of a Reddi married in 'Illata' (see above, p. 192) cannot be imagined.

Until we shall have ascertained by due inquiry what forms of Families exist in Madras, and what are their several institutions and usages, it will be advisable, I believe, to decide each question of division or non-division upon the evidence, and not in accordance with a preconceived idea that every Indian Family is of the form generally known as the 'Joint Undivided.'

Mr. Mandlik observes, at p. ii. of his Introduction : 'A Hindu or Aryan householder, directly he enters the married state, is commanded to have his own sacrificial fires. He has his own sphere of duties, marked out for him up to the point of final emancipation. Even in worldly matters he is advised to live separate, to have his own daily fire-sacrifices, and to live as the head of his own family. Hindu society has more or less conformed to these principles. In provinces where the mercantile elements preponderate, and questions of the collection and distribution of wealth chiefly arise, segregation of interests is the rule and congregation the exception.' These noteworthy observations confirm materially what I have said about the Family.

At p. 94, above, will be found Narada's sensible rule for ascertaining the fact of partition in doubtful

cases.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE SON COMPELLING THE FATHER TO DIVIDE.

My fifth False Principle is that: As to ancestral property, a son, and therefore a grandson, may compel a division against the will of his father or grandfather.'

If this meant only that, when a Brahman Father deliberately chooses to separate his sons from him, he must divide all the ancestral estate amongst them (and others) in equal shares, the principle would be in accord with the old rules of the Smrtis and the authorities generally, and from no point of view objectionable. Unfortunately, it means very much more in Madras. It means here that, in all Families, at any moment, and in any circumstances, a foolish or prodigal son (or grandson) may force the Father to allot to him a specific share of the ancestral estate of the Family. In some cases, where the sons are minors, the Mother is allowed to come to court in their behalf, and ruin the Father, out of spite. In other cases the Father incites the Mother to bring a fraudulent and collusive suit, in order (if possible) to baffle innocent creditors.

That this Madras rule on the face of it is unnatural and unjust, will clearly appear from a consider

ation of the following circumstances. As observed by Professor Jolly (at p. 84), owing to the custom of early marriages, an Indian patriarch may find himself a grandfather shortly after thirty, and a greatgrandfather before fifty.' And he may have a single son by his first wife, and after an interval of many years a large number of sons by another wife, or by two or three other wives, and very many grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Suppose this happens in Madras, and the first-born son, on coming. of age at sixteen, or as an infant suing by his mother, enforces partition through the Court, and gets his moiety of the ancestral estate allotted to him. The consequence will be that, in the course of time, perhaps half a dozen or more of the Father's sons, each with a family to support, will get shares, not of the original estate, to which shares naturally and properly they would be entitled, but of the moiety left to the Father, greatly reduced and shrunk in all probability by necessary outlay on the maintenance of a large family, as also by the cost and injury occasioned by the partition with the eldest son. On the other hand, the eldest son, instead of being dependent on the Father (as he ought to be) until the Father's death, and then getting, perhaps, a one-tenth share, will be independent from the date of the partition, and the sole owner of a moiety of the whole estate, free of all charges on account of the marriages of sisters, initiation fees, maintenance of widows, and the like. Surely no Indian legislator could have contemplated the infliction of injustice like this.

one,

No I should imagine, who has had experience. of litigation in Madras, can doubt that the principle in question must have worked a considerable amount of mischief from time to time. But I need not enlarge here upon the lamentable consequences that unavoidably flow from its adoption. My object is to demonstrate as clearly as may be the great improbability that exists, that such a principle can form part of the usage of the Brahman and non-Brahman Families of the Madras Province.

I have already shown (in Chapter VIII. Part I ) that what little we know of the constitution of society in South India warrants the supposition that Families of several, if not of many, different forms co-exist in this part of the world, having each its own peculiar institutions and usages. And, if so, it would seem to be improbable in a high degree that they should all of them have developed independently of each other so strange and preposterous a principle as that every male child may, as soon as born, compel his Father to render an account of expenditure, and, should he fail to render a satisfactory account, forthwith to break up, and possibly ruin, his Family. It seems incredible that the Nattukottei Chettis, for example, should evolve such a rule for themselves, seeing that they live entirely by financial operations of a more or less delicate character, and for them to allow sons at any moment to withdraw from the Family firms -supposing always that these traders habitually live together in Joint Undivided Families, which I

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venture to think can hardly be the case-would be to paralyse speculation and invite ruin at every step.

Then, with regard to agricultural Families, it is difficult to understand how the rule in question can have commended itself to these. Some of them-for example, the Coorgs-do not permit partition in any circumstances (see above, p. 176). And this fact seems to me to make it doubtful whether the ordinary agricultural Family can have advanced so far from primitive concepts as to permit partition of a village pangu or karei at the bidding of an infant son (see above, p. 173).

The case of the Brahman tribes is different, inasmuch as we know something of their institutions from the (so-called) law-books. And what we know is decidedly opposed to the idea that a son can at any time break up his Family. I have given in my View a number of ancient texts going to show that in no case can a son do anything of the kind; and I believe that many more could be cited in support of my contention, whilst none go directly or necessarily against it. Thus Vishnu XVII. 1, 2, runs as follows, namely:

'If a father makes a partition with his sons, he may dispose of his self-acquired property as he thinks best. But in regard to wealth inherited of the paternal grandfather, the ownership of father and son is equal.' And XVIII. 43 says: 'And if a man recovers (a debt or other property) which could not before be recovered by his father, he shall not, unless