr. Innes' serious explanation of his former colleague's words. He says, 'Why?' (why is it too late to act?). 'Simply because the Hindu law has been administered to these persons for generations, and this because they have always resorted to the Courts as Hindus.' I have touched upon this matter in my introductory chapter. I do not believe that Mr. Holloway would accept for a moment Mr. Innes' explanation of his words.

I rejoice to see that Mr. Mayne says (at § 11), with reference to the alleged impossibility of acting on our consciousness of this grotesque absurdity: 'I must own I cannot see the impossibility.'

In these, as in many other words of Mr. Mayne's (see particularly his first chapter), I observe plain indications of the existence in him of feelings very similar to my own in respect to the great case of Usage v. Law; and I cannot help regretting that he should appear to regard me as a stranger belonging to quite another school, because I differ from or go beyond him on certain minor points, such as the extent of the authority of Manu and the Mitākṣarā.

I am quite prepared to admit, for argument's sake, that Manu and Yajnavalkya and other Smṛtis may have indirectly influenced the several usages of the Vellalans, and goldsmiths, and fishermen, and Pariahs of Madras; though (pace Mr. Innes) there never was an Aryan invasion of South India, and no King or

other political chief ever commanded Dravida folk to obey the rules originally prescribed by seers for the Brahmans and Kṣatriyas of the Panjab. I only insist on the twofold proposition, that every tribe in the Madras Province, whether Brahman or non-Brahman, has at the present day a separate usage of its own; and that, since the usages of all India are expressly guaranteed by the Queen's Proclamation, it is the plain duty of the Madras Government to find out what are the usages of Madras, and guard them against suppression by the High Court. If this duty is much longer ignored, I fear lest the 'grotesque absurdity' of the present system may lead to very inconvenient results.

Whilst Mr. Innes hopefully awaits the coming of the day when the High Court shall have succeeded in destroying the last special usage of the 'lower castes,' it is interesting to observe that the Ceylon Government has carefully preserved in writing the customary laws both of the Kandyans and of the Tamils. The former are expressly protected in the enjoyment of the polyandrous institutions appropriate to their present stage of social evolution; and the latter are permitted to concede to their women a large amount of independence.

It will be observed, of course, that this False Principle is indissolubly mixed up with, indeed forms part of, the next following one, and with it must be held to stand or fall.