DEFINITION AND PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

(Mind, N.S., iii., 347.)

Definition supposed to have been exhaustively handled. This true so far in theory, but not in fact. Reid charged by Hamilton with confounding verbal and real definition. In remarking that individuals cannot be defined, Hamilton quotes from an old logician: "a view of the thing itself is its best definition". Now generally understood that definition does not apply to ultimate notions. Further limitation to notions in their nature composite, but not explicable by means of their components. In this wider and vaguer meaning of rendering intelligible truths in language, its scope might be assigned as bringing about agreement as to the thing denoted by a given name. Vocabulary of Psychology contains terms that explain themselves, their reference being to well-known or familiar facts. Such terms then become stepping-stones in expressing important generalities of high range, and more or less abstruse meaning. Present article to be occupied with the consideration of the leading term " Consciousness". For many purposes, this word free from ambiguity. Yet it becomes involved in subtle and difficult problems. Import so wide that it seems to include the whole of our mental being. Good reasons for not making it the central term of all Psychology. Certain definite issues best connected with it; a number of problems better associated with other terms. Psychological terms that are selfexplaining, Pleasure, Pain, Discrimination, Resemblance, Memory, Learning, Forgetting, Activity, Passivity, Sleeping, Waking. The other class that need stepping stones in order to being understood,-Consciousness, Feeling, Emotion, Will, Idea, Cognition, Belief, etc. In arriving at a definition of Consciousness, lead off with Sleep and Waking: the one the suspension of Consciousness, the other its resumption. Pleasure and Pain most prominently imply consciousness. In regard to Will, not the same unqualified application. Habit a deadening of Consciousness. Attention' a measure of consciousness. Critical problems to be adduced in defining Consciousness. The Object Consciousness. Truths of Consciousness. Certainty of consciousness refers only to a very limited sphere. Consciousness in contrast to Mind. Mind the entire storage of mental impressions, including the hold they have in the cerebral organization when absolutely dormant. Consciousness like the scenery on the stage of a theatre at any one moment: Mind the stores in reserve as well. The Conscious Area. Taken at one instant, this very limited. Attending to only one thing at a time. Every conscious impulse leaves a

ness.

stamp behind it capable of ready recurrence. Narrowness of conscious area the peculiar limitation of the human powers. Intercausation of the three great components of the Subject Mind. Which is the initial motive for making us mentally alive? Do they each operate in turn? Consciousness as essential to Memory. To associate trains of ideas, the things retained must have had the full occupation of our conscious moments, for a longer or shorter time. Reflex and Spontaneous actions, confirmed by repetition. Problem of important mental modifications in the intervals of consciousImmediate Physical Conditions of Consciousness. Problem of the connexion of Mind and Body. Are Animals Automatons? Arguments for animal consciousness. Educability the most effective measure of conscious endowment. The great foundations of intelligence-Discrimination and Educability. Source and commencement of Reflex adjustments an insoluble issue. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. Diversity of meanings of the coupling of Consciousness with Self. Self-conscious as the sense of our own importance. Self-interest our collective life interests. Consciousness covers the Object as well as the Subject. The opposition of the two needs a qualification when the Object reference is excluded; the remainder signified by Self-consciousness. Feelings, Volitions, and Cognitions stated as Self-consciousness-an overstepping of the proper province of Consciousness, as the expression of the passing phases of our mental being. Self-consciousness given as the highest fact we know, and best key to the ultimate nature of existence as a whole-a new departure in the widening of its significance. Self-knowledge, perhaps, meant to be limited to Mind alone, as distinct from the body, although inseparable from it; the body being an incumbrance. Consciousness no help in the controversy as to Reality as against Appearance. The critical examination of Self-consciousness' soon ceases to be a matter of pure Psychology.

THE process of Definition may be supposed by this time to have been exhaustively handled. This is so far true in theory, although derelictions in practice are frequent enough. In Reid's preliminary chapter to his first Essay on the Intellectual Powers, the nature of definition is stated in accordance with the usage of logicians; while yet he is convicted by Hamilton of confounding verbal and real definition. The following note (p. 220) is appended by Hamilton to his remark that individuals cannot be defined. "It is well said by the old logicians, Omnis intuitiva notitia est definitio ;that is, a view of the thing itself is its best definition. And this is true, both of the objects of sense, and of the objects of self-consciousness." Which of the old logicians originated this formula I cannot say; I have never seen it quoted in any other place. Hamilton's rendering, strictly interpreted, gives

it a somewhat limited scope. He would seem to mean by it the actual presentation to sense of the thing to be defined; an interpretation, however, incompatible with his including the objects of self-consciousness: these, it is well known, cannot be shown except in a roundabout, indirect fashion.

