rhetorical. It is an adjective of the highest degree of intensity, and, when coupled with emotion, puts us to the utmost stretch of imagination whereof we are capable. In Science and Philosophy, it simply points to the absence or negation of limit. Hence its application to Space, Time, and their contents. It also indicates how Reality, which is usually narrower than thought, can yet transcend our utmost powers of thought-constructiveness.

Such is a complete list of the great comprehensive designations for what is transcendent in our supposable Universe. The counter terms in the several antithetic couples have been partly dealt with in the review-Knowledge (Being, Unknowable), Relative (Absolute), Thought (Reality), Phenomenon (Noümenon), Finite (Infinite). The first of these terms-Knowledge-in its more limited acceptation, suspends many issues, as we had had occasion to notice under former heads, -as Epistemology and Perception, but chiefly in the contrasts to Being and the Unknowable.

Thus, by the process of exhaustion, we seem to have reached this conclusion-that, over and beyond the problem of Perception, there is but one genuine issue traceable, namely, what is signified under the couplings, RelativeAbsolute, Knowable-Unknowable, when these are brought within the limits of actual human interest. There may be an Unknowable, so far related to us as to influence our welfare; being traceable purely through that relation, and expressible by the same circumstance, that is, as correlative to the Known. Let us find out the cases, and next consider how Empiricism views them.

The chief example, and the one that foreshadows the others, is the theistic handling of Design. This is preeminently a case where we have one foot in the Known and the other in the Unknown and Unknowable, except in so far as the correlation with the Known discloses it. The adaptations in the actual world of inanimate and animate beings may be taken as inferring some power equal to the effect. Nevertheless, Design, while suggesting, does not produce the Designer.

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On this vast issue, the sharp distinction between the empirical and the transcendental handling can no longer be drawn. How far the correlation of a Design and a Designer can carry us is not a matter for strict determination. It is an argument from the best analogy that we possess our own workmanship. From the overpowering importance of the conclusion, it involves our strong likings or emotions. To keep these within their proper bounds is the logician's business, if anybody's. One man believes that the argument from contrivance is a sufficient foundation for Theism, usually understood; another holds that, while it amounts to something, it goes such a little way towards full and definite knowledge as to be practically fruitless. Empiricists differ here, like other men. Hume took the side of barrenness; Mill inclined to the other side, although in a very qualified form. Probably, mankind will never agree on the amount of reliance to be placed on the correlation, as inferring a Creative Mind. Still, the question, while not a mere play upon abstract words, is a distinct advance upon the great Perception-problem; that problem being unable to yield a theistic conclusion, or the reverse.

To refer to the other mode of approaching the theistic position, the argument from our moral nature to a Moral Governor of the world,-would be to repeat the same line of remarks. The value of the correlation here is, if possible, still less ascertainable with precision; and the estimates of different individuals are correspondingly various.

Theism is the united force of all the correlations that can, in such ways, be established between the known and the unknowable. What would be an empiricist's treatment of the subject, as a whole, I do not here consider. It is a question not to be taken up by halves, still less by tenths, which is as large a fraction as is contributed by Philosophy.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTORS.

By objectors I here mean, not the representatives of Apriorism as such, but those that call in question the selfconsistency of the manner of stating the position of Em

piricism, including both opponents and supporters of the creed.

There can be no cogent inference without assuming a general truth.-It is not necessary to spend time on this objection, after what I have said as to the postulate of Uniformity. Experience, by itself, cannot establish a general truth; with this postulate, it can do so.

Immediate cognition is not infallible.-By which is meant, I presume, that, under the very best circumstances. for attaining a valid affirmation, that is, when interpreting a present consciousness, we must make pre-suppositions, or else be liable to mistake. This liability I fully admit, and give the only way of correcting it that I know of-repeated observations with the absence of contradiction. All the pre-suppositions in the world, the whole possible compass of assignable intuitions, without this repetition, are the merest moonshine.

