reported decisions of the High Court clear and unmistakable views upon the above-mentioned matters. Unfortunately, it is not possible for them to discover, even by the most diligent search, anything of the kind. If they read through these decisions from the first page to the last, they will light upon nothing in the shape of explanatory and authoritative teaching upon what really are the very elements of Indian usage. They will find a quite embarrassing wealth of argument on ancillary and subordinate matters, of ingenious disputation and apt illustration, of exhaustive analysis and careful generalisation: they will look in vain for simple and methodical exposition of first principles and leading truths.

This is not at all to be wondered at. The zealous pioneers in the jungle of Sanskrit law, with inadequate knowledge and imperfect instruments, devised a radically unsound and vicious system of cultivation, which successive generations of English lawyers have improved and developed in accordance with rules taken sometimes from English law, sometimes from Roman jurisprudence, and with almost total disregard of novel conditions of soil and climate. And the Madras High Court has done the best it could with the troublesome heritage that has come into its hands.

Though by no means unconscious of the ' grotesque absurdity,' as Mr. Holloway has called it, of much of what they are doing, the Judges have shown themselves unwilling to attempt reform from within. And the result of their labours, directed towards the

production of harmony where harmony is impossible, is merely chaos.

It is not to be expected that any one who is in any degree responsible for the existing discreditable state of things should admit its existence without reserve. And it is but natural that Mr. Innes, though he has admitted much, should vigorously deny the truth of my View of the Hindu Law as a whole. Amongst other things, he contends that to adopt my suggestions whether as regards the higher or lower castes would commit us to chaos in the matter of the Hindū law we are now called on to administer. What is contemplated would result in our abdicating the vantage-ground we have occupied for nearly a century.'

6

I ended my reply to his Letter with the following observations: 'I must, however, in conclusion, notice your remark that to adopt my suggestions would commit you to chaos in the matter of the Hindu law you are now called on to administer. You must pardon me when I observe that my Prospectus has been published only because the present state of the Hindu law is believed by me, as by others, to be as the state of chaos. I wrote that tractate, and its forerunner, not with the object of making idle charges against the High Court; for which, I trust, I have always shown, and always shall show, utmost deference and respect but in order to bring home to the intelligence of the public, that the English have not yet succeeded in apprehending the elementary principles of Hindu law; and that it has been merely impossible for them, as yet, to achieve much in this

department of knowledge. To my eyes, the Hindu law is yet without form and void. My prayer is that the Government, intervening at the right moment as a Deus ex machinâ, may say, Let there be light, and order a commission.'

My object in writing this part of my book is to make it plain to all capable and disinterested persons that, owing to circumstances partly beyond their control, successive Judges of the Madras High Court have brought things to such a pass that 'the present 'state of the Hindu law at Madras is as the state of chaos,' and reform from without has become for it an absolute necessity.

I have already shown how uncertain and unsatisfactory is the law in respect to proved customs, the right of women to succeed, adoption, and some other matters: I will now go on to prove that the law is equally uncertain and unsatisfactory in respect to elementary doctrine touching such matters as the authority and dominion of the Father, the powers of the Managing Member, the rights of sons, and the like.

If I fail in this my endeavour, and men capable of judging declare that, really and as a fact, the decisions upon which I am about to practise vivisection, contain as a whole certain and intelligible teaching upon the constitution and jural relations of the Indian Family, and as expositions of doctrine leave little or nothing to be desired, I shall be fain to believe that I have been deceived all along, and am to blame for lacking power of apprehension. And for the future I

shall abstain altogether from interference in a matter obviously beyond the reach of my understanding.

If, on the other hand, I succeed, as I hope and expect to, in making out my case, it will become necessary, it seems to me, for Government to intervene at last and compel reconstruction of the Hindu law, upon new lines and by a better method.

CHAPTER II.

THE FIRST HALF DOZEN CASES.

Venkataramayyan and others v. Venkatasubramania and others, I. L. R., 1 Mad. 358, is a remarkable and typical case, in every way adapted to my purpose, and eligible as a starting-point from which to go over the operations of the High Court during the last ten years or so, in respect to dealing with the question of the dominion of the Father over the estate of the Family, and certain connected matters.

The specific question supposed to be at issue was, whether certain lands, not having been attached in execution of the decree in a suit, and not having been specifically affected in favour of the creditor by the decree in a subsequent suit, were liable, as part of the joint Family property, under the declarations of the judgment of the latter suit, to discharge the debt due to the creditor of the Father by the decree in the former suit.

The District Court decided the question in the negative. On appeal, the case was heard by Innes and Busteed, JJ., who differed in opinion toto cœlo. Accordingly, it was referred to the Full Bench, with the result that we have here four separate and distinct