erant attitude towards the Tories was in part due to the circumstance that he, more justly than most, could understand, and even respect, the motives which had kept them steadfast in their loyalty to Great Britain. This circumstance points to a radical difference between Hamilton and other Americans. His nationalism was as strong and fervent as theirs; but it rested on another and in some respects a broader basis.

Meanwhile the Confederation was being tested. It is needless to recount here the humiliating events of the period from 1780 to 1787. At its close most citizens who had learned to think and feel "continentally" agreed with Hamilton that the Confederation was "neither fit for war nor peace." Disgrace and danger at last made the people ready to consider the propriety of strengthening the federal government. In the events which led to the Convention of 1787, Hamilton had a conspicuous and useful part. In the Convention itself he presented and in a powerful speech advocated an aristocratic and highly centralized form of government. Let us look at some of its features tenure of office for both the president and the senators of the United States was to be for life. They were to be chosen as now by electors, but these electors were themselves to be chosen by voters having a considerable property qualification. To the president was given an unqualified veto; that is, the president could prevent any measure from becoming law; in the Senate the exclusive right to declare war was vested. The national government was to appoint the governors of the states, and these, like the president, were to have an unqualified veto on state legislation.1

1 Vide Works I, 334. The grounds of Hamilton's views on government are indicated by the following quotations from the brief of his speech:

"Society naturally divides itself into two political divisions—the few and the many, who have distinct interests.

If government [is] in the hands of the few, they will tyrannize over the many. If [in] the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they should be separated.

This separation must be permanent.

Representation alone will not do.
Demagogues will generally prevail.

And if separated, they will need a mutual check.

So far as Hamilton took part in the debates of the Convention, his views were in accord with the principles embodied in this plan of government. His first impression of the constitution, and his forecast of the course of events in case of its adoption, may be gathered from a paper written within a few days after the close of the Convention :

If the government [he wrote] be adopted, it is probable General Washington will be the president of the United States. This will ensure a wise choice of men to administer the government and a good administration. A good administration will conciliate the confidence and affection of the people, and perhaps enable the government to acquire more consistency than the proposed constitution seems to promise for so great a country. It may then triumph altogether over the state governments, and reduce them to an entire subordination, dividing the larger states into smaller districts. The organs of the general government may also acquire additional strength.

If this should not be the case in the course of a few years, it is probable that the contests about the boundaries of power between the particular governments and the general government, and the momentum of the larger states in such contests, will produce a dissolution of the Union. This, after all, seems to be the most likely result.1

In 1780 Hamilton had occupied a position which the people were scarcely able to attain eight years later. In 1787 he occupied a position towards which the people were not progressing from which indeed their line of advance was steadily deviating. From this time onward the gulf between public opinion and his opinions was to widen constantly.

This check is a monarch.

Each principle ought to exist in full force, or it will not answer its end.
The democracy must be derived immediately from the people.

The aristocracy ought to be entirely separated; their power should be perma

nent. . . .

They should be so circumstanced that they can have no interest in a change - as to have an effectual weight in the constitution.” — Ibid. I, 357.

"Gentlemen say we need to be rescued from the democracy. But what [are] the means proposed?

A democratic Assembly is to be checked by a democratic Senate, and both these by a democratic chief magistrate.

The end will not be answered - the means will not be equal to the object.

It will, therefore, be feeble and inefficient." — Ibid. I, 359.

1 Works I, 402.

But in 1787 there was only one course which nationalists could pursue, and that was to support the proposed constitution. This Hamilton did in a way which, had he done nothing else for his country, would have made him one of the most famous and deserving of Americans. He wrote the greater portion of The Federalist, — the unique excellence of which is universally conceded, — and, by dint of courage and argument, he extorted a vote to ratify from the unfriendly convention of New York. His predictions respecting the presidency came true. Washington made a "wise choice of men to administer the government." As secretary of the Treasury Hamilton entered upon the great work of his life. Here for the first and only time in his career, the situation favored the freest exercise of his highest powers. Hitherto, with the single exception of his first youthful efforts, he had always been hampered by wide differences of view between himself and those with and for whom he worked. This was the case when he wrote The Continentalist, when he wrote the letters of Phocion, when he served in Congress and when he was a member of the Convention of 1787; and it remained true, although its effects were less apparent, during his labors to secure ratification. But at the head of the fiscal department of the administration, he found the situation radically changed. As compared with the earlier times he had, in spite of the growing divergence of view between himself and the people, a free hand. Behind him were Washington and the Federalists; before him was a task which, although great and difficult, or rather because of its greatness and difficulty,was to him infinitely attractive; the task, namely, of administering the new and reluctantly accepted national government in such a way as to make the nation itself united, strong, prosperous and respected.

