Edgar, to ascertain by what right or authority of law the defendants or drainage commissioners of district No. 1, in the town of Young America, in said county, exercise the taxing power over lands in the town of Shiloh. Defendants | district, and include the lands of the rela obtained judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. H. Van Sellar and H. S. Tanner, for appellants. James A. Eads and Eckhart & Moore, for appellees. Counsel for relators state the points relied upon for reversal to be: "First, the drainage commissioners of drainage district No.1, in the town of Young America, cannot extend the boundaries of said tors, which lie wholly without the town of Young America, and wholly within the town of Shiloh; and, second, the drainage commissioners could not, by their order, without notice to relators, extend the boundaries of the district, and include their lands, but that, as to such extension and inclusion, relators were en SHOPE, J. Information in the nature of quo warranto was filed by the state's attorney of Edgar county, on the rela-titled to notice and to be heard." An or tion of owners of land in the town of Shiloh, in that county, against the drainage commissioners of drainage district No. 1, in the town of Young America, also in said county, to inquire by what authority of law they were, as such drainage commissioners, exercising the taxing power over lands of relators lying in the town of Shiloh. Upon hearing the circuit court rendered judgment adversely to relators, and against them for costs, der was duly made and tiled by the commissioners finding that relators severally had connected with the drains of the district, and annexing and classifying their lands, with others, August 31, 1889. The fact that relators hadconnected the drains and ditches upon their lands with the ditches of the district lay at the foundation of the right of the commissioners to make such order including their lands within the district. But, that jurisdic and they appeal. The drainage district ❘tional fact existing, relators were, by the of which respondents are commissioners | statute, to be deemed as having volunwas organized in 1879, the area of land included therein lying wholly within the town of Young America. It appears that shortly thereafter a main open ditch was constructed, irom a point about 50 feet north of the south line of the township, near the center line of section 32, thence northerly and westerly through the district, and extending westwardly about a mile beyond the west line of the township to an outlet. The town of Shiloh lies south of and adjoining the town of Young America, and sections 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11, in the town of Shiloh, in which relators' lands are situated, form part of a tarily applied to be included in the dis. trict, and the commissioners in such case are required to treat, classify, and tax their lands as other lands of the district. Chapter 42, Rev. St. 1891, § 117. But the point made is that district No. 1, in the town of Young America, having been organized within that town only, and the highway commissioners of that town being ex officio its commissioners, they cannot exercise jurisdiction over lands lying outside of the town in which the district is organized, and in and for which they were elected highway commissioners. It is to be observed that thestat rally flowed north, through the natural depressions upon lands in the town of Young America, and thence north and westerly through that township. In a state of nature the lands of the district, as well as those of relators, were flat and wet, and inadequately drained by the as we think, to include all individual landowners who should connect with the drains of the district. The highway commissioners, in respect of the drainage dis❘trict, do not act as highway commissioners, in which capacity their jurisdiction would necessarily beconfined to the town watershed, from which the water natu-ute is broad enough, and was intended, sloughs, which had their source upon | ship, but as drainage commissioners; and and south of relators' lands, and extended, as before stated, through the district. Between A. D. 1881 and 1889 relators constructed upon their lands open ditches and tile drains, connecting directly, or through other ditches made or enlarged by them, with the main ditch of district No. 1, in the town of Young America, as the same had been constructed by the commissioners. We do not understand the fact of connection of the drains and ditches of relators with the ditches of the district to be controverted. But, if it was, there is ample to show such connection. As early as 1881 the main ditch in the town of Shiloh was opened down it is not, as seems to be supposed, requisite that the political subdivision in which they are elected should be coincident with the boundaries of the drainage district in which they exercise the functions of drainage commissioners. In view of the construction given the provisions of the constitution prior to the amendment of 1878, it became necessary to invest the legislature with power to authorize the formation of drainage districts, with power of special assessment of property benefited, and the people, by the amendment, adopted in 1878, (article 4, § 31,) granted such power, without limitation as to the mode of its exercise. Such to the road, running on the line between | general grant carried with it, by nec the towns, and the water passed through a culvert into the ditch of the district, and the next year men were employed, and theditch cut across the road and into | There is no limitation upon the legisla essary implication, all other powers necessary to make the grant effective. Kilgour v. Drainage Com'rs, 111 III. 342. the district ditch, and relators' ditches ture as to the mode of forming drainage `and tiles, then or thereafter made, con districts, or as to the agencies to be em nected through said ditch so cut through | ployed in their creation. Huston v. Clark, the road with the main district ditch. 112 Ill. 344; Owners of Lands v. People, v.32N.E.no.7-44 113 111. 296; Village of Hyde Park v. Spen- | by law are vested with power of drainage commissioners of the drainage district, as it may be organized and extended under the law. Covington v.City of East St. Louis, 78 111.550; Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Grat. 661; Brooks v. Mayor, etc., 48 Md. 265; Bryant v. Robins, 70 Wis. 258, 35 N. W. Rep. 545. If assessments are imposed upon the lands of relators, by persons in whose selection they cannot participate, it is the result of their voluntary choice. By connecting with the drainage of the district they are, by the statute, to be deemed to have voluntarily applied to have their lands benefited, included in the district, and, having availed of the drainage, the statute and justice alike demand that they bear a fair proportion of the burden. Undoubtedly the lands in the town of Young America, being servient, were cor, 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. Rep. 846. Thus the legislature may give the county court power to form the districts, or invest the power in the highway commissioners of | the town, or in persons selected from two || boards of highway commissioners, as in the case of the formation of union districts, or county commissioners of the county, or corporate authorities of towns, cities, and villages, (Blake v. l'eo ple, 109 111. 504, and cases supra;) or the legislature may create another corporation within either, and define its powers, and determine the agencies through and by which its powers may be exercised, (Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 133 111. 443, 27 N. E. Rep. 203.) The mode and agencies through or by which the special assessment is to be imposed are left wholly to legislative discretion, and, when it has chosen | bound to receive the waterfalling upon and designated the agency, its selection and flowing from the lands of relators; is conclusive. When the highway com-and it may be concluded that the relators missioners, by virtue of their holding || had the right to collect the water upon that office, exercise the special and added | their lands in ditches and drains, and disauthority of drainage commissioners, they do not do so in contemplation of law as highway commissioners, but as a body charge the same, thus accumulated, upoa the servient lands, without at all affecting the question here involved. Such would of men to whom is delegated the power | be the right in every instance when the and authority of commissioners of the drainage districts organized by and under ||nects with the drain was higher than the land of the individual owner who con the statute. Their powers and duties as drainage commissioners are separate and distinct from their duties as highwaycommissioners, and are to be exercised inde pendently of any duty imposed upon them as highway commissioners. The legislature having provided for the formation of district ditch, yet the statute is express that who so connects shall be deemed to have voluntarily applied to have his lands included. When relators turned the water from their land into an artificial channel connecting with the district ditch, as before shown, they connected their drains "union districts," where the land included | and ditches with the ditch of the district, in a single system of drainage lies in two towns, it would not seem proper in the first Instance to include, in districts of the class here organized, lands lying without the township of its organization. In such cases the law contemplates there may be a union of the lands to be benefited into a district to be organized under the statute. But such provision is not mandatory, and the statute seems to contemplate that separate districts may be formed in each township, for it expressly provides that one district may use the drains of another upon payment being made of an amount equal to what it would have been assessed if originally included in the districts with the ditches of which it connects. Section 42, c. 42, Starr within the contemplation of the statute. The second point made is equally untenable. by their voluntary act the relators have placed themselves where by law they were to be deemed as having voluntarily applied for inclusion of their lands in the district, and it only remained for the commissioners to treat, classify, and tax their lands as other lands of the district. By the act of connecting, they had in effect annexed their lands, so far as benefited, to the district, and rendered them subject to classification and assessment as other lands of the district were liable. The order changing the boundaries of the district, being required, so that the record and map required to be filed might show the lands included in the district, in no If & C. Ann. St. When, however, a drain-way affected the rights of the relators. age district is organized, and individual | they had not connected with the drains owners voluntarily connect with the drains of the district, the statute clearly contemplates that their lands, so far as benefited, shall be included in the district, to the end that they be required to bear their just proportion of the cost of drainage, irrespective of whether the lands lie of the district, the order wasnugatory ; if they had, it was that fact which gave the cominissioners power to classify and assess their lands. No appeal is allowed by the statute from the classification of the lands of the relators, or from the determination of the commissioners to classify within the township in which the district | them; and the right to classify and as was originally organized, or in some other town or county of the state. The power of the legislature to change andauthorize the alteration of the boundaries of the quasi municipal corporations, and extend theauthority of the commissioners of the district, coextensive with the district as changed, cannot be questioned. It is true the commissioners are elected by the qualified voters of the township only, but sess them being dependent, not upon any order of the commissioners, but upon the fact of connection with the ditches of the district, that fact was properly before the court upon quo warranto. That fact is jurisdictional, and, without it exists, the proceedings of the commissioners in re- . spect of classifying or assessing the lands is without authority of law. Relators had, in effect, voluntarily consented to the inclusion of their lands within the dis- | of personal property returned by the as trict, and all they could require was that they should have proper notice of theclassification of their lands, which was duly given, and of which no complaint is made. The case of Commissioners, etc., v. Griffin, 134 111. 330, 25 N. E. Rep. 995, is not in conflict with the views here expressed. Then a petition of a majority of the adult owners of an area of land proposed to be annexed to a drainage district was presented, and we held the same notice was required as in the formation of the district originally. This was, as we still think, entirely correct, but can have no application to the case at bar. There, manifestly, the landowners, whom it was sought to force into the district, had a right to be heard, and the commissioners might refuse or grant the prayer of the petition. Here relators, as already said, had voluntarily subjected their land to classification and assessment as lands of the district. Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed. (142 111. 434) RODGERS, County Clerk, v. CALDWELL.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 2, 1892.) TAXATION-ASSESSMENT-RESIDENCE. 1. Complainant owned three farms, of which two, and the greater part of the third, were in one county, and the residue of the third in a second county. Complainant resided in a house on that part of the third farm lying in the second county. During the winter his cattle were fed on the two farms first mentioned, but were moved upon the third farm before the 1st of May, and were pastured mostly on that part of the farm lying in the first county. Held, that under Rev. St. 1891, c. 120, § 7, which provides that personal property shall be listed and taxed in the county where the owner resides, said cattle were properly assessed for taxation in the second county. 2. The fact that complainant formerly resided in the first county, and moved for the purpose of lessening his taxes, does not affect his rights as resident of the second county. 3. Rev. St. 1891, c. 120, § 9, which provides that property in the hands of an agent shall be listed and assessed at the place where the agent's business is carried on, does not apply to property which, before May 1st, when the assessment is made, has in good faith been delivered by the agent to his principal. Dalby v. People, 16 N. E. Rep. 224, 124 Ill. 66, distinguished. Error to circuit court, Piatt county; EDWARD P. VAIL, Judge. Bill by Alvin Caldwell against Andrew L. Rodgers, county clerk of Piatt county, to enjoin the defendant from extending certain taxes. Complainant obtained a decree. Defendant bringserror. Affirmed. M. R. Davidson and James Hicks, for plaintiff in error. W. E. Lodge, for defendant in error. SHOPE, J. This was a bill in chancery in the Piatt circuit court by defendant in error against the county clerk of Piatt county, praying that said clerk be enjoined from extending upon the tax books of the county a personal property tax against complainant, upon an assessment Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar. sessor of Sangamon township, in said county, for the year 1890, as the personal property of complainant in said township liable to taxation, at a valuation of $11,381. A temporary injunction was issued, and an answer filed, denying the material allegations of the bill. Upon hearing, the circuit court entered a decree making the injunction perpetual. No extended statement of the pleadings is necessary. It is conceded that the issues are properly presented, and they are sufficient to sustain the decree, if otherwise warranted. It appears that Caldwell was the owner of three farms, aggregating 1,600 acres, two of which are situated wholly in Piatt county, and one, of which 710 acres are in Piatt, and 190 acres in Champaign, county. These lands were largely devoted to pasturage, although considerable portions were in cultivation. One of the farms, known as the "Sangamon River Farm," was occupied by adult daughters of Caldwell, who, it is claimed, owned and listed for taxation the property used on that farm. Another, known as the "Wabash Farm," Scott Record lived upon, and worked by the year for Caldwell, taking care of and feeding his stock while there. One of these farms had upon it a good house, large barn, stock scales, etc., and it would appear that it had, at one time at least, been the residence of Caldwell. In 1886, Caldwell built a house on the land in Champaign county, near the line, and, as he claims, then moved into it, and has ever since occupied it as his residence. That since the spring or summer of 1886 his actual residence has been on said land in Champaign county, and that the personal property assessed by assessor of Sangamon township in Piatt county was liable for taxation only in Champaign county, that being the place of his domicile. To this it is answered: First, that his residence is not in Champaign county, but in Piatt county, and that his pretense of occupying the house on the land in Champaign county is fraudulently made, to escape the listing and taxation of his personal property in Piatt county, for the reason that the rate of taxation is higher in the latter than in the former; and, second, that, if it be conceded that his residence was in Champaign county, yet the property assessed, and upon which theextension of the tax is sought to be enjoined, had its situs in Sangamon township, in Piatt county, for the purposes of taxation. It would seem that much of the personal property of the complainant had, in previous years, been listed by him in Champaign county, where, as shown, the rate of taxation was less than in Piattcounty; and it does not seem improbable that this cause may have led Caldwell to change his abode, and claim his residence in the former county. Be that as it may, it seems clear that from 1886 downheclaimed to reside in the dwelling house upon the land in Champaign county. Helived there with his wife at least part of the time, claimed it as his home, voted in thattownship, and did many acts indicative of his intention to make it his place of domicile. We have carefully considered all of the evidence, and think the chancellor fully warranted in finding that his place of residence on the 1st day of May, 1890, and for several years prior thereto, had been upon the land constituting part of what is known as the "Champaign Farm," and in Scott township, in Champaign county. His motive for selecting his domicile cannot be important. If he actually resided in Champaign county, the same legal consequences would result, whatever may have been his motive for choosing it. At the common law, personal effects followed the owner, and had their situs with him, or at his domicile, for many purposes, including that of taxation. Thus it is said: "A tax assessed against the person for personal estate is to be assessed to him at the place of his residence, because, in the contemplation of the law, his movable property accompanies him wherever he goes." Cooley, Tax'n, 269. Section 7 of Our revenue act (chapter 120) provides: "Personal property, except such as is required in this act to be listed and assessed otherwise, shall be listed and taxed in the county, town, city, village, or district where the owner resides." Having found the residence of Caldwell to be upon that portion of his land lying in Champaign county, it followed necessarily that his personal property was to be there listed, unless it fell within some exception to that general rule, and "is required to be listed and assessed otherwise" by some provision of the statute. All of the property in question was by Caldwell, on the 1st day of May, 1890, listed to and assessed by the assessor of Scott township, Champaign county, the same then being upon the Champaign farm. On the 19th day of May, 1890, the assessor of Sangamont wnship, Piatt county, claiming that the property was liable to be assessed in that township, came upon the farm known as the "Champaign Farm," and scheduled 585 head of cattle, 54 horses, 6 wagons, and a lot of agricultural implements, of the aggregate value of $11,381, and returned the same to the county clerk, etc. N question arises as to the identity of this property with the property listed to the Scott township assessor, except perhaps four horses were included in the last assessment, belonging to persons other than Caldwell, who were working for him with their teams. It also appears, and is not controverted, that Record, as the agent of Caldwell, about the 1st of May, listed to Phalan, assessor of said Sangamon township, Piatt county, for Caldwell, 11 horses, 5 cows, 55 hogs, carriage, and agricultural tools and implements, and grain on the Piatt county farms, aggregating, as valued by the assessor, $1,044, which was, as claimed by Caldwell and his agent, all of the personal property of Caldwell, used and permanently kept upon said Wabash and Sangamon river farms, or either of them. The tax extended upon this assessment, as well as that extended upon the assessment of the property in question in Scott township, Champaign county, was paid. It also appears, and is practically uncontroverted in the evidence, that, of the cattle assessed by the Sangamon township assessor May 19th, 100 head, known as the "Missouri Cattle, had been purchased by Caldwell in the fall of 1889, and shipped via the Wabash Railway to the "Wabash Farm," so called, unloaded there, and fed on that farm during the winter of 1889-90, and, upon the feed giving out, were, in April, removed to the Champaign farm, and kept there until in November, 1890, when they were marketed. Both Caldwell and Record, who were called as witnesses by plaintiff in error, testify to their removal in April, and that the reason therefor was that the feed at that farm had been fed out, and that they never returned to the Wabash farm, except in transitu in shipping them. Other stock was purchased in Chicago, which were on hand May 1, 1890, but they were shipped via the Illinois Central Railway, and unloaded at the switch at or near the Champaign farm, and remained there until some time in May, 1890, when they were taken, some of them, to pasture on the Wabash farm, and turned out. It would seem clear that they were still on the Champaign farm as late as the 19th of May, when they were assessed by the Sangamon township assessor. He found them mostly on the Piatt county land, belonging to the Champaign farm, only a few of the cattle and some hogs, and perhaps horses, being on the land in Champaign county. There was no fence on the county line, so that stock passed back and forth at will, or were turned into fields, as suited the convenience of Caldwell. It is apparent that Caldwell, owning these farms, used them, with the feed raised thereon and purchased by him, as might see n most convenient and profitable, in the handling, feeding, and fattening of his stock. We are referred to the ninth section of the revenue act, (chapter 120,) and to Dalby v. People, 124 Ill. 66, 16 N. E. Rep. 224, as controlling this case. Section 9 is as follows: "The property of manufacturers and others in the hands of agents shall be listed and assessed at the place where the business of such agent is carried on." It is apparent that this section of the statute could, in any event, apply only to the property in Record's keeping upon the Wabash farm prior to May, 1890. But it could not, we think, apply to them. The case is clearly distinguishable from Dalby's Case. The stock in controversy was not in the hands of Record on the 1st of May, when all property is required to be listed. Sections 5, 19, c. 120. The evidence shows (both that of Caldwell and Record, and is undisputed) that the stay of the stock at the Wabush farm was temporary merely until the feed accumulated there was consumed, when, as before seen, they were taken to the Champaign farm before the 1st of May, to be cared for and fed. Dalby had no farm. His cattle were in another township from where he resided, at a distillery, being fed, on the 1st of May, and were there listed for taxation by the agent as he was required by law to do; and it was held that Dalby was bound thereby. here they were fed upon Caldwell's own farm, on his own feed, by a hired hand, and were in Caldwell's possession and control. As said in Dalby's Case, the pro But vision of the statute for taxing property | and, thus understanding the meaning of in the hands of the agent is for the purpose of subjecting all the taxable property of the state to taxation; and if it could be seen that a complainant was fraudulently endeavoring to arrange his property so that it might escape its just share of the public burden, a court of equity, ever requiring those seeking its aid to come with clean hands, would refuse its protection against an assessment, however wrongful. But it is said that it is a fraud upon the taxpayers of Piatt county for Caldwell to fatten his stock upon the rich pastures of the county, and then list it for taxation elsewhere. Suppose that he should rent land in Douglas county, and keep his cattle there during the pasture season, would it be contended that there