As with the date of Narada, so with its origin and authorship, nothing is known about them. We can only guess that some learned Brahman took a prose work on law, and reduced it to verse in this instance, just as was done in the case of Manu and other Smṛtis. In what country this reduction took place, and in connection with what religious school, there is nothing to show.

With regard to the contents of the book, Jolly observes (Hindu Law, 49) that it is the only work of its kind in which civil law is treated by itself without any admixture of rules relating to rites of worship, penances, and other religious matters. At the same time civil law and legal procedure are seen in a far more advanced state of progress in the Narada Smriti than in any of the Smritis previously noticed.'

The book consists of two nearly equal divisions, of which the first treats of 'judicature,' particularly of the constitution of courts of justice, evidence by witnesses, and five kinds of ordeal, viz. by weighing, fire, water, poison, and sacred libation; and the second treats of various laws in order, under eighteen 'heads of dispute,' which differ materially from Manu's 'eighteen titles,' viz. recovery of a debt, deposits, concerns among partners, recovery of a gift, &c. Most of these subjects, of course, have little or no interest for the lawyer of the present day. But a few of them, e.g. 'partition of heritage,' are as important to-day as ever they were. And some of the rules laid down seem to deserve special notice.

G

I have already had occasion to notice Narada's doctrines about law, as compared with the King's judgments, the use of law-books in judicial proceedings, and other matters. It is observable that Narada throughout the first chapter attaches comparatively little authority and importance to law, and insists, very properly, on the judge taking logic for his guide, and thoroughly considering the evidence before him, and the conduct of the parties. Thus, in I. 1, cl. 36 we have the observation: 'Holy law is of a subtle nature, and has to be treated with great care. An honest man may become a thief, and a thief an honest man.' What seems to be must be carefully distinguished from what is. 'It is right to examine a fact strictly, even though it occurred in the inquirer's own sight. He who ascertains facts by rigid investigation does not deviate from justice' (I. 1, cl. 67). And again, I. 2, cl. 21 says: As a blind man, heedless, swallows fish with the bones, so does he who enters a court of justice, and then pronounces a perverse opinion from mistake of facts.' See below, p. 148.

The fifth Chapter contains a great number of rules about witnesses, which evince a considerable knowledge of human nature and great common sense, and have been praised by Sir Thomas Strange and even Mill. One thing specially noticeable about them is the oft-repeated injunction that in all disputes the witnesses shall be taken from the class of the disputants. Thus, in disputes between members of a family, persons of the same family shall be witnesses. 'Among companies of artisans, men who are artisans

shall be witnesses; and men of one tribe among those of the same; foresters among those living outside; and women among women.' The reasons for this rule are obvious. One of them is given incidentally in I. 5, cl. 95: If the witnesses were to disagree with one another as to place, time, age, matter, usages, tribe, or class, such depositions, too, are worthless.' From this it appears that the judge should always take into consideration, amongst other important matters, the usages' of the parties; and the witnesses should be taken from the class of the disputants, as being presumably able to furnish information in respect to their usages. I have already shown that in quarrels among gamblers other gamblers are to be consulted, and to decide them. Witnesses must be blameless, decent, and intelligent persons,' and likely to know the facts of the case and the concomitant circumstances. But above all they must speak truth. This is insisted upon with utmost earnestness.

Ordeals of five kinds are described in detail in five several chapters; whilst two others are mentioned, or seem to be mentioned. And Professor Jolly seems to think this circumstance in itself goes a long way towards proving that Narada is of much later date than Manu and Yājñavalkya, and that the law had been greatly developed in the interval separating Manu and Narada. But I think it would not be safe to lay much stress upon this. For Narada, while it fully describes five kinds, barely (if at all1) mentions

1 It seems to me to be doubtful whether Narada really refers to two additional ordeals, both because the presence in it of a detailed description

two other kinds of ordeal. The Vishnu sutra describes the same five that Narada describes. And Yajñavalkya speaks of as many as five kinds. And Manu may properly be held to speak of four kinds, since the oath is in fact an ordeal, differing but slightly from the ordeal by sacred libation. And it is observable that this latter form was forbidden to be used in the case of a Brahman in later times. (See note 5, p. 196, Burnell's Manu.) Possibly, therefore, the author of Manu may have known and disapproved of the ordeal by libation; as also of the ordeal by weighing, which (according to Narada) is the one proper for a Brahman. It is conceivable that the author of Manu intended to recommend the oath pure and simple for Brahmans, and this and the other three ordeals for men of the other classes. Hiouen Thsang, in the seventh century, observed in India the use of Narada's four principal

of five ordeals in itself makes it improbable that the author should have known of more; whilst the supposed references to two more, the ordeal of picking a bit of gold out of a vessel containing hot oil, and that of chewing rice, are not incapable of being explained away. The supposed reference to the former is to be found in the text (I. 1, 16) that enumerates the 'eight constituent parts' of a judicial proceeding, amongst which are gold, fire, and water (see above, p. 49). Now, the Satapatha Brāmhaṇa (see II. 1, 1, 5; III. 2, 4, 8 and 9; 3, 1, 3; IV. 5, 1, 15; III. 3, 2, 2 ; 3, 3, 6) shows that gold is Agni's seed, which he poured into the water, and therefore gold, with fire and water, was an important object in the sacrifice; and also that a piece of gold was tied to the ring finger of the Adhvaryu as a symbol of truth, in order that he might handle the Soma by means of the truth.' And Manu (VIII. 113) directs that the Vaiçya shall swear by his gold. It is not improbable, therefore, that gold may have been included in the 'eight constituents' as being a symbol of truth, to be touched in swearing. As regards the chewing of rice, since it is mentioned irrelevantly, without explanation, at the very end of the description of the ordeal by libation, and apparently as part and parcel of it, it would seem to be not unreasonable to suppose that it may in fact have been something ancillary to the fifth ordeal.

ordeals. And it is these four that are spoken of in the Mricchakaṭikā, as we have already seen. Lastly, it is observable that Narada (I. 5, cl. 107) professes 'to state the rule of ordeals, as it has been laid down. by Manu, for the four classes severally.'

Chapter III. deals with the recovery of debt, and contains some highly important rules. The first of these is that, after the death of the Father, the sons shall pay his debt according to their respective claims, if they separate; or else, if they do not separate, that son who takes the burden of a paterfamilias on himself shall pay it. In default of the sons paying it the grandsons shall pay it, or the great-grandsons. The obligation ceases with the fourth descendant. If the Father is sick, mad, superannuated, or long absent, the son shall pay his debt even while he is alive. If sonless, the widow must pay her husband's debt. So if she inherits his estate: for, whosoever takes the estate, must pay the debts. But, debts contracted by the Father from love, anger, drunkenness, in gambling, and in bailing, need not be paid by the son, or (presumably) by the widow.

The Father shall not pay his son's or wife's debts, unless contracted by his order, express or implied. But any parcener may be compelled to pay another's debt contracted by joint tenants while they were all alive; but if they be dead, the son of one is not liable to pay the debt of another.'

The rules about payment to be observed in the case of a wife going to live with another man, as his wife, are very curious. I do not pretend to understand