Immediate cognitions cannot be distinguished from mediate. In other words, we may readily confound fact with inference. Perfectly true. We think we see distance. Only the skilled psychologist can analyze the perception into its elements, and state how much is fact and how much inference. Now, the knowledge of mankind must rest upon something that everybody can be aware of. My reply to the objection in general is, that Empiricism is not concerned with the matter. That we cognize distance is a fact; that our perception is mediate, or inferred, is a psychological theory or hypothesis of no interest to human beings generally. It is not necessary to the assurance that we derive through the exercise of our senses it is, at best, a matter of learned curiosity. The confidence that we feel does not arise from knowing whether the judgment is mediate or immediate; it arises from sufficiently repeated observation, by which we are secured against illusions.

It is impossible to know other men's immediate experience. This difficulty, whatever it amounts to, presses equally on the empiricist and the apriorist. Intuition is appealed to in vain on such a point. Each man knows his

own experience, and, when language is once formed, we can compare notes with one another, and see what is the extent of our agreement. Only those things wherein we all appear to feel alike are regarded as universal in the highest sense, that is, as truths for all. We are not entitled to presume that what is true to us individually is true to men universally.

On this I may quote from Mr. Shadworth Hodgson (Mind, vii., 488):-" Consciousness has no validity for other conscious beings, unless they recognise their truth as descriptions applicable to the procedure and the phenomena of their own consciousness". Compare Grote in the Theatetus of Plato, who inculcates the lesson of humility as becoming every one that lays down truths in the language of universality. "To deliver my own convictions is all that is in my power: and if I spoke with full correctness and amplitude, it would be incumbent on me to avoid pronouncing any opinion to be true or false simply; I ought to say, it is true to me-or false to me."

Thought is not possible without a Subject.—In another rendering, “the relation of time between one sensation and another could not exist if there were not a subject". I interpret this as a challenge to the empiricist to build up the Subject from his a posteriori elements, as made use of for Space, Time and Cause. This, however, is too much of an undertaking to enter upon at the conclusion of a long paper.

PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPRESSION IN PSYCHOLOGY.

(Mind, xvi., 1.)

The question of how far the study of bodily organs and processes is of avail in psychological inquiries. Expressions used that seem to support the neglect of the physical side. Dr. Ward's remark: Hadrian's address to his soul. Mr. Stout and Mr. Bradley. One extreme as bad as another. Examples to show how far we are already committed to the physical rendering of mental facts. Inquiry into the exact limits of the reference to the bodily functions in psychology has still to be made. How a clearance of the ground may be effected. 1. Survey of the Vocabulary of Mind-showing how indispensable reference to material accompaniments has been. Examples of words of material origin that only now suggest subjective meanings. Examples of terms applicable to mind that still preserve their material meaning. Twofold division of these physical accompaniments. Instances. 2. Cases where the material adjuncts are helpful. Most remarkable of these cases-sensations of the five senses. The double language of mind specially useful also in the study of the Emotions. 3. Hypothetical views aid Expression. In what situations they are helpful. Best mode of guarding against either subjective or objective excess in mental terminology. How the objectors to physiological phraseology are led into their extreme position. Aristotle the originator of physical reference. Where the question of the suitable amount of physiological expression may be advantageously raised. What test may be propounded of the sincerity of the subjective purist. What genuine problem in Psychology it would help to solve. Inadequate reference to physical accompaniments illustrated from Mr. Stout. Quotation from Dr. E. Montgomery. Mr. Stout confuted by himself. Wherein his refusal of physiological aid is deficient; and why his testing example may be objected to. The case of Memory or Retentiveness substituted, and instances given of physical accompaniments of the intellectual operations. Mr. Bradley's subjective purism. Reasons in favour of the hypothesis of physiological activity, in a transformed character, being carried into the mental sphere. Meeting the challenge to produce any laws of connexion between the physical and the mental. Illustration from Pleasure and Pain. Criticism of Mr. Bradley's handling of the physical accompaniments of our hedonic states. Citation of stimulating drugs as throwing us at once upon physical considerations. Other facts in support of the contention that the physical constitution of the nervesubstance is a paramount condition of our pleasurable and painful sensi