bubble gave birth to offspring like itself, 'let us but subscribe to something; anything is better than nothing at all.' I hold those persons to be incautious who give in at once to the spirit doctrine, and never stop to imagine the possibility of unknown power other than disembodied intelligence. But I am sure that this calling in of the departed spirit, because they do not know what else to fix it upon, may be justified by those who do it, upon the example of the philosophers of our own day. Some flints are found in what they call the drift, curiously cut, and, for various reasons believed to owe their shape to agents different from those which give other flints their multitudinous configurations. These queer-shaped things are tolerably like the tools of savages. The geologists do not hesitate a moment: these are the works of men, and the whole history of the human race must shift its basis. And why are these flints the works of men? I can learn nothing but what amounts to this, that the geologist does not see what else they can be. He calls in his higher power the moment he wants to steady his mind upon an explanation: as to waiting a while for further knowledge, that would not suit the hunger of the theory-bag. At last human remains are found, in positions which favour the supposition that we have got the bones of those who owned the axes, as well as the axes themselves. Does this provoke new inquiry into the epoch of these remains? With a few it may, but not with the many. The rapid arrival at conclusions is as conspicuous among the geologists as among the spiritualists. For reasons above given, both are in the right track. So soon as any matter excites warm discussion and lively curiosity, attempts at imposition commence. Some forged flints-perhaps also bones-have certainly been put into the drift; and some forged spirits have made their communi cations. The philosophical world is of easy belief in fraud: they can credit any amount of skill and ingenuity, provided only that what they cannot otherwise explain, except unpalatably, may be thereby shown to be trick. If it were meted to them in their own measure it would go hard with their characters but the outer world is not so unreasonable as they are; and of this they get the benefit. I do not wish to be understood as discouraging suspicion; my own admissions show that I ought to stand up for the keenest scrutiny. What I reprobate is, not the wariness which widens and lengthens inquiry, but the assumption which prevents or narrows it; the imposture theory, which frequently infers imposture from the assumed impossibility of the phenomena asserted, and then alleges imposture against the examination of the evidence. And further, when I speak of the 'philosophical world,' I make a reference which needs. special explanation, and a good deal of it. There are four courts of the mind, if the phrase may be used. First, for the strict reasoning of the exact sciences, purely mathematical or purely logical, resting on those universally acknowledged laws for which consciousness has only to examine itself. I speak not merely of conclusions which require thought and learning, but also of the assents which all persons give to maxims of common life; whether synthetical, as that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; or analytical, as that none are left when all are gone. Secondly, for the evidence of the senses to things which are. Thirdly, for the authority of others, as to principles which can be made certain, if true; or the testimony of others, as to things or events which can be known, if they really exist or actually happened. Fourthly, for principles which are presented as more or less obvious, ' but not capable of the absolute demonstration of logic or mathematics. The first three courts are. peaceable and quiet places of business: the fourth is half the battle ground of the greatest human differences, ambiguity in meaning of words being the other half. I do not include experience, which is a compound usually of perception and testimony. Absolute demonstration, perception by the senses, and the testimony of others (a word which may include authority, when properly used), are the three things by which conclusions may be obtained from without. But in each of the three we may be deceived, now and then and in each of the three we seek the protection of the plural number. A mathematician knows that, when his demonstration is complicated and lengthy, he is glad to fortify himself by another, conducted on a different principle. In matters of sense, there are many cases in which touch, smell, or hearing, are called in to confirm the sight, or vice versa. We all know the overpowering effect of the second witness. And yet in all three cases there may be collusion. The second demonstration may contain the faulty point of the first in a different form; the two senses may in mania it would seem they sometimes do-back each other in deceiving the mind; and two witnesses may be speaking in fraudulent concert. Nevertheless, all deductions made, demonstration, perception, and testimony, are our three supports; and, in at least ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, neither of them leaves reasonable doubt, when applied to matters within its scope, and when not opposed by one of the same kind, or by one of the others. It is far otherwise with the fourth court of human knowledge, the principle, the thing which must be, the dictum of common sense, what nobody can deny, the impress of nature on our minds, &c. &c. &c. Out of this court comes all phi losophy except exact science; all morals except what is founded on belief in human testimony, bearing witness to actual revelation; and no mean portion of all other conclusions. And from this court comes all denial of what I have said about this court. I am speaking of what cannot be established either by demonstration, sense, or testimony: and the fourth court, name it by what name you will, is the giver of law to what I call the 'philosophical world.' I may be supposed to define 'philosophy' as being the handling of all that cannot be proved either by pure logic applied to uncontroverted* postulates, by the senses, or by testimony: there is much to be said for this definition, but here I am only concerned with it as being the best way of describing a world which delights to call itself' philosophical,' and to which I am ready to concede the name on my own terms. This world must be distinguished, on the one hand, from the very small world which cultivates true philosophy in a manner which leads them towards that acquired ignorance, that docta ignorantia, of which Nicolas of Cusa-to whom I suppose we owe the phrase-says 'quanto in hac ignorantia profundius docti fuerimus: tanto magis ad ipsam accedemus veritatem.' It must be distinguished, on the other hand, from that very large world, nearly all the rest of society, which the school I speak of is sometimes falsely accused of corrupting. Falsely: for the truth is that my philosophers those of whom I speakare guilty of no more than methodical cultivation of a propensity of our nature: and we must not describe as part of their crop the weeds which would have grown if they had never handled a spade. They are those who have reduced human * Uncontroverted, not incontrovertible. The undenied is one thing; the undeniable is another. People pass over the first, and fight about the second. infirmity to a system. They are of every kind of pursuit, and of every kind of temperament: they are not to be judged as a body by those who stand out offensively, and who are a trifle more respectable than the others. Conspicuous among the mass, a minority very considerable in number, and unreproved by the rest, are the set who do the looking down from a higher sphere, with smiles of contempt and eyes of pity, when they meet with a man or woman who sets their trite saws at naught; the supernal part of whose mission it is to be useful to reasonable persons by accustoming them to the practice of courtesy * under difficulties. These are the brighter lights of the system; the others are more reserved: they hide their candle under a bushel in the company of those who are not afraid of the craft, and remove the covering when they get among their own set, where they back the bites of their bolder comrades, and bite the backs of their opponents. The difference, such as it is, is a distinction: but a Mussulman is a Mussulman, whether sunny or shy. I should be very loath to say that the whole of this 'philosophy' is ignorance: there is a part of it which is always craving a hearing, and comes recommended by the attribute quod semper, quod ubique. We have for instance to take - * Why do not these people take to writing doctrinal novels? There is a satirist who would be an odious prig if he were to come forward in person, with nothing but his infallible judgments, and his sneers at public men who differ from them. But he joins his own better nature to what would otherwise be insufferable insolence, by putting his opinions into the mouth of a genial parson of the old school, who lubricates dogmatism with port wine, and hates Lord Brougham and a supper of nothing but sandwiches on a common principle. And so he produces what is exquisite reading. His method has the advantage of allowing what philosophy seldom allows, the influence of years upon stiffness of opinion and roughness of manner. Dr. Folliot and Dr. Opimian, as from one hand at different times, are worth comparing together. |