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(162 N.E.)

streets, confirmed for $20,003, and to a first mortgage of $74,000 to the State Bank of Chicago, trustee, $5,000 payable on or before July 3, 1925. The contract contained the following provisions:

"Any money disbursed by the vendor for any of the following reasons shall be an additional charge upon the property, and one-quarter (4) thereof shall be assumed by the purchasers as additional money due the vendor over and above the amount already stipulated as payable by them on or before July 1, 1926, and shall bear interest at the rate of six (6%) per cent. per annum, payable semiannually, from the date of said disbursements. (1) The vendor is hereby authorized by the purchasers to pay any amounts on account of the principal of the first mortgage hereinbefore mentioned, either as installments thereof become due or to procure releases of parts or parcels of the premises herein described, and also to pay all interest due thereon whenever the same becomes due and payable; (2) to pay all general taxes, special taxes and special assessments which become due on any date hereafter; (3) to install and pay for, whenever it may be necessary or advisable, any improvements such as sidewalk, sewer, water mains, gas mains, and electric light service. The vendor is also expressly authorized by the purchasers to at any time make any plat or plats of subdivision of any part or all of the above described premises; to sell by deed or contract, at any price that he may see fit, any part or parcel of said premises: Provided, however, that the purchasers are credited with onequarter (4) of the proceeds of any such sale, and to lease any part or parts of the above described premises at any rental that in his judgment he may deem sufficient, provided the purchasers are credited with one-quarter thereof."

It does not appear from appellant's bill what sum of money was due Colnon under this contract on July 1, 1926, or that the tender alleged to have been made "at the time of maturity" was for the full amount then due Colnon under the contract. There is no allegation in the amended bill that Colnon had not, prior to the time of bringing the suit, disposed of the property in question and accounted to appellant for the proceeds thereof. There is no allegation in the amended bill that appellant has complied with all the requirements of the contract on his part to be performed, or that he has been at all times ready, able, and willing to perform all the terms of the contract on his part to be performed. The amended bill prays that Colnon may be decreed to make a good and sufficient deed of conveyance to complainant of the premises described in the amended bill. The amended bill does not, upon its face, show that appellant is entitled to relief thereunder, and, appellant having elected to stand by it, the circuit court did not err in dismissing it for want of equity.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.

(331 111. 20)

PEOPLE v. WELCH. (No. 18684.) Supreme Court of Illinois. June 23, 1928.

1. Statutes 107(3), 118(1)-Act relating to state farm held not invalid as embracing more than one subject and for failure to contain subjects in title (Laws 1923, p. 481).

Act (Laws 1923, p. 481) entitled "An act in relation to the Illinois state farm" held not invalid as embracing more than one subject and because subjects contained in act are not expressed in title.

2. Statutes 141(1)—Act relating to state farm held not invalid as attempting to amend other acts by reference to their titles (Laws 1923, p. 481).

nois state farm, held not invalid as attempting Act (Laws 1923, p. 481), in relation to Illito amend other acts by reference to their titles.

3. Criminal law 1218-Commitment to state farm under act which repealed act creating state farm held not void, where state farm was continued as penal institution (Laws 1923, p. 481, repealing Laws 1917, p. 223, as amended by Laws 1921, p. 833; Laws 1923, p. 481, § 1).

Commitment to state farm under act (Laws 1923, p. 481), which repealed act creating state farm, Laws 1917, p. 223, as amended by Laws 1921, p. 833, held not void because act creating state farm was repealed, since section 1 of act 1923 provided that state farm should be continued as one of penal institutions of state.

4. Fines 11-Commitment to state farm until fine and costs were paid for possession of intoxicating liquor held authorized (Laws 1923, p. 481).

Where defendant was fined for possession of intoxicating liquor, judgment committing him to state farm under Laws 1923, p. 481, until fine and costs were paid, held authorized.

5. Criminal law 984-Where counts In Information charged separate offenses, judgment on each count was separate judgment as regards necessity of sentence.

Where two counts of information charged separate offenses of selling and possessing intoxicating liquor, judgment on each of counts was separate judgment as regards necessity of sentence.

6. Fines 11-Judgment committing defendant to state farm until fine levied was paid held erroneous, where period of confinement could not be determined (Laws 1923, p. 481).

Where defendant, pleading guilty to sale and possession of liquor, was committed to state farm under Laws 1923, p. 481, under judgment providing that he should be confined on first count, and that on second count he should pay fine and costs, and that in default of payment he should be committed to state farm until fine and costs were fully paid, but not for period to exceed six months, held that judgment was erroneous, since no period of confinement was fixed under first count; hence it was impossible

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162 N.E.-8

to determine either commencement or termina- 1921 (Laws 1921, p. 833) the Legislature tion of sentence under second count.

Farmer, J., dissenting.

amended the act, authorizing the transfer to the state farm of male offenders above the age of sixteen years whose offense was pun

Error to Lee County Court; William L. ishable by confinement in the penal instituLeech, Judge.

Arthur Welch was convicted for sale and

possession of intoxicating liquor, and he brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

M. J. Gannon and Elwin M. Bunnell, both of Dixon, for plaintiff in error.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., Mark C. Keller, State's Atty., of Dixon, and Roy D. Johnson, of Springfield, for the People.

STONE, J. Plaintiff in error was charged,

in an information of two counts filed in the county court of Lee county, with violation of the prohibition act. By the first count he was charged with the sale of intoxicating liquor, and in the second count with possession thereof. He entered a plea of guilty on December 14, 1927, and was sentenced under the following judgment:

"It is therefore ordered by the court that the said defendant, on the first count of the said information, be and he hereby is sentenced to be confined on the Illinois state farm at Vandalia, Ill., and further, that on the second count of said information the said defendant be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and the costs of these proceedings, and that, in the default of the payment of said fine and costs, he be committed to the said Illinois state farm at Vandalia, Ill., until said fine and costs are fully paid, but not for a period to exceed six months. It is further ordered that confinement under the second count of said information be commenced immediately upon the completion of the sentence imposed under the first count of the said information."

Thereafter a motion was made to vacate the judgment and for leave to plead, which was denied. Plaintiff in error brings the cause here for review.

Plaintiff in error contends, first, the act creating the Illinois state farm is invalid because it embraces more than one subject, and the subjects contained in the act are not expressed in the title; second, the act creating the state farm is invalid because it attempts to amend other acts by reference to their titles; third, the judgment committing plaintiff in error until the fine and costs are paid is void, indefinite, and in excess of the authority of the court; and, fourth, the act creating the state farm was repealed in 1923, and the order of commitment is therefore void.

[1, 2] The act creating the state farm was first passed in 1917 and was entitled "An act to create a state farm." Laws 1917, p. 223. This act authorized male offenders above sixteen years of age, found guilty of an offense which was punishable by confinement in the county jail, workhouse, or house of correction, to be committed to the state farm. In

tions of the state, and who might be eligible for parole. In 1923 the act of 1917 was repealed, and a new, complete act was adopted in its place. The title of the act of 1923, is, "An act in relation to the Illinois state farm." Laws 1923, p. 481. Section 1 provides that the state farm shall be continued as one of the penal institutions of the state.

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The objections raised to the constitutionality of the act by plaintiff in error's first and second points were considered by this court in the case of People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 160 N. E. 836, and the validity of the act was there sustained.

[3] Plaintiff in error's fourth objection-that is, that the act creating the state farm was repealed in 1923, and therefore there is no authorization for an order of commitment to the state farm-was also considered in People v. Landers, supra. It was there held that, while the act of 1923 repealed the act of 1917, yet in the interpretation of that act the court is permitted to refer to the earlier act relating to the same subject. Section 1 of the act of 1923 declares that the state farm, as created in the act of 1917, shall be continued as one of the penal institutions of the state. Plaintiff in error's fourth contention, therefore, cannot be sustained.