fore the property was taxable in Douglas? If he should devote his lands in Piatt county to grain raising, and haul and store his grain in Champaign county, would the fact that the rich lands of Piatt county produced it render it taxable there? Manifestly not. It But it is also claimed under the eighth section of the revenue act (chapter 120) the stock was liable to be listed in Piatt county. It is as follows: “When the owner of live stock or other personal property connected with a farm does not reside thereon, the same shall be listed and assessed in the town or district where the farm is situated: provided, if the farm is situated in several towns or districts, it shall be listed and assessed in the town or district in which the principal place of business shall be." So far as the farms, other than the Champaign farni, are concerned, what has been said applies. The property "connected" with the farms had been listed to the assessor of the township in Piatt county, and by him assessed. is, however, insisted that on the 1st of May and subsequently the cattle assessed were in Piatt county, and kept, in the main, upon the lands of that county; and care is taken to show that when assessed by the assessor of Sangamon township, in Piatt county, they were actually running upon that portion of the Champaign farm lying in Piattcounty, there being 710 acres in that county, and 190 in Champaign. It seems clear that, if section 8 can have any application, it justified and required the assessment to be made in Scott township, Champaign county. That the farm was situated in two towns, and that the "principal place of business on such farm" was in Scott township, does not admit of question. Put section 8 does not apply, unless the owner of the stock “does not reside" upon the farm with which they are "connected." A farm is, both by the standards and in common acceptation, defined to be a body of land, usually under one ownership, devoted to agriculture, either to the raising of crops or pasturage or both. It is not understood to have any necessary relation to, or to be circum. scribed by, political or congressional subdivisions. A "farm" may consist of any number of acres, of one quarter section or less, or many quarter sections, of one field or many fields, may lie in one township and county, or in more than one; the word "farm," the witnesses in this case and counsel on both sides designate the 900 acres lying partly in Piatt and partly in Champaign county as a "farm.” And in this sense the language of section 8 must be understood, and, having found that Caldwell resided on that farm, it was properly held that section 8 could have no application. It seems clear that, the property falling within none of the exceptions to the general rule established by section 7 of the revenue act, that section would control, and the property be liable to assessment at the residence of the owner. It necessarily follows that the attempted assessment by the assessor of Sangamon township in Piatt county was without authority of law, and the extension of taxes thereonin Piattcounty properly enjoined. The decree of the circuit court will be affirmed. (142 Ill. 511) JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING CO. V. COMPTON. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 2, 1892.) NUISANCE-SURFACE WATER FROM ADJOINING BUILDING-DAMAGES PENDING SUIT. on In an action for damages arising from water running upon plaintiff's property from an adjoining building erected by defendant his own land, damages cannot be recovered for injuries inflicted after the commencement of the action, since a nuisance caused by a private structure is not regarded by the law as permanent in its nature, and therefore each injury caused by it constitutes a separate cause of action. Appeal from appellate court, third district. Action on the case by Sophie Compton against the Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Defendant appeals. Reversed. The other facts fully appear in the following statement by MAGRUDER, J.: This is an action on the case, begun on April 17, 1890, in the circuit court of Sangamon county, by the appellee against the appellant company. In the trial court the verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff, which judgment has been affirmed by the appellate court. The declaration consists of two counts. The first count alleges that plaintiff was possessed of certain premises in Springfield, in which she and her family resided, and that the defendant, to wit, on April 20, 1885, wrong. fully erected a certain building near said premises in so careless, negligent, and improper a manner that onsaid day and afterwards, “and before the commencement of this suit, "large quantities of rain water flowed upon, against, and into said premises and the walls, roofs, ceilings, beams, papering, floors, stairs, doors, cellar, basement, and other parts thereof, and weakened, impaired, and damaged the same, by reason whereof said messuage and premises became and are damp and less fit for habitation. The second count alleges that Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar. |