I trust that the basis proposed above will be acceptable to you and trust you will notify me so that I may make the necessary preliminary arrangements for reconvening the Joint Commission.

I. GENERAL CHISTIAKOV TO GENERAL HODGE

HODGE

February 28, 1947.

Confirming the receipt of your letter of December 24, 1946, it is with satisfaction I note that as a result of our correspondence the positions of both sides have actually drawn closer together.

1. I take note of your declaration that you are ready to accept as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission, the proposals set forth in my letter dated November 26, 1946. I agree with your interpretation of proposal number 1, bearing in mind that the matter may not and must not be confined merely to expressions of good intentions to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on the part of those parties and organizations which will sign the declaration contained in Communique Number 5. Subsequent action of these parties and organizations who have signed the above mentioned declaration, and consequently have accepted the obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, likewise must be consonant with that obligation.

2. In reference to paragraph number 2 of my proposals, I should like to explain that the Soviet Delegation considers it expedient that parties and organizations which will take part in consultation with the Joint Commission be informed beforehand that they must not designate for consultation such representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

Bearing this in mind, and taking into consideration your observations, I propose the following wording for paragraph number 2: "A party or organization signatory to the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 has the right to appoint such a representative who in its opinion can best present to the Joint Commission its views regarding the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, and who has not compromised himself by activity voicing opposition to that decision. However, if the appointed representative, for completely valid reasons, be considered antagonistic toward the fulfillment of the Moscow decision or toward either of the Allied powers, then the Joint Commission, following mutual agreement, may demand that the party having made such a statement (declaration) should designate another representative in his place.'

3. I agree with your wording of proposal number 3. I assume, however, that by the concept "individuals" shall be understood representatives of parties and social organizations invited to participate in consultations in accordance with the provisions set forth in paragraph number 2 above.

I would deem it more expedient to substitute for the word "individuals" the words "and their representatives" with the result that the first sentence of your third proposal would be worded as follows: "Parties and social organizations and their representatives invited for consultations," etc. According to the text.

The remainder of the wording of this proposal is accepted by me without change,

4. Concerning your observations regarding the alleged existence of conflicts between paragraphs 9 and 10 of my letter, and the proposals set forth in that letter, I must say that I do not discern any such conflict.

I hope that agreement by us on the conditions of consultation will assure a speedy and successful resumption of the work of the Joint Commission (Korea's Independence, pp. 22-32).

21. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, APRIL 8, 1947-MAY 12, 1947

A. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

April 8, 1947.

I wish to call your attention to the situation in Korea. The representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States on the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission in Korea have been unable to make progress toward the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government. It has been nineteen months since the Japanese surrender, yet Korea has profited little. The country is divided into two zones. The Soviet Commander in Northern Korea has refused to permit freedom of movement and free economic exchange between these zones. This has precluded freely chosen political amalgamation of the Korean people and has resulted in grave economic distress.

The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following basic objectives:

(1) To assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a selfgoverning sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations.

(2) To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people. (3) To aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state.

The United States, in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, declared its determination that in due course Korea should become free and independent. The United Kingdom and the Republic of China were parties to the same declaration. The Cairo Declaration was specifically reaffirmed by the Three Powers in the Potsdam Decla ration, which defined terms for the Japanese surrender. The U.S.S.R. in its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, declared its adherence to these declarations.

Upon the surrender of Japan, United States and Soviet forces accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea in the areas respectively south and north of a line arbitrarily assigned for this purpose, the thirty-eighth degree parallel. This line of demarcation became in effect a boundary between zones of occupation. At the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. in Moscow in December, 1945, the serious consequences of the bizonal division of Korea were discussed and an agreement regarding Korea was reached and published in part three of the communiqué of the confer

ment.

The Republic of China subsequently subscribed to this agree

On March 20, 1946, the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission appointed under the terms of the Moscow Agreement met and began its task, as outlined in the agreement, of assisting in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government as a first step in assuring the establishment of an independent and sovereign Korean nation.

It was the hope of the Government of the United States that speedy action would be taken by the Joint Commission, a provisional Korean government would rapidly be established, the unfortunate results of the line of demarcation between the United States and the Soviet forces would be overcome and Korea could be started on the way to attaining an independent and democratic government.

Unfortunately the work of the Joint Commission became stalemated after a short time through the failure to agree on the definition of the word "democratic" as it pertained to the representatives of the parties and social organizations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement to be consulted by the Joint Commission in its task of assisting in the formation of a provisional government. As it became evident that no agreement could be reached at the time, the Joint Commission adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946.

The United States Commander in Korea has several times suggested to the Soviet Commander that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work.

However, the Soviet Commander has insisted on a formula which would result in eliminating the majority of representative Korean leaders from consultation as representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and has reiterated this position in a letter to the American Commander as recently as February 28, 1947. It has therefore been impossible to agree upon a basis for reconvening the Commission.

Now in April 1947, almost sixteen months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real progress made toward the implementation of that agreement.