It is now generally understood that definition is inapplicable to ultimate notions; a limitation, however, not observed hitherto by our dictionary makers. A further limitation is the case of notions in their nature composite or derivative, but not explicable by means of their components. Thus Life, Death, Health, Disease, Combustion cannot be defined except by reference to concrete examples known to those addressed. Considering, then, definition in its wider and vaguer meaning of rendering intelligible truths conveyed by language,—as, in fact, an instrument of popular explanation rather than a process of science, its scope might be assigned under the operation of bringing about an agreement among different persons as to the thing denoted by a given name. If, from any circumstances, people in general conceive precisely alike what is intended by the use of a given word, that word is defined for the purposes of mutual understanding, and for the explication of any complex meanings wherein it plays a part. That there are many such names, is shown by the possibility of addressing intelligent discourse to large masses of mankind. No doubt, in technical and abstruse subjects, names are used belonging to the ordinary vocabulary of life, but with certain special restrictions, which have to be previously comprehended by the listeners to instruction in those subjects. Indeed, in every department of knowledge that has been reduced to scientific form, it is necessary to prepare an introduction, in order that. the names employed may be freed from any indistinctness contracted in popular usage. The expositor of a science gladly avails himself of all such names as have no ambiguity in themselves, that is, are understood, in exactly the same way, by all the persons that have to be addressed. Such words would be the suitable medium of explication of difficult. and abstruse terms that otherwise are not clearly or unambiguously interpreted.

The foregoing observations are more or less applicable to the entire vocabulary of Mind as employed in Psychology. A certain number of terms belonging to that vocabulary are self-explaining and need no definition; the sole and sufficient reason being that they refer to facts or phenomena so familiar, and so little ambiguous, that we are all at one as to their meaning. They become therefore the stepping stones to the definition or explanation of the other class of terms, still more numerous--those expressing important generalities of high range, and more or less abstruse signification, for which all the sources of methodical definition are requisite. We shall exemplify both kinds, after stating the exact drift of the present article, which is to be occupied with the consideration of the leading term "Consciousness".

For many purposes, and on numerous occasions, this word is remarkably free from ambiguity, as well as being intelligible to ordinary understandings. It, however, becomes involved in a number of subtle and difficult problems; and thereby takes on applications not so easy to unravel. Its import is so wide, that it seems to include in its grasp the whole of our mental life; being a sort of generic word under which our various mental functions are so many species. Such being the case, we might readily suppose that all the great psychological issues are bound up with it. Yet, great though its scope may be, there are good reasons for not making it the central term of all Psychology; as will become apparent in the course of our examination of its sphere. We propose to show that there are certain definite issues better connected with the name than with any other name; while we shall have occasion to allude to certain problems more properly and advantageously associated with a different selection from the vocabulary.

Let me now briefly exemplify the two classes of terms formerly alluded to, as entering into the vocabulary of mind. Among those of the first class-universally understood in the same sense the foremost to be quoted is the all-important couple, Pleasure and Pain. Assuming that we are so far observant of what goes on in our introspective consciousness as to be aware that we are at times pleased, and at other times

pained, we find ourselves in agreement with one another upon these facts of our experience. We do not confound a pleasure with a pain, nor with a state of mind that is neither the one nor the other. The properties of the Object world, with all their explicitness, are scarcely more clear or less mistakable than these two leading properties of our truly mental life; consequently, by the use of those terms, which need no definition in themselves, we can introduce exactness of meaning into the less certain terminology of the Mind.

Another unambiguous fact of the Subject world is the process known as Discrimination, Sense of Difference, Feeling of Difference, Consciousness of Difference; all which designations belong to our strictly mental operations, and express something that cannot be mistaken or confounded with anything else,say Pleasure and Pain. This, too, is above the necessity of being defined; it is intuitively known and is so specific and clear that it means the same to all intelligent beings.

The operation named Feeling of Resemblance, Similarity, Recognition, Sense of Agreement, is also a perfectly definite fact of our mental nature, which we do not confound with anything else. When we say that two things are to our apprehension similar, we indicate a truly mental act, and our hearers accept the statement precisely as we intend that they should.

Another name that represents a well understood process, which we take note of from early years, and find ourselves at one with our neighbours upon, is the process called Memory, Remembering, Retaining in the Mind. This is a process truly mental, highly distinct and characteristic, and serving to cover a very large part of our mental being. Our language provides numerous equivalents or synonyms for this grand function, and most of them are intelligible and unequivocable. Such are, Learning, Forgetting, Acquiring, Getting by Heart, Lessons, Drill, and so on. The use of any one of those names conveys to all hearers a familiar fact of their experience; they need no dictionary definition, they carry within themselves a reference to each one's familiar experience, and are understood accordingly.