[4-6] Concerning the third point-that is, that the judgment committing the defendant until the fine and costs are paid is void, indefinite, and in excess of the authority of the court-counsel for plaintiff in error present two arguments. The first is, that the law does not authorize the court to commit a defendant to the farm until fine and costs are paid. This question was considered by this court in the case of People v. Lavendowski, 329 III. 223, 160 N. E. 582, and there decided contrary to the contention of plaintiff in error. The second argument is, that the judgment and order of commitment are so indefinite as to make it impossible to ascertain when the sentence under the first count will expire and confinement under the sentence on the second count begin. The judgment on each count of the information was a separate judgment. People v. Holton, 326 III. 481, 158 N. E. 134; People v. Brush, 324 Ill. 261, 155 N. E. 34. It will be noted that the order of commitment provides "that the defendant, on the first count of the said information, be and he hereby is sentenced to be confined on the Illinois state farm at Vandalia, Ill." This is the sentence imposed under the first count. No period of confinement is fixed. While the sentence under the second count is that the defendant pay a fine of $1,000 and stand committed to the state farm until the fine and costs are paid, but not for a period to exceed six months, these provisions relate only to

(162 N.E.)

the judgment under the second count. There is nothing in the record by which it may be determined when the commitment under the first count expires. It necessarily follows that it is likewise impossible to determine either the commencement or termination of the sentence under the second count.

The judgment was therefore erroneous, and is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the court to enter a proper, definite judgment under each count of the infor

mation.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

FARMER, J., dissents.

(331 III. 129)

CITY OF CHICAGO v. JENSEN.
(No. 17988.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. June 23, 1928. Municipal corporations

592(1)-Statute covering subject of beauty culture held to repeal power city had to regulate and license beauty culture (Cahill's Rev. St. 1927, c. 16b, par. 15 et seq.).

Cahill's Rev. St. 1927, c. 16b, par. 15 et seq., covering whole subject of beauty culture, un

der which license obtained is good throughout state, held to repeal any power city of Chicago may have had to regulate and license beauty culture, and defendant could not be convicted for operating beauty parlor without license required by city ordinance.

Commissioners' Opinion.

ute. The court found her guilty of violating the ordinance, assessed a fine of $10 and costs, and an appeal has been prosecuted to this court, the trial court having certified that the validity of an ordinance is involved and that the public interest requires that the question be reviewed.

It will be unnecessary to consider the provisions of the ordinance, or whether the city had authority, in the first instance, to pass it, for the reason that the state has assumed jurisdiction over beauty culture and has provided for its regulation and license.

The ordinance which appellant was charged with violating defined what should constitute beauty parlors and required a $10 license fee for operating such. It provided how the license should be obtained and that all licenses should expire December 31 each year. It provided for the revocation of licenses and for the regulation of the sanitary conditions of the premises in which the occupation was conducted. There was no provision in the ordinance for the examination of applicants, and the license could only be good within the city. On July 1, 1925, a statute went into effect (Cahill's Stat. 1927, p. 164) which covers the whole subject of beauty culture. It defines what shall constitute the practice, how a license shall be obtained, provides for the examination, registration, and qualifications of applicants, under what jurisdiction the law shall be administered, and a license fee of from $1 to $5 is fixed. It provides how long the license shall be valid, when it shall expire, and how it may be renewed. The license is good throughout

Appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; the state. Matthew D. Hartigan, Judge.

Anna Jensen was convicted of violating an ordinance requiring a license to operate a beauty parlor, and she appeals. Reversed.

William A. Bither, of Chicago, for appel

lant.

PARTLOW, C. Appellant, Anna Jensen, was arrested upon a warrant issued out of the municipal court of Chicago charging her with operating a beauty parlor without a license, contrary to the provisions of an ordinance of the city of Chicago. A jury was waived, she was tried by the court upon a stipulation which provided that on February 19, 1926, she was conducting a business in the city in which she did hairdressing, consisting of marcelling and giving permanent and other waves, and tinting and dyeing hair; that she operated a cosmetic or physical therapeutic establishment as defined in the ordinance, outside of a regularly licensed hospital or dispensary; that she did not have a license as provided by the ordinance, but she did have a certificate or license from the department of education and registration of the state of Illinois, as provided by stat

In Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 58 N. E. 1004, 80 Am. St. Rep. 182, the city of Chicago passed an ordinance which provided for a license of $30 per year for master plumbers. A statute was subsequently passed providing for the licensing of plumbers and for the supervision and inspection of The ordinance was in conflict plumbing. with the statute. This court held that while

the Legislature may delegate power to a municipality to grant a license for a particular occupation and exact a license fee therefor, it may at any time take away such power and the state may resume the exercise of the power; that the Legislature may repeal or amend any of the provisions of the act for the incorporation of cities and villages at pleasure, and if the provisions of the statute are inconsistent with the powers conferred on the city, the statute will operate as a repeal or amendment of the powers so conferred upon the city; that a city, as a subordinate political authority, cannot interfere with the validity or force of a license issued by the state under a statute; that the statute controls the whole subject-matter.

The statute repealed any power the city

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may have had to regulate and license beauty culture; the judgment convicting appellant was erroneous, and it will be reversed.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion reported by Mr. Commissioner PARTLOW is hereby adopted as the opinion of the court, and judgment is entered in accordance therewith.

Judgment reversed.

(831 Ill. 65)

HAMER-PASKINS CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (No. 18690.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. June 23, 1928.

1. Master and servant 403-To entitle dependent to award under Compensation Act, evidence must show claimant was dependent on employee's earnings at time of injury; "dependency" (Workmen's Compensation Act).

To entitle a dependent to an award under Workmen's Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 48, §§ 138-172), evidence must show that at time of injury claimant was dependent on earnings of employee, since state of "dependency" is present, existing relation between two persons where one is sustained by

the other or relies on aid of the other for his means of living.

[Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Dependency.]

2. Master and servant 388-Where employee's mother was not dependent at time of his death, but anticipated dependency, she could not recover compensation (Workmen's Compensation Act).

Where employee's mother was not dependent on him at time of his death, but made claim

by reason of an anticipation of dependency if her husband died, she could not recover compensation, under Workmen's Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 48, §§ 138-172), since anticipation of dependency and contribution for support is not within terms of statute.

HEARD, J. Plaintiff in error by leave of this court has brought here for review the record of the circuit court of Cook county confirming an award of the Industrial Commission against plaintiff in error in favor of Lena Siedschlag, as dependent mother of Fred Bosshart.

Fred Bosshart met his death on the 10th day of September, 1926, in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the plaintiff in error, the Hamer-Paskins Company. He was unmarried at the time of his death and had no brothers or sisters and no relatives except his natural mother. He was an illegitimate or natural son of Lena Bosshart, now Lena Siedschlag, defendant in error. His father was Ted Rueff. His parents were never married and he was reared by an aunt in Switzerland. Subsequently to his birth his mother came to this country and was married to Siedschlag, her present husband. Since 1910 she has lived with her husband on a farm in Osnabrook. N. D. At the time of Bosshart's death she and her husband were living on this farm of 320 acres, which they had rented for onehalf of the proceeds. She did the housework, attended to the garden, potatoes, cows, chickens, and did the other work of a farmer's wife in that community, while her husband worked in the field. They were not in debt, and, as she expressed it, "made a daily living and can just about get by." Her husband had good credit at the bank, and she testified that there was no one up there that denied her credit. In 1926 they had about 250 acres in crops, milked four cows daily, and had 400 chickens. She testified that she was not dependent on her son at the time of his death, but that, if her husband should die, then she would be, and that the reason she was making a claim was that, if her husband died, she would not have any one to take care of her, but that her husband's health was good so far. Deceased had lived with his mother five years prior to November 23, 1925, at which time he went to Michigan, where he worked for a time, and then went to Chicago, where he was working at the time of his death. After leaving home he

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Vic- sent his mother $50 in the middle of Decemtor P. Arnold, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Lena Siedschlag, claimant, for the death of her son, Fred Bosshart, against the Hamer-Paskins Company, employer. The Industrial Commission made an award, which was affirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error. Reversed.

ber, 1925, $50 in March, 1926, $30 in July, 1926, and $20 in August, 1926. This money she used for clothing and for such other purposes as she saw fit.

[1, 2] Plaintiff in error claims, first, that the mother of an illegitimate son cannot be dependent, under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois (SmithHurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 48, §§ 138-172), upon her natural son; and, second, that on the McKenna & Harris, of Chicago, for plain- facts of this case there was in fact no partial tiff in error. dependency. In the view which we take of Murphy O. Tate, of Chicago, for defendant this case it is not necessary to discuss or dein error. cide the first question. The state of depend

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(162 N.E.)

benefit which street improvement will confer on property having restricted use is increased value for restricted use.