In fulfillment of the intent of the Agreement and Declaration made at Moscow in December 1945, the Government of the United States desires to further the work of establishing a free and independent Korea without additional delay.

To this end I ask that our Governments agree to instruct our respective Commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. I further suggest that a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 be fixed for a review by the two Governments of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the United States, mindful of its obligations under the Moscow Agreement, sees no alternative to taking without further delay such steps in its zone as will advance the purposes of that agreement.

I am furnishing copies of this letter to the British and Chinese Governments.

B. THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

April 19, 1947. DEAR MR. MARSHALL: In reply to your letter of April 8 on the question of Korea, I am communicating the following:

At the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in December 1945, an agreement was reached which determined the policy of the three powers with respect to Korea. A basis for this agreement were the proposals of the Soviet Government, to which the Government of the U. S. A. also agreed, having consequently abandoned its first intention not to establish a National Korean Government in Korea. Moscow Agreement held the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government which could take all the necessary measures for the development of Korean industry, transport, agriculture and the national culture of the Korean people, to be a problem of primary importance.

The

Having made these proposals, the Soviet Government deemed that the unification of Korea under the leadership of the Korean National Government was the most important prerequisite for the restoration of Korea as an independent state and the establishment of bases for the development of the country on democratic principles.

The Soviet Government continues to adhere to this point of view and · insists on a steadfast implementation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, being certain that, on the basis of the execution of this agreement Korea would be successfully developed along democratic principles and would become an independent and prosperous state and an equal member of the United Nations.

However, the legislative program provided for Korea by the Moscow Agreement has not yet been carried out. A provisional democratic Korean Government has not been established. The work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, established for the purpose of collaborating in the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government was suspended as a result of the fact that the American delegation on this Commission took a stand contrary to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Furthermore, the American Command in southern Korea did not agree to a serious consideration of the proposals by the Soviet Command in northern Korea on the question of an economic exchange between the two zones, which made it impossible to reach an agreement on this question.

In the course of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission during the period from March to May, 1946, the Soviet delegation made every effort to effect the execution of the aforementioned agreement on Korea and, first of all, provide for a prompt establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government and for the unification of Korea under its leadership. However, the Soviet delegation met only with difficulties in this connection, but also with direct counteraction on the part of the American delegation. Basing itself on the agreement on Korea, which provides that the Joint Commission, in formulating its proposals, should consult Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Soviet delegation insisted on a wide-scale attraction of such parties and organizations to consultation with the Commission. The American delegation excluded participation by a whole series of large democratic organizations in southern Korea and

insisted on consultation with groups which had taken a stand in opposition to the Moscow Agreement, consultation with which, naturally could not facilitate the execution of this agreement. The American delegation included in the list of parties and organizations submitted by it for consultation with the Joint Commission, seventeen political parties and social groups of southern Korea which took a stand against the Moscow Agreement, and only three democratic parties which supported the agreement. The American delegation excluded such large democratic parties and social organizations as the All-Korean Labor Confederation, the All-Korean Peasant Union, the Korean National Revolutionary Party, the All-Korean Youth Union, etc., from participation in consultation. Deeming it impossible to agree to this position of the American delegation, the Soviet delegation nevertheless did its utmost to find a way to reach an agreed decision. This, howeveer, appeared impossible and the work of the Commission, on the suggestion of the American delegation, was curtailed.

The intolerance of the resulting situation is evident. As a result of this, as you know, it was necessary to take new measures in endeavoring to find a way out of such a situation.

The Soviet Commander in his relations with the American Commander endeavored to find a basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. As a result of an exchange of letters, there has been a considerable rapprochement of the points of view of both sides, which fact was noted by both commanders. It was expected that an agreement would soon be reached and the Joint Commission would begin its work very shortly. However, no reply has been received to date from the American Commander to the last letter of February 28, from the Soviet Commander and the proposed agreement was not reached. Disagreement of action was a serious obstacle for the opportune fulfillment of the program of measures proposed in the Moscow Agreement of Korea as a whole.

In connection with northern Korea, during the period beginning with the capitulation of Japan, considerable progress was made in the field of democratization, and also with respect to the restoration of national economy and culture. Wide democratic reforms have been made which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population. I have in mind, first of all, the introduction of an over-all electoral right; a law on equal rights for women; the establishment of local authority agencies and the People's Committee of Northern Korea on the basis of free democratic elections; land reform, as a result of which 725,000 landless peasant farmers and those having little land received more than 1 million hectares of free land, which formerly belonged to Japanese colonists and their accomplices in Korea; the nationalization of former Japanese industries, the 8 hour work-day, safeguarding of labor and social insurance; public educational reform, as a result of which the Korean language has been reestablished, the net work of schools was increased and the number of students was increased, etc. However, such wide democratic reforms have been carried out only in northern Korea, where there is only two-fifths of the population of Korea.

The Soviet Government, closely adhering in their policy toward Korea to the program planned in the Moscow Agreement, believes the following to be points of primary importance: