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bility) of upholding the decision of the majority in Ponnappa Piller's case, and at the same time maintaining in their integrity comparatively recent doctrines of the Madras school' as opposed to other 'schools.' The Chief Justice evidently had not the courage of his opinions, as expressed in the great case; and betrayed at last an inclination to undo everything, and make the Father once more a mere unpaid trustee for the Family. Fortunately for Madras, the Privy Council decision in the Sivagiri case was soon to make itself felt.

CHAPTER V.

THE PRIVY COUNCIL ON THE SIVAGIRI CASE.

In the first half of 1882 the Sivagiri case decided by the Madras High Court, as shown above at p. 288, was disposed of on appeal by the Privy Council.

Sir Barnes Peacock, in delivering the judgment of the Court, quoted largely, but did not think it at all worth while to reply to, the recondite and multiform arguments of the Lower Court. He hastened to declare that the creditor was entitled to succeed upon his second ground of appeal, that the whole Zamindari, or at least the interest which the defendant took therein by heritage, was liable as assets by descent in the hands of the defendant, as the heir of his father, for the payment of his father's debts.'

As to this ground-the judgment proceeds the case is governed by the case of Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall. The doctrine there laid down was not new, but was supported by the previous cases therein cited. The principle of that case was adopted by this Board in the case of Suraj Bunsi Koer, and has been very properly acted upon in Bengal, in Bombay, and in the North-West Provinces, and although it was not acted upon by the High Court of Madras, as

it ought to have been in the case now under appeal, it has since been acted upon in a Full Bench decision by all the Judges of that Court, except two who dissented, of whom Mr. Justice Muttusāmi Āyyar was one, in Ponnappa Pillei v. Pappurayyangar.'

Then comes the unpalatable remark: 'The reasons given in the judgment of the High Court in the present case constitute no ground for the opinion that the case of Kantoo Lall does not apply to the Madras Presidency.' For, (1) the assertion, that in that case there were remarks which show that the Father and son probably were acting in collusion with one another against the purchaser, 'certainly was not justified,' and was clearly a mistake.' And (2) assuming, without admitting, that a difference exists in Bengal and in Madras as to the power of the Father to alienate to the extent of his own share, 'it is impossible to see how the father's power to alienate his own share could constitute a valid reason for supposing that, where that law existed, the son's share, taken by heritage from the father, was thereby exempted from liability for the payment of his father's debts.'

It is then declared, simply, that the fact of the Zamindari being impartible could not affect its liability for the payment of the father's debts when it came into the hands of the son by descent from the father.' And then come directions, and the conclusion: The defendant is liable for the debts due from his father, to the extent of the assets which descended to him from his father, and all the right, title, and interest of the defendant in the Zamindari, which

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descended to him from his father, became assets in his hands, and that right and interest, if not duly administered in payment of his father's debts, is liable, as against the defendant, to be attached and sold in execution of the amount that may be decreed against him.'

Their Lordships therefore advise to reverse the decrees of the Lower Courts; and to direct payment of the debt by the defendant, as the son and heir and legal representative,' out of the property that was of his Father, and came to him by heritage; and to declare the whole estate, both the hypothecated parts and the rest, to be liable to attachment and sale in execution.

What, ultimately, will be the effects in Madras of this uncompromising decision, it would be indeed rash to predict. At the first blush it would seem to suffice in itself to explode the greater part of the peculiar views that obtain in Madras, with reference to the Father's powers and the son's obligations and rights. But, no doubt, we shall soon find a disposition evinced by some at least of the Madras Judges to treat this decision as the decision in Kantoo Lāl's case has been treated; and anyhow to ward off, to the utmost of their ability, the invasion of Bengal ideas and principles.

CHAPTER VI.

MOVING FORWARD AGAIN?

THE case of Puna Kuruppana Pillai v. Virabadra Pillai, I. L. R., 6 Mad., 277, is of importance, as illustrating the state of uncertainty and helplessness to which the subordinate tribunals must have been reduced by decisions such as those commented on in my previous chapters.

Here the debt, one of a few rupees, was incurred by the Father of a Family for the purpose of getting his son married, and the creditor, evidently a cautious man, sued both the Father and the son for payment. His doing so puzzled the Munsif, who referred to the High Court whether, as a Small Cause Court Judge with a restricted jurisdiction, he could dispose of a suit like the one before him, seeing that, with reference to Ponnappa Pillei's case, the question of the son's obligation to pay the debt of the Father was one not of contract but of inheritance. Knowing the views of the Courts and the bar to be divergent,' the Munsif thought it proper to lay the matter before the Judges of the High Court, 'lest his view may be erroneous.'

The decision of Innes and Kernan, JJ., was to