the judgment in the sixth case, has carefully abstained from expressing an opinion (if he had one) upon these questions. And Kindersley, J., has confined himself to more or less safe generalities.

Innes, J., in each of the two cases in which he assisted, has battled manfully for Madras law as against the law of the Calcutta and Bombay Courts and the Privy Council; and taken his stand where possible on processual, in preference to substantive, law. Apparently, he would strip the Father of all power, and turn him into an unpaid trustee for his children, bound to work assiduously for their benefit, and exposed always to the risk of being called to account for waste. And, when the Father dies, Innes, J., would deprive him as far as he could, particularly if a Zamīndār, of the satisfaction of having his debts paid by his sons.

Similarly Muttusāmi Ayyar, J., in his two cases, has promulged decided views in favour of reducing the Father or other Head of the Family to a cipher, except as regards responsibility; and expressed regret that the course of Madras decisions should have recognised alienations by the Father, in opposition to the strict law of the Mitākṣarā. He would seem to be opposed to Nārada and the ancients on the one hand, and to the decision in Kantu Lal's case on the other hand : but not altogether averse to improvement in the law.

Kernan, J., appears to have no particular views to uphold, and to be solicitous only about doing justice between man and man, as well as may be, in accordance with English ideas and the old-fashioned

teaching about the benefit of the Family, bona fides, onus probandi, inquiry by the creditor, and the like. Where the debtor is a Zamindar or Poligar, he would insist on a far greater amount of caution and inquiry on the part of the creditor. He has not yet made up his mind about Kantu Lal's case.

Busteed, J., cares little or nothing for the course of Madras decisions, or for the opinions of the Courts generally. He would insist upon common-sense views, and give the Father the amplest powers, trusting to his parental love and worldly prudence. He believes in the decision in Kantu Lal's case, and would give it full scope.

The judgments in these six cases do not, so far as I can see, establish a single principle on which to rely for guidance. They indicate, on the contrary, the existence of great divergence of opinion amongst the Judges, together with an imperfect consciousness that things are not altogether satisfactory as regards the Hindu law.

CHAPTER III.

THE CRISIS OF 1881.

THE inevitable split in the ranks of the High Court, foreshadowed by the divergent expressions and indications of opinion to which I have invited attention, was precipitated by the coming to Madras of a new Chief Justice. Sir Charles Turner, besides being a man of untiring devotion to work and of an iron constitution, was prone to form new ideas, and having formed, to push and exploit them to the best of his ability. No wonder, then, if, coming to Madras after a long experience of other parts of India, he found himself unable to accept the 'peculiar views in regard to Hindu law' that obtained here, and resolved to do something towards the introduction of a sounder system. And before very long he availed himself of an opportunity.

In Ponnappa Piller's case, I. L. R., 4 Mad., 1, the question was as to the effect of certain decrees made against a deceased borrower, and sales of land in execution thereof, as between the creditor and the borrower's sons. On appeal, the case came up before Turner, C.J., and Muttusāmi Ayyar, J., who agreed to differ, and so was referred to the Full Bench.

On April 1, 1881, each of the five Judges delivered a separate judgment in this case, and their united judgments occupy no less than seventy-three pages of the reports, four of them, in small type, being devoted to descriptive headings.

Shortly afterwards copies of these judgments were furnished to the subordinate Courts for their information and guidance; and it was hoped by many that at last all doubts and difficulties had been swept away for ever, and Mofussil Judges would have for the future plain and certain doctrine upon which to rely in dealing with points of Hindu law of daily

recurrence.

But this hope was premature. The merest glance at the manifesto sufficed to show that the party of reform lacked cohesiveness, and spoke in several tongues, whilst the conservative minority was strong as ever, and prepared to take advantage, on the first opportunity, of any chance of success that might offer.

It appeared that the minority consisted of Innes, J., and Muttusāmi Ayyar, J., the majority of Turner, C.J., and Kernan and Kindersley, JJ.; and that, whilst Kernan, J., confined his very brief judgment to observations on the effect of the decision in Kantu Lāl's case, Kindersley, J., in his very brief judgment, indicated tolerably clearly his reluctance to adopt at the bidding of the Privy Council what he took to be new and questionable doctrine, and his intention not to carry the decisions in the new cases beyond the circumstances upon which the decisions were passed.'

It will not be necessary for me to perform the irksome task of condensing and summarising the elaborate arguments employed by the minority on this occasion, since fortunately the Chief Justice deals with the more important of them in his comprehensive exegesis. It will be sufficient for my purpose to give an outline of what he said.

It will be well, however, to state the conclusion of the judgment of Innes, J., in which Muttusāmi Ayyar, J., concurred. After expressing his opinion that Kantu Lāl's case was not good for the Madras Province, Innes, J., observed: 'I consider that we are still governed by the rules laid down in Saravana Tevan v. Muttayi Ammal, 6 M. H. C. R., 371, and that, where the decree is a decree against the father for his separate debts, the purchaser of ancestral property under the decree takes at most only the share or interest to which the father was entitled at the date at which the charge was created.'

Let us test this by putting a very easily conceivable case. A, aged thirty, and having six sons, and wives and dependants, and managing an estate worth Rs. 10,000, borrows (for purposes neither immoral nor illegal) Rs. 2,000, on a mortgage of the estate. Five of his sons die childless, and at last A dies, leaving one son, and the debt, now increased by interest to Rs. 4,000, charged on the estate by a decree. In such case, would Innes, J., on appeal have adjudged the creditor to be entitled to recover only about Rs. 1,000 and odd, and the surviving son to be entitled to take the bulk of the corpus? Surely not.