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ceivable cases it might be necessary for the sons to compel the Father to abdicate in favour of one of their number, or even to proceed against his will to a partition of the estate.

Whatever may be the true meaning of the teaching of the Mitakṣara and its followers upon the subject of the modes and times of partition, I would, with Professor Jolly, reject it, as being 'too much opposed to the old text-law and to modern usage to be looked upon as more than a theoretical development.'

But, if in spite of everything the Mitākṣarā is still to be retained in its mischievous position of 'Paramount Authority' for Madras, at all events let us not extend in every direction its theoretical developments.' Let us, on the contrary, in favour of the unfortunate beings to whom we administer its provisions, construe its language strictly, as if it were some penal statute. And thus, in construing the isolated text under notice, we might hold that it in no degree limits or restricts the meaning of previous texts governing the management and partition of an estate, but merely illustrates the theory of equal ownership, and indicates the power of the son to oust the Father, in certain exceptional circumstances that are not set out, as, for instance, in the case of the Father separating his sons from him, and giving them shares of bis self-acquired property, but declining to bring into partition the estate left by his father.

I observe that Professor Jolly (at p. 125) declares my analysis of Mitākṣarā, I. 5, 1-7, which is based solely on Colebrooke's ambiguous reading, to be in

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correct when tested by the original Sanskrit, particularly that part of it which relates to § 3; and gives the correct rendering of this paragraph, which goes to show that it is erroneous to suppose that (1) 'the estate inherited from the grandfather shall not be divided at all by the Father with the grandson,' and (2) a partition of the kind' shall be instituted by the choice of the Father alone.' Assuming the absolute accuracy of the learned professor's rendering of the passage, I am inclined to think that it need not necessarily mean anything opposed to my original suggestion as to the meaning of § 8. At all' 'At all' probably is equivalent to 'in any circumstances.' And 'by the choice of the Father alone' may doubtless be intended to mean only where a capable and qualified Father chooses to institute it. And, if so, my original suggestion surely may stand good, as also may the suggestion (made above) that Vijñāneçvara may have had in view the case of a Father somehow disqualified from management, as well as the case of a Father refusing to divide his father's estate when he dismisses. his sons.

It would be tedious to argue out the case more fully. I have shown, I hope, good grounds for reviewing an unsatisfactory judgment on a matter of supreme importance. At all events, I must have made it plain that we are not justified in obliging indiscriminately all the lower castes of Madras by Vijñāneçvara's 'theoretical development' of the special law for the Brahmans of the Panjab. But, in conclusion, I must invite attention to the import

ance in this connection of the new Madras doctrine, by which the son is held to be under the necessity of paying all debts (not being illegal or immoral) contracted by the Father. If we add to the power of the Father by permitting him to mortgage the Family estate to its full value, we must at the same time take away something from the son. And that something should be held (it seems to me) to include the right of enforcing, when he pleases, partition of his grandfather's estate. Otherwise, we shall see, by-and-by, any number of sons suing for partition solely in order to prevent their Fathers from exercising their (recently recognised) lawful powers of alienation. One of the most popular Sanskrit proverbs, quoted by the Gentoo Code, by Ellis, and by P. Sami Iyer in his Introduction to True Hindu Law (Madras, 1877), is to the effect that 'the Father in debt is an enemy to his son'; and perhaps no single principle of the old Sanskrit law is more firmly or generally established than that the son must pay the Father's (legal) debts, whatever their amount. It is only after the Father's creditors have been paid, or satisfied with promises, that the son can take the estate. On the other hand, as I shall show in my next chapter, the Father cannot be compelled to pay his son's debts.

I must not omit to add that, if, as Professor Jolly affirms, I err in attributing to the Mitakṣara the idea that the time of dividing the ancestral estate is (except in special circumstances) at the will of the Father alone, I err in excellent company, namely, with Colebrooke, Ellis, and Sutherland.

In the appendix to Strange's ninth Chapter will be found several concordant opinions of these jurists, to the effect that, ordinarily, the power of the Father over the Family estate is absolute during his life, and under the law of the Mitakṣara sons have a right only in particular cases to exact a partition during the Father's life. And from their language I infer that they were not aware of the existence of any doubt upon the point, or of the possibility of any such doubt arising in the future.

CHAPTER VI.

ON A COPARCENER ALIENING JOINT PROPERTY.

My sixth False Principle is that: 'A member of an undivided family can aliene joint ancestral property to the extent of his own share.' After tracing its history in my View, I asked, 'What is there in all the Sanskrit law-books together that can be held to favour the (to a Hindu mind) most astounding proposition, that a court of law may forcibly break up a united family, and scatter its joint possessions to the four winds of heaven, in order to prevent injury and injustice being done to a stranger by the unauthorised and therefore void act of one of its members, or even to make amends to a stranger for an injury done to him by a single member of the family, without the knowledge of the rest?'

To this question Mr. Innes has given (at pp. 65-69) a most characteristic and remarkable answer. After admitting that the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay insist upon the inability of a coparcener voluntarily to alienate his interest, and that it is perfectly true that the strict rule of the Mitakṣarā law is that no sharer before partition can, without the assent of all the co-sharers, determine the joint

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