lage of Teutopolis, 131 Ill. 552, 23 N. E. 651. 3. WILLS (8 634*)-REMAINDER AFTER LIFE

[6] Before the vacation of the street on ESTATE WITH POWER OF DISPOSITION. this strip by the ordinance of 1905, the in- the termination of a life estate with power to

A remainder in fee may be limited after terest of the village of River Forest in the sell and convey the fee. land in question had been held to be an ease- [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent, ment, and upon such vacation of the street Dig. SS 1488–1510; Dec. Dig. § 634.*] appellant, as the owner in fee of the street 4. WILLS (8 634*)- REMAINDERS-VESTED OR so vacated as well as the owner of the abut- CONTINGENT—"VESTED REMAINDER." ting land, was entitled to the land in con

A remainder in fee, limited after the tertroversy. Helm v. Webster, '85 111. 116; mination of a life estate with power to sell and

Helm v. Webster, '85 Ill. 116; convey the fee, is vested and not contingent, Thomsen v. McCormick, 136 Ill. 135, 26 N. E. notwithstanding the uncertainty to the 373; Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. Co. v. amount of the estate undisposed of by the life Clapr, 201 Ill. 418, 66 N. E. 223; Bell v. tenant. Mattoon Waterworks Co., 245 Ill. 544, 92 N.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Cent.

$$ E. 352, 137 Am. St. Rep. 338, 19 Ann. Cas. Dig. 88 1488–1510; Dec. Dig. $$ 634.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phras153.

es, vol. 8, pp. 7305-7307.) The question is raised by both counsel in

their briefs as to the interest of appellant in 5. WILLS ($$ 600, 616*)–CONSTRUCTION-NA

TURE OF ESTATES CREATED—"'LIFE ESTATE'' the south half of Lake street between the

OR “TEE SIMPLE.' Desplaines river and Oak avenue. That ques- A devise of land with general power to distion is not in this record, and we express no for life, with power to dispose of the reversion,

pose of it passes the “fee simple," but a devise opinion concerning it. It is not liable to passes an estate for life only. arise in any practical way as long as Lake

[Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Wills, Cent. street continues to be used as a public high- Dig. $S 1335-1339, 1418-1430; Dec. Dig. 88 way.

600, 616.* [7] Where a municipality undertakes to

For other definitions, see Words and Phras. take possession of a street to which it has es, vol. 3, pp. 2708,2710; vol. 8, p. 7662; vol.

5, pp. 4153, 4154.) no right, the proper remedy is injunction. City of Peoria V. Johnston, 56 Ill. 45; Mc- 6. LIFE ESTATES ($_23*)-SALES AND CONVEY.

ANCES BY LIFE TENANT. Intyre v. Storey, 80 Ill. 127. Under these au

Where a life tenant of real estate was give thorities the facts in this record authorized en power to sell the real estate, or any part, if a court of equity to grant the relief prayed she should deem it necessary in order to supfor. The circuit court erred in dismissing of life, any exercise of the power of alienation

ply herself with the comforts and necessities the bill for want of equity. The decree of without reference to the condition imposed that court will therefore be reversed, and would be restrained by a court of equity. the cause remanded, with directions to en

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Life Estates,

. ter a decree in accordance with the prayer of Cent. Dig. $$ 21, 42-45; Dec. Dig. 23.*] the bill.

7. CONVERSION (8 15*)-DIRECTION IN WILL

TO SELL, Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Where a will directed that upon the death of the testator's wife his real estate should be

sold and the proceeds paid to a church parish (259 Ill. 262.)

for a specified purpose, the gift was one of per

sonal property. BURKE et al. v. BURKE et al.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Conversion, (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.) | Cent. Dig. $8 28-37, 52; Dec. Dig. & 15.*]

8. PERPETUITIES (8 4*)-SUSPENSION OF Pow. 1. RUSTS ($ 21*)-VALIDITY-CERTAINTY AS

ER OF ALIENATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. TO SUBJECT-MATTER.