All students of the Federalist period are acquainted with the admirable way in which Hamilton organized his department, and with that comprehensive financial policy which was a chief agency in restoring economic prosperity and in consolidating the Union. In this policy Hamilton provided for meeting in full existing national and state obligations; for easing the bur

den of payment by a wise funding scheme; for obtaining a national revenue as we are now doing, by means of imposts and excises; for aiding the operations of the Treasury and facilitating the credit transactions of the people through the establishment of a national bank; and for increasing the economic and thereby the political independence of the country through a protective policy. It would be difficult to overrate the far-reaching educational influence of these measures. There is one chapter in the history of certain American states which no one who cares for the good name of our people likes to read, the chapter, namely, which narrates the dealings of these states with their creditors. But when we read of repudiation by individual commonwealths, it is consoling and encouraging to remember the honorable course in respect to financial obligations which the national government has thus far pursued. This policy of public honesty was inaugurated by Hamilton. Other statesmen, it is true, and the general sense of the people were on his side; but he led the movement, and on him fell the heaviest blows of the truly formidable opposition. Probably no feature of his plan was attacked so often and so vehemently as the funding scheme; and yet, without this or its equivalent, adequate provision for the public indebtedness could not have been made. One of Hamilton's strongest motives for an honest public policy was the tendency it would have to make honesty and fair dealing elements of American character. In his First Report on the Public Credit, communicated to the House of Representatives January 14, 1790, he said:

In so strong a light... do they [the maxims which uphold public credit] appear to the secretary that on their due observance, at the present critical juncture, materially depends in his judgment the individual and aggregate prosperity of the citizens of the United States ; their relief from the embarrassments they now experience, their character as a people; the cause of good government.1

In the summer of 1792 (July 29) Washington sent Hamilton. a list of objections to the financial policy of the administration. These objections Colonel Mason of Virginia had communicated

1 Works II, 49, 50.

to the president, and it was supposed that they represented the views if not the authorship of Jefferson. To these Hamilton made reply on August 18. The paper is remarkable in many ways. The answers to the twenty-one objections were prepared in haste and were copied, so Hamilton wrote Washington in the accompanying note, "just as they flowed from my heart and pen without revision or correction." For this very reason their value as a portrayal of opinions and character is all the greater. In meeting the twentieth objection, that "the owners. of the debt are in the Southern, and the holders of it in the Northern division," Hamilton made the dignified and characteristic reply:

If this were literally true, it would be no argument for or against anything. It would be still politically and morally right for the debtors to pay their creditors.1

Hamilton recognized to the full the immense value of credit both in national and private economy; and he recognized further that character, moral as well as industrial, is the most solid and durable foundation of credit. Moreover, in order to estimate justly both the difficulty and the value of his service to the moral and economic welfare of the American people, it is necessary to remember that he lived in a revolutionary age, when the influences which tend to weaken the sense of obligation are unusually active and powerful. That Hamilton's ideal of public honesty was higher than the popular ideal, and that his courage and firmness in supporting his ideal were remarkable, will hardly be questioned by those who realize the demoralization which followed the close of the Revolutionary War- a demoralization which led to and was increased by the stay laws and legal tender acts, which in many states debauched the conscience of the citizen then in much the same way that state repudiation has debauched it in more recent times. It would however be wide of the mark to assert that the opposition to Hamilton was due in any considerable degree to his championship of national honesty. The dislike aroused by the funding scheme and by other features of his policy rested in 1 Works II, 274.