skrit 'law books,' in altercations amongst learned Brahmans and a few others, certainly did not desire disputes arising amongst the lower orders to be decided by reference to books like the Mitäkṣarā. This passage may profitably be read in connection with the very important deça dharma chapter of the Smṛticandrikā, a translation of most of which by Burnell will be found at p. 115 of my View.

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The twelfth Head of Dispute, on the duties of man and wife, contains many remarkable provisions. Not only does it permit various kinds of Niyoga (levirat); it so speaks of them as to show clearly that this institution was firmly established and perfectly moral and laudable at the time when Narada was written. Further, it authorises the wife of a man who, though impotent with her, is potent with another woman, to take another husband. For the woman is the field, and he who has no seed for it must not possess it.' Again, where women leave their husbands for others, their offspring belong to the begetter, if they have come under his dominion, in consideration of a price he has paid to the husband; but the children of one who has not been sold belong to her husband.' There is nothing wrong in sexual intercourse with other men's wives where the husband is an offender, or has abandoned his wife, or is impotent or consumptive. Absent husbands need not be waited for very long by amorous wives. And, lastly, the chapter winds up with this very suggestive rule : 'Therefore let the King take special care to restrain the women from sinful intercourse with men of other

classes than their own.' But a Çudra woman 'may take three husbands in the inverse order of classes,' just as a Brahman may take three wives of other classes in the order of classes.' Similarly, Vaiçya women may have (in all) three husbands, and Kṣatriya women two. I do not know whether Narada may rightly be said 'to occupy a far more distinguished position in the development of Hindu law than Manu;' but certainly many of the rules contained in it appear to be (in the words of Manu) 'fit only for cattle.'

The thirteenth Head of Dispute relates to the 'partition of heritage.' The first rule is that sons may divide the Father's estate, according to their order, after his death; and daughters (or their issue) may divide the mother's estate after her death. But, certain things are not divisible-for example, any favour conferred by the Father, or any gift made by the Mother to one of her sons; for the Mother, like the Father, is competent to bestow gifts.' Here, then, we have the existence of two separate estates, the Father's and the Mother's, clearly established. Or, when the mother's menses have ceased, and the sisters have been married, or when cohabitation has ceased, and the father's carnal desire is extinguished,' the daughters may institute a division.

เ

Another rule is: 'Or the Father, being advanced in years, may himself institute the division among his sons; either dismissing the eldest with the best share, or however else his inclination may prompt him.' For, 'the Father is the lord of all,' and may

do as he pleases; unless his mind is disturbed by disease, anger, love, or the like, so that he cannot properly exercise his will, and loses his independence.

Otherwise, the eldest brother may support the rest like a Father, if they consent. Or the youngest may do so, if capable. The prosperity of a family depends upon ability;' and 'he who maintains the family of a brother studying science shall take a portion of the wealth gained by science, though he be ignorant

himself.'

Where the Father separates the sons from him, he should take two shares for himself. Where a division takes place after his death, the Mother takes a share equal to a son's share, as also does an unmarried daughter; but the eldest son takes a larger, and the youngest a smaller, share.

Various rules are laid down for illegitimate sons of many kinds. kinds. For example, a damsel's son by an unknown father should present the funeral cake to his mother's father, and inherit his property. And the son of a woman who has been sold by her husband to another, presents the cake to his begetter. When no such sale has taken place, the illegitimate son of a married woman, 'obtained' by another, presents the cake to his mother's husband. The son of two fathers presents the cake to both severally, and takes a half share respectively of the inheritance of his begetter and of his mother's husband.' This is a curious provision, inasmuch as, according to Narada's view (shown above), the 'seed' should belong to the owner of the field,' i.e., in the present case, the husband.

And this is Manu's view of what is to be held, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, in IX. 52–53. Baudhayana and other writers take different views of the position and rights of the son of two fathers (Dvyāmuṣyāyana, or Bījin).

As regards widows- Amongst brothers, if any one die without issue, or enter a religious order, let the rest of the brothers divide his wealth, except the wife's separate property;' but she is to be maintained and protected by them, so long as she remains faithful to her deceased husband. In default of husband's kinsmen, her own kinsmen are to be her guardians. Nothing is said directly about the wife of the separated brother taking his wealth for his sons or daughters, if he leaves any, or for herself. Apparently she takes only in the capacity of manager, as suggested above.

Plain and satisfactory rules are laid down for cases in which it may be doubtful whether partition has or has not taken place. Thus, it is declared that 'those brothers who live for ten years, performing their religious duties and carrying on their transactions separately, ought to be considered separate, that is certain.' And if, such persons, 'not being accordant in affairs, should give or sell their shares, they may do all that as they please; for they are masters of their own wealth.' On the other hand (as shown above), the gift of 'joint property' is expressly prohibited. It would be a good thing for Madras if these two rules were consistently observed by the

courts.

'A son born after division shall alone take the

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paternal wealth.' What of a son born before division? It cannot be supposed that he will be worse off than he would be if born later. Or he shall participate with the coparcener reunited with his father.' But the position of such 'coparceners' is quite unintelligible in the English. The share of reunited brothers is considered to be exclusively theirs; otherwise-i.e. on failure of reunited brothers-they cannot take the inheritance; it shall go to other brothers when no issue is left.' Professor Jolly appears, after due consideration, to have preferred this rendering to three others; what must they be like!

The list of twelve sorts of sons given by Narada differs in some respects from that given by Manu, which again differs from lists given elsewhere. As usual, it is divided into two equal divisions; of which the first comprises those sons who are to be considered 'heirs' as well as 'kinsmen.' In this division Nārada places none but real sons. After the legitimate son he names next the son begotten (by niyoga) on a wife. Then come the son of an appointed daughter, the damsel's son, the pregnant bride's son, and the son born secretly. Amongst those who are not 'heirs' the adopted son comes second, after the son of a twicemarried woman. And the author expressly states that the twelve sons are named in order according to their respective rank; and that they (or the first six of them?) succeed in their order, the inferior taking in default of the superior only. According to this rule, taken with previous rules, where A'obtains' without a present B's wife, and begets C on her, and