1889, and a board of education was then elected, which board established a high school at Highland Park,-a city containing more than one-half of the population, and situated on the shore of Lake Michigan, and on the east side of the township,-which school has since been maintained in rented rooms, which have become inadequate and inappropriate for the purpose. The village of Ft. Sheridan lies near Highland Park, on the north, and the rest of the township consists mostly of farms, and is less thickly settled. The township contains about 30 square miles of territory, and the inhabitants of its western part seem to have been opposed to the permanent establishment of the high school, at least at Highland Park. The high-school township embraced two political townships, the western, called "West Deerfield," containing 18 square miles and upwards of 200 legal voters; the other, called "East Deerfield," which included Highland Park and Ft. Sheridan, and containing upwards of 600 legal voters. For general elections there were three polling places,-one in West Deerfield, and two in East Deerfield. Two members of the board of education were generally elected from West Deerfield, and the other three from East Deerfield, and for some reason the two from West Deerfield rarely attended the meetings of the board. In 1896 the board purchased lot 8 in block 35 in Highland Park for a site for a high-school building, for the price of $2,750, and, from taxes levied and collected for the purpose, paid for it, and caused it to be conveyed to the trustees of schools of township 43 for the use of the township high school. This purchase was not authorized by any vote of the electors of the township. In July, 1897, at one of the regular meetings of the board, the three members only from East Deerfield being present, a resolution was adopted calling a special election, to be held August 21, 1897, for the electors to vote upon two propositions submitted, viz. for or against authorizing the board of education to erect a high-school building upon said lot 8, and for or against issuing the bonds of the township, to the amount of $30,000, with which to pay for said building. In pursuance of the resolution and notice the election was held at the time specified, from 1 o'clock to 7 o'clock p. m., at the Young Men's Club building in Highland Park, and both propositions were carried by a vote of 240 for and 35 against.

The principal grounds on which it is claimed the injunction should be granted, and the issuing of the bonds enjoined, are: First. That the board of education had no power to purchase the site for the school house without a vote therefor by the electors of the township, and that therefore the subsequent calling and holding of the election to authorize the board to erect the building on the lot in question, and to issue bonds to pay for it, were illegal and void acts; and in this con

I nection the position of appellants is controverted, that the vote to erect the building on said lot so purchased was a ratification of the purchase. Second. It is contended that the election was not legally called, because the two members from West Deerfield were not present, and had no notice of the meeting. Third. It is claimed the election was irregular and void because called and held at only one polling place, remote from large numbers of the electors, and that the polls were not open for a sufficient length of time. Fourth. That there were not a sufficient number of notices of the election posted; that they were not posted in public places, and did not remain, but disappeared a few days after they were posted; and that they were not properly signed.

As to the first point made, it was decided by this court in Greenwood v. Gmelich, 175 Ill. 526, 51 N. E. 565, that a township board of education has no power to purchase a site for a high school without authority given by a vote of the electors of the township; that their power in such a matter is the same as that of school directors to purchase a site for a district school, who are prohibited by the statute from making such a purchase without a vote of the people at an election called and conducted as required by the statute. Counsel for appellants have endeavored to distinguish that case from this, but we are unable to see any reason why the principle announced in that case is not equally applicable here. The question must be regarded as settled by the case cited.

A more serious question remains, and that is the alleged ratification, by vote of the people cast at the election held August 21, 1897, of the unauthorized purchase by the board of said school-house site. The site had been purchased and paid for by the board from the taxes levied and collected for the purpose, and the title had vested, by the conveyance, in the proper authorities. If the people had the authority, as they certainly did have, to authorize the board to purchase the lot, they had the power to ratify the purchase made without authority, after such purchase was made. They were not bound to do so, and could have repudiated the purchase by voting down the proposition to build the house on that site. So, too, they could ratify it, and we are of the opinion that they did so, if the election in question was otherwise valid. It is to be remembered that one of the propositions voted on and carried was to build on this site, particularly describing the lot. It is difficult to see what more the people of the township could have done to ratify the purchase which had already been made with their money, than to vote for and adopt this proposition. There is nothing in the record to show that any other site was or had been proposed for submission, and the vote was not illegal or nugatory because confined to that site. It might well be that in many cases only one

site would be proposed or desired by any one, and such may have been the case here, so far as the record discloses. Had the site not been previously purchased, it would have been competent to submit the propositions to purchase it, to build a school house upon it, and to issue the bonds, all at the same election. People v. Sisson, 98 Ill. 335. By the action taken, the effect in this case was substantially the same as if those propositions had been submitted to and adopted by the people at one election. See Leighton v. School Dist., 66 N. H. 548, 31 Atl. 899. Municipal corporations may ratify the unauthorized contracts of their agents or officers within their corporate powTown of Bruce v. Dickey, 116 Ill. 527, 6 N. E. 435.

As to the second point, no notice to the members of the board of the meeting at which the election was called appears to have been necessary. It appears that the meeting was a regular and stated meeting of the board, previously provided for by a regular order.

Third, it is strenuously insisted that the election should have been held at the three polling places which had been provided for in the three precincts for the holding of general elections. Section 41 of article 3 of the school law provides: "For the purpose of building a school house, supporting the school and paying other necessary expenses the township shall be regarded as a school district, and the township board of education shall have the power and discharge the duties of directors for such district in all respects." Section 31 provides that it shall not be lawful for the directors to purchase or locate a school-house site without a vote of the people at an election called and conducted as required by section 4 of article 9 of the act. Section 8 of article 5 provides: "Notices of all elections in organized districts shall be given by the directors at least ten days previous to the day of said election. Said notices shall be posted in at least three of the most public places in the district, and shall specify the place where such election is to be held, the time of opening and closing of the polls and the question or questions to be voted on." And section 4 of article 9 provides: "Whenever it is desired to hold an election for the purpose of borrowing money, as provided for in this article of this act, the directors shall give at least ten days' notice of the holding of such election, by posting notices in at least three of the most public places in such district. Such notices shall specify the place where such election is to be held, the time of opening and closing the polls and the question or proposition to be voted upon" (prescribing a form of notice, and

indicating but one polling place). Other provisions of the statute requiring more than one polling place are not applicable to elections of this character. We are satisfied that the high-school township, for the purpose of the election in question, must be regarded as a school district, and that the statute required only one polling place, which was to be fixed by the board, and stated in the notices which were required to be posted up in three of the most public places 10 days before the election. The board followed the statute, and their action in doing so cannot be declared illegal. There is no evidence of any intent on their part to prevent publicity, or to fix the polling place at a time or place to prevent a full vote from being cast. In fact, it appears that they caused many unofficial notices to be posted up, calling attention to the election and its importance. It also appears that all who appeared at the polls had ample time and opportunity to vote, and no one was deprived of the privilege of voting who desired to exercise it. It may be, and probably is, true that in such a district, greatly larger and more populous than an ordinary school district, provisions should be made for a more general and effective notice to the voters, and for more than one polling place; but that is a matter of legislation. It seems that the election was held near the center of population, and where it would be convenient to the greater number of the voters, and that the site selected was centrally located to accommodate the greatest number of pupils. The courts cannot relieve against the hardship, if any there be, to those whose homes are remote from such center, where the statute has been followed and no fraud has been shown, and where the election has been fairly called and conducted, and the voters desiring to vote have not been deprived of the opportunity to vote.

The point is made that the notice should have been signed by the several members of the board according to the statutory form provided for signing by individual directors, instead of being signed by the corporation, by its president and secretary. We think the point unimportant. There was a substantial compliance with the statute in the respect mentioned, and the section of the statute referred to requires nothing more.

We cannot find, from the evidence, as it is contended we should, that the notices were not sufficiently posted, or not posted in public places. The judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the decree of the circuit court is affirmed. Judgment reversed.

MAGRUDER, J., dissenting.

(182 Ill. 60)

McCOY et al. v. FAHRNEY et al. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 25, 1899.) DEEDS-CONSTRUCTION-MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS-CHILDREN BENEFITED.

1. One of the purposes of the premises of a deed is to set forth recitals explaining its operation, and the reasons for executing it.

2. The true intent of a deed must be gathered from the whole instrument, separate parts being viewed in the light of other parts.

3. It is the presumption in marriage settlements that the parties thereto intended to provide for the issue of that marriage only, and clear language is necessary to overcome the presumption.

4. A grantor conveyed all his property to a trustee, stating in the premises of the deed that the conveyance was made for the benefit of his creditors, and to secure a permanent support and maintenance for the use of his wife and children. In a subsequent part of the deed he directed that property remaining after payment of his debts should be conveyed to "all the children" of his wife. Held, that the intention was to provide only for the grantor's children, and that children born to his wife by a subsequent husband are entitled to no benefits under the deed.

Appeal from circuit court, Ogle county; James S. Baume, Judge.

Bill by James B. McCoy and others against Ella E. Fahrney and others, impleaded with John E. McCoy and others. From a decree in favor of defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

This was a bill in chancery for partition. The circuit court ruled the complainants in the bill and in the bill of interpleader had no title or interest in the premises involved, and dismissed the original bill and the bill of interpleader. The complainants in the original bill and the bill of interpleader are the children of Elizabeth McCoy, deceased, by her second husband, James B. McCoy, Sr., and the children of deceased children of said Elizabeth McCoy by her said second husband. Said Elizabeth McCoy was formerly the wife of one Samuel Ankeney. Of this former marriage two children were born, namely, Nathaniel A. and Ann Amelia Ankeney. The position of the defendants in the original bill is that the title to the premises in question vested in said children of the first marriage, from whom the defendants (appellees here) claim by conveyance and descent. The title to the land in suit was in one Nathaniel Swingley, as assignee or trustee of said Samuel Ankeney, the first husband. Whether the children of the second marriage took any in terest or title in the premises depends upon the construction of the following instrument: "This indenture, made January 21, 1834, between Samuel Ankeney, of Washington county, and state of Maryland, of one part, and Nathaniel Swingley, of same county and state, of the other part: Whereas, said Samuel Ankeney is indebted to sundry persons by judgment notes and otherwise; and whereas, he is desirous of making arrangements to

liquidate said debts, and to secure a permanent support and maintenance for the use of his wife and children: Now, this indenture witnesseth that in consideration of the premises and of the sum of five dollars said Samuel Ankeney hath bargained and sold, aliened, enfeoffed, and confirmed, and by these presents doth grant, * * * unto said Nathaniel Swingley, his heirs and assigns, all the right, interest, and estate, both at law and in equity, of him, the said Samuel Ankeney, of, in, and to a tract or portion of land situated, lying, and being in Washington county, aforesaid, of which a certain David Ankeney died seised in fee, and which land was sold to said Samuel Ankeney by a certain Henry Firey on the 27th day of October, 1822, as trustee, by virtue of a decree passed by Washington county court, as a court of equity, on the 29th day of March, 1832, in a cause pending in said court in which Samuel Ankeney and Mary Ankoney were complainants and Henry Ankeney, Sarah Ankeney, Jacob Ankeney, and David Ankeney were defendants, which, by reference to the proceedings in said cause, which is numbered on the equity docket of said court 352, will more fully and at large appear. Said tract or parcel of land hereby bargained and sold contains two hundred and twenty acres, more or less. And the said Samuel Ankeney doth by these presents further grant, bargain, and sell unto the said Nathaniel Swingley, his executors, administrators, and assigns. the following personal property, to wit: One negro man, one negro boy, one negro woman and her two children (both girls, three years old and two years old), and one negro girl, three horses, five mares, three mare cclts, all the cattle, hogs. sheep. plows, harrows, and farming utensils, all the household and kitchen furniture, and all the rest and residue of the personal property, goods, and chattels, of what nature or kind soever, said Samuel Ankeney now owns and possesses; to have and to hold the said lands and tenements, and the appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining, and also the above-mentioned negroes, cattle, or other goods and chattels, unto said Nathaniel Swingley, his heirs, executors, and administrators, to and for the uses, trust, and purposes following, and to and for no other use, intent, or purpose whatsoever; that is to say, in trust that the said Nathaniel Swingley shall sell and dispose of, at public or private sale, for cash or on credit, as in the judgment of said Nathaniel Swingley may be most expedient, all the aforesaid lands and tenements, and all the aforesaid negroes, cattle, goods, and chattels, except such portion of said negroes, goods, and chattels as the said Nathaniel Swing ey may think proper to retain for the use of said Elizabeth Ankeney during her lifetime, and convey the said lands and tenements by good and sufficient deed or deeds, and deliver possession of said negroes. goods, and chattels to the respective purchas

in view." Robinson v. Stow, 39 Ill. 568. The same principle is announced in Street v. Storage Co., 157 II. 605, 41 N. E. 1108. "Particular expressions will not control where the whole tenor or purpose of the instrument forbids a literal interpretation of the specific words." Updike v. Tompkins, 100 Ill. 406. "A rigid adherence to the letter often leads to erroneous results, and misinterprets the meaning of the parties. Inconsistent clauses must be construed according to the subjectmatter and the motive; and the intention of the parties, as gathered from the whole instrument, must prevail over the strictness of the letter." Beach, Mod. Cont. § 708. "Where two clauses, apparently repugnant, may be reconciled by any reasonable construction, or by regarding one as the qualification of the other, that construction must be given, because it cannot be assumed that the parties intended to insert inconsistent provisions." Id. § 718. "A written contract should be read as a whole. All its provisions are to be considered, and the general design must not be frustrated by allowing too much force to single words or clauses." Id. 711.

The instrument under consideration is in the nature of a postnuptial marriage contract or settlement. In marriage settlements it is the presumption that the parties thereto intend to provide for the issue of the marriage, and clear language in the deed is necessary to overcome this presumption. Wallace v. Wallace, 82 Ill. 530. In Johnson v. Webber, 65 Conn. 501, 33 Atl. 506, a bequest to a granddaughter, and in case such granddaughter should die, leaving a husband surviving, such husband should take the bequest, was construed to apply only to the then husband of the granddaughter, and not to a second husband, on the ground the manifest intent of the testator, gathered from the entire will, could not be overcome by the particular words employed. In Elliott v. Elliott, 117 Ind. 380. 20 N. E. 264, a devise of real estate to one designated in the will as the wife of the testator, though he had a former living wife from whom he had not been divorced, "with power to dispose of the same as she [the wife named in the will] may think best for herself and my children," and a bequest of personal property to the wife, "to have and use as she may think best and proper for herself and my children: provided, that in case my beloved wife, Mary Ann Elliott, should marry after my decease, then and in that case it is my will that two-thirds of all my property, both real and personal, shall descend in equal por

tions to my children," were held to be a devise and bequest to the children of the testator born of the person named in the will as his wife, to the exclusion of other children born to the testator by his lawful wife. The ground of the decision was that though ordinarily, when a man speaks of his children, he is understood to mean his legitimate children, it was plain from the context of the will, taken as a whole, and the situation and circumstances of the family and property of the testator, that he did not mean by the words "his children" to refer to his children born of his lawful wife. The intent of the testator was enforced in Gelston v. Shields, 78 N. Y. 275, though against the literal language of the will, the words "my children" being held to refer to children by the person named in his will as his wife, and not to include children born of a former wife. Thomas v. Crosby (Mass.) 51 N. E. 6, a trust deed executed by a husband and father was declared to be a family settlement, and the word "children" of the grantor was, in view of the manifest intent which animated the grantor, held to refer, not to all his children, but only to such as were born to him of his then living wife, and to the exclusion of those born to the grantor by another wife.

In

Applying these rules of interpretation, we hold the trust deed under consideration was executed for the benefit of the then living children of said Samuel Ankeney, born of his then wife, and such other children as should thereafter be born to them, and that the provision of the deed that upon the death of his said wife all of her children should share in the property affected by the trust deed meant all of her children born to him. The wife, subsequently to the execution of the deed, obtained a divorce from the grantor, and became the wife of one James B. McCoy, Sr. Children born to the wife by the second husband, though included withir. the literal meaning of the words "all her children," were clearly not intended to be included within the meaning of the word "all" as employed by the maker of the instrument. The word "all" must, in view of the manifest intention of the grantor, be so limited in meaning as to refer only to all of the class of children intended to be benefited by the instrument. The chancellor correctly decreed the bill and the bill of interpleader should be dismissed, and that decree is affirmed. Decree affirmed.

CARTWRIGHT, C. J., took no part in the decision of this case.