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according action activity already appear Aristotle Aristotle's become body chapter character circumstances citizen clear clearly comes common conceived conception concerned conduct conscious consists contrary courage definition desire difficulty direction distinction doctrine element essential ethics excellence exercise express fact faculty fall feeling follows friends friendship function further give Greek habit hand happiness higher highest hold human idea ideal important individual kind knowledge less limits live man's matter mean merely mind moral moreover nature never noble object opinion organic pain particular passage passion philosophy Plato pleasant pleasure point of view political practical present principle prudence question realize reason regard relation respect seems seen sense separate side social Socrates soul suggests temperance theory things thought true truth understand virtue whole wisdom wrong
Stranica 57 - Spite of this flesh to-day I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole!" As the bird wings and sings, Let us cry, "All good things Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul!
Stranica 49 - It is not growing like a tree In bulk, doth make man better be; Or standing long an oak, three hundred year, To fall a log, at last, dry, bald, and sere: A lily of a day, Is fairer far, in May, Although it fall, and die that night; It was the plant, and flower of light. In small proportions, we just beauties see: And in short measures, life may perfect be.
Stranica 309 - Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the 'Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one...
Stranica 13 - So that in the first place I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death.
Stranica 193 - It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied ; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.
Stranica 193 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, or the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Stranica 44 - Man's Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness; it is because there is an Infinite in him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the Finite.
Stranica 314 - ... through them. With a like view they may be taught drawing, not to prevent their making mistakes in their own purchases, or in order that they may not be imposed upon in the buying or selling of articles, but rather because it makes them judges of the beauty of the human form. To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls.
Stranica 310 - In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life: in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man's feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested...
Stranica 13 - Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter.