Of another work to which, I regret to see, the Madras High Court is beginning to ascribe undue prominence, namely the Smṛti-Candrika, Mr. Mandlik has something very important to tell. In the first place he declares (at p. lxxiii.) that this work is not by the same author as the Dattaka-Candrikā. And, second, he tells us that it is 'as it professes to be, the work of Bhaṭṭa Kubera, a Bengal author. Kubera's name is not even known on this side of India; and Mr. Borradaile expressly says that the original work did not exist in Western India in his time. Steele's list does not mention such a work at all.' Third, he leaves it as one of the 'speculative and comparatively unknown works,' and chooses for publication one of the well-known modern nibandhas.'

It is devoutly to be hoped that in the course of time Government will become conscious of the Paramount Absurdity of upholding the Mitākṣarā as the Paramount Authority for South India, alike for the privileged classes, for whose edification (in North India) it was composed, and for the dumb masses whose interests Vijñāneçvara never dreamt of injuring; and of subordinating to a mere sectarian farrago of 'theoretic developments' the whole enormous mass of works from which, some day, Orientalists may succeed in evolving for all India a scientifically valuable system of Sanskrit or Brahmanic law. In the meantime, something must be done by Government in its legislative capacity, and that quickly, or the present scandalous state of things undoubtedly will lead to most serious results, including the ruin

of innumerable Families, and the paralysis or destruction of commercial credit.

It is unnecessary for me to urge again, what I have strenuously insisted upon in my View and Prospectus, the necessity of ascertaining by systematic inquiry the usages and customs of the various tribes i and families, Brahman and non-Brahman, that constitute the Hindu' population of the Madras Province, and of gradually building up on the basis of knowledge thus acquired a structure out of which, ultimately, a Code might be constructed. And at present I have nothing to add to the suggestions already made by me as to the mode in which such inquiry should be conducted and utilised. It will suffice for me to repeat here my conviction that, at the present moment, at all events in Madras, Englishmen are absolutely destitute of knowledge, easily obtainable, of the facts from which alone Hindu law can be deduced; and that, unless and until such knowledge is obtained, the administration of satisfactory law to Indians is nearly impossible.

But, I gather from expressions made use of by some of my critics, that it is not generally understood why I object so strongly to the Mitākṣarā, and for what special reasons I hold that we do very ill in selecting it as a guide; and, therefore, I shall now attempt to explain, briefly and compendiously, the grounds of my particular hostility to this clever and interesting treatise, and with what I would wish to replace it in general estimation.

In the first place, it is (I believe) now universally

1

allowed that the 'Mitākṣarā,' as done into English by Colebrooke, is no more than a speculative essay of an unknown writer, who flourished in an unknown place in North India, in an unknown time, upon the meaning of thirty-six verses of a Smrti known by the name of Yajnavalkya; and that this Smrti belongs to, or is more or less intimately connected with, a school attached to the new, or bright,' or 'White Yajur Veda,' adherents of which, if they ever existed in, are no longer to be found in, South India. This single circumstance, in my humble opinion, is fatal to the hypothesis that the 'Mitākṣara' has been, and is, accepted by the Brahmans of South India generally, as a Paramount Authority.

On the other hand, adherents of the old, or ' Black Yajur Veda,' particularly Apastambīyas, are to be found in great numbers in South India; and they still possess sūtras and smṛtis, e.g. Apastamba, Baudhāyana, Manu and Narada, and valuable commentaries on some of them. It is highly improbable, therefore, that any of the most numerous Brahman families in the Madras Province should have resolved to adopt the Mitākṣarā as their guide, and thereby degrade a sacred Rishi.' And still more improbable is it that Ruk-Vedis should have done this.

6

In the next place, it is a fact that, whilst all the Rishis differ from one another more or less, Yajnavalkya is a name specially connected with differences of opinion and with schism, and the commentator Vijñāneçvara on several important points stands aloof from the commentators in general,

in more or less of isolation. Anything he may have to say necessarily is suspicious, unless and until it is found to be corroborated by extrinsic evidence.

Then, a great part of what he has to say consists. of theoretic developments,' educed from abstract ideas. And some of these ideas, notably the idea that property is by birth, are palpable absurdities. Property or ownership is a concrete fact occasioned by the law or custom of the country, and the circumstances and accidents of the man's life and does not come by birth any more than does starvation, or the measles. So far as it is known and understood, the Mitākṣarā does not commend itself to a discriminating mind as being an improvement on the law-treatises. generally, e.g. on Nārada.

But, there is good reason to doubt whether this work is tolerably well known and understood. Mr. Mandlik evidently regards with suspicion both the text at present received, and Colebrooke's translation of it. And Professor Jolly has shown that a very important passage in the Mitākṣarā has been entirely misconceived by Colebrooke. Very possibly research may show that other important passages in the work have been mistranslated and misunderstood.

For these and other reasons, though quite ready to recognise the general cleverness of the work, and its possible practical usefulness within due limits, I must always object most strongly to the Mitakṣarā being forced upon the people as the Paramount Authority, in derogation, rather (I should say) in supersession, of the aggregate authority of all other;

BB

existing works

'law.'

dharma and vyavahāra, or

Still more strongly must I object to the mode in which the so-called law of the Mitākṣara is applied day by day to the whole Indian population of the Madras Province, and particularly to the theoretic developments' evolved by the High Court, sometimes with the aid of fanciful analogies borrowed from English, Roman, and German writers on jurisprudence, from the supposed 'theoretic developments' of Vijñāneçvara.

For example, take my fifth False Principle, that 'as to ancestral property a son, and therefore a grandson, may compel a division against the will of his father or grandfather.' I have shown (above, at pp. 207-24) that this principle, as at present worked, enables a baby in arms, suing by his mother, to break up the Family, and (as the case may be) ruin the Father, or cheat innocent creditors or purchasers. If this principle were part of the law of the land, I would wish Government at once to consult the people as to the necessity or advisability of abrogating or modifying it, as being an essentially bad law. But most certainly this is not of the law of the land: and never has been. It is nothing more than an arbitrary, and a violent, extension of the assumed principle of Vijnaneçvara, that the son may at his pleasure compel the Father by suit to give him his share of his grandfather's estate; which principle is supposed to be educed from Vijñāneçvara's absurd notions about property being by birth, and the ownership