Putting all these on one side as unworthy of serious consideration, we may doubtless find in books of this class much that is of permanent value. And possibly in none of them will more valuable assistance to the inquirer be forthcoming than in the unjustly condemned and despised digest of Jagannatha, which was translated by Colebrooke, and ordinarily goes by his name. It appears from Colebrooke's letter at II. Strange, 175, that the old Madras Pandits made great use of Jagannatha: and it would seem to be but reasonable for a Madras judge to turn for information and guidance to a work believed in and used by the Madras Pandits, rather than to the Mitākṣara and other works that Colebrooke (who never lived in the Madras Province) pronounced, for reasons of his own, to be authorities better adapted to the needs of the Madras people.

Some quite modern compilations would appear to be of practical value, as, for example, the Anācāranirṇaya, which is described by Burnell (Introduction, Manu, xxxvii.) as being a small manual of practices usual in Malabar, Cochin, and Travancore, and opposed to the Sanskrit law, and an unquestionable authority for the peculiar customs of Malabar, though not as yet noticed by the High Court, which, however, has gravely accepted as genuine the impudent and stupid forgery styled the Aliyasantanada Kaṭṭu Kattale.

With reference to books of this class, I would wish to invite attention once more to the Dayadaçacloki, a most interesting little work, compiled probably

not more than a century ago, by a native of South India, and edited by Burnell. According to its editor, it contains all the chief rules laid down in the received treatises, and, so far, cannot contribute false notions.' It is the 'chief rules' that specially need to be established; and surely it must be profitable to consult compendious works like the Dayadaçaçloki in which (of necessity) only such rules are exhibited.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MṚICCHAKAṬIKĀ.

MR. INNES (at pp. 18-20) has made much of the ninth chapter of the Mricchakatika, as proving beyond the possibility of doubt that at Ujayyini, in about the second century after Christ, there existed a judicial tribunal appointed by the king; the judges holding office, as do the judges of the High Court, during the sovereign's pleasure'; and an aggregate of rules of conduct administered by that tribunal, and 'contained presumably in the Manava-dharma-castra referred to by the Chief Judge, as his guide, in communicating to the king the sentence which according to Manu it was unlawful to pass, and that which the king might lawfully pronounce. See Manu Ch. VIII. § 380. Toy-Cart, Act IX.'

And Professor Jolly (at p. 68 of his Tagore Lectures on Hindu Law) has ventured on a somewhat similar conclusion. He says finally :-'I have dwelt thus long on these analogies betweeen one of the most celebrated Sanskrit plays and the teaching of the later Smritis, because they contain most valuable evidence in favour of the practical character of these works.'

Amazed at these statements, and feeling pur

suaded that they must be far too bold and comprehensive to be warranted, I have studied the ninth

chapter of the Clay-cart' (as done into English by Wilson, and into French by M. Regnaud) rather carefully, with the result that I have arrived at the opinion that, taken as a whole and rightly understood, this amusing scene shows tolerably conclusively that nothing at all resembling criminal law (as Englishmen now understand the phrase) was administered (or known) at Ujayyini in the early part of the Christian era.

Both because I would wish to justify, if I can, this my opinion, and because the matter is in itself one of some little importance and interest, I purpose examining here the ninth chapter of the Clay-cart' at some little length.

The first thing to be noticed, perhaps, though a trifle, is the circumstance that, upon arriving at the place of trial, the judge asks the servant (the 'huissier '), who has just swept the floor and arranged the seats, to show the way to the court, not being in a habit (apparently) of sitting regularly in one place.

The next thing is the constitution of the tribunal. The so-called 'judges' are three in number: first the President, or judge proper, second the Headman of the merchants, and third the Kayastha scribe. Now, certainly, according to Manu, the trial should have been held in the presence of the King's delegate and (as explained by Medhätithi) not less than three Brahmans. See above, p. 45. And in any case it must have been wholly unnecessary and highly improper

-I will not say illegal, because from my point of view no 'law' is to be found or expected in a work like the Mricchakatika-for a merchant, however respectable, and for a Kayastha scribe to sit in judgment upon a Brahman nobleman like Charudatta, the defendant in this trial. According to Wilson, the Kayastha class was in old times specially obnoxious to Brahmans.

The day's work begins with the President lecturing his assessors on the duty of a judge as regards patience, impartiality, and the like. He then asks whether there are any complainants ready to be heard, it being doubtful (apparently) whether there will be anything for the court to do. The scribe goes out to see, and comes back in a state of trepidation, with the news that the King's brother-in-law has come in person with a complaint. Hearing this, the judges are alarmed, and at once become unwilling to begin business. The President solemnly observes: This announces, like an eclipse at sunrise, the fall of a considerable man.' And then he causes it to be intimated to the King's brother-in-law that the judges are too busy to attend to him. Whereupon the complainant at once sends word to them that, if that is so, he will tell the King, and get the President dismissed, and another judge appointed in his place. His words terrify the court, and he is directed forthwith to come and tell his story. Upon this he swaggers into the court, gorgeously apparelled, treats the judges with utmost insolence, telling them that their continuance in office depends upon his goodwill, and actually offers to sit in their seats, but finally waives his privilege.

F