A bequest in trust of an amount to be Where a testator devised the rents and in- placed on interest and the income used for the come from his real estate to his wife for her perpetual care of burial lot was void, as violalife, with power to sell the real estate, or any tive of the rule against perpetuities. of it, if she should deem it necessary in order to supply herself with the comforts and neces: Cent. Dig. & 444; Dec. Dig. $ 4.*]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Perpetuities, sities of life, and directed that upon her death the real estate remaining should be sold and 9. CHARITIES ($ 12*)-PURPOSE OF GIFT-EDU. the proceeds paid to a church parish for the

CATION. erection and support of a parish school, the A bequest for the founding and maintepower of disposition given to the widow didnance of a school, under the control of a church not render the subject-matter of the trust for parish, was for a public charity, although the the erection and support of the school uncer- instruction might not be gratuitous, and the tain, so as to invalidate the trust.

branches to be taught were not specified. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Charities, Dig. SS 29, 30; Dec. Dig. & 21.*]

Cent. Dig. $ 36; Dec. Dig. 12.*] 2. TRUSTS (8 10*) – VALIDITY – PROPERTY 10. CHARITIES (8 16*)-PURPOSE OF GIFT

( WHICH MAY BE SUBJECT OF A TRUST.

PRAYERS OR MASSES. Any right, interest, or thing which may be The saying of masses for the soul of a testhe subject of property, or which the law rec-tator, his wife and son, which was made a conognizes as valuable, may be granted or trans- dition of a bequest in trust, was a charitable ferred in trust.

purpose. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. & 8; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]

Cent. Dig. § 40; Dec. Dig, § 16.*] *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

11. CHARITIES (8 47*)-TRUSTEES APPOINT- , expenses of administration, gave two legacies MENT BY COURT.

to be used in saying masses for the souls of A bequest to an unincorporated church parish for the erection and maintenance of a

the dead. It then gave all the residue of the school by such parish was not void, since courts personal property to the widow. The fifth of equity have original and inherent jurisdic- and sixth clauses of the will are as follows: tion over charities, independent of statutes, and "Fifth. I give, devise and bequeath to my may appoint a trustee to carry out a charitable purpose, if no donee is named, or if the donee said wife all the rents and income from all named is incapable of taking the property.

the real estate of which I die possessed, so [Ed._Note.-For_other cases, see Charities, long as she may live, she to have the right Cent. Dig. § 85; Dec. Dig. § 47.*]

to occupy or lease said real estate as she 12. WILLS (8 81*)-PARTITION-INVALIDITY-may prefer, and to keep the same in good EFFECT.

repair and condition and pay all taxes and Where a will shows a complete and connected plan for the disposition of the whole es

assessments levied or assessed thereon; and tate, its valid provisions must be rejected with in case at any time she shall deem it necesthe invalid, if the latter are of such a charac- sary to sell said real estate, or any part ter as to destroy the testator's scheme, or if thereof, in order to supply herself with the the enforcement of the valid provisions would comforts and necessities of life, I hereby result in injustice.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. empower her with full right, power and auDig. $$ 201, 202; Dec. Dig. § 81.*]

thority to make such sale and to convey said 13. WILLS (8 81*)-PARTITION-INVALIDITY-property so sold as her own. EFFECT.

"Sixth. Upon the death of my said wife Where a testator devised real estate worth it is my desire that my real estate at the $30,000 to his wife for life, with power to sell and convey if she deemed it necessary in order time remaining be sold and of the proceeds to supply herself with the comforts and neces- the sum of five hundred dollars ($500) be sities of life, and directed that upon her death given to Saint Mary's Catholic parish of the real estate remaining should be sold, $500 paid to a church parish, the income of which Sterling, Whiteside county, Illinois, said sum was to be used for the perpetual use and keep-to be placed on interest and the income thereing of a burial lot, and the balance paid to such from to be used for the perpetual care and parish for the erection or support of a school keeping of my burial lot in Calvary cemetery by such parish, the invalidity of the trust for the care of the burial lot did not render invalid of said Saint Mary's parish, the balance the trust for the school, in view of trifling thereof to be given said Saint Mary's parish amount of the bequest for the burial lot as of Sterling, Illinois, for the erection or supcompared with the whole estate.

port of a school to be erected and maintained [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Cent. by said parish in said city of Sterling; said Dig. $$ 201, 202; Dec. Dig. § 81.*]

bequest for said school being made upon conAppeal from Circuit Court, Whiteside dition that five masses be said annually from County; Frank D. Ramsay, Judge.

and after the death of my said wife, for the Bill in equity by Mary Burke and others peaceful repose of the souls of my said wife, against Margaret Burke and others. From

Margaret Burke, my son, Thomas Francis a decree in favor of complainants, defend- Burke, and myself.”

. ants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with The mother and other heirs at law of the directions.

testator filed a bill against the widow, St. Stager & Stager, of Sterling, and A. D. Mary's Catholic parish, the pastor and cerEarly, of Rockford, for appellants. C. C. tain members of the parish, and the Catholic & J. W. Johnson, of Sterling, and McMahon bishop of Rockford, praying the court to de& Rogers, of Fulton, for appellees.

clare that the sixth clause of the will was

null and void, and to decree the property DUNN, J. John F. Burke died on Decem- mentioned in it to the heirs. An answer was ber 24, 1910, leaving a widow, Margaret filed, the cause was heard upon a stipulation Burke, his mother, Mary Burke, and two as to the facts, and the court rendered a brothers and four sisters, his heirs. He own- decree that the sixth paragraph of the will ed personal property valued at $450, two lots is null and void, and that all of the real estate in the city of Sterling, on which was a dwell- is intestate property, subject to the interest ing house which he occupied with his wife as and power given to Margaret Burke by the a residence, and a farm of 160 acres, having fifth paragraph of the will. An appeal has a rental value of $7 an acre; all of said real been taken from this decree. estate being worth $30,000. He and his wife [1] The intention of the testator is plain, were members of the Roman Catholic church, and it ought to be carried out, unless to do so and she was, and still is, a member of St. would violate some fixed rule of law. The Mary's Catholic parish of Sterling, Ill. He circuit court found that by reason of the left a will, which was admitted to probate, in power to sell the real estate, given to the life which his wife was named as executrix, tenant by the fifth paragraph of the will, without bond. Letters testamentary were the subject-matter of the trusts attempted to issued to her, the estate was fully adminis- be created in the sixth paragraph is uncertered, and the executrix discharged. The tain, and the sixth paragraph is therefore will, after providing for the payment of the void. It is argued that because the widow, testator's debts and funeral expenses and the in the exercise of the power of sale, may dis

pose of the real estate or some part of it, an prior demands upon it befc-re its application uncertainty exists as to the subject-matter to the purposes of the trust renders the subof the trust, and the cases of Mills v. New- ject-matter of the trust uncertain, but that Berry, 112 Ill. 123, 1 N. E. 156, 54 Am. Rep. there is no fund which can be the subject213, and Wilce v. Van Anden, 248 Ill. 358, matter of a trust, where its application to 94 N. E. 42, 140 Am. St. Rep. 212, 21 Ann. the purposes of the trust depends upon the Cas. 153, are relied upon as supporting this absolute and unconditional discretion of the position. This is a misapprehension of what person in control of the fund. In such case was decided in those cases. They recognize there is nothing which a court of equity can and apply the established rule that the sub- lay hold of—nothing binding on the conject-matter of a valid trust must be certain. science. The chancellor cannot direct what But the rule is not violated in the will now disposition one shall make of property which under consideration. In Mills v. Newberry, is given to him to dispose of as he chooses. supra, the testatrix devised and bequeathed This was the character of both the cases cited to her mother all the property of the testa- and of the authorities on which the opintrix, "upon the express condition, however, ions in those cases rely. Wherever a clear that she devise, by will to be executed before discretion or choice to act or not to act is receiving this bequest, so much thereof as given, wherever the prior dispositions of the shall remain undisposed of or unspent at the property impart absolute and uncontrollable time of her decease, to such charitable insti- ownership, wherever the trustees have an tution for women, in said city of Chicago, as option to withdraw the funds from the purshe may select.” The mother declined to exe- poses of the trust and apply them in their cute a will in accordance with the devise, own discretion, the court cannot execute such and therefore could take nothing under her a trust. This was the character of both the daughter's will. She was, however, her cases cited. The rule laid down in them goes daughter's only heir, and there was no resid- to this extent, and no farther, and is amply uary clause in the will. It was claimed that sustained by the numerous authorities cited. a trust in favor of charity attached to the [2-4] The fact that a trust is involved does property in the mother's hands, and it was not affect the question. The principle is that, held that the language was sufficient to create having granted the whole dominion of the a trust with respect to such property as may property, nothing remains for the grantor to be the subject of a trust. The insuperable give, in trust or otherwise. The uncontrolled difficulty which the court found to the cre- ownership of property precludes any condiation of the trust was the uncertainty as to tions as to its disposition or use.

In generthe subject-matter. The mother having the al, any right, interest, or thing which may be property absolutely, with full power of ex- the subject of property may be granted in pending and disposing of it unconditionally, trust. Every kind of vested right which there was nothing to which a trust could at the law recognizes as valuable may be transtach. The question whether there should be ferred in trust. Perry on Trusts, $$ 67, 68. any property or not for the trust to operate The law is well settled that an estate may be on was in the absolute discretion of the moth- given to a person for life, with power to sell er, and there was nothing which equity could and convey the fee, and that a remainder enforce. The case of Wilce v. Van Anden, may in such case be limited in fee after the

, supra, cites Mills v. Newberry, supra, to termination of the life estate. Henderson v. sustain the proposition that the trust in that Blackburn, 104 Ill. 227, 44 Am. Rep. 780; case was void, because it was uncertain that Walker v. Pritchard, 121 Ill. 221, 12 N. E. there would be any part of the trust fund 336; Skinner v. McDowell, 169 Ill. 365, 48 remaining at the death of the annuitants in N. E. 310, 61 Am. St. Rep. 183; Saeger v. the hands of the trustees, as at that time it Bode, 181 Ill. 514, 55 N. E. 129. A remainder might be entirely exhausted in the payment of so limited is vested, though subject to be deannuities. The latter case adds nothing to feated by the exercise of the power by the the former, but relies entirely upon it for this life tenant. The uncertainty as to the proposition. It may well be doubted whether amount of the reduction because of the disthe decision in Mills v. Newberry went so far position of the estate, or a part of it, for as it was carried in Wilce v. Van Anden, or the comfort or necessities of the life tenant, whether the trust in the latter case would

and the consequent uncertainty as to the have been held void, because the payment of the annuities might exhaust the fund; but amount of the estate which may be undisit was clearly void for the second reason posed of, does not render the remainder constated in the opinion—that is, because of the tingent. Ducker v. Burnham, 146 Ill. 9, 34 N. discretion given to the trustees to give to E. 558, 37 Am. St. Rep. 135; Hawkins v. the brothers and sisters of the testator such Bohling, 168 Ill. 214, 48 N. E. 94; Harvard portion of the trust fund as they might think College v. Balch, 171 Ill. 275, 49 N. E. 543; best and devote the rest to charity. The Kirkpatrick y. Kirkpatrick, 197 Ill. 144, 64 proposition upon which Mills v. Newberry N. E. 267. was decided (and the same applies to Wilce [5, 6] The devise here to the wife was exV. Van Anden) was, not that the possible ex- pressly of the rents and income of the real haustion of tbe fund by its application to estate so long as she might live, with the right to occupy the real estate if she prefer-, the instruction may not be gratuitous and the red to. This was an express life estate. A branches to be taught not specified, is a pubdevise of land with general power to dispose lic charity, is held in Andrews v. Andrews, of it passes the fee simple; but a devise for 110 Ill. 223. The saying of 'five masses annulife, with power to dispose of the reversion, ally for the souls of the testator, his wife and passes an estate for life only. Dalrymple son, which is made a condition of the bev. Leach, 192 Ill. 51, 61 N. E. 443. The power quest, is a charitable purpose. Hoeffer v. of disposition here is not unlimited, but is Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 49 N. E. 527, 40 L. R. qualified, to be exercised only in case the A. 730, 63 Am. St. Rep. 241. life tenant shall deem it necessary in order [11] It is contended that the parish is an to supply herself with the comforts and ne- unincorporated association which cannot be cessities of life. A court of equity would re- a grantee or act as trustee, and that the bestrain any exercise of the power of alienation quest cannot, under such circumstances, be without reference to the condition imposed. sustained as a charity. In support of this Dalrymple v. Leach, supra. In a case of a proposition reliance is placed upon Philadeldevise of a life estate with a more liberal phia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. power of disposition than is the case here, 1, 4 L. Ed. 499, which sustains it. This dewe held that the life tenant could not give cision was based upon the two propositions away the property or exercise the power that the statute of charitable uses (43 Eliz, without reference to the limitations. Bev- c. 4) was repealed by the Legislature of Virans V. Murray, 251 Ill. 603, 96 N. E. 546. ginia, and that charitable bequests, where There is no uncertainty about the subject- no legal interest is vested, and which are too matter of the trust. It is all the real estate vague to be claimed by those for whom the of the testator after the termination of the beneficial interest was intended, cannot be life estate of Margaret Burke, his widow. established by a court of equity, independent The whole estate may be defeated by the ex- of the 43 Eliz. The first proposition is not ercise of the power of Mrs. Burke in accord-true in this state, and as to the second the ance with its conditions; but the estate is decision has been expressly overruled in Kain a vested estate in remainder, and a court v. Gibboney, 101 U. S. 362, 25 L. Ed. 813. of equity can and will protect the estate, it The original and inherent jurisdiction of necessary, and enforce the trust.

courts of equity over charities, independent [7,8] The real estate is directed to be sold of the statute, is now recognized in most of and the proceeds paid to St. Mary's Catholic the states. Virginia, Maryland, and North parish. The gift is therefore one of person- Carolina are exceptions. In this state deeds al property. Five hundred dollars of the made to the rector, church wardens, and vesamount is to be placed on interest and the trymen of an unincorporated church for income used for the perpetual care of the church purposes and to pay the salary of the testator's burial lot in Calvary cemetery of rector were held not void for want of a said parish, the remainder to be used for the grantee capable of taking the deed. Alden erection and support of a school to be erect- v. St. Peter's Parish, 158 Ill. 631, 42 N. E. ed and maintained by said parish in the city 392, 30 L. R. A. 232. Where a gift is made of Sterling. It is insisted that the trust for to a charitable use and no donee is named, the perpetual care of the burial lot is void, or the donee named is incapable of taking the and we so held in Mason v. Bloomington Li-property, the gift will not fail, but a court brary Ass'n, 237 Ill. 442, 86 N. E. 1014, 15 of equity may appoint a trustee to carry out Ann. Cas. 603, on the ground that it violated the charitable purposes. the rule against perpetuities.

[12, 13] It is argued that the trust for the [9, 10] The testator and his wife were mem- care of the burial lot was a part of the tesbers of St. Mary's Catholic parish of Ster- tator's scheme for the disposition of his enling, Ill., which is an unincorporated re-tire estate, and that to enforce the rest of ligious society and a duly established parish the will, while rejecting this part, would be of the diocese of Rockford of the Roman to violate the testator's wishes and to make Catholic Church, having about a thousand a new will for him. The rule is, where the members, who are subject to constant change will shows a complete and connected plan by reason of deaths, births, and removals. for the disposition of the whole estate, that The parish has no property in its own name, the valid provisions of the will must be rebut its property is all held in the name of jected with the invalid, where the latter are the bishop, and cannot be diverted from the of such a character as to destroy the testause of the parish. A parish school is an tor's scheme, or where the enforcement of integral part of every parish of the Roman the valid provisions would result in injusCatholic Church, and it is the duty of St. tice. Barrett v. Barrett, 255 Ill. 332, 99 N. Mary's parish, under the rules of the church, E. 625. But here the invalid bequest for the to maintain such a school. The rules of the care of the burial lot is trifling in amount church provide what branches shall be taught compared to the rest of the estate. The in such school and how it shall be conducted. school, it is manifest, was the testator's great That the founding and maintenance of a concern after his wife was taken care of. his intention to take his bequest away from character the trial court is authorized to apply the school and bestow it on his heirs, thus more appropriate correctives. entirely disregarding his wishes, than sub- Error, Cent. Dig. $ 4135; Dec. Dig. § 1060.*]

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and

$ stantially to carry out his will as he made it. The decree will be reversed and the cause

2. TRIAL ($ 132*)-MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL

-CURE OF ERROR. remanded to the circuit court, with directions

A judgment should not be reversed for misto enter a decree finding the provisions of the conduct of counsel for the prevailing party in will valid, except as to the bequest of $500 alleging facts which no evidence tends to esfor the care of the burial lot, and, as to that, traction of counsel, and the admonition of the

tablish if from the nature of the case, the refinding it invalid.

court it appears that the natural effect of the Reversed and remanded, with directions. misconduct has been averted.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent.

Dig. SS 315, 316; Dec. Dig. § 132.*] (259 Ill. 145)

Error to Circuit Court, Hamilton County. HOOPESTON DRAINAGE DIST. v. HONEY

Error to Circuit Court, Marion County. WELL,

Two actions, one by one Driscoll against (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1913.) the Cincinnati Traction Company, the other

an action wherein one Tuttle was convicted APPEAL AND ERROR (8 555*)-ASSIGNMENTS of assault. From a reversal of a judgment

* OF ERROR-REVIEW.

Assignments of error relating only to a for plaintiff in the former case and of a purported bill of exceptions, which has been conviction in the latter case, plaintiffs bring stricken from the record, cannot be reviewed.

error. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and both cases reversed, and the original judg

Judgment of the circuit court in Error, Cent. Dig. $ 2955; Dec. Dig. $ 555.*]

ment affirmed. Error to Vermilion County Court; Lawn rence T. Allen, Judge.

Stricker & Johnson, of Cincinnati, for

,

Driscoll. Kinkead & Rogers, of Cincinnaji, Proceedings for annexation of territory to the Hoopeston Drainage District. There was for Cincinnati Traction Co. Mouser & Moan order of annexation, and A. Honeywell loney and Charles L. Justice, both of Marion,

for the State. H. E. Hill and Crissinger & brings error. Affirmed.

Guthery, all of Marion, for Tuttle. C. M. Briggs and Jay Briggs, both of Hoopeston, for plaintiff in error. Dobbins PER CURIAM. However wide may have & Dobbins, for defendant in error.

been the difference between the original cases

out of which these proceedings in error arose, COOKE, C. J. This is a writ of error to judgments of reversal were rendered by the review an order of the county court of Ver- circuit courts in both cases because of the milion county annexing certain territory to misconduct of counsel for the prevailing parthe Hoopeston drainage district.

ties, and the propriety of the judgments of When filed, the record in this case contain-reversal should be tested by considerations ed a purported bill of exceptions. Upon the which are substantially identical. In both consideration of a motion by defendant in cases the misconduct for which the circuit error at a former term, this bill of excep- court reversed the judgments consisted of tions was found not to be properly a part remarks, obviously improper, which counsel of the record, and was expunged therefrom. made in presenting the case to the jury. ReAll of the assignments of error which have marks of counsel to jury always constitute been argued relate to matters presented only misconduct when they either tend to diminby the purported bill of exceptions. As these ish respect for the administration of justice matters are not now open for our considera- or to subject the claims of the adverse party tion, and no other errors are complained of, in the case to prejudice not warranted by the judgment of the county court is affirmed the case actually presented for determina

.

tion. Judgment affirmed.

[1] But misconduct of the former character may constitute a very grave offense

against the administration of justice without (88 Ohio St. 150)

entitling the adverse party to a new trial if DRISCOLL V. CINCINNATI TRAC

he suffers only in common with his fellows, TION CO.

all of whom are entitled to have proceedings STATE V. TUTTLE.

in courts conducted with such decorum and (Supreme Court of Ohio. May 6, 1913.) propriety as to win the respect of all obsery(Syllabus by the Court.)

ers.

For offenses of that character a new 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (S 1060*)-GROUND FOR edy to which the judge of the trial court is

trial is an expensive and inappropriate remREVERSAL-MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL.

A judgment should not be reversed for such not driven by any necessity; there being misconduct of counsel for the prevailing party within his power modes of correction which as tends only to discredit the administration of