of the parties and witnesses.' Now, this is not a warrantable account of what really happened. What alone the scribe appears to have written down, was an abstract of the complaint, as amended by the President; and as soon as he had written this down, the King's brother-in-law effaced the whole of it with his foot. I do not find that the depositions were, nor was any part of them, taken down in writing on this occasion. And if, as Professor Jolly seems to aver, the rules of Bṛhaspati and the rest direct that 'all the statements of the parties and witnesses' should be written down, those rules certainly must have been disobeyed. But, indeed, it is not reasonable to suppose that the whole proceedings in a case would be written out in extenso on the sandy floor of a hall.

Next, the learned Professor points out that Katyayana says that a few virtuous merchants shall be present at every judicial assembly,' which very possibly is the case. But, on this occasion only one merchant was present, and he was present not as a spectator or amicus curia, and to ensure propriety of procedure, but in the capacity of a judge-a very different matter. As I have shown above, a merchant and a Kayastha are represented as sitting in judgment on a noble Brahman in a capital case. Their doing so surely would have been in the eyes of all Hindūs a very unusual and most improper proceeding, though indeed Charudatta did not object to it. Perhaps this is to be accounted for by supposing that he was (as he seems to have been) hopeless of obtaining justice, and apathetically resigned himself to an inevitable fate.

Nothing need be added to what I have already said about the sentence and Manu, or about Charudatta's observations anent his trial and sentence.

The only remaining incident noticed by Professor Jolly is the enumeration by the President of the qualities required in a judge, of which 'a thorough knowledge of the law books' is said to rank first.' But I regret being compelled to aver that this is by no means the fact. The French is, (the judge) 'doit connaître la loi,' and as soon as I read it I presumed that the Sanskrit could mean no more than that the judge should have that vague knowledge of the whole subject-matter of the Vedas which properly every good Brahman ought to possess. Accordingly I referred to the original, and found (as I expected) that the word which Professor Jolly considers to be equivalent to 'law books' is çastra. Now çastra, according to Burnell (v. Manu, p. 13, n. 5), is a body of teaching on any subject, either of divine or human origin.' And the commentator on the text of the Mricchakatika explains the meaning by saying, the author goes on to indicate the qualities of one who comprehends Nyāya. See above, Chap. III.

Certainly it seems to me to be something like making a mountain of a molehill to present these few unimportant and doubtful matters as positively indicating that, some thirteen centuries ago, Indian judges like the one portrayed in the Mricchakaṭikā were in a habit of consulting the latest editions of law-books, and conscientiously guiding themselves thereby, in administering justice to suitors day by day.

To my mind it is far more reasonable to regard the trial scene under notice as (probably) faithfully reproducing ordinary incidents of mock trials held in an unknown age; and to suppose that the authors of Bṛhaspati and the rest had similar incidents in contemplation when they composed their works on law as it ought to be, and naturally made mention of them in suitable places.

However this may be, I think a prudent man will do well to hesitate to modify his opinion of the practical' character of works like the Manava-d.-ç. in view of any evidence upon the subject to be extracted from the trial scene in the Mricchakatikā.

I have not thought it necessary to investigate the other well-known Sanskrit trial scene, that in the Çakuntala. Mr. Innes is under the impression that the one now dealt with is 'the one solitary picture, so far as is known, contained in ancient Sanskrit literature, of the administration of justice in a Hindu kingdom,' as also that it is enough for his purpose.' And Professor Jolly speaks of but one trial scene. It may not be unprofitable, however, to quote here the words of Professor Barth (in his note to p. 416, Revue Critique, 1878, in which he does me the honour of reviewing my View of the Hindu Law). He says: 'Il y a dans la littérature sanskrite deux relations bien connues d'affaires judiciaires. L'une, qui se trouve dans Çakuntala, est réglée par ces procédés sommaires de tout temps prisés en Orient, cette briève justice, comme Chardin dit quelque part, qui n'est souvent qu'une prompte injustice.'

CHAPTER V.

OBSERVATIONS ON NARADA.

6

In his preface to Narada Professor Jolly expresses the hope that his translation of the most luminous, complete, and systematic ancient treatise on Hindu law will be welcome to those who take an interest in the practical aspect of Hindu law,' inasmuch as 'it occupies a far more distinguished position in the development of Hindu law than the Code of Manu, perhaps the very highest;' whilst it is specially laudable in that its laws are not mere theoretical rules and precepts, but such as have doubtless been administered.' And the same author tells us in his Hindu Law, at p. 56, that upwards of half the Clokas, of which the Narada Smrti consists, are quoted in the Digests. Clearly, therefore, Narada should be a work of considerable importance in the eyes of Indian judges. I purpose making in this chapter some observations on its date, character, and practical value.

The date of Narada is at present unknown, and can only inferentially and approximately be guessed at. I believe it is universally allowed that the Nārada Smrti is of a later time than both Manu and Yajnavalkya. And, so thinking, Professor Jolly for

divers reasons concludes that the composition of this work has to be placed in the fifth or sixth century A.D.' But, since Burnell has shown us that Manu's date probably is about 500 A.D., and may be even later by some centuries, we cannot but doubt the propriety of placing in so early a time a work that shows so great a development of law proper as does the Narada Smrti, at all events in form and theory. Moreover, the current version of the work appears to be founded on an earlier and considerably larger version—indeed, may be said to be practically an abridgment of it-and a considerable space of time may reasonably be supposed to have elapsed between the dates of these two versions. If we suppose an interval of 500 years to separate Manu and the current version of Narada, then as the former, according to Burnell, is to be placed at about the beginning of the sixth century, Narada may be placed in the eleventh century. Or it may even be a little later.

If Narada belongs to the eleventh century, it is of the same century as the Mitākṣarā (according to Bühler), and one great argument in favour of using the latter as 'the paramount authority' for Madras disappears. For, obviously, when the choice lies between an aggregate of (supposed) laws proper, and a number of 'mere theoretical rules and precepts,' nothing can warrant the adoption of the latter if they are not believed to be far more modern than the former, and faithfully to represent great changes of both usage and theory.