Where property is restricted by grant or statute to particular use from which it cannot improvement devoted to restricted use, true legally be diverted, and property is at time of measure of benefit which street improvement will confer is increased value of property for restricted use.

4. Municipal corporations 466-Benefit from local improvement to property voluntarily devoted to private use extends to any use to which property is adapted.

ency is a present, existing relation between 3. Municipal corporations 467-Measure of two persons where the one is sustained by the other or relies on the aid of the other for his means of living. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 329 Ill. 494, 160 N. E. 833. To entitle a dependent to an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the evidence must show that at the time of the injury the claimant was dependent upon the earnings of the employee. An anticipation of dependency and a contribution for support, although it may be reasonably expected, is not within the terms of the statute, which furnishes the rule by which the right of a claimant shall be determined. Wasson Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 312 Ill. 241, 143 N. E. 584. In the instant case the evidence does not show that Mrs. Siedschlag at the time of her son's death was sustained by him or relied upon his aid for her means of living, but, on the contrary, it shows that while he had sent her some money during the year prior to his death, she was in fact supported by her husband, and that she herself did not consider that she was dependent upon her son at the time of his death, but was only making the claim by reason of an anticipation that her husband might die.

Defendant in error's state of dependency not existing at the time of her son's death, the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

(331 III. 58)

CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS v. AMERICAN
ASPHALT ROOF CORPORATION et al.
(No. 18739.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. June 23, 1928.
1. Appeal and error 1005(4), 1012(1)-
Finding or approved verdict on question
whether property was assessed more than ben-
efited by street improvement is conclusive,
unless palpably against evidence.

On review of question whether property has been assessed more than it will be benefited by paving and improving system of streets, jury's verdict, approved by trial judge, or trial court's finding, will not be disturbed, unless it is palpably against weight of evidence.

2. Municipal corporations 502 (3)—In proceedings to confirm street assessment, evidence held to support finding that objectors' property was not assessed more than benefited.

In proceeding for confirmation of special assessment to pay cost of paving and improving system of streets in manufacturing district, evidence held sufficient to justify jury's verdict that property of objectors had not been assessed more than benefited.

Where land is voluntarily devoted to private use, which may be changed at any time, benefit derived from local improvement is not confined to owner's present use of property, but extends to any use to which property is adapted.

Appeal from City Court of East St. Louis; Silas Cook, Judge.

Petition by the City of East St. Louis for the confirmation of a special street assessment. Objections were filed by the American Asphalt Roof Corporation and others, and, from an adverse judgment, the objectors appeal. Affirmed.

Wheeler & Oehmke, of East St. Louis (William C. Dunham, of East St. Louis, of counsel), for appellants.

Dan McGlynn, Jr., of East St. Louis, for appellee.

DeYOUNG, C. J. The city of East St. Louis filed a petition in the city court of that city for the confirmation of a special assessment to pay the cost of paving and improving a system of streets. Objections were filed by the American Asphalt Roof Corporation, the Stormcote Roofing Corporation, and R. P. Munger, owners of certain lots assessed for the proposed improvement. The legal objections were overruled. The objectors waived the question whether their lots were assessed more than their proportionate shares of the cost of the improvement. The objection that the lots were assessed more than they would be benefited was tried by a jury, and the verdict was adverse to the contention of the objectors. Motions for a new trial were denied, judgment was rendered on the verdict, and the objectors prosecute this appeal.

The streets, portions of which it is proposed to improve, are Renshaw, Summit, College, and Ohio avenues, and Twenty-Sixth, Twenty-Ninth, Thirty-First, Thirty-Second, Thirty-Third and Thirty-Fifth streets, in the city of East St. Louis. The American Asphalt Roof Corporation owns lots 1 to 6, inclusive, in block 2 of North Renshaw place. These lots are numbered from north to south, face west on Thirty-First street, and have a depth of 120 feet. Lot 1, which is separated from the right of way of the Louisville &

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