Zamindar v. Lakshmana, I. L. R., 9 Mad., 188. Here there was an advance of money to the Father, for purposes neither immoral nor illegal; a suit against him solely; and a decree, followed by the attachment and sale of part of the estate.

After the death of the Father, his son the new Zamindar sued for recovery of possession of what was sold, and his suit was dismissed.

On appeal, Kernan, Officiating C.J., and Muttusāmi Ayyar, J., reversed the decree of the Lower Court with costs, holding that the purchaser acquired no more than the life-interest of the judgment-debtor in the property sold.

The Judges admit, in their several judgments, that the debt was contracted by the Father for purposes neither illegal nor immoral, and that no doubt the Zamīndārī may be in the hands of his son liable to pay the debts of the late Zamindar.' But, the Father was not the absolute owner of his estate, even though he might have alienated the whole or part of it for purposes properly binding on his son'; and, as a fact, 'nothing more could be sold, or was purported to be sold, than the property of the defendant in the buildings.' And 'no equity in favour of the purchaser had arisen.'

In a word, the debt of the Father being one for which the son and the 'heritage' were alike properly liable, a British Court of equity and good conscience could not see its way, through conflicting decisions, to protect an innocent purchaser against that son.

It has been shown in this Third Part of the book that the fundamental divergence of opinion among the Madras Judges which began to be noticeable during the last days of Morgan, C.J., became serious soon after the arrival in Madras of Turner, C.J., and led to a crisis in Ponnappa Pillei's case, when three of the five Judges were arrayed against two in open and admitted opposition; that, on this occasion, whilst the conservative minority resolutely adhered to what it conceived to be genuine 'Madras doctrine,' as opposed to the very different doctrine of other parts of India, and of the Privy Council, Turner, C.J., was determined to accept without reserve the principles laid down conspicuously in Kantu Lāl's case, and by his own efforts evolved a new set of principles intended to supersede those of the minority, notably my sixth False Principle, that a member of an undivided family can aliene joint ancestral property to the extent of his own share,' and to empower the Father to contract debts, and aliene the estate of the Family, practically at his pleasure; that towards the end of his judgment, however, the Chief Justice exhibited

signs of hesitation and want of courage, and failed to give their full effect to his initial deductions; that the two Judges who followed him did so but halfheartedly and with ominous reserve, in very brief and guarded judgments, whilst evidently differing in opinion the one from the other; and that it would be extremely difficult to state the actual results achieved by the joint parturition of all the five Judges in this most remarkable and momentous case.

It has further been shown that almost immediately after Ponnappa Pillei's case the minority set to work to destroy the effect of it, and overruled Kernan, J.; that the minority, in a certain very simple case, first decided in direct opposition to the decision of the majority in the great case, and then, on review, for no apparent reason, effaced by a few words its own obstructive judgment; that the mind of the Chief Justice was swayed to and fro by conflicting theories, and betrayed great uneasiness, and a disposition to abandon the greater part of what he had before vehemently insisted upon; and at last, after various conflicting and irreconcilable decisions, the Chief Justice was brought right round to the opinion (of course only to be inferred) that the Father is impotent, being a mere unpaid trustee for his sons, or rather an unpaid Receiver and Manager of the Family property, who may not come to the Court for instructions, but must act always on his own responsibility and at his own peril.

Next, it has been shown that in the Sivagiri case the Privy Council made short work of the (supposed)

'Madras doctrine,' and unmistakably manifested its displeasure at the refusal of the Madras High Court, for reasons that were no reasons at all, to accept for Madras the established general principles repeatedly acted upon in Kantu Lal's case and other cases; and declared in precise terms that the Sivagiri Zamīndār was liable for the debts due from his Father, to the extent of the assets which descended to him from his Father; that all the right, title, and interest in the Zamindari, which descended to him from his Father, became assets in his hands, liable to attachment and sale in execution; and that the son must pay the debts of his Father, as the 'son and heir and legal representative,' out of the property that was of his Father, and came to him by heritage; and declared the whole Zamindari, both the parts that had been hypothecated and the parts that had not been hypothecated, to be liable to attachment and sale in execution.

After this, it has been shown that the subordinate Courts had been so bewildered that it was doubted (and for a very logical reason) whether a Small Cause Court had power to hear the simplest suit, brought against the Father and the son jointly, in which the son's liability to pay a debt of the Father was alleged to exist; that in another case the Court, including the Chief Justice, went back upon its words; that subsequently the Chief Justice took a great step forward, carrying the whole Court with him, and in a very brief judgment overruled a number of cases; that afterwards the full Court agreed in setting aside the old-established

sixth False Principle, and held that the Father, if unseparated, ordinarily has no power to make a gift to a stranger of ancestral property; that soon afterwards the Chief Justice decided another case in opposition to one of his principles previously established; that again the Chief Justice held that the Father cannot by will defeat the son's interest in order to provide for the Mother; that two new Judges decided a case on quite reactionary principles in disfavour of the innocent creditor; that soon afterwards one of these two turned round and joined the Chief Justice in overruling the other in a similar case; and that the Court, in the last case commented on, arrived at a decision adverse to the innocent purchaser that seems to be quite irreconcilable in principle with the Privy Council decision in the Sivagiri case above set out.

I am not aware that I have omitted to notice any important Madras decision reported during the last ten years or so: but, if by accident I have done so, the omission is immaterial. The analysis I have given must amply suffice, it seems to me, to prove the allegation that so far the Judges of the Madras High Court are not in agreement, and are very far from agreeing, upon such fundamental matters as the powers and jural relations of the Indian Father, the dependence and rights of the son, the position and authority of the Managing Member, the status of the Head of a Family owning an ancient Zamindārī or other large estate, and the subordinate nature of the processual law, and in regard to many questions of constant cccurrence in every court in the country.