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inclination and judgment in performing necessary civil acts.

I would refer readers who desire further information upon this matter to Mr. Mandlik's valuable work on Hindu law. He has discussed it at considerable length, and would seem to be entirely at one with me upon the question of the propriety of subordinating so-called law to usage in respect to adoption.

In Virasanyappa v. Rudrappa (I. L. R., viii. Madras, 440), the second marriage of a Lingayit woman of S. Canara, entered into during the lifetime of her first husband, who had deserted her, was held to be valid. In delivering judgment Turner, C.J., observed: The learned note of Mr. V. N. Mandlik, in his work on Vyavahāra Mayūkha, lays down the only rule which could be safely adopted in Southern India to determine what are valid marriages and what are the incidents of marriages, viz., that we must look to existing usage which, even in the case of the higher castes, has more or less modified the Brahmanical law.'

This is admirable, and just as it should be. But, the observation naturally occurs, why go to Bombay for instruction about Madras that has been yielded in abundance by the writings of Madras men like Ellis, Munro, the Stranges, and Burnell ?

In Viraragava v. Ramalinga, I. L. R., ix. Madras, 148, it was decided by the Full Bench, overruling the case at 3 M. H. C. R., 28, that amongst Brahmans in South India usage permits the adoption of a boy of

the same gotra, after the Upanayana ceremony has been performed.

In this case the original suit was instituted in 1877, and it was not until 1885, and after many hearings in four several courts, and the examination of a small army of witnesses, that the adoption was finally upheld as good and valid.

In delivering the elaborate judgment of the Court, Turner, C.J., was 'compelled to admit,' with regard to usage, that certain considerations had been allowed 'somewhat too much weight,' and that 'it is possible that in view of fuller information it may be necessary to modify in some few instances the conclusions at which the Courts have arrived.' And then comes this highly ambiguous explanation: I say in some few instances because I do not think much difference will be found between the established usage and the written law on the points on which the circumstances accepted in the locality have pronounced themselves explicitly.'

It is very gratifying to find the late Chief Justice confessing with Mr. Innes (see above, p. 6) that the conclusions of the High Court may be to some extent erroneous, and open to correction, especially when, as I shall presently show, the greater part of the principles denounced by me in 1877 had been overruled or abandoned when this judgment was pronounced.

But, lest we should be tempted to rejoice overmuch, there is the case of Vythilinga v. Vijayathammal, at I. L. R., vi. Madras, 43, in which Turner, C.J., and Muttusami Ayyar, J., decided that a Muppanār,

of one of the robber tribes, had not sufficiently proved the custom of his people of adopting a married man, in derogation of a rule for Çūdras in the DattakaCandrika, &c. Now, Muppanars are not Çudras, and can have no concern in Sanskrit books. And in the same case the Court declined to recognise a marriage with a brother's daughter. On the whole, however, it would seem to be safe to conclude that the third False Principle is dead and buried, and that in future, at all events, no man need be deterred by considerations other than that of expense from attempting to establish by proof before the Madras High Court the existence of a Family usage of which there is no trace in the Mitākṣarā law.

CHAPTER IV.

UNION IN THE HINDU FAMILY.

My fourth False Principle is that: 'A state of union is the normal and proper state of the Hindū family; and, therefore, non-division shall in all cases be presumed until the contrary is proved.' I argued in my View to the effect that, as pointed out by Burnell, the Sanskrit law expressly advocates division ; that presumptions are wholly foreign to the Sanskrit law; that division is constantly taking place in South India at the present time; and that, ordinarily, no presumption in favour or disfavour of union is warranted, but each case should be dealt with upon its merits.

It is worthy of remark that all Mr. Innes has to say upon this point is that, 'the Sanskrit law cannot be any guide as to what is a question of evidence'; and, since division takes place comparatively seldom, although the Sanskrit law advocates it, the presumption in favour of union clearly is right. The whole pith of my observations was that in every case we should look to the evidence therein forthcoming, and not to a presumption prescribed by the High Court. And Mr. Innes first says that the question is one of

evidence, and then, begging the question, says that the presumption clearly is right.

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Since writing the View I have had occasion to consider the nature and constitution of the Hindu Family' as it occurs in South India, and I would wish to add something to my former argument.

As I have shown in my chapter on the Joint Undivided Family,' whilst we have no real knowledge of the internal structure of society in the Madras Province, there is good reason to suppose that at the present moment Families of several, if not many, forms may be observed to co-exist within this Province, and each of them must involve the existence of separate institutions and usages. Thus, the polyandrous Family of the Nairs must necessarily differ from the ordinary Brahman Family; and the institutions and usages of these two forms must be different. And the ordinary agricultural Family (in all probability) must differ widely from a trading Family such as, say, that of the Nattukottei Cheṭṭis. This being so, I would wish to contend that a presumption in favour of union, even if good for some, cannot necessarily be good for all, Families in Madras. The agnates of a purely trading Family in Madras may, for aught I know to the contrary, have a common purse, and live together in a state of perfect union; but it seems to me to be exceedingly unlikely that this should be the

case.

And I cannot conceive the probability of a gay Maravan, who lives by his sword and spear, habitually sharing his earnings with brothers and cousins. How the presumption in question would work in the case

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